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Civil-Military Relations in British and Independent India. 1918-1962.
and Coup Prediction Theory
ABSnRACT
Itiis thesis e>q)lains vAy India did not experiortce a military ooiç) 
d'état from 1918 to 1962. This involves a detailed consideration of the 
coropeting, thcoÿi often complementary, theories vMch attempt to analyse 
the specific conditicms and motives that cause officers to intervene 
against their government. As no one ”cotp theory" is found definitive, 
each is deployed vhen relevant to crucial episodes in British and 
independent India's civil-military relations from 1918 to 1962, 
including the history and development of a professional officer corps, 
Indian nationalism, the Indian National Armies of World War II, the 
Transfer of Power, Ayub Khan's "Revolution", the rise of the Menon-Kaul 
nexus, and the 1962 Sino-Indian War.
Ihrou^iout, the emphasis is on the views and actions of senior retired 
Indian military officers. Ihe opinions of almost 20 such officers are 
taken from their respective published (auto-)biographies. Ihe views of 
another 108 officers (as well as a number of Indian civilians with 
experience in, or expertise at the hi^iest level of civil-military 
relations) come from one of two versions of a detailed questionnaire 
and/or comprehensive perscxial interviews.
Ihis thesis reveals that there was never any serious threat of a 
military coup in India. Some factors contributing to this phenomenon are 
inherent: the country is large, diverse, predominantly Hindu, and 
enjoyed a continuity of political leadership. Other factors are the 
result of deliberate choices by the civil-military leadership and 
include the country's stability, quality and tradition of democracy, 
relative administrative efficiency, institutionalization of diverse 
centres of power and, most importantly, the professionalism of the 
officer corps.
While this examinaticxi suggests measures available to other countries 
seeking to ensure civil supremacy-of-rule, the particular mix of factors 
îdiich contributed to India never having experienced military coup is 
unique.
— 2 —
Civil-Mjlitary Relations in British and Independent India. 1918-1962.
and Ooup Prediction Theory
13ÆUE OF OGNTElfCS
Ackncwledgements............................................5--5
List of I^les, Diagrams and Maps............................. 6— 8
Introduotion......................... ............... ......9— 22
1. Theories of Military Intervention Leading to A Ooup D'État 23— 49
I. Huntington's Conoept of Military Officers'
Professionalism.................................24— 27
II. Oompeting Military Intervention Theories.............. 27— 38
III. Causes of Changes in Military Intervention Theories.....38— 48
2. The History and Development of the Professional Indian
Military Officer During the Interwar Years.................50— 92
I. Commissioned Indian Officers.........................52— 63
II. Developing Professionalism.......................... 63— 84
III. The Indian Navy and Air Force.................. .....85— 90
3. Commissianed Indian Officers and Indian Nationalism............93-137
I. Commissioned Indian Officers and the Nationalist
Movement.......       95-114
II. Nationalist Politicians' Understanding of the Military. .114-130
III. The General Public's IMerstanding of the Military.....130-135
4. Test One: The Indian National Armies of World War II...... ...138-176
I. Indian Participaticxi in World War II  ........    .139-143
II. The Indian National Armies......................... 143-175
5. Test two: the Transfer of Power.......................... 177-214
I. The Armed Forces. ............  178-197
II. The Civil Forces.................................. 197-205
III. Civil-Military Pelatiais........................... 205-211
6. Test Three: General Ayub Khan's 1958 Pakistan '^ Revolution"....215-250
I. Civil-Military Relations in India, 1947-1957..........216-224
II. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, 1947-1958....... 224-233
III. Contrasting Experiences............................ 233-247
- 3 -
7. Test Pour: The Menon-Kaul Nexus.............   251-301
I. Menon  ...................  252-259
II. Kaul.............................................259-266
III. Politicization?...........    266-286
IV. Ooup D'État?......................................286-297
8. Test Five: The 1962 Sino-Indian War....................... 302-363
I. The "Forward Policy" .......   303-328
II. war..............................................328-344
III. Aftermath................... ....................344-361
Conclusion...  .........................................  .364-373
Appendix A 
Appendix B 
Appendix C 
^pendix D 
^apendix E 
^3pendix F
Questionnaire 1................................ 374-380
Questionnaire II  ........     381-388
Military Officer Details.........................389-390
Military Officer Interview Details......   391-391
Civilian Interview Details....................... 392-392
Table 0.1 Details...............................393-395
Select Bibliography................................  396-420
— 4 —
Civil-Military Relations in British and independent: India. 1918-1962.
and Ooup Prediction Theory
First and foremost, I wish to acknowledge the unfailing kindness and 
generosity of those commissioned Indian military officers and civilians 
vho gave their time and energy to this research. Without their 
cooperation, this thesis would not have been possible— or my research so 
enjoyable. Frustratingly, due to their position and/or the sensitive 
nature of my research, I cannot mention them by name here. However, my 
thanks are sincere and heartfelt.
Happily, I can acknowledge the deep d^ot of gratitude owed to my 
supervisor. Professor T.J. Nossiter. His guidance, encouragement, faith 
and patience with myself and my research have been infinite and 
inspirational.
I would also like to thank my uncle. Dr. Shubendu Rjndu, for his 
unflagging assistance with the questicxinaire mailings, and the Majumdar 
family of Delhi for their gracious hospitality.
The librarians at the Briti^ Library of Political and EocMTomic Science, 
the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, and the Uhiversil^ of London 
School of Oriental and African Studies also have my thanks for their 
help and assistance.
Finally, a thou^t for my parents, Arabinda and Alessandra, vAo well 
know hew much this research has cost them. Grazie mille!
— 5 —
Civil-Military Relations in British and Independent Tndia. 1918-1962.
and Coup Prediction Theory
LIST OF TABLES, DIAGRAMS AND MAPS
Table* Title Page
0.1: Which of the following factors have contributed to
Indian ever having experienced a military coup............. 17
FT 2.1: Indian Officer Candidates in the first 18 RMC courses 
(1919-25) by area, area's percentage of national 
population (1921), and ratios.  .........   57-58
FT 2.2: Officer candidates in the first ten IMA regular courses 
(1932-36) by area, area's percentage of naticxial 
population (1931), and ratios............................ 62
2.1: What was the attitude of Indian officers towards 
British officers and vice-versa in
the pre-independent Indian Army?......................... 75
2.2: The academy origins of army commanders in the major
military conflicts of independent India...... ............ 91
3.1: Were you yourself, any family members, and/or close
friends personally active in the independence movement?..... 101
3.2: Why did you join the military?.....     104
3.3: What was your father's oocu^tion?...................... 104
3.4: What was the generally perceived status of a military
career when you joined?..........   108
3.5: Did your career choice meet with your family's
approval?.............................................109
3.6: What was the attitude of Indian officers towards the
nationalist movement and its leaders?.................... 110
FT 3.1: Outside of the nationalist movement, have you and/or
any members of your family ever been involved in
politics and/or stood for political office?............... 113
FT 3.2: How often have you voted in national elections?........... 114
3.7: What was the attitude of nationalist politicians
towards the pre-independence Indian Army?.................127
—  6 —
3.8: What was the oommon man's attitude tcwards the
pre-independence Indian Array?............................ 132
4.1: IXtring WWII, vhat was the attitude of Indian officers
towards tho:% vho joined the Indian national armies?........167
FT 5.1: The shortage of experienced coraraissioned Indian
Array officers at independence........................... 184
5.1: Did the break-up of the British-led Indian armed 
forces into the separate forces of India and 
Pakistan affect you personally?......................... 186
5.2: Did the break-iç) of the Briti^-led Indian armed forces 
into the separate forces of India and Pakistan affect 
the professionalism of the new Indian armed forces?.........188
5.3: Were the armed forces properly prepared for
independence?.  ............   195
5.4: Was the political leadership properly prepared for
independence?......................   .199
FT 5.2: Ratio of Indian to Briti^ ICS Officers (1909-1947)........ 202
5.5: Was the civil service was properly prepared for
independence?....................   204
5.6: Were/Was the armed forces/political leadership/civil
service prc^ jerly prepared for independence?............... 213
FT 6.1: What was the attitude of the central government 
towards the armed forces in the first decade of 
independence?.................................  219
6.1: What was the attitude of the political leadership/ 
senior civil service towards the armed forces in 
the first decade of independence?........................220
6.2: What were your feelings on Ayub Khan's '^ Revolution"?. ..... 229
6.3: A breakdown of Table 0.1's sixth-place choice,
"(C) Dominant Hindu culture inherently against
military rule", by respondents' religion............ .241
6.4: Did civilians/military officers feel the Indian 
armed forces should follow the example of
Ayub Khan's Revolution?................................ 246
7.1: What were your initial feelings on Msnon's
appointment as Defence Minister?  .................. 254
7.2: Khat was your opinion of Lieut-General Kaul before the
Autumn of 1962?............     264
— 7 —
7.3: Did Menon politicize the military?....................... 279
7.4: Were you affected by political favouritism during
Menon's tenure as Defence Minister?. ......    ..284
8.1: What was your opinion of the Forward Policy?............... 326
8.2: Which factors acquitted themselves worst in the
1962 Sino-Indian War?. .......   340
8.3: In the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, vhat 
was the attitude of field officers towards the 
political leadership?.................................. 347
8.4: m  the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, vhat 
was the attitude of the public towards the
political leadership?.................................. 349
8.5: In the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, lAat 
was the attitude of field officers/the public 
towards the political leadership?........................ 350
8.6: In the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, vhat
was the public's attitude towards the military?.......   351
8.7: In the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, vhat 
was the attitude of field officers towards the 
military leadership?.....................  353
8.8: In the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, \ihat 
was the political leadership's attitude towards 
the military?....................................   354
8.9: In the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, did 
civilians/military officers feel the armed forces 
should move against the government?..........   360
Diagram Title Page
5.1: The Defence Hierarchy in India, 1938 and 1949...........209A-B
Title Page
8.1: The Northern Borders.................................. 304A
8.2: The North East Frontier Agency (NEEA)................... 305A
8.3: The 'Forward Policy' in Ladakh......................... 316A
8.4: NEEA: The Thagla Ridge................................ 317A
8.5: NEEA: The Indian Retreat...............................328A
FT denotes a Thble in the footnotes.
- 8 -
Civil-Military Relations in British and Independent India. 1918-1962.
and Coup Prediction Theory
IMIBODÜCTICN
\
The crucial issue in any country's civil-military relations is not 
Wiether the armed forces will influence political decision-making— the 
state is ultimately a body of armed men— but to Wiat degree and in Wiat 
ways. A "normal" civil-military relationship has formal and informal 
boundaries between political and military roles accepted by both 
civilians and armed forces' officers.^  Officers are free to lobby their 
political masters over such items as the military's budget allocation, 
recruitment, pay rates, perquisites, weapons procurement and the like, 
so long as this pressure is carried out within regular channels, using 
mutually accepted codes-of-conduct. Where such boundaries are disdained 
or ignored, the civil-military relationship is ruptured, and with it the 
acceptance of civilian control over the military. In the worst-case 
scenario familiar in developing countries, officers' dissatisfaction 
moves them forcibly to overthrow the government.
Despite recent hopes that the fall of the Berlin wall signalled the 
glc±al ascendancy of democracy,^  the military coup d'état— the sudden 
and illegal replacement of a country's legitimate government throu^ the 
use or threat of violence by a small group of conspirators drawn from 
within the armed forces— continues to be endemic in the third world.^
 ^ C.E. Welch, Jr. "Civilian Control of the Military: Myth and Reality" 
in Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing 
Countries, ed. C.E. Welch, Jr. (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1976), p. 2.
 ^R. Dcwden, "Coups bli^t Africa reform". Independent on Sunday, 24 
October 1993.
 ^ Coups do not necessarily include military elements. Paramilitary
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Estimates vary, but since India's independence in 1947, there have been 
well over 100 successful military coiçs throu^out the world (with 
perhaps an equal number of failures) / Armed forces have removed regimes 
in geographically large and populous nations and in geographically small 
and underpopulated ones; in multi-ethnic, seemingly sophisticated and 
modernized countries as well as their opposite; in ex-British, French, 
Belgian, IXitch and Spanish colonies, and in nations with no colonial 
past; soon after indepaidence yet also after years of civilian self- 
rule. In justification, cotç) executors have promised all types of 
action, from sweeping socioeconomic reforms to radical retrenchment of
groups, armed irregulars and even civilians may overthrow the 
government. Hcwever, due to the military's primacy in weaponry, such a 
configuration of ooup-plotters must have the means to immobilise or at 
least successfully confront the armed forces and any other of the 
regime's security forces. Furthermore, the military's other capabilities 
such as those of secrecy and speed of internal communications mean that 
their personnel almost invariably make up at least a portion of the coup 
conspiracy. Because coups vhich do not include any armed forces' 
elements make iç> such a tiny number of examples, all references to coups 
belcw will assume military participation unless otherwise noted. See 
R.H.T. O'Kane, The T.ikelihood of Coups (Aldershot: Avebury, 1987), p.
22; and R. First, The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the 
OouD D'État (London: Allei Lane The Penguin Press, 1970), p. 19.
* A definitive number of ootps worldwide is difficult, especially in the 
case of unsuccessful attempts. O'Kane counts 134 successful coups in 67 
countries from 1950 to 1985. S.R. David writes that "it is generally 
agreed that since World War II there have been more than one hundred 
successful coups and about as many unsuccessful attempts". W.R. Thonpson 
notes 274 attempted coups in 59 states between 1946 and 1970. Of these, 
122 are classified as "successful", 19 as "compromise", and 132 as 
"unsuccessful". (NOTE: the total of successful, compromise and 
unsuccessful coups is one short of the 274 mentioned earlier due to 
Thompson's discrepancy in numbering coup attempts in Haiti at seven on 
p. 7 and six on p. 68.) In 1991, the World Bank reported that "Since 
1948, there has been at least one coup attempt per developing country 
every five years". See S.R. David, Defending Third ^ rld Regimes from 
Ooups D'État (Lanham, Md. : Uhiversity Press of America, 1985), p. 4; 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Develqpænt/THE WORLD BANK, 
World Development Report 1991 The challenge of Development (Oxford: 
Oxford diversity Press, 1991), p. 128; O'Kane, cp.cit., pp. 3, 141-144; 
and W.R. Thompson, The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers (Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 7 , 53, 68-70.
- 10-
conservative rule, but almost always promising to end the comçjtian of
the previous regime, t^ xsn removing a government, officers have installed
regimes vMch include only themselves as the new rulers, a mix of
themselves, other military personnel and/or civilians drawn from outside
and/or inside the previous regime, or have refused to assume office.®
Hie proliferation and diversity of military cotçs, and the
unpredictability of their subsequent regimes' programmes has led some
scholars to call for an end to attempts to systemize— and thus predict—
instances of armed forces' intervention. For R.D. McKinlay and Â.S.
Cohan, "the performance of a regime rather than its origins...is of
greater significance".® M.D. Feld questicms vhether plural societies can
ever achieve a stable civil-military relationship:
Since the military policy of a secular society has as its 
objective the creation of an apolitical armed force and the 
social policy of the professional soldier has as its objective 
the creation of an apolitical society, sustadned and equal 
partnership between the two is impossible.^
Faced with the apparent inevitability of armed forces' och d^s occurring
and recurring without predictable causes, many commentators choose to
study the more concrete manifestations of a military regime's
performance rather than the factors vhich led officers to assume power,
This thesis, however, concerns India, a country which has
experienced neither a military regime nor an unsuccessful coup. Given
the global proliferation of forcible armed forces' interventions against
governments, vhat factors have contributed to this remarkable state of
® O'Kane, op.cit., pp. 141-144.
* R.D. McKinlay and A.S. Oohan, "A Comparative Analysis of the Political 
and Economic Performance of Military and Civilian Regimes: A Cross- 
National Aggregate Study", Comparative Politics 8:1 October 1975, p. 1.
’ M.D. Feld, "Professionalism, Nationalism and the Alienation of the 
Military**, in Armed Forces and Society Sociological Essavs. ed. J. Van 
Doom (Ihe Hague: Mouton & Co. N.V., 1968), p. 68.
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affairs? Moreover, does one structure an examination of \diat is, in 
effect, (^ ^non-ev^]t2-^
In almost any analysis of national civil-military relations and the 
factors influencing the (im)probability of a cou ,^ much depends on 
understanding the country's military officers. It is their perception of 
their role in society and their view of national events which ultimately 
decide \diether or not the armed forces will remain in their barracks or 
overthrew the government. Gh^iber Cne of this thesis therefore begins 
with an examination of the nature of military professionalism, 
concentrating on Samuel Huntington's seminal 1957 study of dajective 
versus subjective professionalism as the distinctive quality of 
commissioned armed forces' officers and their relations with their 
civilian rulers.® Ihis is followed by an analysis of competing coup 
prediction, or military intervention theories. Using as a partial guide 
David Horowitz's division, these are organized into four, almost 
exclusive groups vdiich may be summarized according to their respective 
views that a governmæt is forcibly overthrown because officers are (1) 
ideally qualified citizens altruistically motivated to help their 
country's floundering attempts at modernization, (2) political actors 
seeking to maximize their power in fluid polities, (3) reacting to 
threats to their perceived corporate self-interest, and (4) fulfilling 
their personal and/or clientelist ambitions with little regard for the 
consequences.® Finding insufficient quantitative or qualitative reascxis
® S. Huntington, Ihe Soldier and the State: Ihe Iheorv and Politics of 
Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Ihe Belkap Press of Harvard 
Ifiiiversity Press, 1957).
® D. Horowitz Coup Iheories and Officers' Motives; Sri Lanka in a 
Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton Oiiversity Press, 1980), 
pp. 3-15.
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for favouring one theory over any of its rivals, Chapter One concludes 
with the decision to deploy all four where relevant in the examination 
of the factors behind India never having ejqjerienced a military cou .^
To help determine the relevance of particular personal, corporate, 
societal and/or international factors for India never having experienced 
a military coup, this thesis deploys the recorded opinions of the 
potential executors of any such action; senior Indian armed forces' 
officers themselves. One group, numbering almost 20, consists of those 
having published an (auto-)biographical work and includes General K.S. 
Thimayya, Admiral K.D. Katari and Air Chief Marshal P.O. LelL.^ “ Ihe 
other comprises 108 senior retired officers from all three defence 
services, including 24 Lieut.-Generals, 2 Admirals and 3 Air Chief 
Marshals (vhose identities are known only to nyself and to the thesis 
examiners provided with a Key. ) Ihese officers' respective views on a 
wide variety of issues conceming Indian civil-military relations are
 ^“ Ihese works include M.R.A. Baig, In Different Saddles (Bombay: Asia 
Publishing House, 1967); General J.N. Chaudhuri, General J.N. Chaudhuri: 
An AutcÆtiocnraphy. As narrated to B.K. Narayan (New Delhi: Vikas 
Publishing House, 1978); H. Evans, Ihimayya of India (Dehra Dun: Natraj 
Publishers, 1988. First published at New York: Haroourt, Bruce & Go, 
1960); Admiral K.D. Katari, A Sailor Remembers (New Delhi: Vikas 
Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1982); Lt General B.M. Kaul, Ihe Iftitold Story 
(Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1967); M.A. Khan, Friends Not Masters: A 
Political Autx±>ioaraphy (Lcndon: Oxford IMiversity Press, 1967); Air 
Chief Marshal P.C. Lai, My Years with the lAF Ed. Ela Lai (New Delhi: 
Lancer International, 1986); I.M. Muthanna, General Cariap^; Ihe First 
Indian Oommander-in-Chief (Mysore City: Usha Press, 1964); Air Vice 
Marshal Harjinder Sin^, Birth of An Air Force; Ihe Memoirs of Air vice 
Marshal Hariinder Sinch. Ed. Air Commodore A.L. Saigal (New Delhi: Palit 
& Palit, 1977); General Mohan Sin^, Leaves From Mv Diary (Lahore: Free- 
World Publications, 1946); Brigadier Sukhwant Sin^, Ihree Decades of 
Indian Army Life (Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1967); Lieut.-General D.R. 
Ihapar, Ihe Morale Builders: Forty Years with the Military Medical 
Services of India (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965); Lieut.-General
S.P.P. Ihorat, Frcrni Reveille To Retreat (New Delhi: Allied Publishers 
Private Limited, 1986); and Lieut.-General S.D. Verma, To Serve with 
Honour; My Memoirs (Dehradun; Natraj Publishers, 1988).
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taken frcm one of two very similar versions of a detailed questionnaire 
distributed in 1988 and 1989 (see ^ pendixes A and B), and/or 
COTprehensive personal interviews conducted by myself in 1986-7 and 1989 
(see Appendixes C and D). Opinions expressed in complementary interviews 
of a number of Indian civilians with experience in, or expertise at the 
hi^iest level of the country's civil-military relations as expressed in 
personal interviews are also employed (see ^ pendix E). Ihrouÿiout the 
thesis, the names are used only of those officers and civilians vlho have 
published their record of events; otherwise only the rank/title and key 
number of individuals appear.
This reliance on written records and oral interviews has both
dravtecks and advantages. Major-General D.K. Palit, author of the recent
War in Hicgi Himalaya; The Indian Army in Crisis. 1962. perhaps the
definitive memoirs/book on the Indian civil-military decision-making
hierarchy during the Sino-Indian War,^  ^ acknowledges that
Time has drawbacks...A memoir [sic] is a subjective record, a 
mix of fact and opinion, and time can play tricks with opinions.
It is one thing to form an objective judgement with the 
advantage of hindsi^t; it is quite another to allow the years 
to blur the difference between opinion and held then and 
opinions held ncw.“
In his Introduction to India's Political Administrators 1919-1983. David
Potter recognizes further disadvantages of works written after the fact:
Powers of memory decline as one gets older.. .There is a tendency 
to exaggerate the importance of one's own career, to emphasize 
successes and play down or bury failures. In addition, certain
 ^^ See my review of D.K. Palit, War in Hicdi Himalaya: The Indian Army in 
Crisis. 1962 (London: C. Hurst, 1991) in Journal of Asian Studies (Ann 
Arbor) February 1994, pp. 261-263.
 ^^ Moreover, Palit has "on occasion cauÿit myself subconsciously 
assuming that an opinion I now is one that I held thirty years ago. To 
allow that impression to remain would be patently dishonest and I have 
meticulously endeavoured to avoid that pitfall". See Palit, op.cit., p. 
ix.
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types of people are far less likely to write reminiscences, the 
disreputable, for exanple.“
While the above criticisms of relying on records written after the fact
also may be applied to oral interviews undertaken subsequent to events,
there are undoubted advantages to using such materials. For Palit,
Distance in time has the virtue that viev^int distortions of 
contemporary events can be strai^tened out as they acquire 
perspective, and as emotion and prejudice recede. The passage of 
years also makes available others' views and opiniŒis vhich help 
to modulate subjective judgements formed under the stress of 
immediate reactions.^ *
Potter, too, argues that "autobiographical materials, if used with care,
do provide a most useful supplément to other forms of evidence".^ ®
Bearing in mind the advantages and disadvantages stated above, this
thesis justifies its heavy reliance cm (auto-)biogrephical works,
questionnaire responses and oral interviews written and/or undertaken
after the events in question in a number of ways. Firstly, as Potter
explains, "obvious whitewashes are not difficult to spot";^ ® especially
vhen, as in this case, there are a large number of contemporary
accounts— (auto-)biographies, questionnaires and oral interviews—
available for cross-checking. (Of course, the thesis also makes full use
of second-hand vrorks by political scientists and historians to give
perspective to the above accounts.) Secondly, these records are very
detailed: the officers' (auto-)biographical books are vrorks of some
substance; the tvro versions of the questionnaire are very detailed
(having 57 and 55 questions, respectively); the oral interviews lasted
over two hours on average. Thirdly, officers answering the questionraire
“  D.C. Potter, India's Political Administrators 1919-1983 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 16.
Palit, op.cit., p. ix.
Potter, op.cit., p. 16. 
ibid., p. 16.
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and/or interviewed were chosen randcanly from various official and 
unofficial sources.^’ (Hie Government of India does not release a 
systematic list of the names and addresses of armed forces officers, 
serving or retired.) Fourthly, the hi^ response rate of 96 completed 
questionnaires out of 412 mailed out indicates the inclusion 
of a wide mix of officers. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the 
over 20 (auto-)biographical books, 96 questionnaire responses, and 44 
interviewees (officers and civilians) form a unique insist into Indian 
civil-military relations. Ihese men were either the ultimate guarantors 
or executioners of civil stpremacy-of-rule in India. See Table 0.1.
Iftitil now, no work has been able to tap the chinions of such usually 
extremely reticent sources on such sensitive topics.
While commissioned officers of independent India's armed forces have 
had to overcome challenges uniquely their own, their professional 
standards and understanding of their role vis-a-vis the civilian 
government has most directly been shaped by British military traditions. 
CtiE^ pber IWo examines the history and development of commissioned Indian 
officers during the interwar years, emphasising the nature of their 
professional role and responsibilities from the 1918 admission of Indian 
Gentleman Cadets to the Royal Military College (RMC), Sandhurst, throuc^
See S.P. Baranwal, ed. and comp.. Military Yearbook (New Delhi: Guide 
Publications, 1965-) ; India and Pakistan Year Book Inc3ud1ng Who's Who. 
1948-1953 (Bombay: Times of India, 1948-1953); India Who's Who (New 
Delhi: Inf a Publications, 1969-); Indian Year Book And Who's Who^ 1931- 
1947 (Bombay: Times of India, 1931-1947); S. Sarkar, ed., Hindustan Year 
Book and Who's Who, 1992 (Calcutta: M.C. Sarkar & Sons Private Ltd, 
1992); Jaswant Sin^, ed. and comp., Indian Armed Forces Yearbook 
(Bombay: n.p., 1964-); Times of India Directory and Year Book Including 
Who's Who. 1954- (Bombay: Times of India, 1954-); Ihe Military Year 
Book, 1974- (Government of India Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting, 1974-). I am indebted to Lieut.-Ceneral Dr. M.L. Chibber 
for access to his unpublished list of officers' names and addresses.
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TABLE 0.1
Which of the follcwing factors have contributed to India 
never having experienced a military coup?
Ranked by the questionnaire respondents in order of importance.
1st: Professionalism of armed forces (M).
2nd: Diversity of peoples, cultures, languages (B).
3rd: Initial political stability, quality, and/or democratic rule 
(G).
4th: Nationally representative military personnel (J).
5th: Sheer size of India (N).
6th: Dominant Hindu culture inherently against military rule (C). 
7th: Widely-held belief in democracy (O).
Joint 8th; Wisdom and stature of naticxial leaders (P).
Administrative efficiency (A).
Political awareness of masses (K).
Joint 11th: 40-year old habit of democracy (E).
institutionalization of diverse centres of power (H). 
Logistics unfavourable: five regional army commands, troops 
dispersed naticaially, etc. (I).
Joint 14th: Independence struggle's non-violent nature (F).
Exaiiple of ineffectiveness of military rule in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh (D).
16th: Other (Q).
17th: Political unawareness of masses (L).
Rankings are from votes cast by the 69 respondents of Questionnaire II. 
Letters in parentheses refer to the original alphabetical order of the 
list as appearing on Questionnaire H. See ^ ppenàjx F for details.
the 1932 c^ )ening of the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehra Dun, to the 
eve of World War II. It reveals that, despite a multitude of formal and 
informal challenges— the trials of Sandhurst, the racist "Indianization" 
experiment, the prejudice of British officers and polite society, 
discrimination visited by Indian RMC graduates vçon their IMA comrades—  
commissioned Indian officers mastered professionalism's demands of 
e)q)ertise in "the management of violex%"^ " and sense of organisational
H. Lasswell, "The Garrison-State Hypothesis Today", as used in S. 
Huntington, Chancdna Patterns of Military Politics (New York: Tbe Free 
Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962), p. 51. See also Lasswell, "Ihe Garriscxi 
State", American Journal of Sociology 46:4 January 1941, pp. 455-458.
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corporateness. What remained to be seen was vAiether these officers, 
chosen for their loyalty to the Raj and trained to be full members of 
the ruling elite, w>uld be able to transfer their professionai sense of 
responsibility to the rulers of independent India.
A strong indication of commissioned Indian officers^ future sense of 
professional responsibility may be seen from their pre-independence 
views of, and relationship with the Indian nationalist movement and its 
leaders. Would military izzat continue to shield Indian officers from 
the greater political landscape of the subcontinent— perhaps poisoning 
civil-military relations in independent India— or would the struggle for 
independence cause their professional responsibility to shift from the 
King Bnoperor to nationalist politicians— with potentially disastrous 
results for military discipline and effectiveness? Chs^ iber Ihree shews 
the nationalist movement had little effect on the loyalty and discipline 
of commissioned Indian officers, débité some having had first-hand 
experience in nationalist activities before joining the armed forces. 
This non-involvement was due to a number of factors including: Indian 
officers' desire to prove their professional competence once 
commissioned, the military's strict internal discipline of 
apoliticality, most nationalist leaders' (and the public's) indiffermce 
to military matters, and the unique non-violent nature of the 
independence movement. The almost total exclusion of the military in the 
nationalist struggle meant there was no mystification of the soldier as 
hero. When independence came, no military man would be in a position to 
challenge the ri^t-to-rule of those naticxialist leaders vho became 
India's democratically elected representatives.
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CSi^ iter Pour explores the notable exception to ccanmissioned Indian 
officers' non-involvement in the independence movement; the formation of 
various Indian "national" armies to combat the Raj. Althouf^ these 
forces proved no match for the Allies in ccaribat, their mere existence 
and raison d'etre gave rise to fears for the loyalty of the British-led 
Indian armed forces' overwhelmingly Indian personnel. Such concerns were 
misplaced. Although some tens of thousands of Indian PoWs, including the 
great majority of Japanese-held commissioned Indian officers, did switch 
their allegiance, almost as many chose to endure the harsh regime of 
Axis prison cairps. More importantly, those Indian soldiers and 
commissioned officers on active duty remained loyal to the Raj, 
believing their wartime allegiance and efforts would be rewarded by 
independence. Ihis belief also quieted post-war qualms about vhat to do 
with those vho had joined the various Indian national armies. So long as 
this "clique" of ostaisibly politicized men v^ ere not allowed back into 
the armed forces— and they v?ere not— even commissioned Indian officers 
could agree vjith the public and naticmlist politicians that such men 
had been true, if misguided, Indian patriots.
After the test of the Indian national armies came the challenge of 
independence. Chapter Five shows hew commissioned Indian officers' 
constant belief in the quality of their professional expertise and 
corporateness enabled them successfully to conquer immediate post-war 
strikes and mutinies, the division of the armed forces between India and 
Pakistan, the departure of British military personnel, and immediate 
actions in Punjab, Junagadh, Hyderabad, and Jammu & Kashmir. Although 
many officers felt their efforts v#ent unappreciated by the Indian 
political and administrative elite, they remained confident in the
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latters' ability to manage the difficult transition of independence.
Ihis faith in the ability of the country's new political and 
bureaucratic elite to govern effectively after independence allowed 
officers to transfer their professional responsibility smoothly from the 
British Raj to independent India's new civilian rulers.
What if the political leadership failed to live \jp to officers' hi^ 
expectations? Chuter Six shews Indian officers to have perceived the 
first decade of independence as one of governmental neglect of the 
military. Mi^t they copy the example of their former comrade. General 
Ayub Khan, who justified his 1958 takeover of Pakistan's government by 
saying the civilian leadership had mismanaged the country? No; for any 
number of reasons. Firstly, despite his disinterest in the armed forces, 
Ndiru ccaitinued to respect their corporate sphere of decisicxi-making and 
adequately reward their personnel. Officers also understood that wider 
societal demands on the government budget were si$}erior to their own 
corporate needs. Moreover, unlike in Pakistan (and most other countries 
e>q)eriencing military coups), a long-standing mutual antipathy inhibited 
Indian officers and administrators from forming the "military- 
bureaucratic coalitions" essential to governing in place of civilian 
politicians.^ ® Other factors— India's initial political quality and 
stability, its (arguable) national culture of Hinduism, and Indian and 
Pakistani officers' ccxitrasting referenoe-group identification 
experiences— further distanced Indian officers from follcwing the 
example of their former comrades.
®^ R.E.Dowse, "The Military and Political Development" in ed. C.Leys 
Politics and Change in Developing Countries Studies in the Theory and 
Practice of Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 
pp. 228-232.
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Ihe time of greatest civil-military conflict in India began in the 
late 1950s with the rise of Krishna Menon and Lieut.-General B.M. Kaul 
to the top rank of the defence establishment. Ch^^ber Seven examines how 
these sL^ iremely arrogant/ambitious individuals, alone and in tandem, 
used their administrative skills and close personal relationship with 
Nehru to bypass the established civil-military decision-making 
hierarchy, play favourites and upset colleagues to the point of being 
c^ )enly charged with politicising the armed forces. Did a Mencxi-Kaul 
nexus split the officer corps into pro- and antHfenon-Kaul factions?
Was there a danger that either bloc mi^t intervene against the civilian 
government to ensure the furtherance of its respective interests? No; 
despite undoubted rancour in the armed forces and their sterling 
performances abroad and at home, officers' non-participation in the 
independence struggle continued to limit public respect for them as 
agents for positive change— especially vhen compared to the towering 
authority and peculiarity of Nehru, Moreover, the nature, if not extent, 
of the Menon-Kaul nexus' disregard for India's formal civil-military 
decision-making process was not without precedent. Also, however 
disgruntled, RMC and IMA graduates ccaitinued to adhere to the notion of 
a professionalism based on perfecting "management of violence" skills at 
the expense of political awareness and/or activity. Most importantly. 
Congress, thoL#i now tarnished with the failures inevitable to 
governing, continued to demcaistrate its pccwlarity at the polls.
If civil supremacy-of-rule in India was ever under threat, it was 
vhen (defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War for the first time called into 
(question the competence of the civilian government. Cti^her Eight 
exposes the shambolic nature of Indian civil-military (3ecision-making
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before and during the war. It reveals how the anny's field officers, 
that strata of any officer corps most likely to instigate a coup, held 
highly negative postwar attitudes towards both the political and 
military leadership, and perceived the public to be sympathetic towards 
the military and resentful of the political leadership. Despite this 
confluence of attitudes, remarkably few officers recall talk of moving 
against the government. This reticence was mainly because the government 
addressed field officers' grievances: respected commanders replaced 
disgraced senior officers; politicians embraced the armed forces as an 
integral part of national defence [sic]; the civil-military hierarchy 
was modified to include the opinions of senior officers and their staff; 
and the nation focused on external vigilance, not internal revolution.
In time, the army also admitted to some responsibility for meeting the 
enemy with insufficient conviction. Most crucial to continued civil 
siç>remacy-of-rule in India was the removal from the administration of 
Defence Minister Menon, perceived by both field officers— and the 
public— as the chief culprit of the defeat. With him, Nehru had been 
seen as part of the problem; without him, the PM could remain as the 
legitimate and uncontested leader of a civilian administration.
Never having had a military coup does not make India unique among 
developing countries. If, as is obvious, negative instances shed li^t 
on positive ones, then this examination of the non-event of a cou^ may 
serve as a guide, not only to the working relationships between officer, 
politician and administrator in India, but also to a general theory of 
the conditions vrtiich preclude military intervention in politics.
( "
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CHAPTER 1
theories of Military Intervention leading to A Ooup D'État
Introduction
How best to understanding the factors encouraging or inhibiting an 
armed forces' coiç>? Ihis chapter begins with Huntington's understanding 
of civilian control of the military as exercised throu^ the 
professicxialization of oommissioned officers. The four main strands of 
competing ootp prediction theory are then examined in turn, before 
considering hew and vhy each in turn displaced the previous one. Which 
theory should guide this thesis' investigation into the factors behind 
India never having experienced a military coup?
I. Huntington's Concept of Military Officers' Professionalism
Complaining that the study of civil-military relations "suffered 
from too little theorizing"/ Samuel Huntington set out the first 
specific theory of hew a society can best ensure ultimate civilian 
control of its military officers and thus armed forces. He proposed two 
basic methods of civilian control; subjective and cA)jective.’
Subjective civilian control means minimizing internal military power 
by maximizing the power of governmental instituticxis, social classes, 
and/or definite constitutionsd forms. When armed forces' officers 
display loyalty and respect for the legitimate direction of a particular 
civilian governmental institution— the President, Congress, or
 ^Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. vii. 
 ^ ibid., pp. 80-5.
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Parliament— civilian control should be assured. Similarly, iiAen officers 
identify with the particular social class viiich makes or holds sway 
over the ruling civilian regime, their subservience should follow. 
Finally, vhen officers accept the constitutional form— democratic or 
totalitarian— of the civilian government a shared ideology and mutually 
accepted methods of civil-military interacticai should combine to ensure 
ultimate civilian supremacy.
Yet, as Huntington points out, all three methods of subjective 
civilian ccaitrol are imperfect. Since ruling governmental institutions 
are more concerned with the distribution of executive versus legislative 
power than divisions of civil and military authority, the armed forces 
may attain too much influence. Iftiresolved or highly contentious conflict 
between social classes and/or grot^ as to vAo can be said to be more 
closely identified with officers and therefore more completely in 
control of them also may allow the military to escape secure government 
control. NOr can specific constitutional forms guarantee civil 
SL^ ]remacy: the mutual interests and goals of a democracy and its armed 
forces may allow the latter to became all too closely intertwined with 
the direction and implementation of policy, especially during wartime, 
vdiile a totalitarian regime's method of controlling the military throu^ 
"terror, conspiracy, surveillance, and force"^  is hi^ily precarious.
In attempting to have officers identify with its own character 
and/or objectives, the state seeks to create a military in its o%m 
image; a "mirror",* as it were. Ihe fragility of subjective civilian
 ^ ibid., p. 82.
* ibid., p. 83.
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control is that the military may tire of the ruling regime's "face" and
seek to exchange it for one more to its own liking.
For Huntington, a more reliable means of ensuring civilian control 
over the armed forces is to maximize officers' military professionalism 
and its three significant characteristics of expertise, responsibility 
and corporateness coranon to all professional occupations. Like modern- 
day medical doctors or lawyers, the armed forces' officer is "an expert 
with specialized knowledge and skill in a significant field of (
endeavour".® That this esqpertise in what Harold Lasswell calls the 
"management of violence"® is both measurable by "objective standards of 
professional competence"" and unique enables society to judge an 
officer's competence v^le allowing him to be the sole provider of a 
service essential to its continued success. As the professional military 
officer's one and only client, society also imposes a two-fold 
responsibility upon his expertise: it may be used only at the discretion 
of the society's legitimate rulers; v^le any unauthorized or freelance 
deployment of his service will banish the officer from the ranks of his 
profession. Professional corparateness, that quality which allows 
members of a profession to "share a sense of organic unity and 
consciousness of themselves as a group apart"® from the rest of society 
imposes further restrictions as to preserve his separateness an officer 
will refrain from attempts to exercise his expertise in areas unsuited 
to its applicatiCTi for fear that professionals claiming e>q)ertise in 
other fields mi^t try to influence his own.
® ibid., p. 8.
® Lasswell, "The Garrison-State Hypothesis Today", p. 51. See also 
Lasswell, "The Garrison State", pp. 455-458.
" Huntington, Ihe Soldier and the State, p. 8.
® ibid., p. 10.
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For Huntington, maximizing objective civilian control ensures 
ultimate civilian authority by separating the military officer from 
society. Free to exercise his expertise in his own sphere of influence, 
yet always "ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian groiç) vAiich 
secures legitimate authority within the state",® the professional armed 
forces' officer is a "tool" of government.^ ®
II. Corapeting Military Intervention Theories
II.À. The "Pull" of Modernization Failures
Althou^ Huntington bases his conception of professional military 
officers on his analysis of the history of Western militarism, the 
"first" group of coup theorists are quick to base their predictive 
pattern of third world civil-military relations on an idealized 
conception of these states' armed forces and their officers.^  ^ They 
believe third world militaries, as usually the oldest and most 
Westernized institution in their respective countries, will seek to 
continue to evolve along modem, developed-country lines of professional 
efficiency and quality: recruiting the best and bri^test regardless of
® ibid., p. 84. 
ibid., p. 83.
See Horowitz Ooup Theories and Officers^ Motives, pp. 3-15, For the 
first set of ootp prediction theorists see H. Daadler, The Role of the 
Military in Emerging Oountries (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1962); W. 
Gutteridge, Military Institutions and Power in the New States (London: 
Pall Mall Press, 1964); M. Halpem, The Politics of Change in the Middle 
East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); M. 
Lissak, "Modernization and Role-Expansion of the Military in Develc^ing 
Countries: A Comparative Analysis", Conoparative Studies in Society and 
History 9:3 April 1967; L. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political 
Modernisation", and E. Shils, "The Military in the Political Development 
of the New States", in The Role of the Military in tfrtderdeveloped 
Countries, ed. J.J. Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1962).
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race, religion, regional and/or socioeconomic background; basing 
promotions and assignments on merit; and teaching their personnel 
loyalty to the naticm^s legitimate political rulers rather than to 
traditional sources of authority. Since the nature of their profession 
necessitates planning for all contingencies, officers themselves will be 
forward-looking, eager to leam the latest technical and managerial 
skills. For the first group of coup prediction theorists the third world 
professional military officer is a model citizen: intelligent, 
qualified, dedicated, skilled, not bdiolden to traditiŒial prejudices, 
and concerned with the welfare of his society.
Such citizens are greatly needed in third world states characterized 
by this first set of military intervention theorists as suffering from 
disjointed attenpts to rapidlÿ achieve Western **modemity”.^ * Imitating 
Western development patterns entails abandoning traditional sources of 
identity, influence and power, inevitably causing massive social 
displacement. Newly formed, inexperienced, inefficient, and/or 
numerically insufficient political and administrative civilian elites 
and their institutions, as well as economic infrastructures, cannot 
cope with unrealistic expectaticms raised by the eiphoria of 
independence. Self-government also rapidly expands available political 
and bureaucratic offices which, combined with the society's 
impoverishment, create considerable scope for oomption and abuse. 
Disillusionment with the civilian leadership may be exacerbated further 
by foreign policy complications as new states make their début on a
 ^^ Shils defines this as "dynamic, concerned with the public, democratic 
and egalitarian, scientific, economically advanced, sovereign, and 
influential". See ibid., p. 9.
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world stage replete with regional and global oomparison pressures, and 
exposure to siçjerpower rivalries and intrigues.
The first set argue that, against the backdrop of a developing 
society's disjointed attempts to itodemize, military officers do not so 
much choose to enter the political arena as they are "pulled"^  ^ into it 
by the void created by political and administrative leadership failures. 
Seeking to emulate Western armed forces makes officers well aware of the 
achievements of developed societies, ihey see the slow, disorderly and 
often corrupt modernization efforts of their own country's civilian 
elites as a ''major weakness in national defence and a serious blot on 
its international prestige".^^  As "guardians of the nation"^ military 
officers cannot stand idly by while their country flounders on the path 
to modernization for lack of civilian leadership and/or oorrtçtian. They 
perceive themselves and their institution as the only body possessing 
the necessary capabilities to better the situation.
The first set also perceives officers as enjoying siçjeriority in the 
means to forcibly assume power. Most obvious is the armed forces' near 
monopoly of weapons in society. Thou^ oon^iracies may be formed 
without a single regular military officer, such occasions are rare since 
to ensure success such a group would first have had to neutralize the 
various branches of the armed forces as well as other governmental 
security services. Hi^ily structured and strictly hierarchical, 
officers— and soldiers— are used to unquestioningly following orders and 
enjoy proven, secure lines of communications which ensure the secrecy 
essential for the successful execution of a ootç>. Finally, armed forces'
1 3 
1 4
1 5
Thompson, The Grievances of Military Ooup-Makers. p. 5. 
Daadler, op.cit., p. 16. 
ibid., p. 16.
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personnel are imbued with an internal esprit de corps and instantly 
recognisable public persona hard to match by other governmental 
institutions or political parties.
Huntington's characterization of officers' professional expertise, 
responsibility and corporateness is seen by the first set of coup 
theorists as ideally suited to gearing them and their organization to 
lead third world societies throu^ the difficulties of development. "No 
new state", writes Edward Shils, "can modernize itself, and remain or 
become liberal and democratic, without an elite possessing force of 
character, intelligence, and a very complex set of hi^ moral 
qualities".^ ® For Shils and the first set, professional officers in 
developing countries are just such an elite. As Egypt's Nasser once 
said, "If the army does not do it, who will?"^  ’
II.B. Ihe "Push" of a Political Military
Although the second set of military intervention theorists also 
perceive third world states as ineffectually managed, transitional 
societies beset with socioeconomic and political conflict, they think 
Huntington's characterization of maximizing professional expertise, 
responsibility and corporateness may promote rather than inhibit 
military intervention in government.^ ® For, ^Aile expertise may separate
Shils, op.cit., p. 60.
As used in E. Fossum, "Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Military 
Coups D'État in Latin America", Journal of Peace Research Vol. 3 1967, 
p. 233.
 ^® For the secxxxi set of coop prediction theorists see Feld, 
"Professionalism, Nationalism and the Alienation of the Military"; S.E. 
Finer, Ihe Man on Horseback; Ihe Role of the Military in Politics 
(Londcxi: Pall Mall Press, 1962); E. Liewen, "Ihe Military; A Force for 
Continuity or Change", in eds. J.J.TePaske and S.N.Fisher. Explosive 
Forces in Latin America (n.p. : Olio State University Press, 1964); A. 
Perlrautter, "Ihe Israeli Array in Politics: Ihe Persistence of the
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the armed farces as an institution, it cannot protect officers from 
becoming enmeshed in the larger conflicts common to newly independent 
societies v^ere strict occiç)ational separation is relatively new and 
traditional class, ethnic, regional and religious ties between officers 
and civilian elites are exploited to combat changing advancement 
criteria against a background of scarcity/ ^ Nor does professional 
responsibility follcw from e:^ )ertise. Huntington's theory of <±>jective 
civil control is for S.E. Finer compromised by its "essentialist” 
reasoning; hi^ily professional officers always civil supremacy-of- 
rule; if they do not, they are not completely professional. It is no 
good to implicitly instil in officers' minds the idea of civilian 
supremacy, it must be internalized as an explicit principle. Failure to 
do so, continues Finer, may allow officers' professional respcmsibility 
to serve their client, society, to mutate into a perception of 
themselves "as the servants of the state rather than of the government 
in power".'" Oorporateness, too, may be dangerous if officers, comparing 
the military's strength, cdherenoe and success in emulating Western 
patterns of development with the haphazard behaviour and organisation of 
civilian elite institutions, develcp an overblown sense of their 
organizational identity and potency.
Equipped with these new interpretations of officers' espertise, 
respcxTsibility and corporateness, the second set of ooip prediction
Civilian Over the Military", World Politics 20:4 July 1968, and "Ihe 
Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army Toward a Taxonomy of Civil- 
Military Relations in Developing Politics", Comparative Politics 1:3 
April 1969.
See M.P. Lofchie, "Ihe Uganda Coup— Class Acticxi by the Military", 
Journal of Modem African Studies 10:1 May 1972; and J. Nun, **Ihe Middle 
Class Military Coiç>", in ed. C.Veliz Ihe Politics of Conformity in Latin 
America (New York: Oxford Ifiiiversity Press, 1967).
Finer, op.cit., pp. 24-25.
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theorists argue that the armed forces' propensity to intervene in 
politics is not dependent on any professional limits of civil-military 
behaviour but rather a variable of society's political maturity. Like 
any other interest grou^ in society, the military will use its 
professional strengths to take advantage of political fluidity and 
socioeocaiamic disjointedness and, if possible, ”push”“  their way into 
politics. Thou^ still clinging to his notion of the truly professional 
officer as apolitical, even Huntington comes to acknowledge this new 
dynamic of political maturity in coiç) prediction theory: "In the world 
of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle-class world he is 
a participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon he 
becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order".’* Moreover, 
where officers ocxispire against the ruling regime, "society as a Wiole 
is out of joint, not just the military",” and they are merely 
fulfilling their great potential power as political actors.
II.C. Corporate Motives
Ihe "third" set of ootç) prediction theorists sees military 
intervention as a result of an overblown sense of self-important 
corporate identity among officers.”  Ihis arrogance can result from
”  Ihonpson, op.cit., p. 5.
”  Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 221.
” ibid., p. 194.
For the third set of ccnjp prediction theorists see B. Abrahamsscn, 
Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1972); R.E. Dowse, "The Military and Political 
Development" in ed. 0. Leys, Politics and Change in Developincf Oountries 
Studies in the Iheorv and Practice of Developmart (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969), p. 235; First, Ihe Barrel of a Gun; K. Lang, 
"Civil-Military Relations", in N.a., Military Institutions and the 
Sociology of War A Review of the Literature with Annotated Bibliography 
(Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972); E. Nordlinger Soldiers in 
Politics; Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
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exercising basic duties, working in civil-military defence ministries, 
or vdien military strategy and civilian policy tend to merge or unduly 
impact upon each other. For instance, as the technical and managerial 
expertise necessary to decide matters of weapons' task suitability, 
source procurement and deployment rises, so does the feeling among 
officers that only they themselves are competent enou^ to make these 
choices. Working in defence ministries containing a military-civilian 
mix may lend a sense of "psychological parity*'^ ® to officers previously 
accustomed to viewing such elites deferentially. Where national security 
considerations place heavy demands on a society's scientific competence 
and/or economic output, or if mass psychological or physical 
mobilisaticai is needed to guarantee the country's continued 
independence, military strategy can affect the very nature of civilian 
poli"tical and socioeconomic policies.^ ® In newly independent oountries 
vhere political and administrative elites are unlikely to have the time, 
understanding, or interest in military technology and/or strategic 
considerations, and/or experience of setting dcwn formal civil-military 
boundaries, officers may find the need— and opportunity— to redress any 
number of corporate grievances. For the third set of coup prediction 
theorists, officers are not pushed or pulled into government to serve
Hall, 1977); A. Perlrautter, Ihe Military and Politics in Modem Times 
(New Haven: Yale university Press, 1977); R. Price, "A Theoretical 
Approach to Military Rule in the New States Reference Groip Theory and 
the Ghanaian Case", World Politics 23:3 ^ sril 1971; Thompson, The 
Grievances of Military Ooup-Makers; C.E. Welch, Jr. and A.K.Smitii, 
Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil^iilitary Relations (North 
Scitoiatie, Mass: IXDdxiry Press, 1974); and A. Zolberg, "Military 
Intervention in the New States of Tropical Africa: Elements of 
Comparative Analysis", in ed. H. Bienen The Military Intervenes: Case 
Studies in Political Develorment (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 
1968).
Lang, op.cit., p. 113. 
ibid., p. 115.
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the best interests of the state but to protect or enlarge any number of
vtot they perceive as their own organizational interests.
Of course, no one specific corporate grievance is necessarily
sufficient to spur military officers to the extreme measure of a cotp.’^
Given a regime vtoch enjoys widely accepted legitimacy, officers'
complaints will be dealt with throu^ regular civil-military channels.
If, hcwever, government interference in the military's corporate sphere
of decision-making becomes rampant or the armed forces are
called rpcai repeatedly to put dcwn strikes or to deal with 
disorder in a dissident region... [or] asked to suppress one 
faction of the government against another in a showdcwn... [or 
participate] in similar operations in a country other then their 
own, or merely... [to acquire] information about the involvement 
of other military units in events of this sort^  *
officers will be quickly and closely acquainted with the "seamy side"^  *
of political life, losing respect for the governing ability and
authority of their erstwhile political masters. In such situations, the
military will use their corporate identity and power to act almost as a
glorified "trade union" f ° seeking to redress perceived grievances and
extend the limits of its influence at every given opportunity.
II.D. Personal/Clique Motives
Ihe "fourth" coup prediction theory, in the shape of Samuel Decalo, 
takes the most cynical view of officers' professionalism, insofar as it
Attempts to factorize specific armed forces' corporate grievances and 
related causes of military intervention include Thompson's 10 corporate, 
ei^t "not-so-corporats", and two "societal residual" sources of 
potential military dissatisfaction, and Welch and Smith's 20 points of 
probable civil-military contention. See Thompson, op.cit., pp. 12-45; 
and Welch and Smith, op.cit., pp. 8-30.
Zolberg, op.cit., p. 81. 
ibid., p. 81. 
ibid., p. 81.
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play any part in civil-military relations.^  ^ For Decalo, officers do not 
overthrew governments out of default, nor as any other political actor, 
nor to protect or enlarge their corporate interests— such motives would 
be presupposing a unified institutional consciousness or regard vÆien 
many developing nations' armed forces erfiibit "little resemblance to a 
modem [Western] complex organization" ' Instead, third world 
militaries suffer any number of professionally and organizationally 
destructive features, including discriminatory recruitment and promotion 
patterns based on traditional differences, insubstantial officer- 
training programmes hurriedly undertaken by departing colonial masters, 
the rapid promotion of insufficiently qualified native officers to fill 
gaps at independence and, viien they fail to emulate their seniors' 
meteoric rise, the resentment of junior officers. Decalo sees such 
factors, vihen combined with the personal animosities and ambitions found 
in any organization, as resulting in developing country militaries which 
are "a coterie of distixict armed camps owing primary clientelist 
allegiance to a handful of mutually competitive officers of different 
ranks seething with a variety of corporate, ethnic and personal 
grievances**. [Author's italics. Huntington's conception of maximizing 
military professionalism to ensure the armed forces' subservience to the 
legitimate rulers of society is seen as of little consequence in 
fragmented and unstructured polities vAere the means for assuming
^^  See S. Decalo, "Military Coups and Military Regimes in Africa", The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 2:1 1973, and Coups and Army Rule in 
Africa Studies in Military Style (New Haven: Yale Ikiiversity Press, 
1976).
”  Decalo, "Military Coips", p. 14. 
ibid., p. 14-15.
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ultimate authority are fluid and military officers' personal and 
factional ambitions for power are often temptingly easy to fulfil.
Is Decalo's theory too simplistic in blaming individual officer 
self-interest as the prime motivational factor behind the military coup? 
Or is it too complex in committing one to the herculean task of 
investigating the personal backgrounds of each and every military 
officer? Even if all the relevant data were somehcw available, surely it 
would be impossible accurately to predict the particular play of life 
ejperienoes vAiioh would cause an individual officer to engineer a coup. 
Decalo's personal/clientelist theory of military intervention seems to 
preclude the formulation of any predictive theory of conditions and 
motives leading to an armed forces' ooup.
II.E. Which Military Intervention Theory?
Which of the four coip prediction theories described above should be 
used as a guide to examining independent India's civil-military 
relations history? Does one accept the first set of military 
intervention theorists' view of professional armed farces' officers as 
potential model rulers only reluctantly pulled into forming a 
government? Or are the second group more accurate in describing military 
coup executors as no better and no worse than any other self-interested 
actor competing for maximum political authority? Perhaps the third set 
are correct in dcwn-playing the wide societal pressures of developing 
countries in favour of concentrating on officers' perceptions of their 
corporate self-image and integrity? Or is Decalo ri^t in seeing the 
military as merely an aggregate of clientelist factions seeking to 
increase their power in society?
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As described above, some scholars dismiss all attempts at 
discovering a pattern of the motives and causes of coups. MüKinlay and 
Cohan argue that any regime, be it entirely civilian, military or a 
mixture of both, is best understood in terms of its political and 
economic performance once in power, rather than its origin in election 
or coup.* * Even then, after using a sophisticated cluster analysis 
method of comparison on "all independent countries of the world"^  ® on 
two separate occasions with varying data bases and variables, *^ they 
find a "sizable proportion"  ^’ of civilian and military regimes virtually 
indistinguishable in their respective political and economic 
performances. While McKinlay and Ochan concede that the two types of 
government diverge in their "political dimension"^  ® and, to a lesser 
degree, in their international trading circumstances, they conclude that 
civilian and military regimes "cannot be differentiated from one another 
by military, background economic, or économie performance criteria".’*
See R.D. McKinlay and A.S. Odhan, "A Comparative Analysis of the 
Political and Bconondc Performance of Military and Civilian Regimes", p. 
1; and "Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regime 
Systems", American Political Science Review 70:3 September 1976, p. 850.
McKinlay and Cohan, "Performance and Instability", p. 850.
McKinlay and Cchan examine 115 countries divided into four sub- 
populaticxis— (1) "military regimes", (2) "periods of civilian rule in 
countries that have experienced a military regime" (3) "all other low- 
inoome countries vdiich have experienced only civilian rule", and (4) 
"hi^-income systems"— with 21 political and economic performance 
variables for the period 1951-1970. One year later, they analyse 101 
naticxTS divided into two sub-populations— based on "vAiether they have 
experienced a military regime"— over 25 economic and political variables 
for from 1961-1970. Débité the two studies^ differences in division of 
regime types, political and économie performance variables, and even 
time periods, their respective conclusions are virtually identical. See 
McKinlay and Odian, "A Comparative Analysis", pp. 1-5, and "Performance 
and Instability", pp. 850-852.
McKinlay and Ochan, "A Comparative Analysis", p. 23.
McKinlay and Cohan, "Performance and Instability", p. 863.
’* ibid., p. 863.
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Does one aooept Decalo's impossibility of systemizing ooup 
prediction motives or MoKinlay and Odban's argument of the irrelevancy 
of military intervention theory altogether? Or can one cull some more 
general predictive theory of armed forces' intervention applicable to 
all countries, particularly India, from a mixture of all the theories 
described so far? The answer may come from an investigation into vhat 
has caused the changes in coup prediction theory over time.
III. Causes of Changes in Military Intervention Theory
III .A. Larger Theoretical Concerns
David Horowitz wanders if rapid changes in cotç) prediction theory—  
less than 20 years separate Huntingtcxi's characterization of military 
officers as dedicated professionals from MoKinlay and Cohan's concern 
only with regime performance— derive from larger theoretical concerns.* ° 
Thus, the first theory of the armed forces as able modernizers of 
transiticxjal societies comes from contemporary concerns with 
traditional-modern dichotomies. The second theory, vhioh portrays the 
military as one of many politicized actors competing for power in hi^ily 
fragmented societies, reflects a concem with special interests and 
their manifestations in fluid polities. Here, factional concerns are 
paramount and the prevalent cotp prediction theory appears to lend 
itself to class analysis. The third, corporate self-interest theory may 
be traced to the growing regard for understanding bureaucracy's internal 
machinations and their influence on political policy. Finally, the
Horowitz, op.cit., pp. 6-7.
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fourth theory vAiich sees personal/clientelist ambition as the cause of 
COIÇ3S appears based on patron-client theories of politics.
Horcwitz, hcwever, goes on to ridicule the connection between 
military intervention theories and their respective contemporary 
concerns with larger patterns of political behaviour as one of theory 
following fashicai. I see no reason to disagree. As Horowitz states, 
vAiile such changes in coiç) prediction theories may be "ground for 
confidence or disquiet",*^  depending on one's assessment of the 
development of the larger body of theory, "it may also speak volumes for 
the role of theoretical preconceptions in cotç) studies".*'
III.B. Quantitative Analysis
What if theoretical preconceptions are ignored in favour of using 
quantitative analysis to explain changes in competing theories of armed 
forces' intervention?*' E.A.Nordlinger, for instance, uses the 
"exceptionally reliable"* * data compiled in I.Adelman and C.T.Morris' 
stüây of the economic develc^ inent of 74 states*® for a cross-naticxial
*' ibid., p. 7.
*' ibid., p. 7.
*' See Fossum, op.cit.; K.Q. Hill, "Research Note Military Role vs. 
Military Rule Allocations to Military Activities", Oamoarative Politics 
11:3 ^ jril 1979; M.C. Needier, "Political Development and Military 
Intervention in Latin America", American Political Science Review 60:3 
Sept. 1966; R.N. Tarmahil, "Ihe Performance of Military and Civilian 
Governments in South America, 1948-1967", Journal of Political and 
Military Spciolooy IV Fall 1976; and P.O. Schmitter, "Military 
Intervention, Political Competitiveness and Public Policy in Latin 
America: 1950-1967", in eds. M. Jancwitz and J. van Doom. On Military 
Intervention (Rotterdam: Rotterdam Ikiiversity Press, 1971).
** E.A. NOrdlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: Ihe Impact of Military Rule Upon 
Eoonomic and Social Change in the Ncav-Westem States", American 
Political Science Review 64:4 December 1970, p. 1135.
*® I. Adelman and C.T. Morris. Society. Politics and Eoonamic 
Development; A aiantitative Approach (Baltimore: Ihe Johns Hopikins 
Press, 1967.)
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aggregate data study of the first set of coup theorists' belief in a 
positive correlation between military regimes and modernization. While 
his findings echo Huntington's understanding of officers' behaviour as 
dependent on the level of a society's political maturity, he emphasizes 
that armed forces' regimes are more strongly conservative than 
previously imagined. Only at the very lowest levels of political 
participation and within the context of a "minuscule middle class''^ ® do 
military regimes sponsor some modernizing policies. Nordlinger's 
findings bury the notion of armed forces' officers as modernizers and 
lend credence to the seccmd and third theories of cotç> prediction and 
their respective perceptions of the military acting as a self-interested 
actor or arrogant corporate body.
Nonetheless, numerical data studies are always open to 
reinterpretation and only six years after Nordlinger's conclusions on 
military regime performance Rcbert Jackman employs the very same Adelman 
and Morris data base but ends up with entirely different conclusions.*^  
Using his cwn co-variance analysis model, Jackman rejects both the 
differentiation of armed forces' regimes as "either reacticaiary or 
progressive",*® and the notion that the effects of military rule are 
contingent on the size of the middle class. Nor is Jackman impressed 
\mhen he examines 77 independent third world countries to test 
Huntington's hypothesis of officers' actions as dependent on society's 
level of political maturity: "Military governments have no unique 
effects on social change, regardless of level of economic
*® Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti", p. 1143.
*’ R.W. Jackman, "Politicians in IMiform: Military Governments and /
Social Change in Ihe Third World", American Political Science Review 
70:4 December 1976.
*® ibid., p. 1086.
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development"/ ^ Instead, in an echo of McKinlay and Cohan's findings, he 
concludes that the "simple civil-military government distinction ag^ aears 
to be of little use in the explanation of social change"
Yet, since no quantitative analysis, however thorou^ its 
methodology and conclusive its findings, can repudiate contradictory 
conclusions drawn by later quantitative analyses, theories of coup 
prediction must not be discarded because of any one particular cross­
national aggregate data analysis. So it is with Jackman's rubbishing of 
Nordlinger's conclusions Wiich support Huntington's hypothesis. Four 
years after Jackman's findings, C.I.Eugene Kim's quantitative cross­
national aggregate data analysis of four Asian countries' respective 
socioeconomic performances finds that civilianized military regimes 
outperform purely civilian or vAiolly military governments.“ Eugene Kim 
argues that military officers sharing power with civilians in a ruling 
regime themselves beccxne civilianized, development-orientated 
technocrats and executives. Furthermore, using the natural, physical 
authority of the armed forces enables such mixed governments to 
implement policy in an effectively stable political environment. Eugene 
Kim's conclusions lend new credence to the first coup prediction 
theory's notion of the military as efficient modernizers.
III.B.l. Quantitative Analysis Shortcomings
Given the often fundamental differences between the conclusions 
drawn by various quantitative analyses— even when they enploy an
ibid., p. 1096. 
ibid., p. 1097.
C.I. Eugene Kim, "Asian Military Regimes; Political Systems and 
Styles", in ed. M. Jancwitz. Civil-Military Relations Regional 
Perspectives (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1981).
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identical data base— it becomes difficult to believe any findings
reached throu^ quantitative means. Problems arise at the most basic
level of defining even the most fundamental terminology: vtfiat criteria
can be accepted as defining **modemization” or "socioeconomic
development" by ^ Aiich the performances of civilian governments versus
military regimes may be compared? Althouÿi qualitative studies suffer a
similar problem, quantitative analyses are more acutely compromised
since they depend on breaking down definitions into readily measurable
variables. For instance, which indicators most accurately measure the
degree of influence vdiioh a particular country's military has over a
civilian regime in the time period under investigation? Even if and vAen
some agreement can be found as to the necessary variables to be
enployed, quantitative analyses are conpromised by the inaccuracy
inherent in most of these measurements, especially for figures compiled
in developing countries where such information is difficult to retrieve
and often inaccurate. How, too, does one incorporate particular concerns
of qualitative theories such as regime corruption iidiioh are all but
impossible to measure? As R.E.Dowse points out, we
need to be very careful that the entities we factorize exist in 
the real world in any quantifiable saise.. .There is a danger 
that the statisticians may contribute an aura of specious 
accuracy to hypotheses that are themselves intrinsically 
vague.® ^
Quantitative analyses are not entirely irrelevant. Despite their 
limitations, data comparisons can be useful insofar as they throw ip 
much needed information on previously unexamined areas. The vast 
majority of such studies, however, are either too general in their 
formulation reliably to predict a particular country's armed forces
Dowse, op.cit., p. 221.
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intervening in politics, or too specialized in their origins accurately 
to anticipate probable patterns of officers' behaviour beyond the 
original example. If even their authors cannot vouch for the strict 
relevancy of their respective quantitative studies' data irputs,®* hew 
can others be confident of their conclusions?
III.C. Changes in Ooup Executors' Motives
Perhaps military intervention theory has changed so often because 
coup executors' motives have changed. In immediate post-colonial Africa, 
writes Ruth First, "Independence was still young and crisis was not yet 
mature".®* Ihus, initial military coups were "pay strikes"®® taken to 
fulfil narrow corporate demands. Once such grievances were addressed, 
officers returned to their barracks. But, continues First, military men 
are fond of the saying, "The virginity of the army is like that of a 
woman...once assailed, it is never again intact",®® As officers began to 
comprehend their overwhelming corporate power relative to other societal 
elites and instituticais, th^ shed any professional inhibitions against 
assuming political control and were less hesitant about overthrowing a 
government if dissatisfied. Only now coups are taken with the intention 
of ruling until larger, national objectives (typically limited to re- 
imposing colonial style bureaucratic control over the government, 
promoting the power of administrative elites, and rearranging key 
political perscamel) are achieved. Finally, concludes First, the longer 
officers remain in power, the greater their appetite for rule.
5 3 See Jackman, op.cit., p. 1092; and Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti", 
1138.p. 
®* First, op.cit., p. 21.
® ibid., p. 21.
®® ibid., p. 20.
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First's oonoeption of the advance of the motives behind military 
intervention directly contrasts with the progression of coup prediction 
theories described above. Both the first and second theories assume that 
officers, \diether their motives are altruistic or political, will 
install regimes intended to discipline and revive society as a Wiole. 
Only later do the respective third and fourth ocxxp prediction theories 
of narrow corporate self-interest and personal/clientelist ambition 
fulfilment emerge. How does one account for this differing conception as 
to the progression of coup executors' motives?
III.D. Case Availability
The most plausible explanation for the relentless advancement of 
diverse military intervention theories is that of case availability.
OoLp prediction theories have evolved, competed with, and soumit to 
displace their predecessors on the basis of past and contemporary 
occurrences of officers' intervention and their subsequent political and 
socioeconomic performance in government. Later theorists have had the 
advantage of hindsi^t lAen formulating their arguments.
Ihe first set of coup theorists Wio welcome armed forces'
intervention on the grounds that only professional officers possess the
individual iddLlls, will, and organisatianal resources to efficiently and
ably administer traditional societies struggling to modernize are
writing in the early 1960s. For Finer, this was
almost the worst imaginable time to write on these matters 
because all but two of the Latin American military regimes had 
just been swept away, and the African military regimes had, with 
one or two exceptions, not come into existence. Of the new 
states of the post-World War period, it was the Arab ones—  
Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Sudan— which made nearly all the running.
Ihis did not deter observers from predicting great things 
for the then incipient military regimes. God may not be on the
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side of poor and developing oountries but the academics are; and 
it really did seem as thou^ vAatever newfangled experiment in 
despotism was adopted in these states, it was the ajprcpriate 
answer to their backwardness.. .Since the [military] regimes were 
for the most part only two or three years old at the most, these 
apologists could not knew hew they would perform. They could 
only infer— infer from the ambitions and pronouncements of the 
new military ruler, or a priori, from siçposed characteristics 
of the military, their social badkgrounds, the nature of their 
occiçjation, their social function..
and, of course, from Huntington's original portrayal of the professional
armed forces' officer as skilled, nc±)le, and organized in performing his
service to society.
The first set of coiç) theorists' naivety is soon displaced by the 
second grotç) of military intervention theorists Wio, writing during the 
early to late 1960s, need no longer rely i:çx>n an a priori inference of 
coup plotter's motives and actions once in office. There are new a 
multiplicity of cases to study, especially in sub-Saharan Africa where 
there is an explosion of military coiçjs following this region's newly 
gained independence.®* Experience now shows the professional officer to 
be more often than not irrevocably tied to narrow interests pertaining 
to his own personal background. The armed forces can no more socialize 
him into a professional political neutrality than they can ignore a 
growing avrareness of their own institutional strength as the most
®’ S.E. Finer, **The Man on Horseback— 1974”, Armed Forces and Society 
1:1 November 1974, pp. 19-20.
®" From 1950 to 1962 inclusive, there are 29 successful military coL^ 
in the world: 11 in Central and South America, ei^t in the Near and 
Middle East, nine in Asia, and one in sub-Saharan Africa. From 1963 to 
1969 inclusive, there are 43: 11 in Central and South America, seven in 
the Near and Middle East, four in Asia, fully 20 in Africa, and ona in 
Europe. See O'Kane, Th«a T.ikAlihood of Coups, pp. 141-150. Of course, 
sets of coup prediction theorists cannot be definitively broken dcwn 
into the above year to year gradations. As a rouÿi guide, I am using the 
earliest and latest dates of publication of the respective works cited 
in the footnotes above under the first and second sets of military 
intervention theorists, respectively.
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powerful potential political actor in societies vAiere the means of 
allocating authority are fluid and easily seized. Despite their inherent 
limitations, the first cross-national aggregate data analyses provide 
enouÿi empirical comparisons for the second group of coip theorists to 
discredit their predecessors' assumption of armed forces' regimes as 
modernizers. Where the military was once thouÿit to be only reluctantly 
pulled into power, officers are new seen to pu^ as well.
Ihe next decade brings no relief from military coups throu^iout the 
developing world® ® and is reflected in the third set of military 
intervention theorists' more cynicad assessment of both their causes and 
of professionalism's effect on officers' behaviour. Increases in the 
technical sophistication of weaponry, functional specialization, and the 
blurring of the boundary betsæen military strategy and government policy 
gives rise to a heightened sense of corporateness within the armed 
forces. Officers become over-sensitive to perceived slights against 
their professional expertise and their professional ism is an ego to be 
protected even at the cost of overthrowing the ruling regime. No longer 
do only the most fragmented of polities need to fear the armed forces' 
coup, more established governments must also tread li^itly \iAiere the 
military's corporate interests are concerned.
Significantly, new case studies of armed forces' intervention in 
sub-Saharan Africa® “ demand that a regional factor be added to time as
®® From 1970 to 1977 inclusive, there are a further 29 successful 
military coups: ei^t in Central and South America, one in the Near and 
Middle East, seven in Asia, 11 in sub-Saharan Africa, and two in Europe. 
See ibid., pp. 141-150. As above, as a rou^ guide I am using the 
earliest and latest dates of publication of the respective works cited 
in the footnotes above under the third set of military intervention 
theorists.
®“ See First, op.cit. ; J.M. Lee, African Armies and Civil Order (New 
York: Praeger Press, 1969.); E.W. LeFever, Spear and Sceptre: Army,
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an influence on the progression of ccfop theory. Zolberg, after closely 
examining military intervention in the recently independent nations of 
"tropical” Africa,® ^ concurs with First's understanding of ootç> motive 
progression; *TDoth within each country and over the ccaitinent as a 
vhole.. .Military interventions have tended to move from either or both 
'strikes' and 'referee' actions to 'take-overs'".® ' Zolberg and First's 
reversal of the above four qualitative coup prediction theories' 
depiction of the development of cou^ executors' motives may be explained 
by their exclusive reliance on African case studies where çxxip motive 
progression may indeed differ from those found in other areas of the 
developing world.
A specific geographic emphasis also provides the impetus for the 
last of the four qualitative military intervention theories. Examining 
armed forces' coiçîs in sub-Saharan Africa at a time (mid-1970s) vhen 
fully 20 of 41 of the region's countries are ruled by military or civil- 
military regimes,® ^ Decalo finds that, vhile previous qualitative 
characterizations of developing societies as rent with political and 
socioeconomic tensions are still applicable, depicticxis of "the man <xi 
horseback"®* as society's nc*>le saviour are not. Instead, in a region 
\ihere political power is often the only means of ensuring economic 
security, attention must focus cn officers' personal/clientelist
Police, and Politics in Tropical Africa (Washington: Ihe Brookings 
Institution, 1970.); C.E. Welch, Jr. Soldier and State in Africa: A 
Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Chance 
(Evanstcxi: Northwestern ihiversity Press, 1970.); and Zolberg, '^ Military 
Intervention".
® ^ Included in Zolberg's survey are "all countries south of the &idan 
and north of the Zambezi, except Liberia and Ethiopia". See Zolberg, 
"Military Intervention", p. 96.
®^  ibid., p. 83.
®^  Decalo, Coups, p. 6.
®* ibid., p. 13.
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ambitions and allegiances vÆiich, thoufÿi they may be "predominant, 
secondary, or merely coincidental [as motives behind interventicm, ] are 
invariably present in coup situations and cannot be ignored”.®®
Conclusion
lhat ootç) prediction theory has constantly developed in response to 
the latest examples of military intervention is now evident. Working 
frcm few actual examples and placing much credence in Huntington's 
characterization of the apolitical, professional military officer, the 
first set of military intervention theorists sees ootç) executors as 
ideally qualified citizens altruistically motivated to help their 
country's floundering attempts at modernization. After witnessing an 
explosion of coups in newly independent countries throu^iout the third 
world, the second group of military intervention theorists perceives 
officers' professional sense of client responsibility shifting from the 
government to the state itself, with the probability of their 
overthrowing a regime now dependent on the level of society's political 
maturity rather than a specific desire to lead development. Armed with 
quantitative analyses showing no relation between a military regime and 
modernization, and viewing no end to examples of armed forces' coups, 
the third set of military intervention theorists factorizes coup 
executors' motives as reactions to perceived interference in their 
corporate sphere of influence. Finally, in an attenpt to explain the 
myriad examples of coups throu^iout sub-Saharan Africa Wiioh he claims 
cannot be understood unless officers' perscxial and/clientelist ambitions 
are examined, Decalo develops a fourth theory of military intervention—
ibid., p. 19.
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leaving us with the impossible task of œllating huge amounts of hi^ily 
subjective data and factoring them into a predictive formula.
Ihe surfeit of armed forces^ coups and the diversity of the 
countries in vhich they occur may appear to make attempts at factorizing 
the particular conditions and motives leading to their execution futile. 
Why not examine the more unusual phenomenon of peaceful, legitimate 
transfers of power, or a government's performance instead of its origin? 
Yet, one does no, for example, quit the study of the origins and motives 
behind terrorist actions simply because of a proliferation of examples. 
If anything, the multiplici^ of military coups is cause for closer 
investigation of the phenomenon.
Which armed forces' intervention theory should we choose for 
examdning civil-military relations in British and Independent India? Ihe 
quick succession of competing coup prediction theories has made their 
thorou^ testing on a worldwide basis impossible, and prevents 
designating any one as entirely correct or incorrect. Thus, throughout 
the following examinaticn, emphasis will be placed on. the perceptions of 
armed forces' officers to various crucial events in Indian civil- 
military relations history with only the selective deployment of the 
above competing coup prediction theories. The first task is to determine 
the nature of the commissioned Indian officers' military 
professionalism; that is, their understanding of expertise, 
responsibility, and oorporateness in a Britishr-ruled subcontinent.
-49-
Civil-Military Relations in British and Independent India, 1918-1962.
and Coup Prediction Theory
CHAPTER 2
Hie History and Development of the Pcofessioncil Indian Militazy Officer
During the Interwar Years
Introduction............................................... 51-52
I. Ooftnmissioned Indian Officers...............................52-63
A. Indian Nan-Oammissioned and Viceroy's Commissioned
Officers............................................52-54
B. King's Commissioned Indian Officers..................... 54-57
C. Interwar Military Reforms..............   58-59
D. Indian Commissioned Officers.................   60-63
II. Developing Professionalism................................63-84
A. ODjective and Subjective Control.......   63-66
B. At the Academies: "Officers and Gentlemen"................66-71
C. "indianization"  ................     70-74
1. Questionnaire Respondents.......................... 75-77
2. Price's »*Reference-Grotç)" Military Intervention
Theory. ........   77-80
D. Izzat............................................... 80-84
III. The Indian Navy and Air Force  ....................... 85-90
A. Ihe Indian Navy. ................................... 85-87
B. Ihe Indian Air Force.................................. 87-90
Conclusion............  90-92
(Includes Tables 2.1-2.2.)
— 50 —
CHAPTER 2
Hie Hisbocy and Development: of the P^ rofessicnal Indian Military Officer
During the Interwar Years
Introduction
As the embodiment of that most traditional of all government 
institutions, the military, commissioned armed farces' officers are 
often disproportionately affected in their oontenporary decision-making 
processes— including Wiether or not to instigate a ooiç)— by the wei^t 
of personal and institutional experience. The officers of independent 
India are no exception. While they have had to meet and overcame 
challenges uniquely their own, their professional standards and 
understanding of their role vis-a-vis the civilian government has most 
directly been shaped by British military traditions first imported to 
the subcontinent over 300 years ago.
Ikifortunately, this chapter cannot provide a complete record of the 
events vAich shaped independent India's military officer corps from the 
ei^teenth century to the present day.^  Instead, it will focus on the
 ^ Ihe history of the British-led Indian armed forces, from the 
Honourable East India Oompany's conquest of the subcontinent throu^ the 
Great Mutiny/Sepoy Rdoellicn of 1857 to the apogee of the Raj in the 
late 19th century is well kncwn and closely documented in any number of 
works. See S. Oohen, Ihe Indian Army: Its Contribution to the 
Development of a Nation (Berkeley: Ikiiversity of California Press,
1971); B. Farwell, Armies of the Ran: From the Mutiny to Independence. 
1858-1947 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company); T.A. Heathoote, Ihe Indian 
Army: Ihe Garrison of British Imperial India 1822-1922 (Vancouver: David 
and Charles, 1974); V.I. Longer, Red Coats to Olive Green: A History of 
the Indian Army 1600-1974 (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1974.); P. Masai A 
Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army. Its Officers and Men 
Ebk. ed. (London: Macmillan Publishers Limited, 1986. First published 
Loidon: Jonathan Cape Limited, 1974); Major M.P. Sin^, Indian Army 
IMer the Fast India Company (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt Ltd.,
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period from the opening of the Royal Military Academy to Indian cadets 
to the eve of World War II. Ihrouÿiout, the development of the 
commissicaied Indian officer's professional role and responsibilities 
will be emphasised.
I. commissioned Indian Officers
I.A Indian Non-Oommissioned and Viceroy's Commissioned Officers
Althou^ Indians had fou^it in the British-led armed forces of the 
subcontinent for over 300 years, not one was serving as a full King's 
commissioned officer (KCO) in 1914. Instead, the Indian Army's Indian 
soldiers, or jawans,^  were led by a unique combination of Indian non­
commissioned (NCOS) and Viceroy's commissioned officers, and Britii^ 
KCOs. While Indian Army NOOs filled positions comparable to their 
British Army counterparts (lance-naik or corporal, havildar or sergeant, 
and havildar-major and quartermaster-havildars of various levels), VCOs 
held all the commissioned officer places (jemadar, equivalent to a 
second-lieutenant; sabedar, similar to a lieutenant; and subedar-wajor, 
of a status equal to a major) vMch in a British Army regiment were 
filled by KCOs. Only the commander of an Indian Army unit, a British 
lieutenant or second-lieutenant in command, was a KCO.^  In an army \idiere 
the British commander (CO) was of another culture and vhere his troops 
mi^t speak a mixture of dialects different than his one Indian
1976); and C.C. Trench, The Indian Army and the King's Enemies^ 1900- 
1947 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1988).
 ^Jawan, strictly translated as "youth" or "lad", replaced "sepoy", from 
the Persian sipah or arrty, during the late 19th century. See Cohen, 
c^.cit., p. 50; Heathcote, op.cit., p. 114; Mason, pp.cit., p. 31.
 ^Cohen, op.cit., pp. 42-44.
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language, VOOs provided the crucial interface and could attain great 
respect and responsibilities.* Yet their career opportunities were 
limited: none were promoted beyond the regimental level and at no time 
could a VCD command British troops.
Only the Indian Array's heroic performance during the First World 
War® and the need to secure the continued participation of the 
subcontinent at its hei^t (see Chapter Hxree) led the authorities to 
open up coraraand positions. Althou^i almost invariably too uneducated or 
too old to rise far, nine serving VOOs and holders of temporary 
commissions won King's commissions before the Armistice, as did a few 
NOOs (including future Pakistan President Iskander Mirza).* Six of the 
39 Indians in the sole graduating class of the Cadet College, Indore 
(opened in 1918 to give preliminary military training to "a few 
carefully screened Indian boys*'),’ were later granted regular King's 
commissions (including the first Indian Indian Amy Ocramander-in-Chief, 
General K.M. Carieppa).® Nearly 700 Indian doctors serving in the
* See Trench, pp.cit., pp. 16-17.
® From 1914-18, Indian Army personnel increased from 150,000 to almost 
600,000 in number. In all, over 700,000 Indian troops served cai the 
Western front, in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Macedonia, East Africa, Aden, 
Singapore, Hong Kong and China. Ihey suffered 36,000 killed and 70,000 
wounded \»^le winning 16 Victoria Crosses and 99 Military Crosses. See 
Commonwealth War Graves Commission, Commemoration of the War Dead of 
IWivided India (Maidenhead, England: Oommcmwealth War Graves 
Commission, n.d.), pp. 5-8; Heathoote, c^.cit., p. 79; Longer, c^.cit., 
pp. 127, 150-169; Masoi, op.cit., pp. 412-443; Recruiting in India 
Before and IXnrincr the War of 1914-1918 (AnmyH.Q., India, October,
1919), ^pendix 9, as used in Cohen, pp.cit., p. 69; Brigadier R. Sinÿi, 
History of the Indian Army (New Delhi: Arrty Educational Stores, 1963), 
p. 121 ff., as used in Oohen, op.cit., p. 68; and N.a., "Ihe Itouble at 
Singapore", India, February 26, 1915, p. 100.
* See Cohen, pp.cit., p. 73-75; Farwell, op.cit., p. 293; V.I Longer, 
Ihe Defence and Foreign Policies of India (London: Oriental Uhiversity 
Press, 1988), pp. 3, 29; and Longer, Red Coats to Olive Green, p. 171.
’ Ihorat From Reveille To Retreat, p. 2.
® Muthanna, General Cariappa. p. 27.
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military's auxiliary Indian Medical Service (IMS) also became KOOs 
during the First World War.*
I.E. King's Cammissioned Indian Officers
Ihe First World War also saw the first "permanent” step in the 
creation of the modem Indian commissioned officer corps vdien the 
authorities opened the Royal Military OoUege (RMC), Sandhurst, to 
Indians.^ * Up to ten Indian Gentleman Cadets (GCs) per year would be 
trained to be KOOs. Ihe initial batch of were examined in 1918, attended 
from January 1919, and were variously cammissioned from Jüly 1920 to 
August 1921.11 Althou^, as full second-lieutenants of the British Armed 
Services, they were entitled to command any of His Majesty's forces
* See Farwell, op.cit., p. 297; and Ihapar, Ihe Morale Builders, p. 328. 
1 ° For a history of the RMC (and other training establishments for 
British officers of the Honourable East India Company's Presidency 
armies), see Heathoote, c^.cit., pp. 130-131, 135; Longer, op.cit., p. 
49; Ifeson, cp.cit., p. 179; J. Snyth, Sandhurst Ihe History of the Roval 
Military Academy. Woolwich, the Royal Military College. Sandhurst, and 
the Royal Military Academy. Sandhurst 1741-1961 (London; Weidenfeld, 
1961), pp. 27-206; and M. Yardley, Sandhurst: A Documentary (London: 
Harrr^ , 1987), pp. 17-70.
Althou^ this was the first time Indians under Crown rule were 
admitted to the RMC, Dr. T.A. Heathoote notes that "the first ever 
Indian gentleman cadet. Prince Dhulip" of one the Princely States 
attended Sandhurst in the 1890s and joined the British Army's Blues (the 
Royal Horse Guards) "on the grounds that they did not go overseas much, 
and [as] his father was working up a rebellion...it would be rather 
embarrassing to have to fi^t against him". HCfUEz In their respective 
autobiographies, both J.N. Chaudhuri and S.P.P. Ihorat mistakenly write 
that Indian cadets attended the RMC only from 1922. See "A Nominal Roll 
of Indian Gentlemen Cadets Attending the Royal Military College at 
Sandhurst Between 1 January 1919 and 31 December 1927", "Seniority Roll 
of Indian Gentlemen Cadets Attending the Royal Military College at 
Sandhurst Between 1 January 1919 and 31 Deoeariber 1927", and "Summary of 
India Gentlemen Cadets at the RMC Betweai Jan. 1919 and Dec. 1927"; 
unpubli^ed documents compiled from the "Registrar of Gentleman Cadets 
of the Royal Military College from 1919 to 1927" by Dr. T.A. Heathoote, 
Curator, Ihe Royal Military Acadeny Sandhurst Collection and given to me 
in correspmdence, 1990; Chaudhuri, General J.N. Chaudhuri  ^p. 30; and 
Ihorat, pp.cit., pp. 2-3.
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throu^ ioiit the world, Indian KCIOs (henceforth referred to as King's
GGnmissicned Indian officers, or KCIOs) had to make their careers in the
Indian Array (after spending their initial year with a British Array unit
on a tour of duty in the subcontinent),
Entrance to the RMC for prospective Indian candidates was not easy.
One had to have access to considerable funds/ ^ and the examination
procedure varied tremendously. As a student at Hi^igate School, London,
General J.N. Chaudhuri answered a newspaper notice inviting applicaticxis
for a King's Indian Cadetship to Sandhurst, then sat before just one
interview board (including Field Ifershal Sir Claud Jacob) in the India
Office)  ^lieut.-Gaieral S.P.P. Thorat describes the more caramon and
harrowing e)g)erience faced by Indian candidates on the subocxitinait:
All applicants were first interviewed by the provincial 
Governors \iAio submitted the names of deserving candidates to the 
Government of India.
mis initial screening was very selective and in 1924 only 
ten candidates from the whole of India and Burma were chosen to 
take the entrance examination, mis small batch of raw sixteen- 
year old boys gathered in Simla.. .and was given a written test 
of the under-graduate level, men followed a series of 
interviews. The first was by the Selection Board and I was 
overawed by the array of Army officers who constituted it. They 
asked me a few simple questions but followed each with 
esdiaustive si:çplementaries to ascertain the depth of my 
knowledge. After this ordeal came the interview with the 
Ooramander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Sir William Birdwood.. .me 
next [and final] face I saw was His Excellency Lord Reading, 
Viceroy of India... [My indent, f *
While RMC fees were Rs.11,000 (Rs.7,000 if the son of a military 
officer), leave and other expenses upped the necessary sum to 
approximately Rs. 20,000 (to be deposited in full before applying). See 
Khan, Friends Not Masters (LcxxJon: Oxford IMiversity Press, 1967), p. 8; 
and Ihorat, op.cit., p. 3; and A.L. Venkateswaran, Defence Organisation 
in India (A studv of manor developments in Organisation and 
Administration since Independence 1 (n.p. : Publications Division Ministry 
of Information and Broadcasting Government of India, 1967), p. 159.
Chaudhuri, op.cit., pp. 24-25.
Ihorat, op.cit., pp. 3-4. See also Venkateswaran, op.cit., p. 159.
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Graduates of the Prinoe of Wales Royal Indian Military College (FWRIMC; 
established at Dehra IXm in 1922 to prepare Indian boys for the rigours 
of Sandhurst, its initial batch of 32 cadets included future Indian Army 
Chief General K.S. Thimayya) bypassed preliminary selection rounds and 
advanced strai^t to Simla.
Ihrou^iout the selection process, preference was given first to sons 
of military officers and then those from conservative, "politically 
inert'" * families vhich had for generations constituted the Indian 
princely, landed and military elite. Belonging to one of the "martial 
races" from vhich British commanders had preferentially recruited troops 
since the mid-18th century, made a candidate that much more 
admissible.^’ A random sample of seven illustrious Indian graduates of 
the RM3— Generals Ihimayya, Chaudhuri and M. Ayub Khan (vho reached this 
rank in the Pakistan Army and later become the country's President), 
Lieut.-Generals Ihorat, S.D. Verma and B.M. Kaul, and Adjutant (later 
Ambassador) M.R.A. Baig— reveals these preferences.^ * Ihimayya (a cousin 
of Field Marshal Cariappa vho himself came from a Westernized family
See Cohen, op.cit., p. 84; and Evans, Ihimayya of India, p. 43.
Oohen, Ihe Indian Army, p. 119.
See Great Britain, Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire 
into the Organisation of the Indian Army; together with the Minutes of 
Evidence and Appendiv^ Qnd. 2515, 1859 and Recruitincr in India Before 
and During the War of 1914-1918, p. 7, as used in Oohen, op.cit., pp.
38, 44; Cohen, op.cit., p. 40-41, 51; Heathoote, op.cit., pp. 81-82, 94- 
95; Lcxiger, op.cit., pp. 109-110, 121-123; Mason, op.cit., p. 345; Major 
G.F. MacMunn, Ihe Armies of India (Bristol: Crecy Books, 1984. First 
publi^ed by n.p.: A & C Black, 1911), pp. 129-172, and ihe Martial 
Races of India (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd., 1933); D. Pal, 
Traditions of the Indian Army. 3rd ed. (1961; rpt. New Delhi: National 
Book Trust, 1978), pp. 1-91; R. Ihapar, A History of India: Volume One 
Pfck. ed. (1966; rpt. Harmmdsworth: Penguin Books, 1986), pp. 37-40; and 
Trench, qp.cit., pp. 11-12.
See Baig, In Different Saddles; Chaudhuri, op.cit. ; Evans, op.cit. ; 
Kaul, Ihe Ihtold Storv: Khan, qp.cit. ; Ihorat, op.cit. ; Verma, To Serve 
with Honour.
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with a tradition of government service)^  ® and Thorat came from wealthy 
and Westernized families of traditional, martial races' communities. 
Chaudhuri was raised in a rich and virtually bi-cultural thou^ ncxi- 
martial Bengali family. Khan's father was a land-owning, martial races' 
risaldaiMnajor of the Indian Amy's famous Hodson's Horse, vhile Verma's 
was an England-trained barrister-at-law- Baig's grandfather was a 
risaldar in a unit \iAiich later formed the nucleus of the elite Royal 
Deccan Horse, i^ diile his father (CSI, KCIE) retired as Vice-President of 
the Council of India, at that time the '"highest post an Indian could 
occupy in government service".^ ® Baig himself spent most of his 
adolescence in comfort in England. Only Kaul came from a relatively 
poor, non-martial family.
Rtthanna, op.cit.
Baig, qp.cit., p. 10.
Ihe RMC's preference for cadets from martial races' areas and 
Princely States may be seen on Table FT 2.1 in \^ch such regions are 
hi^ili#ted. Figures for (a) and (b) adapted from Longer, op.cit., p. 
196; and Heathoote, "A Noaminal Roll of Indian Gentlemen Cadets", 
"Seniority Roll of Indian Gentlemen Cadets", and "Summary of India 
Gentlemen Cadets". Figures for (d) adapted from J.H. Bittcai, Census of 
India, 1931 Vol. I-India Part I-Reoort (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 
1933), p. 35. NOTE: Both Cohen and Heathoote mistakenly refer to 83 
Indian cadets admitted to the RMC between 1918 and 1926. Cohen also 
miscounts his own list of 89 cadets as printed. See Cohen, qp.cit., pp. 
75, 119; Evans, cp.cit., pp. 53-4, 56, 58-9, 70-1, 74; Heathoote, 
op.cit., p. 147.
TABLE FT 2.1
Indian Officer Candidates in the first 18 RMC courses (1919-25) 
by area, area's percentage of national population (1921), and ratios
(a) Province, (b) Number (c) Percentage (d) Area's (e) Ratio of
State of of Total Percentage (c) to (d)
or Candidates Number of of National
Agency Candidates Population
(1) Punjab 35 41-18 6.49 6.35/1
(2) Bombay 12 14.12 6.or 2.33/1
(3) United Provinœs 9 10.59 14.23" 0.74/1
(4) Bengal 9 10.59 14.64 0.72/1
(5) NWFP 5 5.88 0.71 8.28/1
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I.e. Interwar Military Reforms
Appointed in 1925 and containing a majority of Indian politicians 
including Mutilai Nehru, Mdiammed Ali Jinnah and Sir Jogendra Sin^, the 
Indian Sandhurst Ocnmittee (ISC) found many shortcomings in the 
selection process, numbers, academy education, and subsequent promotion 
opportunities of Indian GCs. The subccaitinent's over 300 million 
people* * contained more potential officers than the 85 Indian GCs 
admitted to the RM3 from 1919-1925. More worrying was that 30% of Indian 
cadets, compared to only 3% of British GCs, failed to graduate.** Many 
in the ISC felt the low Indian pass rate existed largely because non- 
EWRIMC candidates were disadvantaged by insufficient and/or improper 
educational preparation. The FWRIMC's hi^ fees and exclusivist 
admissions almost regardless of aptitude were also thou^t unfairly 
restrictive.** Another major complaint was the lack of Indians in hi^ier
(6) Hyderabad State
(7) Bajputana Agency
(8) Burma
(9) Goorg
(10) Bihar
(11) Assam
(12) Central India Agency
(13) Other/Uikncwn
Total
* Population percentage is for "Bombay Presidency including Aden".
® Population percentage is for **lftiited Provinces of Agra and Oudh".
3 3.53 3.91 0.90/1
3 3.53 3.08 1.15/1
2 2.35 4.14 0.57/1
2 2.35 0.05 47.00/1
1 1.18 10.66F 0.11/1
1 1.18 2.34 0.50/1
1 1.18 1.88 0.63/1
2 2.35 -.— /I
85 100.01 68.20
c Population percentage is for "Bihar and Orissa".
* * Hutton, op.cit., p. 35.
** Mason, op.cit., p. 463.
** FWRIMC fees were @ Rs.2000 per year for ei^t years. See Evans, 
op.cit., p. 43; and Brigadier Sukhwant Sin^, Three Decades of Indian 
Army Life (Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1967), p. 30.
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cx2ramand positions, seen to be a direct result of limiting KCIOs to the 
array's Indianized ei^t units (see belcw).
Ihe ISC report of 1926 proposed various remedies. ®^ Ihe number of 
RMC places reserved for Indians should be doubled from ten to 20, 
thereafter increasing annually by four. KCIOs should also be allowed to 
join the array's Artillery, Engineer, Signal, Tank and Air arms. Ihe 
limited ei^t unit experiment (see below) should be replaced by a 
ooraprehensive programme of Indianization including the opening of a 
military college equivalent to Sandhurst on. the subocxitinent. Finally, 
Indians of all ooraraunities, martial and "non-martial", should be given 
an equal chance of admission for all of the above.
Althou^ the British dragged their feet on implemaiting all of the 
unanimous prc^ xDsals of the ISC (vAose members they themselves had 
appointed), reforms did come. Ihe RMC's annual intake of Indian 
candidates was doubled, and an additiaial five places (rising to ten if 
the nuraber of direct entry candidates was lower than the allowed limit) 
were reserved for VCOs. Indians also were given six vacancies at the 
Royal Military Academy (RMA), Woolwich, for training in artillery, 
engineering and signals, and six places at the Royal Air Faroe College 
(RAPC), Cranwell (see below). Subsequent pressure from the first Indian 
Round Table Conference Defence Suboonmitbee resulted in a threefold 
increase in RMC places reserved for Indians (bringing the total to 60), 
and a widening of Indianization (see below). By far the Defence 
subcommittee's most important result was the 1931 creation of a 
Committee of E%q)erts under General Sir Philip W. Chetwode to investigate 
the establishment of an Indian equivalent of the RMC.
longer, op.cit., pp. 196-197.
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I.e. Indian Garamissioned Officers
A landmark change came with the establishment of the Indian Military 
Academy (IMA) at Dehra IXm on 10 December 1932. With the closure of 
Sandhurst to Indian GCs, all Indian officers henceforth would ejqjerience 
their military education wholly cm the subcxmtinent.^  ® While IMA 
graduates were to be known as Indian Gonmissicned Officers (ICOs), like 
KCIOs they would begin their careers with a year in a British Army 
regiment serving in India before transferring to the Indian Army. 
However, unlike KCIOs vAio had been cxmmissicmed by the King into "His 
Majesty^s Land Faroes", ICOs were coramissianed by the Viceroy into "His 
l&jesty's Indian Land Forces", giving them cxxnplete authority over 
jawans anyvhere in the world but Briti^ troops in India only.^’
The IMA's admissions procedure was perhaps more rigorous and 
certainly less arbitrary than that of the PMC. After submitting his 
applicaticm throu^ the Collector or Deputy Commissioner of the district 
in which his parents resided, a candidate would attend a competitive 
examinaticm held twice a year in Delhi by the Federal Public Service 
Ccnniissicn (FPSC). The examination cxmsisted of four compulsory 
subjects, three cjpticmal subjects, and an Interview and Record Test 
conducted by a board made iç) of a FPSC member (Chairman), two Indian 
Army officers nominated by the Oommander-in-Chief (C-in-C) in India, and
The last of Sandhurst's Indian GCs graduated in 1934. See Longer, 
op.cit., p. 209.
ICOs were not accorded completely equal powers of command until the 
impending arrival of Japanese forces on India's borders in 1942. See 
Venkateswaran, qp.cit., p. 160.
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two non-official gentlemen (one nominated by the Government of India and 
one by the C-in-C) ®
Ihe IMA was set up as a copy of the RMC, Its commandant was a senior 
British brigadier, his teaching and drill staff was overwhelmingly 
British, and they provided a virtually identical military education to 
officer candidates who vrould continue to be called GCs. However, due to 
the lack of suitable preparatory institutions on the subcontinent, IMA 
cadets would undergo five terms of training over two and a half years 
instead of Sandhurst's three terms in 18 months.^’ Many felt that the 
extra two terms spent at Dehra Dun often resulted in a more uniformly 
educated and knowledgeable second-lieutenant.  ^®
Socially, admission was no longer restricted. Admittedly, the make- 
IÇ) of the IMA's first half-yearly batch of 40 GCs (which included future 
Indian Array Chief S.H.F.J. Manekshaw)^^— 15 (37.50%) cadets admitted by 
open competition, 15 selected from Indian Array VOOs and other ranks 
(after a two-year course at the Kitchener College, Ncwgong), and ten 
from the mdian State Farces (ISF) of the Princely States? * — reflected 
the military authorities' traditional bias for cadets of the martial
IMA admission age limits wvere 18 and 20. See ibid., pp. 189-190.
 ^® For the IMA pattern of instruction, see Sukhwant Sin^, pp.cit., pp. 
29-31.
See Cohai, op.cit., p. 121; Farwjell, op.cit., p 299; and Sukhwant 
Sin^ i, c^.cit., p. 35.
See Longer, op.cit., p. 209.
 ^^ In 1901, the British established the Imperial Cadet Corps (ICC) to 
train Princely States' subjects for officer positions in the Imperial 
Service Troops (1ST). A special form of ccmmissicm in "His Majesty's 
Native Indian land Faroes" made available four years later allowed IOC 
graduates to avoid the years as a s^xy which Indian Array VOOs had to 
eidure— thou^ their powers wvere just as restricted. Despite their 
sterling contribution during WWI, 1ST personnel w^ ere re-integrated into 
individual state militias or armies and renamed the Indian State Faroes 
(ISF). See above and Uxigeoc, pp.cit., pp. 208-209; Lieut.-General Sir 
George MacMunn, Ihe Indian States and Princes (London: JarroldS/ 1936), 
pp. 177-178, 182, 265; and Venkateswaran, op.cit., p. 189.
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races and/or aristocracy/^ Nonetheless, the IMA's much Icwer, all- 
inclusive fees made the academy affordable to a wider segment of Indian 
society, especially the sons of the burgeoning, educated middle-class/* 
A limited number of scholarships provided by provincial governments
 ^* Ihe IMA's bias for cadets from martial races' areas and Princely 
States may be seen on Table FT 2.2 in which such regions are 
highli^ted. Figures for (a), (b) and (c) adapted from Lt Gen Dr M.L. 
Chibber, Military Leadership to Prevent Military Coup (New Delhi; Lancer 
International, 1986), p. 40. Figures for (d) adapted from aitton, 
op.cit. MGŒE: I have corrected the arithmetical/typographical errors in 
lines 1, 3, 7-12, 15, and the total as shown in Chibber's table of 
figures on p. 40.
TABLE FT 2.2
Officer candidates in the first ten IMA regular courses (1932-36) 
by area, area's percentage of national pc^ sulation (1931), and ratios
(a) Province, (b) Number (c) Percentage (d) Area's (e) Patio of
State of of Total Percentage (c) to (d)
or candidates Number of of National
Agency Candidates Population
(1) Punjab 165 41.67 6.68 6.24/1
(2) NWFP 50 12.63 0.69 18.30/1
(3) United Provinces 41 10.35 13.72 0.75/1
(4) Delhi 13 3.28 0.18 18.22/1
(5) Bombay 9 2.27 6.22» 0.36/1
(6) Central Provinces 6 1.52 4.40 0.35/1
(7) Madras 6 1.52 13.25 0.11/1
(8) Bengal 4 1.01 14.20 0.07/1
(9) Gujarat 4 1.01 1.13® 0.89/1
(10) Kerala 3 0.76 1.91 0.40/1
(11) Burma 3 0.76 4.16 0.18/1
(12) Bihar 2 0.51 5.34= 0.10/1
(13) Orissa 1 0.25 5.34= 0.05/1
(14) Other 1 0.25 -.— /I
(15) Princely States 88 22.22 13.03 1.71/1
Total 396 100.01 90.25
* Population percentage is for "Bcmibay Presidency including Aden”.
® Population percentage is for **Westem India States Agency".
° Respective population percentages for "Bihar" and "Orissa" are halved 
number for "Bihar and Orissa".
Ccmpare the IMA fee of Rs.3850 to the expected expenditure of 
Rs.20,000 at the RMC. See above and Venkateswaran, op.cit., p. 190.
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provided further access/^ (No fees were charged to arny-nominated 
cadets.) Uius, the first batch of IMA cadets included youths of "all 
castes and creed— Hindus, ïtelims, Sikhs, Christians, Parsis and Anglo- 
Indians— and from the hi^i and humble families".^ ®
II. Developing Professionalism
II.A. CSDjective and Subjective Control
To a large extent, the Britidi-led government of pre-independent 
India ensured its stçremacy^f-rule over the Indian Army^s British 
officers throu^ objective control; minmizing their influence by 
maximizing their professional characteristics of ejqjertise, 
responsibility and corporateness. While these officers' expertise, as 
measured by "objective standards of professional competence"  ^’ may be 
argued to have been no better and perhaps poorer than that of some 
European counterparts, it was superior to any found c»i the subcontinent. 
Ihe professional responsibility of British Indian Army officers to 
deploy their expextlse only at the discretion of its client, society, 
under penalty of e>^ 3Ulsion from their profession was also respected, as 
evidenced by their unquestioned obedience to Crown rule. Finally, 
corporateness, or that "sense of organic unity and consciousness of 
themselves as a group apart",flourished among officers so obviously 
différait to the general population. Firmly under objective control, 
British Indian Army officers were the tools of their civilian masters.
“  Venkateswaran, op.cit., p. 190. 
Longer, pp.cit., p. 210.
3 7 
3 8
Huntington, Ihe Soldier and the State, p. 8. 
ibid., p. 10.
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To a greater extent, however, the Raj secured ultimate power over 
British Indian Army officers throu^ subjective control, minimizing 
their power by maximizing their identification with the character and/or 
objectives of the regime. Britain's historical mistrust of a standing 
array** meant only those wealthy enouÿi to purchase a commission and 
SLÇ3pDrt themselves in a style unc±tainable on a officer's meagre 
official salary could command troops in the British Amy.* “ Besides 
inhibiting a coup from within, officers owing their position to the 
status'-qoo also discouraged any civilian radicsd reform movement. 
Althou^ the purchase system was abolished by Royal warrant in 1871,* *- 
and British Amy officers increasingly professionalized after the 
respective Crimean and Boer Wars,* ' British Indian Amy officers 
retained their traditional, privileged and conservative character. 
Indistinguishable from the Indian ruling civilian elite by ethnicity, 
education and socioeconomic status,*^  British Indian Amy officers were 
a mirror of their government, and little doubted the desirability, 
necessity and correctness of the Raj.
Theories of objective and subjective control are less clear vhen 
applied to the Indian Army's growing numbers of commissicaied Indian 
officers. In Table 0.1, the questicamaire respondents appear to suggest 
the paramountcy of objective control by ranking "Rrofessicaialism of the
J. Haswell, The British Amy A Concise History (London: Thames and 
Hudscai, 1975), pp. 7-11, 17-26.
*“ See Haswell, op.cit., jp. 28-29; Heathoote, cp.cit., pp. 177- 119; A. 
Perlmutter and V.P. Bennett, The Political Influence of the Military 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980) as used in Chibber, op.cit., p. 
10; and Yardley, op.cit., jp. 31-34.
*^  Yardley, op.cit., p. 34.
*^  See Chibber, op.cit., p. 10; and Haswell, cp.cit., pp. 95-102, 109- 
119.
* ^ Heathcote, op.cit., pp. 121-122, 140-144.
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armed forces” as the most iirportant factor in the armed forces' non­
involvement in independent India's politics. Yet follow-up interviews 
reveal most respondents as understanding an officer's professionalism to 
be composed simply of military expertise.** Questions conceming the 
nature of the military professionalism as bequeathed ty the British to 
independent India's military officers, of Huntington's perception of 
professional responsibility and corporateness, and of larger civil- 
military questions are dismissed as the province of the very hipest 
ranks only- Most officers, says Air Marshal 5, simply are too busy 
"concentrating on the technical and other working aspects of the job".*® 
Where the respondents do discuss professionalism in the context of 
civil-military relations, opinion is divided as to whether it includes 
an implicit, explicit, or no understanding at all of officers' 
subservience to the government.
Despite most respondents' reticence to view professionalism as more 
than expertise in training, tactics and command, their ranking of it as 
the prime factor ensuring civil supremacy-of-rule demands that it be 
examined in a context of historical subjective and objective methods of 
control. To begin with, was subjective control relevant— given their 
obvious ethnic and cultural differences, could commissioned Indian 
officers share their Briti^ counterparts' identification with the 
subocxitinent's ruling elite? What made objective control? Could 
British officers and KCIOs vHno had studied at Sandhurst have the same 
understanding of professional expertise as ICOs educated at the IMA?
** Lieut.-General Dr. M.L. Chibber breaks this esqîertise down into: "(1) 
the organizing, equipping, and training of this [military] force; (2) 
the planning of its activities; and (3) the direction of its operation 
in and out of combat”. See Chibber, cp.cit., p. 75.
*® From an interview with Air Marshal 5; New Delhi, 17 August, 1989.
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with the rise of the independence movement, would KCIOs and ICOs see 
their professional responsibility to the legitimate ruler of the 
subcontinait as laying with the British Raj or Indian nationalist 
leaders? Finally, given the many sources of ccnflict KCIOs and lOOs 
faced within the military (see below), to Wiat degree did they count 
themselves part of the overall corporate identity of the Indian Army?
II.B. At the Academies: "Officers and Gentlemen"
IXiring the interwar years, the Indian Army's British and Indian 
cammissioned officers began their careers with the same military 
education intended to make them into an "officer and gentleman". If the 
"officer" half of this equaticxi may be taken to entail professional 
ejqjertise, responsibility and corporateness, or those qualities \iAiidh 
make officers the tool of a government, the "gentleman" half may be 
interpreted as that behaviour appropriate for those cdiosen to be the 
armed mirror of the ruling elite.
Before becoming an officer and gentleman, a young Indian cadet had 
to overcome any number of prejudicial attitudes and practices at the 
RMC. Living in England from 1910 to 1923 had made Airtassjador Baig 
"almost a young Englishman". Only at Sandhurst did he "for the first 
time... [encounter] racial prejudice.. .We did not belong and were made to 
feel it".*® Of course, most Indian GCs had never before travelled 
outside the subcontinent nor had to deal with British boys as equals.* ’ 
For them, Ihorat's experience of suffering an "inferiority conplex vis-
** Baig, op.cit., pp. 32-34.
* ^ Among the exceptions was Chaudhuri: "Ihree years at an English school 
and a year as a house prefect had completely removed any inhibitions I 
mi^t have had about white men. I neither feared nor disliked them". See 
Chaudhuri, op.cit., p. 13.
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ar-vis British cadets"*® was oammon. That British and non-British GCs
hardly ever mixed compounded this new sense of not belcxiging, and
President Ayub Khan recalls how Indian cadets "all sensed that we were
regarded as an inferior species".*® To protect themselves and to bolster
their self-esteem, adds Chaudhuri, Indian GCs developed their own
unwritten code of conduct, a break from iiAiich would have meant 
ostracism. The rules were fairly simple. An Indian GC was to tip 
his servant 5 shillings weekly, Wiich was double the normal 
rate. At the cinema, the Indian GCs were to use the more 
expensive balcony seats and not the cheaper stalls. Visiting "Ma 
Hart", the RMC's favourite pawn shqp was taboo. Attendance at 
the end of term ball, a very colourful, affair, was forbidden 
unless one could bring an Indian girl to it. Finally, cutting in 
on or filching another Indian GC's girlfriend was the greatest 
crime of all. I suppose the first three rules were designed to 
show that Indians were not a poor race. Rule 4 made sense and 
rule 5, looking at the shortage of girls vho in those days would 
be seen with Indians, was a safety device.®®
unwritten rules also applied in the "open" competition between cadets
for executive ranks. "Indians", writes Lleut.-General Kaul, "were
allowed to hold only an honorary rank of up to a Corporal and could go
no hitler, unlike others. Nor could they command anyone except their own
nationals. This discrimination seemed incongruous..."®^— especially as
KCIOs would be entitled to command Briti^ troops and junior officers
Lpon graduation.
Despite the painful adjustment from India's privileged class to 
Sandhurst's underclass, many Indian cadets flourished under the RMC's 
strict regimen of training in academic, physical and leadership skills. 
Chaudhuri speaks for many Indian cadets vhen he fondly remembers
* ® Thorat, op.cit., p. 5.
*® Khan, op.cit., p. 10. Sandhurst had hosted a number of foreign 
nationals from the Middle East, Siam and the Orient for many years 
before the arrival of Indians. See Chaudhuri, qp.cit., p. 30.
®° Chaudhuri, op.cit., p. 36.
®^  Kaul, cp.cit., p. 23.
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the riding schools, the hours spent in the "halls of 
stu£ty"...the crack and thud of the rifle ranges, long bicycle 
rides in columns of two for outdoor exercise, bridge building, 
field engineering vhich seemed to mean digging interminable 
holes in the ground, and the frequent ceremonial parades, all of 
vhich made up life at the RMC remain vholly pleasant 
memories.° *
T,1 eut.-General Verma also enjoyed cadet life and does "not recall any
particular instance of racial discriminaticm at Sandhurst".®^
For all the prejudice against Indian GCs, they shared a privileged,
conservative and, in the case of FWRIMC graduates, a public school
background with the vast majority of British cadets®* vhich enabled most
to assimilate, and the RMC to impart, those qualities necessary to a
"gentlemanly" military professionalism. Kaul's recollection of his
education includes descriptions of professional e3q)ertise,
responsibility and corporateness:
I had imbibed much at Sandhurst. I leamt a code of conduct, a 
sense of discipline and the significance of honour. I vras tau^t 
a set of principles true to spiritual values by vhich can be 
judged vhat is ri^t. I acquired the rudiments of military 
knowledge, the basic techniques of ny profession and to 
appreciate the importance of turnout and skill at professional 
vfork and games and also to face agreeable and unpleasant 
situations alike. I vjas tau^t how to play the game, to know 
vhat the qualities of leadership were, the sense of many values 
and the honour of serving one's countiy selflessly and vdth 
devotion.® ®
That their education v»as intended to make Indian GCs into an integral 
part of the ruling elite is confirmed by Chaudhuri's recollection of the 
briefing given to all newly coraraissimed officers travelling to India:
®* Chaudhuri, pp.cit., p. 42,
®® Verma argues out that Indians "are perhaps over-sensitive to 
expressions used by English-speaking vhite races to describe non- 
vhites.. .We feel insulted, but never think twice about referring to an 
African as a habshi, or call and refer to our cwn "low caste" citizens 
by all sorts of derogatory names". See Verma, pp.cit., p. 8.
®* Yardley, op.cit. pp. 40-41.
® Kaul, op.cit., pp. 30-31. See also Ihorat, op.cit., pp. 7-8.
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The natives had to be firmly handled for familiarity would breed 
disrespect. Native habits and customs were declared to be 
inocaonprehensible and generally unclean. Apart from the men 
enlisted into the Indian army, the locals were classed as 
usually dif^nest. The only section of natives to vhom these 
rules did not apply were some, but not all, rajas and maharajas 
who could be useful hosts for shikar and polo. Indian women of 
any category were to be severely left alone thoi#i the Anglo- 
Indian could be discreetly dallied with but not married. Nothing 
was said about their history and culture of the country, nor 
about the faiths and beliefs of the people.. .The emphasis lay on 
preserving the prestige of the vhite man.. *
Chaudhuri doubts if the briefing officers were "really conscious”®’ of
the three Indians present.
While created in the hope of widening the intake, the IMA continued 
disproportionately to admit Gentleman Cadets from the north and 
northwest preserves of the martial races and train them according to the 
BMC ideed of an officer and gentleman— devoid of racism. Former NDA 
Secretary A.L. Venkateswaran lists the intentions of the IMA's course of 
instruction as:
(a) to develop in the Cadet the characteristics of leadership, 
discipline and physical fitness, and to instill in him a hi^ 
sense of duty and of honour, and a realisation of the 
responsibilities of a servant of the State,
(b) to ensure that a Cadet on joining his unit is in a position 
to discharge the essential duties of a platoon commander. [My 
indents and italics.]®*
Althou^ virtually identical in its emphasis on gentlemanly
professionalism and professicaial expertise and oorporateness, the fact
that IMA cadets were all Indians and were tau^t vholly on Indian soil
allowed the academy to lay greater stress on officers' professional
sense of responsibility to their client, society. The following extract
®* Chaudhuri, pp.cit., pp. 45-46.
Chaudhuri, pp.cit., p. 47.
®* Venkateswaran, pp.cit., p. 190.
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from C-in-C General Sir Hiilip Chetwcde's inaugural speech at Dehra IXin 
was later inscribed on the walls of the IMA for all GCs to see:
The safety, honour and welfare of your country come first, 
always and every time.
Ihe honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command come 
next.
Your own ease, comfort and safety come last, always and 
every time. [My indents. ®
Despite the IMA's more esqjlicit emphasis on officers' professional 
respcnsibility to their society, one avtoard question remained: in pre­
independent India which, exactly, was the client meant by 
Venkateswaran's "the State" and Chetwode's "your country" above? Was it 
the same as saying the British Government of India or did it aitail a 
"hi^er" loyalty to the "nation" of India, and/or to her peoples?
II.C. "Indianization"
Commissioned Indian officers' understanding of professional 
corporataiess was also a matter for debate, especially after the 1923 
imposition of the "eight unit experiment" vdiich limited KCIOs to two 
cavalry regiments and six infantry battcilions of the Indian Army.® “ 
Moreover, these ei^t units would no longer accept newly oommissicmied 
British officers, and all KCiOs already serving elsevAere encouraged to 
transfer. Officially justified as an attempt to prove Indian officers 
could perform as efficiently as their British counterparts on a 
regimental scale, the "Indianization" of the army unofficially ensured 
that, at least within the designated units, no British officer would 
have to serve under an Indian superior.® ^ And such was the paucity of
As used in Mason, qp.cit., p. 465.
®“ Verma, op.cit., p. 17.
®^  See Baig, op.cit., p. 53; Heathoote, c^.ci 
op.cit., p. 454.
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p t., p. 147; and Mason,
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hi^er positions now open to KCIOs that it would require over 25 years
fully to Indianize the ei#t units!® ^
The increasing number of KCIOs entering the Indian Arany socai forced
the ei^t units to replace their VOOs with KCIOs of seoond-lieutenant
rank. Althou^ British Army subalterns began their careers by leading
platoons, KCIOs deeply resented the "platoomsm"® ^ of having to command
the Indian Array's smallest body of men as demeaning their ooraraissions,
especisdly since non-Indianized units retained their VCOs. Platoonism
also greatly increased conpetition for promotion within the battalion,
kept static the number of Indian officers in the array as a whole, and
angered jawans by reducing their prospects. The first Round Table
Oonferenoe Defence suboommittee's extensiŒi of Indianization still
forced KCIOs and, later, ICOs to begin at platoon level.**
In addition to the formal career restrictions of Indianization,
oomraissicned Indian officers, especially the pioneering KdOs,
atteropting to develop a sense of professional oorporateness had to face
the challenge of informal professional and social prejudice. Chaudhuri
explains that, as the array was admitting Indians to positions of
significant responsibility much later than other government services,
many British officers "had not yet got used to Indians vho were prepared
to meet them in every way on their cwn terms".*® Baig agrees:
A British officer could speak with almost tears in his eyes 
about old Risaldar Bewaqpof Khan, or Jemadar Ooloo Sin^, vho 
may have served under him, but, at the same time, oould hardly
tolerate the presence of an Indian vho held the King's
ooramissicsi and was thus his social equal.**
* ' See Cchen, op.cit., p. 107; and D. Cmissi, The Sepoy and the Rai: The
Indian Army 1860-1940. unpublished manuscript. Table 6.1.
*® Farwell, qp.cit., p. 299.
Mason, op.cit., p. 465.
Chaudhuri, op.cit., p. 69.
* Baig, op.cit., p. 65.
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KCIOs expecting to assume a social position commensurate with their
responsibilities often came against unspoken barriers. KCIOs were the
first Indians to break the colour-bar at military clubs and social
functions— and this usually only if a sympathetic commanding officer
took it upcai himself to intervene on their behalf.*^  For Ihorat, the
usual British officers'
social behaviour [towards Indian officers]...bordered on the 
hostile. Ihey made no secret that Indians were not wanted as 
officers. We were forbidden to bring Indian food or play Indian 
music evai in our own rooms. Some Britidi officers did not allow 
their wives to dance with Indians in the club; in short we were 
treated as outcasts.*®
Kaul recalls British officers in his training regiment contemptuously
referring to Indians as *»WOGs (Westernized Oriental Gentlemen)” and
keeping aloof from any ccxitact with them.* ® For the sans of India's
elite, accustomed to deference and lives of ease, such treatment could
not have been easy to tolerate, much less serve under, and General
Ihimayya saw how it "could bring c»i feelings of inferiority and
insecurity with attendant personality complications"’ ° cxi junior
officers vho felt th^ could not openly protest or retaliate.
Some KCIOs ccped by visiting their frustrations with professional 
and social discrimination on lOOs. DCS Lieut .-General D.R. Ihapar 
recalls a mess dinner discussion on the new lOOs at \ihich a young KCIO 
asked the guests to "imagine our feelings vhen we have to call these 
[Dehra] Docai [sic] Pansies our brother officers. Ihey are only glorified 
V.C.Os and will never be real officers.. .after all these pseudo-officers
*’ See Ihapar, op.cit., pp. 135-136; Evans, cp.cit., pp. 86-88, 100-101, 
111; and Verma, op.cit., p. 22.
*® Ihorat, op.cit., p. 21.
*® Kaul, op.cit., p. 39.
Evans, op.cit., p. 81.
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are young men Wio oould not afford to go to Sandhurst".’  ^ "Fortunately", 
continues Ihapar, "there were only a few of this irritating type and the 
large majority were proud of these young officers and did all they could 
to make them at home".^ '
KCIOs and ICDs also differed in their respective contact with 
British officers. While KCIOs had at first been scattered throu^iout the 
Indian Army, lOOs were posted to units long Indianized and had much less 
contact with British officers. Sceptics thou^t their lack of 
professional intercourse with British comrades would result in lOOs 
being of inferior quality. IMA siçporters hoped instead that the onset 
of lOOs would signal the end of the tragicomic "Brindian" officer vho, 
thou^ Indian by birth and background, heedlessly aped British ways. 
Ihapar remembers one such officer who, thou^ bom and raised in 
Rawalpindi, pretended to forget Hindustani with such insistence that his 
Briti^ commander put him for the relevant language test where he 
"sang quite a different tune". Another kept his drawing room clock set 
to Greenwich time "just to knew vhat people at home are doing at this 
time" yet had never having travelled further west than Egypt.^  ® Althou^ 
"Brindian" entered common usage as a derogatory term, the British 
authorities approved, believing, writes Miascn, that commissioned Indian 
officers "must resemble British officers— and vhat is more, British 
officers from public schools— in every respect except the accident of 
birth".’* Anything else would imply a lowering of standards.
Ihapar, qp.cit., p. 126.
’  ^ ibid., p. 126.
ibid., pp. 93, 123.
’* Mason, op.cit., p. 458. m  this particular instance. Mason is 
referring to the 1923 A.H.Q. committee reporting on the Progress of 
Indianization.
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Despite the multitude of obstacles, cornmissicaied Indian officers
acquired a hi^ degree of professional expertise and corporateness
during the interwar years. Surprisingly, it was Indianizaticn which
provided the motivation and conditions for KCIOs and lOOs to develop
more quickly hi^ professional standards. Initially, this was because
British— and jawan— scepticism pushed the first commissioned Indian
officers to work twice as hard to leam the basics of military
expertise. Raul recalls hew
Ihe Britii^ had conveyed an impression to the Indian ranks that 
the Indian officer was perhaps sectarian in outlook and mi^t be 
partial to them in promotion, welfare and in other respects, 
unlike the 'sahebs' vÆio were so ^just and impartial'. The rank 
and file, therefore, greeted us rather apprehensively. They also 
wandered if we could compete in all respects with our foreign 
counterparts since they had never seen an Indian on equal terms 
with a 'saheb'. We had to work extremely hard and under great 
provocation, to do well.”
Indianizaticn also encouraged a kind of professional corporateness by
forcing the small number of commissioned Indian officers to compete not
only with themselves, but as a grocç> apart from the mainstream of
British Indian Army officers. Chaudhuri explains:
Had a handful of Indians been scattered round the iiAole army, 
their impact would have been minimal and, swamped by the British 
officers, they would have found it difficult to establish an 
identity of their own. Concentrated in the Indianising units 
their impact was much stronger and easier to evaluate as a 
successful, long overdue step.”
Thus, Indianization ultimately helped to spur KCIOs and ICOb to pursue
only the hipest professional standards of expertise and to develop a
distinct corporate identity within the Indian Army.’ ’
”  Raul, op.cit., p. 40. See also Chaudhuri , op.cit., p. 69.
”  Chaudhuri, cp.cit., p. 54.
”  Not all commissioned Indian officers enjoyed successful military 
careers. Chaudhuri describes the first KCIOs to join his regiment (the 
7th Li^t Cavalry). The first, a Burmese, **must have disliked both India 
and soldiering for in a couple of years he left for home and a job with 
the Burma Police". The second displayed "a total inability to pass his
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II.C.l. Questionnaire Respondents
Is this gloomy picture of Indian-British commissioned officer 
relations an accurate portrayal of that found during the later interwar 
years and World War 11? See Tcihle 2.1. Note: in Table 2.1, respondents 
are divided into four categories: "All"; "Pre-1945" (those joining up to 
1945 inclusive); "Post-1945" (those enlisting after 1945); and "Mmown" 
(those with no kncwn date of joining). Ihe examination focuses on "Pre- 
1945" respcaidents. Respondent Lieut.-Ceneral 92, as a KCIO, is omitted.
TABLE 2.1
What was the attitude of Indian officers towards British officers 
and vice-versa in the pre-independent Indian Army?
Respondents All Pre-1945 Post-1945 Mcncwn
Percent (No.) - — ^
Positive 25.26 (24) ,^34.29 (12) \ ^7.07 (7)) 26.32 (5)
Generally Positive 15.79(15) UZ.20 i5V 15.79 (3)
Mixed 17.89 (17) 20j0Q^_JXL^ 15.79 (3)
Generally Negative 13.68 (13) 4^^TS7 (9)^  ) 5.26 (1)
Negative 15.79(15) \ 17.14 ( ^ C  14.63 (6)^15.79 (3)
No Answer 11.58 (11) ^-e>4D0-<0) 17.07~n7T 21.05 (4)
Total 99.99 (95) 100.00 (35) 99.99 (41) 100.00 (19)
promotion examination from Captain to Major" and eventually "faded out 
via the Army Service Corps". The third, (future) Ambassador Baig, 
resigned for a mix of political and personal reasons (see Chapter 
Three). The fourth, too fcaid of alcohol, "had to go" and ultimately 
ended up as an officer in one of the Princely States. The fifth was 
killed in the 1935 Quetta earthquake. The sixth, Niranjan Sin^ Gill, 
"fell out with the Colonel and was transferred to an infantry 
battalion". After capture in WWll, he joined the Indian Naticnal Amy 
(see Ch^)ter Four) and after independence held a "number of minor 
ambassadorial anointments very successfully". Chaudhuri does not 
describe the fates of the three KCIOs vho joined the regiment before 
him. He does point out that, "If the Indian officers were rather a mixed 
bunch, that mixture was well matched by the British officers on the 
books of the 7th Li^t Cavalry at that time". See ibid., pp. 62-63.
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By more than two to one, the "Pre-1945” respondents characterize
relaticais with their British counterparts as "Positive” (34.29%) or
"Generally Positive" (20.00%) versus "Generally Negative" (8.57%) or
"Negative" (17.14%). Air Chief Marshal 12 is among the minority viho
recall relations as "very poor. I saw Indians transferred v^en promoted
so that they would not be in a position of superiority over Briti^
officers. I also heard hi^-rariking touring British officers enunciate
this policy".'^  For Brigadier 29, "Indians were allowed to become
officers [only] due to worldwide losses and inadequate numbers of
Britishers". Yet Brigadier 70 explains how good Indian-Britiidi officer
relaticms needed understanding on both sides:
Ihe cultural divide tended to to separate the two and our Indian 
taboos such as abhorrence of beef and pork and similar 
propensities did not help in the fusion of the two. Indian 
officers generally tended to criticise and find fault with the 
B.O.s [British officers], perhaps more out of envy at their 
aplomb and phlegm.
Brigadier 20 recalls "those Indians vAo blamed British prejudice for
sli^ts %hen really it was there cwn shortcomings and/or personality
clashes vhich were to blame.. .Once you proved [to British superiors] you
were good, you were good".^ * m  the end, writes Lieut.-General 4,
"Indians respected the average Briti^ officer for his character,
integrity and education". Ihe majority of "Pre-1945" respondents agree
with Brigadier 28 that the reverse was also true and that Indian and
British commissioned officers displayed "mutual respect and regard".
Ihat KCIOs and the majority of "Pre-1945" respondents disagree as to 
the state of Indian-British officer relations may be ascribed to their 
respective dates of coramissicaiing. For, whereas Indian only stqpped
From an interview with Air Chief Marshal 12; Pune, 11 October 1987. 
From an interview with Brigadier 47; New Delhi, 19 August 1989.
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being granted King's commissions in 1934, only two of Table 2.1's "Pre-
1945” officers enlisted during the interwar years— the remaining 33
joined during World War II.® ° These two distinct periods saw very
different British officers joining the Indian Army. Brigadier 70 recalls
two classes of B.Os [British officers] vhen I joined [in 1942]—  
the old-time regular and those that became officers during the 
war. The former, vhile strictly fair in most instances, only 
accepted the Indian [officer] as an equal Wien one proved 
oneself in some way. The newocmers fraternised more.
Indeed, Wiile praf^ ar-ccramissioned British officers teided to display the
inbuilt prejudices of the kol-hai ("Wio's there?") types who felt the
subcontinent their natural preserve, those entering the Indian Amy
during WWII usually had a more liberal i:ç3bringing and joined without
previously having formed censorious attitudes towards the capabilities
of Indian personnel. These significant differences mean the older
Sandhurst-educated groiç) of KCIOs' description of a relationship full of
pitfalls is more accurate of interwar Indian-British commissicmed
officer relations than that of the majority of "Pre-1945” respondents
who describe such relations as generally positive.
II.C.2. Price's **Reference-Grotç)” Theory of Military Interventicxi
The existence of Brindian officers signals a potential dilemma for 
the corporateness of independent India's officer corps. Rd^ert Price's 
"referenoe-grotç)" theory of military intervention holds that all 
individuals internalize the central norms and values, including certain 
modes of group thou^t and behaviour, of the societal referenoe-grotç)
®° The 35 "Pre-1945" respmdents joined so: œ e  in 1932, one in 1938, 
five in 1940, three in 1941, ei^t in 1942, seven in 1943, five in 1944, 
and five in 1945.
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with vAiich they identify.®^  Militaiy academy training, however, is a 
socialization process which replaces a cadet's identification with his 
original civilian reference-grou^ with new "ego-involved" associations 
centred on the armed forces. Price argues that so powerful is the desire 
of Ihird World officers to retain all aspects of their prestigious 
Western academy training that they develop a positive reference-group 
identification with the officer corps of the educating state.
Where the overseas training of a particular developing country's
officer corps is widespread, continues Price, a large proportion of
officers may become "non-nationalistic" and "zjon-puritaidcal" .* ® Ihe
first relates to officers \Ao are
not only.. .likely to share the disdain for politicians that is a 
component of the military ideology of the army of the "mother" 
country, but also.. .likely to share its contempt for leaders of 
the anti-colonial movement, men who subsequently become the 
leaders of the governments under vAiich these officers serve.® ®
Ihe second describes officers vto, instead of having an ideological
predisposition towards a regimented and austere mode of living, apply
their Western reference-group's standards to matters such as career
compensation and social behaviour, thus appearing extravagant to the
poorer, more conservative society of their own, developing country. Such
officers may then find themselves at odds with political leaders
attempting to shift scarce resources away from the armed forces towards
other areas, especially during early independence. Ihis "emulation
paradox"® * of non-nationalism and non-puritanism, argues Price, creates
an inherent tension between officers Wio wish that their country would
® ^ Price, "A Iheoretical Approach to Military Rule in the New States". 
®^  ibid., p. 402.
®® ibid., pp. 412-413.
®* ibid., p. 402.
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return to pre-independence standards of behaviour and order and the new
civilian regime striving to lead the country in a more egalitarian
direction. If the military perceives the new rulers or their corporate
status and/or rewards as less than those of colonial days, they may
execute a coup d'état.® ®
enviously, all commissioned Indian officers had to feel some form of
reference-groL^ identification with their Briti^ counterparts. Selected
because of their respective families' service to the Raj, membership of
a community deemed particularly loyal, and/or socioeconomic ties to the
British ruling elite, KCIOs were sent to the **mother" country to be
trained as servants of the Empire. Althou^ chosen from a wider pool of
applicants, most ICOs ccxrtinued to be drawn from the martial races
and/or families idiich had benefited from Briti^ rule. While they
attended a military academy on Indian soil, it was geared to producing
officers with the same professional skills and attitudes of Sandhurst.
Lieut.-General 49 describes the Indian-British referenoe-groLp
relationship from an unusual angle:
By 1944 there was no real difference between Indian and British 
[ccxnmissioned officers] due to [the] needs of the war and [a] 
great dilution of the traditional British officer with ncxi- 
public school educated [officers and those from]...lower social 
classes. In fact, the public school Ehglishraan seemed more at
® ® Price, however, obstructs his reference-group military intervention 
theory from the "soft" autobiographical data of only two instigators—  
À.A. Afrifa and A.K. Ocran— of one military cotp— Ghana 1966. Yet both 
Afrifa and Ocran were reacting in large part to the civilian regime's 
mishandling of armed forces' corporate concerns, the formation of 
official armed groups perceived to be competing with the arny, and these 
groups' pay and perguisites. EVen if relevant to Ghana in 1966, Price's 
reference-group theory appears inadequate as a model for all developing 
nations with a strong colonial past. See A.A. Afrifa^ Ihe Ghana Ooup 
24th February 1966 (London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1966); K. Nkrumah, 
Dark Davs in Ghana (London: Panaf, 1968); A.K. Ocran, A Myth is Broken: 
An Account of the Ghana Coup D'État (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 
Ltd., 1968); and Price, op.cit.
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home with public school Indians than with some of his own kind 
viho were not public school.
Public school-educated or not, far from all KCIOs commissioned abroad
developed the extreme reference-group identification of Brindians (many
of vhcm, paradoxically, had not been educated in England). Chaudhuri,
for instance, recalls that vAen the British commander of the non-
Indianized unit in vdiich he underwent a fortni^t's "suitability for the
cavalry" assessment requested him to remain if Army HQ agreed, he
refused. Chaudhuri reasoned that not only would HQ's almost certain
denial blot his future career, but it "seemed more important to go to an
Indianized unit vhere I would be itolly an Indian instead of a
continuing to be something of a brown Englishman"."* With their much
lower level of contact with Britiidi officers, ICOs could be expected to
feel even less influenced to become a "brown Englishman".
Ihat most KCIOs— and many ICOs— were less forthri^t than Chaudhuri 
in rejecting the extreme British reference-group identification of the 
Brindian officer is potentially dangerous for the future of independent 
India's civil-military relations. At least the Brindian was c^ )en, if 
somewhat ridiculous, in his loyalty to all things British. Only the 
coming of independence would reveal vherein and/or to \ihat degree lay 
the reference-grotç) identification— the old Crown or the new republic—  
and ultimate allegiance of the majority of commissioned Indian officers 
with more subtly expressed attitudes.
II.D. Izzat
Chaudhuri, op.cit., pp. 54-56.
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In pre-independent India, the question of to j/ibaoi or vAiat 
conmissioned Indian officers felt loyal, or professionally responsible, 
began with the Indian soldier. lb a large extent the jawan, like the 
sepoy before him (and the NOOs and VOOs vAo rose from the ranks), 
enlisted for the security and rewards offered first by the Honourable 
East India Company and then by the Crown.® ^ Ihe martial races enjoyed 
their designaticm as men of special fi<ÿiting ability, the anry's steaôy 
pay, and being pensicxied off with newly irrigated land in Punjab. Iheir 
communities were pleased with receiving their sons' remittances, having 
army pensions spent locally, and the knowledge that future generations 
were virtually guaranteed military careers. While the long-term benefits 
may have been less obvious to the military's non-martial races, their 
personal rewards were equally attractive. Finally, no stigma was 
attached to serving under a leader not of erne's own background, and the 
''mercenary" tag vhich later dogged Indian men— and officers— up to 
Independence had not yet surfaced (see Chapter Three).
Yet on the battlefield. Company and Crown soldiers fou^it not just 
for pay and pensicxi but to defaid their izzat, a complex mix of 
personal, familial, caste, religious and even generational honour melded 
with that of the unit in Wiich they served.® ® In the Indian Army, a 
close identification with regimental honour was encouraged with the
®’ See Heathoote, op.cit., jp. 105-110; Longer, cp.cit., p. 65; J. Lunt, 
ed., From Sepoy to Subedar hoi no the Life and Adventures of Subedar Sita 
Ram, a Native Officer of the Bengal Army written and related by himself 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970. Translated and first published by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Norgate, Lahore, 1873); Lieut.-General Sir G.
MacMunn, Vignettes Prom Indian wars (London: Sampson Low, Marstcn & Co. 
Ltd, 1932), pp. 195-210; Mason, cp.cit., pp. 207-215; and J.A.B. Palmer, 
The Mutiny Outbreak at Meerut in 1857 (Cambridge: CUP, 1966), p. 139.
*® Mason interprets the Hindustani word izzat as a combination of 
"glory, honour, reputation". See Mason, op.cit., p. 127.
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development of a unique internal structure of ’•class"— made \jp entirely 
of the same caste or ethnic groiç)— and "class ocmpany"— containing a 
different class in each of its three companies— regiments. As well as 
ensuring a measure of divide et impera within each unit, class and class 
company regiments allowed a British commander to do his recruiting 
simply by sending his NOOs to their villages with orders to get "more of 
the same". He then would then have troops united by speech, religion, 
caste, and blood to their immediate superiors vho were, in turn, 
conscious of proving to their commander that his faith in their 
judgement of recruits was fully justified.®® The boundaries between 
individual, clan and unit identities were then blurred by incorporating 
men's traditional social and religious observances into regimental 
functions,®® and the bond between officers, men and their unit further 
reinforced by emphasizing the solemnity of the oath vpon enlistment, the 
precision of guard-mounting, and the sacredness of the colours as the 
symbol of honour.®^
For the pre-independent Indian Army, a close identification of the 
jawan with his unit was extremely important as there was no deviously 
patriotic reason to join and fi^t, even after British control over the 
subcontinent became near total. Ihe Indian soldier may have felt a kind
®® Mason, op.cit., p. 350.
® ° Some say British insistence on recruiting only those Sikhs vAo 
strictly observed their religious rites helped preserve the Sikh faith 
as a separate religicai. See Heathoote, op.cit., p. 103; IfecMurm, Ihe 
Armies, p. 135; and Trench, op.cit., p. 11.
® ^ Regimental izzat created in the Indian Army a special working 
relationship fondly recalled in any number of British officers' memoirs, 
including F. Ingall, The Ta^t of the Bengal Tanry*rg (London: Leo Copper, 
1988); J. Masters, Buales and a Tiaer (London: Michael Joseph, 1956) and 
Ihe Road Past Mandalay (London: Michael Joseph, 1961); C.C. Trench, Ihe 
Frontier Scouts Paperback ed. (1985; rpt. Oxford Iftiiversity Press,
1986); and F. Yeats-Brown, Bengal Tanry^ r Paperback ed. (1930; rpt. 
London: Anthcay Mott Limited, 1984).
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of loyalty to a distant \diite ruler, but he understood his place in
society more as a client or an associate of an alien ruler/ ' Therefore,
it was crucial that throu^iout their career, jawans could feel that
their regiment was their home, and their British commander their mai bap
meherbani (literally "benign mother and father"). No problem would be
too small to ignore, none too big to overcame— together.' ^ When the
troops were well led, fairly treated and respected, the intensely
personal nature of the Indian Army's unique system of class and class
company regiments and dependence on martial races created a virtually
unbreakable bond of loyalty between a man and his unit in vAiich was tied
the very definition of his existence.'*
Despite the huge gulf in their respective political and
socioeconomic classes, ccmmissicaied Indian officers developed just as
powerful a loyalty to their respective regiments' izzat as did the
jawans. Like the troops, KCIOs were of specific communities and usually
served out their careers in one regiment, with every opportunity to
develop an intensely proud, proprietorieil attitudes towards it. As a
young lieutenant reporting to his new unit, Thorat recalls being greeted
by both an Indian NOO and the British commander with words to the effect
of "welcome to the finest battalion in the Indian Amy".'® He adds:
What pride those old soldiers had in their units 1 It is this 
fierce pride Wiich welds a unit together and makes it good in 
peace and even better in war. It drives men to make unceasing 
efforts to maintain and enhance its good name— its "Izzat". This 
is a big war-winning factor and the Services must assiduously 
foster it.'*
' ^ Heathoote, op.cit., p. 105.
See Raul's description of an Indian Amy unit as "like a large family 
with hi^ traditions" in Kaul, op.cit., p. 33.
' * See MacMunn, Vignettes  ^p. 55; and Mason, op.cit., p. 128-130.
'® Thorat, op.cit., p. 13.
'* ibid., p. 13.
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Althou^ loany lOOs differed from KCIOs in their respective families' 
political and socioeconomic status, most continued to come from British- 
designated martial races' areas. Those with previous familial or 
ooraraunity martial histories desired to add to them, vAiile those without 
suoh traditions were anxious to start new ones. Whatever their 
backgrounds, ICOs, like KCIOs, shared a stake in their regiment's izzat 
and felt just as strong a desire to succeed in their prestigious 
profession. In the end, an array based on recruiting selected martial 
races into strictly segregated class and class company regiments created 
a keen sense of personal and professional responsibility among jawans, 
NCOS, VCDs and commissioned Indian officers alike towards their client, 
not society but the regiment and, thrcu^ the regiment, the array.
The close personal identification of Indian Army men and officers 
with their regiment and, throng it, the army, mi^t pose a danger to 
independent India's future civil stçsremacy-of-rule. Hjntington argues 
that military professionalism's corporate characteristic lends officers 
a shared ccxisciousness of themselves as a group apart from society. With 
its unique izzat, specialized recruiting and distinctive internal 
structure, the Indian Army could be characterized as an impenetrable 
inner society. While very effective in battle, its personalized 
corporate loyalty mi^t adversely affect ccraraissioned officers' 
understanding of their proper role in civil-military relations. Gome 
independence, how would Indian officers react to government decisions 
affecting their corporate well-being? Wbuld their personal, regimental 
loyalty be transformed into a corporate allegiance to the central 
government, or further, to loyalty to some hitler notion of India?
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III. The Indian Navy and Air Force
An examination of the potential actors in a military coup vhich 
ignores or dismisses naval and air forces on the basis that only the 
army has the equipment and mar^ Jcwer necessary to take power and/or fill 
multiple government positions is inoonplete. Experience shews that non- 
anry officers, especially those in the air force, can lead a military 
intervention to replace the legitimate government.® ’ On the other hand, 
such has became the destructive power, range and efficiency of modem 
air forces that this branch of the armed forces may itself severely 
damage or even prevent an attempted takeover of government by the amy. 
The perceptions of naval and air force officers also indicate how 
military officers in general feel about government actions directed at 
the armed forces. Finally, as a number of the questionnaire respondaits 
are either naval or air force officers (four and 10 of the total 96, 
respectively), an examination of their professional origins follows—  
althou^ lack of space precludes a fuller treatment.
Ill .A. The Indian Navy
Like the Indian Army, the Royal Indian Marine (RIM), as the British- 
led Indian naval force was known until well into the twentieth century, 
ewes much of its traditions, tactics and professional character to the 
British. It, too, sprang from Honourable East India Company origins, 
served faithfully in the conquest of the subcontinent and abroad, and
® For example, Fli^t Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings' 1981 ooL^ in Ghana.
See N.a., "Ghana timetable for civilian rule". The Independent (London), 
7 March 1992, p. 11.
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fulfilled Imperial duties in the First World War.® ® The RIM also 
recruited selected Indian communities to serve in the ranks— Hindu 
Ratnagiri seamen and stokers (descendants of the sea-going Angria clan 
of Mahrattas) and Goanese galley, wardroom and paymaster staff giving 
way to a Punjabi Muslim majority by Independence!® ® — vMle reserving 
commissioned officer positions for Britiidi personnel only.
Only after Sandhurst's example did the RIM consider opening its 
commissioned officer corps to Indians. The first step came on 1 December 
1927 vdien the RIM IXifferin was re-dedicated as a mercantile marine 
officer-training vessel for Indian cadets (one of the first of vhom was 
R.D. Katari, later independent India's first Indian Chief of the Naval 
StaffHowever, vhile British cadets of two similar UK training 
vessels had long been eligible to sit the entrance examination for 
direct entry into the RIM, IXifferin graduates could join private 
shipping companies or various government port authorities in India only. 
Not until 1931 were the first Dufferin cadets allowed to sit for the RIM 
entrance test (vAien four were admitted, including B.S. Soman, the second 
Indian Chief of the Naval Staff) Indeed, the first two Indians to 
become RIM officers had bypassed the Dufferin altogether.^  ° ^
®® See Commonwealth War Graves Commission, op.cit., p. 12; Commander
D.J. nestings. The Royal Indian Navy. 1612-1950 (Jefferson, North 
Carolina; McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 1988), pp. 1-35, 309- 
319; K.S. Sidhu, The Role of Tthel Navy in India's Defence (New Delhi; 
Hamam Publications, 1983), pp. 5-21; and Verikateswaran, cp.cit., p. 21. 
®® See Hastings, op.cit., p. 81-82; and Katari, A Sailor Remembers, p. 
62,
Katari, op.cit., pp. 6, 90. 
ibid., pp. 14-15.
 ^° ^ Dijendra Nath Mukherji was commissioned as an Engineer Sub­
lieutenant in 1928 after training as an engineer in Calcutta and 
Scotland, while Haji Mohammed Siddique Chaudhri won entry throu^ open 
examination in 1930. See Hastings, op.cit., pp. 360-362; and Katari, 
op.cit., p. 14.
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Opportunities for Indians to win commissions in vAiat, from 1934 
became the Bpyal Indian Navy (RIN) / ° ^ remained inconsistent, limited 
and expensive. While British candidates could opt for an examination 
held in London and valid for all three Indian armed forces, IXifferin 
graduates sat a special test conducted by the FPSC, and other Indian 
candidates appeared for an examination in Delhi held conjointly with the 
IMA entrance test.^“* Ihe (historically) limited size of the officer 
corps in the sea-going branch of the British-led Indian naval forces 
also meant the annual intake of all new officers, British and Indian, 
was tiny, and permanent vacancies arose only from natural wastage and 
the like. Whether selected in India or England, all RIN officers were 
trained in UK naval establishments for which they had to deposit in full 
a personal share of their fee.^“®
Àlthouüÿi few in number, the RIN's commissioned Indian officers 
represented a wider geographic and socioeconomic background than the 
Indian Arroy's KCIOs and ICOs.^“® To a large extent, this was because the 
RIN's technically demanding posts demanded educated youths vho, by the 
late 1920s, were to be found among the Westernized middle-class in any 
of subcontinent's larger cities. Moreover, while the RIN continued to 
favour Punjabi I&islims as seamen, its lack of NOO positions and the 
subcontinent's relatively meagre sea-going tradition combined to curtail 
the growth of a naval martial races' lobby.
III.B. The Indian Air Force
Verikateswaran, op.cit., p. 21. 
ibid., p. 191.
Ihis personal share was £260 or Rs.3500. The Government of India 
contributed a further £1,268 for an Executive Officer and £2,261 for an 
Engineer Officer. See Verikateswaran, op.cit., p. 191.
See Hastings, op.cit., pp. 82-83; and Katari, op.cit., p. 11.
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with no pre-British predecessor on the subcontinent, the air force 
of modem India perforce had traditions, tactics and professional 
character based cai British origins. Ihe subcontinent's first military 
flying school was established in 1913 at Sitapur.^  “ ’ A Royal Flying 
Oorps (RFC) detachment arrived two years later and slowly grew into a 
body of some strength until 1919 vhen, like its UK counterpart vhich 
became the separate Royal Air Force (RAF), it too i^lit from the army to 
become the Royal Air Force in India (RAFI). Althoui^ the RAFI remained 
closed to the few Indians vho had leamt their aviaticxi skills at civil 
flying clubs set iç) in Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta and Lucknow in the late 
1920s,several Indian pilots had managed to become RFC commissioned 
officers during the First World War, distinguishing themselves in 
European theatre combat.^ '”
Ihe gallantry of the RFC's Indian pilots added wei^t to the 
argument that Indians be allowed to train as air force commissioned 
officers. Ihe ISC recommended giving selected Indians King's coramissicxTs 
to form an Air Arm of the Indian Army and, pending the establishment of 
proper flying training facilities on the subcontinent, training them at 
Cranwell.“ ® As with RIN candidates, Indians hoping to attend the RAFC 
sat their entrance examination alongside prospective IMA cadets. After
Lai, My Years with the lAF. p. 11. Ihe history of the lAP from its 
inception to the eve of WWII described in the text is taken from Air 
Marshal M.S. Chaturvedi, History of the Indian Air Force (New Delhi: 
Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1978), pp. 1-8; Lai, op.cit., p. 11-13; 
and Verikateswaran, cp.cit., pp. 21-22, 192.
Lai, op.cit., p. 11.
Before being killed in action. Lieutenant Indra Lai Roy won the 
Distinguished Flying Cross and Lieutenant S.G. Welin^tar the Military 
Cross. Another pilot, H.S. Malik, later joined independent India's 
Ministry for External Affairs. See ibid., p. 11.
ibid., p. 11.
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paying their fees/^^ successful candidates then endured the same two 
year course as their British classmates. The first batch of six Indian 
cadets went to Cranwell in September 1930 and five passed out as pilots 
two years later (including Suhroto Mukherjee, independent India's first 
Indian Chief of the Air Staff) into vhat, on 8 October 1932, became the 
Indian Air Force (lAF)/^^
Uhlike the Indian Army and RIN, the lAF granted commissions only to 
Indians. Because of nationalist fears e>qaressed in the Legislative 
Assembly that the creation of a third, separate defence service could be 
used as an additional means of continuing British domination of the 
subcontinent, the Indian Air Faroe Bill had insisted that only "genuine" 
Indians as opposed to "statutory" Indians be permitted to join the 
IAF.^ “  However, as there were very few commissioned Indian officers,^  ^ * 
a number of senior British officers and technicians sufficient to run a 
separate service were seconded to the lAF from the RAF. The Indian Air 
Force Bill also stated that the lAF be open to all suitable Indian 
candidates.This requirement, combined with military aviation's 
teohnical demands and the lack of any significant domestic tradition of
RAFC fees were £360 or Rs.4800 for the cadet and £220 for the 
Government of India. See Verikateswaran, op.cit., p. 192.
See Chaturvedi, cp.cit., p. 2-4; Lai, op.cit., pp. 12-13; and 
Verikateswaran, op.cit., p. 21.
Chaturvedi, op.cit., p. 4.
Ifiitil its great expansion during WWII, the lAF developed slowly, and 
only in 1936 was it detailed to assist the Indian Array in combat 
operations directed at maintaining peaœ in the NWFP. On the eve of 
WWII, the lAF included just 16 Indian officers and 144 Indian airmen, 
with mechanical backtp provided by the 22 out of 29 Indians vho, 
recamted from civilian railway workshops and trained for a year at the 
Royal Air Force Base in Karachi, had successfully qualified as 
^prentice Aircraft Hands. See Chaturvedi, op.cit., pp. 2-4, 6; Lai, 
op.cit., pp. 12-13; and Singh, Birth of An Air Force.
Chaturvedi, op.cit., p. 4.
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flying, produced an lAF officer corps more educated and nationally 
representative than the Indian Array.
Conclusion
Hie Indian Army's great strength remained the relationship of trust, 
loyalty and pride vMch jawans and their officers felt for one another 
and their regiment. With the exception of the Great Mutiny, this shared 
izzat grew and flourished through the cmquest of the subcontinent, the 
unification of the three Presidency armies, the shift to martial races 
recruitment, the strains of the First World War, and the introduction of 
cammissioned Indian officers. Ihe esqploits of the British-led Indian 
armed forces would provide independent India's military with a Icaig 
history of glorious fighting tradition on three continents.
Hie credit for much of this tradition must go to the small group of 
pre-independence commissioned Indian officers. Despite a multitude of 
formal and informal challenges— including the trials of Sandhurst, the 
racist ei^t unit experiment, the prejudice of British officers and 
polite society, and even the discrimination visited by KCIOs ipon ICOs—  
the RMC and IMA turned out officers vho were quick to master military 
professionalism's qualities of expertise and oorporateness. Their 
prowess was crucial as immediately i:çon independence these relatively 
inexperienced officers were rapidly promoted to senior command positions 
with responsibility for r^xilsing considerable threats to national 
security. See Table 2.2.^ ®^
Adapted from Chibber, op.cit., p. 35. Commissioned in 1950, General 
V.N. Sharraa was the first Indian Army Chief (1988-90) to have joined the 
independent Indian Army. From an interview with Lieut.-General 101; New 
Delhi, 18 August 1989.
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TABLE 2.2
The academy origins of array coramanders in the 
major military conflicts of independent India
Years Adversary Senior Coramanders Hi^ier Coraraanders
(Lieut.-Colonels) (Brigadiers and Above)
1947-48 Pakistan Pre-War IMA 1921-34 RMC
1962 China 1944-45 IMA 1921-34 RMC, Pre-War IMA
1965 Pakistan 1946-47 IMA Pre-War IMA, Wartime (1941-43) IMA
1971 Pakistan 1954-56 IMA Pre-1949 IMA
Independence would also reveal viherein lay commissioned Indian
officers' professional responsibility. Chosen for their loyalty to the
Raj and then trained to feel full members of the ruling elite, would
KCIOs and ICOs— and jawans— be able to transfer their sense of
professional responsibility to the new rulers of indepaident India?
Chaudhuri does not doubt the jawans' ability to do so:
Having been recruited and maintained in India, and having been 
recruited almost vtolly from the rural areas vAiere their land 
and its produce were their essential livelihood, Indian soldiers 
had their roots deep in the country. Once India became real and 
tangible, once it became their cwn, it was quite clear that they 
would fi^it as fiercely for their country as they had once 
foo^t for their good name, their ooraraunity and for gain.^  ^ ^
Yet for commissioned Indian officers, the departure of the British
ruling elite meant their **membership" lapsing and the subjective methods
of controlling the military lessening. At the same time, depending
solely on cA>jective methods of ccaitrol meant allowing the Indian Arroy's
'^ mercenaries" (in that officers and jawans volunteered to serve for the
military's security, rewards and status) wider corporate autonony. Mi^t
such a course threaten independent India's civilian supreraacy-of-rule?
Much would depend on Indian officers' understanding of the relationship.
Chaudhuri, General, p. 82.
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discussed in the next chapter, between themselves and those nationalist 
leaders vAio were poised to take over the reins of government.
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CHAPTER 3
Ooeissicned Indian Offioezs and Indian Nationalism
Introducticn
Ihe likelihood of a military oaap depends as such cn ooranissicned 
officers' perc^Ttion of the civilian leadership— and vice-versa— as on 
their understanding of professional responsibility. If a regime is 
perceived as inccnpetent and/or illegitimate, civil supremacy-of-rule is 
mdangered. So long as the Viceroy and his administration represented 
the universally acknowledged governing authority on the siiDContinent, 
questions concerning professional reqonsibility remained 
straightforward and commissioned Indian officers were free to 
concentrate on loyalty to their unit. However, steadily mere forceful 
and reqxnsible nationalist leaders were questioning the British ri^it- 
to-rule. Oould military izzat continue to shield mdian officers from 
the changing political landscape, or would the freedom struggle cause 
their professional responsibility to shift from the King fkperor to the 
nation?
Obviously, this chapter cannot provide a conprAensive record of the 
Indian nationalist movement from the 1885 founding of the Indian 
National Congress to the eve of World War II.^  Instead, it will focus on
 ^Ihe Indian nationalist movemait is well known and detailed elsesd>ere. 
See J.M. Brown, Modem India: Ihe Origins of an Asian Democracy Ftk. ed. 
1988. (Oxford: OOP, 1985); P.M. Chopra, ed.. Towards Freedom 1937-47 
(New Delhi: Indian Council of Historical Research, 1985); L. Collins and
D. Lapierre, Freedom at Midnight (London: Collins, 1975); D. Das, India 
From curzon to Nehru and After (London: Collins, 1969); P. Moon, 2 »  
British Conquest and Dominion of India (London: IXickwarth, 1989); and P. 
Spear, A History nf India: Volume IVp Ftk. e. 1986 (Harmondsworth,
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KCIOs' and lOOs' pesxseptions of the independence movement, and the views 
of nationalist leaders— and the public— of the Indian armed farces.
I. Ocraoissicned Indian Officers and the Nationalist Movement 
I.A. KdOs
Ihe independence movement interfered little with the military 
careers of KCIOs. like young officers in any army, KCIOs were kept busy 
with their professional duties and responsibilities. Whether they were 
tiaught under diffidait koi hai types or helpful and tolerant British 
officers, the small number of RdOs were very aware that as the first 
members of the army's Indianization eogperiment, they were under close 
scrutiny by both British authorities and Indian politicians to see if 
Indians oould handle command responsibilities as well as their British 
counterparts. So leam they must, and to the highest standards.
Oonforming to the Indian Amy's professional practices also meant 
assiduously ignoring politics, especially of the nationalist variety. As 
most Indian Army cantonments were located far from urban centres where 
nationalist politics were most prevalent, KCIOs became isolated from 
mainstream Indian thought after joining the military. More importantly, 
in the regimental mess, that particularly British military institution 
vhere "decorum and regimental customs were tauÿït and observed".* 
political discussions of any sort were judged wholly inappropriate. What 
little political awareness was allowed consisted of contrasting the 
internal racial and religious harmony of the army with the often
Ehgland: Penguin Books, 1973).
* Ihorat, From Reveille to Retreat, p. 14.
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ferocious oonnunal violence afflicting Indian society at large. KdOs
woriœd just as hard as British officers to shield their men frcro any
external attempts at hi^i^iting religious and political differences
which oould destroy their regimental izzat.
The absence of nationalist sentiments amongst the majority of RdOs
was also connected with their conservative, privileged Lçbringing.
General Chaucfcuri describes the interwar years as
an age whai the upper middle classes in India felt it necessary 
to have moderate political via®, which they must have felt was 
more important at the time than open revolution, violent or non­
violent. This seems to have been true all over India and not 
only in Bengal.. .It was only after Gandhiji began his first 
movement in 1921, that a greater political awareness slowly 
started to come into every Indian's consciousness.'
For the most part, the families of KdOs viewed nationalist politics as
upsetting the status quo from which they profited and their privileged,
commissioned officer sons accepted these sentiments. That the better
Indian families continued to send their sons to Sandhurst deqaite the
Indian CCS' high failure rate was but one indication of their unwavering
enthusiasm for British institutions.
Even where there was some family history of political involvement,
the freedom movement was not seriously discussed. Despite a grandfather
being W.C. Bonnerjee, Congress' first President, and growing up in a
Bengal "seething with political and nationalist fervour",* Chaudhuri
confesses that
much though I would like to.. .show myself as an ardent 
nationalist at an early age as some of my military 
contemporaries seem to have done, I find it difficult to recall 
any significant political action or discussion either in our own 
home or in the homes of our relations and friends. Naturally we
' Chaudhuri, General J.N. Chaudhuri, pp. 11-12.
* ibid., pp. 3, 11.
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admired the nationalists and talked about a time the 
country would be free but this is where it ended.’
Only '*many years" later did Chaudhuri discover that his father had "in
1917.. .openly joined the extremists and played a leading role in ousting
the moderates from.. .the Congress Party".* For reasons of secrecy or
sisply because their families were uninterested, most upper-class
youths— including future KdOs— were shielded from nationalist politics.
Yet a few KdOs were involved in the freedom movement while youtdis. 
Lieut.-General Kaul recalls pasting a "nationalistic poster at the 
entrance of a British official's residence", delivering "a parcel to a 
mendicant in the Old Port [of Delhi]...at the dead of night", and 
frequent visits to the Legislative Assembly where he heard "stirring 
speeches" by leading nationalist politicians.^  Lieut.-<3eneral Veraa. 
recounts how his father, "a strong nationalist", reluctantly gave his 
consait for him to leave school in re^xnse to Gandhi's call for student 
boycotts.*
Ihe general lack of nationalist sentiments among KCIOs is reflected 
in their reasons for joining the Indian Amy. Take the seven illustrious 
FMC GCs discussed above. General Tbimayya, Iieut.-Oeneral Thorat and 
Ambassador Baig enlisted in the military with boyish enthusiasm after 
little prompting from families and/or clans with a tradition of 
government service. Resident Ran was eager to follow in the footstqs
’ ibid., pp. 10-11.
* ibid., p. 11.
’ Kaul was also in the gallery vhen Bhagat Sin^ and B.K. Dutt e9q>loded 
two bombs in the Legislative Assembly and, ailong with many others 
present, was detained briefly on suspicion. See Kaul, The Ohtold Story, 
pp. 9-11.
* Verma returned after losing an academic year and went on to join the 
PMC from the famous Govemmait Oollege, Lahore. See Verma, To Serve with 
HODas:, pp. 2-3.
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of his risaldaiMnajor father.* Despite his strong nationalist 
sentiments, even Kaul chose the military because he "scu^it a life of 
advmture".^* Viiile Chaudhuri enlisted mainly as a means of getting away 
from his extended family circle of lawyers and doctors, he told his army 
interview board he wanted to join-tp because "the military profession 
was an honourable and necessary one while the importance of Indians 
joining the army of their country could not really be ignored".^  ^ Verma 
(vho to a much lesser degree than Kaul displayed some nationalist 
synpathies) does not give any particular reason for his choice of 
career. H tus, of the six out of seven KCIOs above who give a ^ ^^edfic 
reason for choosing an army career, five do so because of a family/clan 
tradition of govenment/ini 11 tary service anà/or to sedc adventure. Only 
one, Chaudhuri, esplains his decision in wtet may be demned patriotic 
terms.
Not surprisingly, Indians with overt nationalist seitimaits were
hard to find once conmissioned into the any. Kaul (perhaps enhancing a
tattered reputation) remembers
that whilst I and a few other Indians, in extreme minority, used 
to argue for our nationalist cause or in support of our 
nationalist leaders, many of our compatriots who rose later to 
occupy the hi^iest military posts.. .poured unwarranted and 
critical ccm aFait on our national leaders.. '
Although Kaul's compatriots may have included a number of Brindian
officers believed in the superiority of all things British, others
must have been playing safe since Indian officers deemed particularly
* See Baig, In Different Saddles, p. 32; Evans, ThiTTByva of India ^ pp. 
30, 40; Khan, Rriends Not Masters, pp. 2, 7; and Ihorat, op.cit., pp. 1, 
218-223.
Kaul, cp.cit., pp. 16-17.
“ Chaudhuri, op.cdt., pp. 2-3, 25.
Kaul, op.cit., p. 41.
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unsuitable to serving the Raj were sometimes forced to resign/'A few 
RdOs also resigned their ccomissicns voluntarily, though this was 
usually the result of a disillusicrment witdi the harshness of military 
life, the ddoilitating effect of entrenched racism, and/or because one 
could not make the grade rather than any appreciation of the nationalist 
cause
A ccDhination of all of the above factors led to Baig resigning his
Captain^s commission. From a very Westernized and privileged background,
Baig was deeply resentful of the racism he encountered in the Indian
Army. Moreover, he clashed on two occasions %d.th the same siçerior
British officer, the second of which cost him a sufficieitly high
grading to be ^ pointed adjutant. Ihe politics of the freedom movement
also entered his life %hen, %Aile stationed at Allahabad, he visited
leading nationalists. Baig left this posting
a very different person... [who] felt that there were greater 
things to be done than to be trained, and to train others, for a 
war with which India mi^it not be concerned. To prepare to die 
and to kill for someone else's country seemed particularly 
athorrent.^  *
Soon afterwards, and despite the protestations of his fellow KdQs that 
leaving would only add to arguments üat Indians were unfit for King's 
commissions, Baig resigned.
Yet the vast majority of KCIOs concentrated on conforming to the 
professional standards and established practices of military life. Most 
were keen to achieve excellaice in a career previously reserved for 
British officers vhich meant learning the methods vhich continued to
“  See Evans, op.cit., pp. 96-98, 114-115.
 ^* Venaa recalls that the "one universal esqjlanaticn for failing cn a 
course or Indian examination or getting an adverse report was: 'because 
I was anti-British'". See Verma, op.cit., p. 14.
Baig, op.cit., p. 69.
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bend all cxxmissioned officers to each other, their men, and the 
regiment. Even Kaul admits that his British Ocnpany Oonmander, Major 
Rees, "was my idol and I tried to emulate his example thrcu^xxit ny 
professional life".^‘
I.E. lOOs, or Questionnaire Re^xxidents
If KCIOs had little compunction about dismissing nationalist 
politics in favour of advancing their career, vhat of ICOs? IMlike the 
former, trained in Ehgland largely in the 1920's, the latter imbibed 
their professional education at the Dehra DurHased D A  from the early 
1930's onwards. Moreover, lOOs entered the Indian Army at a time when 
the freedom struggle had been active for some time; when the question of 
the British leaving India was rapidly changing from a context of "if" to 
"when". Would their personal politics be more in synpatly with the goals 
of Indian nationalism than with the KCIOs' status-quo conservatism? If 
so, would this affect the continued loyalty and discipline of the 
British-led Indian armed forces?
I.B.l. Youthful Involvement
Given its growing popularity during the interwar years, were ICOs 
involved involved in nationalist activities? See %ble 3.1. In %bles
3.1 to 3.6 KdO Lieut.-General 92 has been omitted. Sinoe the remaining 
respondents consist of lOOs or other IMA-trained officers, they are 
deemed interchangeable with lOOs and are addressed as such. In Tables
3.1 to 3.8, respondents are divided into four categories: "All"; "Pre-
Kaul, op.cit., pp. 48-49.
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1945” (those joining up to 1945 inclusive) ; "Post-1945” (those enlisting 
after 1945) ; and "Unknown” (those with no known date of joining).
TABL£ 3.1
Were you yourself, any family menfcers, and/or close friends 
personally active in the indepmdenoe movement?
Respondents All Pre-1945 Post-1945 Uhknown
Peroent(No.)
No 69.47 (66) 77.14 ( 27) 68.29 ( 28) 57.89 (11)
Yes 28.42 ( 27) 20.00 ( 7) 29.27 (12) 42.11 (8)
Self Only 40.74 (11) 14.29 (1) 41.67 (5) 62.50 (5)
Family and/or 44.44 (12) 71.43 (5) 41.67 (5) 25.00 (2)
Friends
Both 14.81 (4) 14.29 (1) 16.67 (2) 12.50 (1)
No Answer 2.11 (2) 2.86 (1) 2.44 (1) 0.00 (0)
Total 100.00 (95) 100.00 ( 35) 100.00 (41) 100.00 (19)
Like RdOs, the vast majority of lOOs did not have first- or even
seoond-iiand experience of the ind^iendenoe movement. Over two-thirds
(69.47%) of "All” respondents answer "No”; neither they, their family
nor their friends were involved in the struggle for swaraj (freedom).
Of the more than a quarter (28.42%) of "All" re^xxidents who say
"Yes” to involvement in nationalist activities, just over two-fifths
(44.44%) describe actions by "Family and/or Friends" only. These usually
took the stïape of joining Oongress Party activities etnd/cr youthful,
student-day e)q)loits. Majors-General 85 describes the consequences;
elder brother was President of the Indian National Congress 
Ccranittee in 24 Parganas. He took [an] active part in the 
independence movement and spart many years in jail on several 
occasions. Later he was detained at home with a police guard 
mounted 24 hours.
Lieut.-General 49 adds that such familial anchor frimds' actions "did 
not seem to affect our personal relations”. Débité growing popular
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resQTtment with the Raj, sons and cousins continued to join the armed 
forces without caisure from Idieir more politically active family members 
and/or friends (see below).
Of the minority (28.42%) of "All" re^xudents who recall naticredist 
activities, a majority (55.55%, or 40.74% "Self Only** plus 14.81%
"Both") were themselves involved. Most such actions were limited to 
studart days, with Baigalis in the forefront. Major-General 33, "as a 
student in Presidency College, Calcutta...was involved in [the pro- 
independence] All-India Student Federation", while Brigadier 47, as "a 
student in Calcutta" joined the 1932 civil disobedience mcrvusnt and was 
subsec^ iently "sentenced to six months iiiprisonnent". Admiral 58 "was a 
member of the Seva Dal whioh %#as a youth vdng of ths Congress", and 
Brigadier 64 "used to attend all local Oongress meetings". Brigadier 40 
participated "to the extent that 2Ü.1 young men were fired with zeal in 
those days... [and took part] in demonstrations, shouting slogans and 
being thrilled %Aen chased by the police!"
A few respondents were more daring— or foolharxfy— in their 
nationalist exploits. "As a student", Major-General 20 "planted a high 
e9g)losive bomb under a British military train. I was nearly killed by 
the police firing. I saved myself by junping into the swollen Ganges and 
^dmdng 11 miles". Wiile a Lucknow Uhiversity student, Lieut.-General 
95 formed "a small secret party of six in 1942...[which] carried out 
violent activities on a fair scale— [we] burnt some police stations, 
destroyed by esq)losives communications' channels, cyclostyled and 
secretly distributed revolutionary material". After arrest under the 
Defence of India Rules whioh allowed only death by hanging as 
punishment, he and his conpatriots refused to enter their cells because
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they were "not provided with the regulation six lanterns". T.inod 
against a wall and givai a count of ten to reconsider or be shot on the 
spot, they were saved on seven by the synpathetic (Indian) jail 
superintendent %Ao agreed to their demand for the lanterns before 
sending them to their cells with the whispered advice: "you want to 
serve your country? You can do it much better alive than dead". Due to a 
combination of his (American) college president's arguments on his 
bNialf and police bungling, Lieut.-General 95 was eventually freed.^  ^
Ihe nationalist movement's increasing attraction for educated Indian 
youth during the interwar years is hi^ilighted by the growing 
participation of the "Yes" re^ondents. JUst over a quarter (28.58%, or 
14.29% "Self Only" plus 14.29% "Both") of "Pre-1945" officers themselves 
participated in nationalist activities compared to fully three-fifths 
(58.34%, or 41.67% "Self Only" combined with 16.67% "Both") of "Post- 
1945" respondents. (Over the same period, such actions by "Family and/or 
Friends" fell from just under three-quarters (71.43%) to just over two- 
fifths (41.67%).) Uhlike KCIOs and even "Pre-1945" ICOs, a significant 
minority of Indian officers commissioned after 1945 could boast of 
youthful, personal involvement in the nationadist movement.
I.E.2. Reasons for JOining-Up
Did this significant minority's involvement in, and/or knowledge of 
nationalist activities lead lOOs to choose a career in the armed forces 
fear different reasons than had KCIOs? See Ibble 3.2. As with KCIOs,
 ^’ From the questionnaire and a follow-iç) interview with Liait.-General 
95; New Delhi, 14 S^itember 1989. His story is confirmed in T.N. Kaul, 
Reminiscaxes Discreet and Indiscreet (New Delhi: Lancers Publishers, 
1982), pp. 93-94.
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factors affecting ICOs' decision to enlist also depended on their
respective family backgrounds. so see also Table 3.3.
TABLE 3.2
Why did you join the military?
Respondents All Pre-1945 Post--1945 Uhknown
Peroent(No.)
Adventure 31.58 (30) 34.29 (12) 21.95 (9) 47.37 (9)
Career Prospects 29.47 (28) 25.71 (9) 34.15 (14) 26.31 (5)
Utplanned 12.63 (12) 8.57 (3) 19^ 51 (8) 5.26 (1)
Family Military 12.63 (12) ^9.76 5.26 (1)
Tradition
Patriotic 9.47 (9) 8.57 (3) 12.20 (5) 5.26 (1)
To Fight in WWII 4.21 (4) 2.86 (1) 2.44 (1) 10.53 (2)
Total. 99.99 (95) 100.00 (35) 100.01 (41) 99.99 (19)
ThESL£ 3.3
Wiat was your father's occupation?
Respondents All Pre-1945 Post-1945 laiknown
I^ eroent(No. )
Government Service 36.84 (35) 37.14 (13) 36.59 (15) 36.84 (7)
Law/Business 12.63 (12) 14.29 (5) 9.76 (4) 15.79 (3)
Engineering 10.53 (10) 11.43 (4) 12.20 (5) 5.26 (1)
Medical Doctor 9.47 (9) 5.71 (2) 9.76 (4) 15.79 (3)
Education 8.42 (8) 5.71 (2) 9.76 (4) 10.53 (2)
Military 7.37 (7) 11.43 (4) 7.32 (3) 0.00 (0)
Agriculture 5.26 (5) 8.57 (3) 2.44 (1) 5.26 (1)
Landlord 4.21 (4) 0.00 (0) 9.76 (4) 0.00 (0)
Other 2.11 (2) 0.00 (0) 2.44 (1) 5.26 (1)
No Answer 3.16 (3) 5.71 (2) 0.00 (0) 5.26 (1)
Total 100.01 (95) 99.99 (35) 100.03 (41) 99.99 (19)
Oorparing the respondents in Table 3.3 with the sevai KCIOs 
described above reveals a continuity in family occupations. Like four—  
Khan, Thiraayya, Ihorat and Baig— of the six (66.67%) KCIOs giving a 
reason for joining the military, almost half (44.21%) of "All" 
respondents had fathers eroployed in "Government Service" (36.84%) or the
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••Military" (7.37%). lOOs, too, grew up knowing something of serving the 
Government of India and could be expected to be desirous of, or pudKd 
into following in their fathers' footsteps.
Tâble 3.2 shows lOOs also following KCIOs in their motives for 
joining the armed forces. The third (34.29%) of "Pre-1945" respondents 
who describe "Adventure" as üie main factor in choosing a military 
career share the boyish athusiasm of Thimayya, Kaul and Ihorat, and 
Baig. Brigadier 28 was "fascinated with military life and [the] glamour 
of an officer's life in prewar India".
Ihe quarter (25.17%) of "Pre-1945" respondents who joined the armed 
forces for "Career Pro^iects" make this the second most popular reason. 
Like the above KCIOs, this choice is partly due to these officers' 
positive e)q)erienoes of fathers employed in "Government Service" or the 
"Military". It also reflects the lOOs' more modest socioeconomic 
standing compared to most KCIOs, and thus their greater concern with job 
security, prcmotion proqpects and earning potential.
Ihe fifth (20.00%) of "Pre-1945" re^xxidents who make "Family 
Military Tradition" the third most popular reason for joining-tp 
continue a more obvious tradition of the above RdOs. (Ihat this 
percentage is higher than the 11.43% of Table 3.3's "Pre-1945" 
respondents whose fathers were in the "Military" is due to dan, 
gæerational and/or an extended family record of service in the armed 
forces.) Air Marshal 3 describes a "family tradition of government 
service, especially in the army, since Maharaja Ranjit Sinÿi's time".
great grandfather was wounded during [the Great] Mutiny in 1857", , 
adds Major-General 86. "We knew no other profession".
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Only after WWII do more differenoes emerge in lOOs' and KCIOs' 
re^jective reasons for joining the military. In Table 3.2, "Post-1945" 
respondents relegate "Adventure" (21.95%) to second place in favour of 
"Career Projects" (34.15%). Major-General 31 explains how "during WWII, 
all options other than the armed forces were nearly closed". The 
military, adds Lieut.-Colonel 11, offered "about the only career. • .when 
I finished my B.A. in 1943". (To entice educated young men to ailist, 
recruitment to non-military all-India govemnent services was suspended 
from 1942 until the end of the war. )^ “ The war's limited job market also 
forced boys with no history of martigü. service to consider a career in 
the armed forces as evidenced by the comparatively small number (9.76%) 
of "Post-1945" respondents who joined-up because of a "Family Military 
Tradition".
Perhaps the most striking change over time between ICOs' and RdOs' 
re^)ective reasons for choosing a military career is the growing number 
of the former joining-tp for "Uhplanned" reasons. Whereas less than a 
tenth (8.33%) of "Pre-1945" reqaondents choose this option, the fifth 
(19.51%) of their "Post-1945" counterparts v*o do make this their third 
most popular reason. Wing Oonnander 26 entered üie air force to avoid a 
"wait for two years before I could appear for [the entrance examination 
to the] Indian Administrative Service". Major-General 85 joined-tp after 
reading an "advertisement in the The Statesman in 1946 calling rpon 
Indians to epply for selection as Permanait Coonissioned Officers". 
Brigadier 39 e>q)leuns hew, "after studying for [the] 'medical groiç)' for 
two years in college, I found myself not fit enouÿi to follow [in] the 
footst j^s of my ancestors [and therefore] decided to join the amy".
T.N. Kaul, op.cit., p. 105.
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Unlike RdOs, many lOOs, e^secially after WWII, opted for the armed 
forces only after other career options had been exhausted.
Tüble 3.2 2ÜJSO reveals a small but growing nuicber of respondents 
who, like Chaudhuri above, chose a military career for "Patriotic" 
reasons. However, because of their reflective times of commissioning, 
just what RdOs and lOOs understood to be "patriotism" was very 
different. For the former, concerned with finding their place in a 
British-ruled subcontinent, there could be little sense of "Indiamess" 
exclusive of King and Boopire. Yet for many of the latter, the rise of 
nationalism during the interwar years meant that to be truly "Indian" 
entailed imagining a subocntinoTt free froxn British rule. Ihe few 
(8.57%) "Pre-1945" "Patriotic" respondents perceived a military career 
as a means to an end. Lieut.-Cenered. 10 joined-tp so as "to assist in 
the independence of India by being prfiared to weaken the British 
military stronghold from within", while Lieut.-General 49 chose an any 
career "as a possible beginning to help in getting the British out of 
India after the war finished". Such sentiments were potentially 
e9q>losive in an army still commanded by a British C-in-C and a country 
ruled by a British Viceroy.
By the time the tenth (12.20%) of "Post-1945" "Patriotic" 
respondents gained their commissions, there was less argument over %Aat 
the term meant. Entering the armed forces after 1945 but before the end 
of the Raj, Brigadier 90 recalls that "at the time of joining one felt a 
sense of participation and belonging to the army of free India". In 
1946, Lieut.-Goieral 95 gave up a planned career in engineering %Aen his 
"patriotic instincts were aroused" by Congress' The National Herald in 
which Nehru appealed to Indian youth to enlist in the defence services
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so as to serve Independent India's needs.In li^it of the naticnedist 
movement's grip on the imagination of the suboontinent, what is 
surprising is that not more "Post-1945" respondents cite a "Patriotic" 
reason as their strongest motive for joining the armed forces.
Miatever their family background and reasons for joining, lOOs 
believed they were enbar)dng xipan a hi^ily respected career. See Thble 
3.4. As with the KCIOs, the vast majority (83.11%) of "All" respondents 
recall the reputation of their chosen profession as "Excellent". 
Nonetheless, regional variations in the military's status reflected both 
the Indian Army's traditional martial races' recruiting bias and 
differences in nationedist awareness. For Brigadier 41, "the general 
public in North India had shown respect and consideration to the 
military...States like Kerala showed indifference, while in Bengal they 
tended to be hostile".
TABLE 3.4
What was the generally perceived status 
of a military career when you joined?
Re^xndents All Pre-1945 Post-1945 Uhknown
Percent(No.)
ExcellQTt 83.11 (79) 88.57 (31) 78.05 (32) 84.21 (16)
Good 13.68 (13) 5.71 (2) 19.51 (8) 15.79 (3)
Pair 1.05 (1) 0.00 (0) 2.44 (1) 0.00 (0)
Poor 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0)
No Answer 2.11 (2) 5.71 (2) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0)
Total 100.00 ( 95) 99.99 ( 35) 100.00 ( 41) 100.00 (19)
There are also the first signs of a slide in the respondents' 
perceptions of the armed forces's reputation. As "Excellent" becomes a 
less popular choice (from 88.57% of "Pre-1945" respondents to 78.05% to
From a follcw-iç) interviaf with Lieut.-General 95; New Delhi, 14 
September, 1989.
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of "Post-1945" officers), "Good" quadrilles its tally (frcm 5.71% to 
19.51%), and "Fair" gains its first adherent (from nil to 2.44%). Poor 
Vice Admiral 6, the armed forces offered "a lot of gold cn the arms; no 
money in the bonk". Still, as yet no reqaondent thinks that an armed 
forces' career suffered a generally "Poor" image %Aen he joined.
Ihat an overwhelmingly positive image of a military career continued 
from RdOs to lOOs is also shown in Table 3.5. Ihree-fifths (58.82% 
"Yes") versus less than one-fifth (16.18% "No") of "All" respondents' 
re^ective families ^ jproved of their young relations' career choice 
despite the wider politiced context of rising nationalism, if not also 
their own involvement in a%oraj activities. Wiat little parental 
disapproval there was tended to be worries about their son's safety.
TABLE 3.5
Did your career choice meet with your family's approval?
Re^xxidents All Pre-1945 Post-1945 Unknown
Yes
No
No Answer
Percent(No.) 
58.82 (40) 
16.18 (11) 
25.00 (17)
63.16 (12) 
10.53 (2) 
26.32 (5)
63.89 (23)
13.89 (5) 
22.22 (8)
38.46 (5)
30.77 (4)
30.77 (4)
Total 100.00 (68) 100.01 (19) 100.00 (36) 100.00 (13)
Thus, débité a growing nationalist awareness— and involvement— lOOs 
continued to chose a career in the armed forces for much the same 
reasons as had KCIOs. The similarities are most striking for interwar- 
conmissioned officers. Both KCIOs and "Pre-1945" respondents tended to 
come frcm families where the father was employed in "Government Service" 
or the "Military**, selected the armed forces for reasons of **Adventure" 
or "Family Military Tradition", thou^it their chosen career enjoyed 
"Excellent" status, and had the full support of their families in their
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job choice. Ihe one noticeable difference, the importance of •’Career 
Prospects** as a factor in the latter's choice of a career, simply 
reflects their relatively lower socioeooncmic standing. This slightly 
different background, combined with a dearth of adtemative employment 
opportunities during and immediately after WWII, meant **Post-1945** 
respondents joined the armed forces more for **Career Fto^ )ects** and/or 
**Uhplanned** reasons than had their predecessors. Yet they too tended to 
have fathers in **Govemnent Service** or the **Military**, enlisted also 
for **Adventure**, looked forward to a job with **Booellent** status, and 
enjoyed their families' backing in joining-tp. Except for the tiny 
minority of respondents joining for **Patriotic** reasons, ICOs, like 
KCIOs, did not let nationalist politics affect tiieir choice of career.
I.B.3. Career Attitudes
Cnee commissioned, ICOs also shared the KCIOs' opinions of the 
independence movement. See Thble 3.6.
TNSLZ 3.6
Wiat was the attitude of Indian officers towards the 
nationalist movement and its leaders?
Respondents All Pre-1945 Post-1945 Uhknown
Pexoent(No.)
Negative 3.16 ( 3 ) 2.86 (1) 4.88 ( 2) 0.00 (0)
No Particular Notice 18.95 (18) 22.86 (8) 12.20 (5) 26.32 (5)
Generally Sipportive
Thou^ Passive 65.26 (62) 65.71 (23) 65.85 (27) 63.16 (12)
Synpathetic to
Active Support 4.21 (4) 2.86 (1) 4.88 (2) 5.26 (1)
No Answer 8.42 (8) 5.71 (2) 12.20 (5) 5.26 (1)
Total 100.00 ( 95) 100.00 (35) 100.01 (41) 100.00 (19)
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In a reflection of the oonservatism of families used to government 
service, a small number (3.16%) of "All" respondents had "Negative" 
feelirgs about the indgpendgnce movement. Brigadier 70 explains;
own and, dare I say, the attitude of officers who came from 
gov't service houses %#ere aware of the foibles of seme of our 
politicians and hence [had] little respect for Nehru, his sister 
Vijaya Lakshmi, G.B. Pant, etc. Iheir doubtful credaitials for 
leadership viewed against the background of disciplined and 
controlled and well-led gov't servants...gave little, if any, 
hope of the grant of independence.
Ihou^ less likely than RdOs to be the sons of military officers,
aristocratic families and/or martiad races' communities, lOOs continued
to be drawn fxtxn the sidxxntinent's establishment, albeit a more middle-
class one.
A fifth (18.95%) of "All" re^xmdents took "No Particular Notice" of 
the nationadist movement. Like RdOs, lOOs adhered strictly to 
professional military discipline. Officers, recalls Wing Commander 26, 
were just "not authorised to think about it [nationalist politics]". "I 
don't think it [the independence struggle] mattered much", adds Lieut.- 
Colonel 80, "politics was not part of the raake-iç> of a service man". Ihe 
methods of winning swaraj were not stimulating. "For a soldier", writes 
Brigadier 69, "Satya and Ahimsa [non-violence]^ ® did not appeal much" 
even though there is a growing awareness of the nationalist struggle 
over time.
In the most popular re^xnse, two-thirds (65.26%) of "All" 
re^xondents were "Generally Si:çportive Though Passive" admirers of the 
independence movement. For Major-General 34, "Indian politicians of 
those days were men of treoendous integrity and moral force and they 
enjoyed a very hic^ regard among the Indian Amy officers". Yet overt
'® Brown, op.cit., pp. 204-205.
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support was shunned since, writes Brigadier 31, "British offioers 
definitely did ham to those Indian offioers whom they subjected to be 
nationalists”. The offideLl anti-swaraj bias of the Indian araed forces 
continued te be respected throughout the interwar years: two-thirds of 
both "Pre-1945" and "Post-1945" respondents agree a "Generally 
Supportive Thouÿi Passive" attitude towards the indgyendence acwement 
and its leaders remained the most popular view of Indian officers.
Whatever the dangers, a few (4.21%) "All" re^xndents rendered 
"Sympathetic to Active Support" to the nationalist movement. As with 
similarly minded RdOs, however, their options were limited. Brigadier 
83 recalls how "several officers supported the independence mcwanent and 
were prepared to relinquish their ooonissions towards this end. But they 
were persuaded to remain in the army because their services %#ould have 
been required when independence was achieved". Publicly supporting 
Swaraj remained perilous. "After Gandhi's movement in '42”, writes Air 
Marshal 7, "some offioans openly voiced their support for the 
[nationalist] movement and lost their jobs".
That a majority of respondents felt "Generally Supportive Though 
Passive" towards the nationalist movement and its leaders would be 
crucial to civil siçremacy-of-rule in independent India. See Thfale 0.1 
in which officers rank "Wisdom and stature of national leaders" as the 
joint ei^Tth contributing féfcctor in India never having eaqierienced a 
military cotç). The development of a core group of political leaders of 
one party— Oongress' Gandhi, Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel, Maulana Azad— who 
could unite and command both urban intellectuals and the uneducated 
masses in the campaign for independence was its greatest achievement. 
Moreover, mass participation in the freedom struggle over many years
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would give Indians an understanding of swaraj as rule by those popular 
political leaders who had led the movement. Ihe stability cruaal to 
ensuring civilian rule free from military interference was almost 
guaranteed as nationalist leaders, through the congress Party, would 
govern during India's formative years as a sovereign nation with the 
overwhelming consent of the people.
Yet this open si^port was in the future— deqpite a sigiificant 
minority of ICOs having participated in nationalist actions while 
youths, few serving officers were willing to speak up in favour of 
svaraj during the interwar years. Like KCIOs, they concentrated on 
developing professionalism, ignoring any open siçpart for nationalist 
politics which might interfere with their career proe^ )ects,‘ ^ and living
Ihe general reluctance of coranissioned Indian officers to get 
involved in any sort of political activity is further evident in Tables 
FT 3.1 and FT 3.2.
ThEL£ FT 3.1
Outside of the nationalist movement, have you and/or any members of your 
family ever been involved in politics anV^r stood for political office?
Self Family Both
Peroent(No.)
No 95.79 (91) 88.42 (84) 98.95 (94)
Yes 3.16 (3) 10.53 (10) 1.05 (1)
No Answer 1.05 (1) 1.05 (1) 0.00 (0)
Total 100.00 (95) 100.00 (95) 100.00 (95)
In %ble FT 3.1, overwhelming majorities of re^xrdents say "No" all 
catiegories of involvement in politics. Ihe details of the re^aective 
three (3.16%) ten (10.53%) and one (1.05%) who say "Yes" to "Self", 
"Famil]  ^and "Both" follow. "Self": Lieut.-General 10 stood for 
Parliament as an independent candidate in 1984; Lieut.-Colonel 25 helped 
on J. Balliles' respective campaigns for Virginia, USA, Attorney General 
and Governor; Group Captain 77 was a menber/advisor(?) with "Janata 
1976-1978". "FeBdly": Vice AAniral 6's father is a life-long supporter 
of Congress and for 10 years after his retirement was a nominated member 
of the Kerala Assembly; Lieut.-Colonel ll's brother stood for a
—113—
to the full the panpered lifestyle of the hard-drinking, polo-playing, 
shikari-fond "Poona colonel".
II. Nationalist Politicians' Uhderstanding of the Military
Livermore, California, USA, city council seat; Lieut.-General 15's 
maternal uncle is a U.P. Congress M.L.A. ; Major-General 33's grandfather 
(mother's uncle) was an active member of CPI before and after 
independence "based in Calcutta and Moscow"; Brigadier 53: "Yes, 
Congress(I)"; Brigadier 55's "cousin sister [sic]" was a "Congress 
central minister, 1970-75"; Major-General 68's "younger brother [was an] 
indepoident[?] at Lucknow from 1956-1963"; Grotp Captain 77: "father—  
Congress"; Brigadier 84's "in-laws were in the Congress Party in 
Darjeeling since [sic] a long time. Ihey were Congress Presidents of the 
District during [the] forties and fifties. My mother-in-law was a member 
of Parliament for 12 years (1952-1964)"; Major-General 85's "elder 
brother [was active in the] Indian National Oongress [in] pre- and post- 
ind^aidenoe Bengal". "Both”: Croup Captain 77 (see above).
TNSŒ FT 3.2 
How often have you voted in national elections?
Percent(No. ) Total Peroent(No.)
Always 7.37 (7) >
Almost Always 12.63 (12) > 35.79 (34)
Most Times 15.79 (15) >
Sometimes 25.26 (24) >
Twice 1.05 (1) > 36.84 (35)
Once 10.53 (10) >
Never 26.32 (25) > 26.32 (25)
No Answer 1.05 (1) > 1.05 (1)
Total 100.00 (95) 100.00 (95)
In Table FT 3.2, a large number of the two-thirds of respondents vho 
vote seldanly or not at all (25.26% "Sometimes" plus 1.05% "TWice" plus 
10.53% "Once" plus 26.32% "Never") blame career obstacles; most usually 
the fadlure of ballot papers either to reach remote garrisons in time to 
be returned by the final count or to ke^ up with an officer's frequart 
moves. When r^eated this put them off trying to vote altogether. 
Althou^ a t&a (re)discover a voting habit when retirement brings a 
measure of locale stability, most officers' failure to vote must be seen 
as a measure of their apathy to de^jer political involvemait.
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II .A. Oongress Party Actions
Nationalist politicians' concern for the armed forces of the
subocntinent began early. At Congress' inaugural 1885 session members
expressed their concern at the excessive cost of maintaining the Indian
Army. A year later Raja Rampai Sin^ complained that prevailing military
practices were "systematically crushing out of us all martial
^irit.. .converting a race of soldiers and heroes into a timid flock of
quill-driving sheep".”  In 1886, Congress resolved that
the military service in its higher grades ^ xxild be practically 
opened to the natives of this country, and that the Gcvemment 
of India should establish military colleges in this country 
where the natives of India, as defined by statute, may be 
educated and trained for a military career as offioers of the 
Indian Amy.’ ’
Six years later, G.K. GoMiale lamented that "India is about the only 
country in the civilised world where the people are debarred from the 
privileges of citizen-soldiership and from all voluntary participation 
in the responsibilities of nationsd defence".’  ^ Even extremists like
B.C. Hlak supported the participation of Indian military personnel 
during the First World War: "If you want Home Rule be prepared to defend 
your Home.. .You cannot reasonably say that the ruling will be done by 
you and the fighting far you.. ® Tilak understood that self-government 
without the will or expertise for self-defence meant nothing.
Nonetheless, even those nationalist politicians most interested in 
military matters felt that increasing Indians' administrative.
” As used in Longer, Red Coats to Olive Green, p. 124.
” ibid., p. 124. 
ibid., p. 136.
”  Frcm a speech at Poona, n.d., in E.G. Tilak, His Writings and 
Speeches (Madras: Ganesh, 1918), p. 365, as used in Cohen, Ihe Indian 
t W i  p. 92.
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legislative and socioeooncmic oppcsrtunities took preoedencie over defenœ 
issues. Ihe efforts of those loyal members of the opposition interested 
in military matters vho Oohen labels "instnaental gradcalists" (ranging 
from Raja Ranpal Sin^ and G.K. GcDldiale to P.S. Sivaswany Aiyer, Motilal 
N i^ru, H.N. Kunzru and, during his time as a Oongress member, Huharanad 
Ali Jinnah did achieve important gains in esganding Indian participaticn 
in the armed forces.'* Yet the more conservative instrumental 
gradLK&lists' "jobbery",'’ their pcecxxai^tion with opening iflp particular 
positions to Indians, eventually became seen as an unnecessary drag on 
the greater goal of independence.
As instrumental gradualists became consumed by the gathering pace of 
the nationalist movement, defence matters were increasingly left to the 
British authorities and those Indians Oohen terms "traditional 
militarists".'* Ihe latter represented oommunities which the British had 
previously or were presently recruiting into the Indian armed forces. In 
sedcing enhanced enlistment opportunities for their members only, they 
hindered efforts at promoting a truly representative Indian Army. Ihe 
combined pressure of traditional militarists and conservative British 
conmanders ensured that the Indian Army's commissioned Indian officer 
corps continued to remain disproportionately drawn frcm traditional, 
Britdsh-designated martial races' recruiting areas.
Depute their waning interest in defence matters, instrumental 
gradualists consciously decided ts allow ocmmissicxTed Indian officers to
'* See Oohen, op.cit., pp. 65-68, 78-85; and Longer, op.cit., pp. 183- 
185.
J. Nehru, Jawaharlal N^iru; An Autobiography (New Delhi: CKford 
University Press, 1980. First published at London: John Lane, Ihe Bcxiley 
Head Ltd., 1936), pp. 293-294.
" Oohen, op.cit., pp. 58-65.
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leam their profession free frcm external political interferenoe. Their 
reasoning is perhaps best expressed in the following conversation 
between Motilal Ndiru and (then Lieutenant) Thimayya where the latter 
has just asked if he should continue in with his any career:
"First nothing would please the British more than your 
resignations. For thirty years we've fought for army 
Indianization. We're now winning the fight. If you give vç>, we 
shall have lost it.. .But that's not the most iirportant reason 
you must continue.. .We're going to win indeyendenoe. Perhaps not 
this year or the next, but sooner or later the British will be 
driven out. When this happens, India will stand alone. We will 
have no one to protect us but ourselves. It is then that our 
survival will d^aend on men like you."
"You mean that ws should stay with the army to leam as much 
as we can?" •..
"Exactly.. .And it won't be easy. Often you'll be (laying 
polo when your friends are fighting, perhaps cfying. You will 
begin to hate yourselves, and the tençtation to weaken will be 
great.. .But no matter what people say to you, none of you must 
give tp.. .you must persuade the other Indian officers to stick 
with it as well.**
Ihorat describes a very similar conversation %dth Lala Lajpat Rai.*“
Débité his frequent social contact with leading nationalist politicians
and thinkers, Baig also reports no direct attempt to influence his
military career for political ends.*^  By never trying to wean
commissioned Indian officers (and soldiers) away from unquestioning
obedience to their British ocnmanders and towards nationalist politics.
* Evans, op.cit., p. 124.
* * Newly graduated from Sandhurst, Ihorat found himself travelling back
to India on the same ship as Rai. He asked the nationalist leader:
"Sir, do you think that we have done wrong in joining the 
Indian Amy, on the strength of which the British are ruling 
us?...
"No, I don't think so at all. Hew long will the British 
continue to rule us? One day India shall become a free country, 
and then we will need trained men like you. So work hard and 
qualify yourself for that moroart." [My indents.]
See Thorat, op.cit., p. 8.
“ Baig, op.cit., pp. 52-75.
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Oongress' instrumental gradualists not only allowed KCIOs and lOOs to 
leam a degree of professionalism essential oome independenoe, but 
ensured that India's future civilian governments did not have to contend 
with a politicized officer corps.
II .A.I. Mercenaries?
Althcu^ nationalist politicians' paramount oonoem was the 
political and socioeconomic battle for swaraj, KCIOs and ICOs were not 
cccpletely free from cledms that they were mercenaries coldly enforcing 
British subjugation of the sidocontinent. *The fact", sedd Patel in his 
presidential address to Congress' 1931 Karachi convention, "is that the 
British any in India is an any of ooapation. Defence is a misnomer. 
Frankly, the array is for defending British interests and British men and 
women against any internal t^rising".'^ Would such sentiments adversely 
affect the instrumental gradualists' attempts to protect commissioned 
Indian officers and men from nationalist politics?
Hardly. In his speech above, Patel lays out the two most salient
concerns of Indians about "their" array: its role as the chief instrument
of foreign rule; and the drain of its needs on the goverrment's budget.
Of the two, the latter was always the prime concern for India's
politicians, from the first days of organized Indian political opinion
in the second half of the ei^rteenth century through to the interwar
years. Ihe mercenary question, in contrast, was ignored by the political
leadership exo^jt whai "speechifying", again sparing Indian officers and
men from political interference.
” As used in A.M. Khan, Leader by Merit a study of th^ «Mi
character of Sardar Patel. as well as his ideas and idpalsr including 
all his important speeches from 1921 to 1946 (Lahore: Indian Printing 
Works, 1946), p. 98.
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II.B. Mahatma Gandhi
Contrary to popular belief, Gandhi did not forswear violence:
I do believe that when there is only a choice between cowardice 
and violence, I would advise violence...I %iould rather have 
India resort to arms in order to defend her honour than she 
should in a cowardly manner become or remain a helpless victim 
to her own dishonour.' '
He had explained raising a volunteer anobulance carps to aid the British
Boer War effort as a rdxxke to the "average Oiglishman [who] believed
that the Indian was a coward, incapable of taking risks or looking
beyond his iianediate self-interest".' * The First World War was no
different, and Gandhi formed a Indian volunteer corps for ambulance
duties while in London on his %aay back from South Africa to India, and
helped with any recruiting efforts in Kheda tpon his return.' ' Depute
his hope that the subcontinent's loyal service during the First World
War would hasten the day of self-government, peace trou^ not freedom
but an extension of wartime's harsh Bowlatt Act and the infamous
Jallianwala Bafÿi massacre.'* Stu.ll Gandhi did not then, or ever
afterwards, resort to violence in fighting for swaraj. That he did not
may be traced to Gandhi's first-hand knowledge of the horrors of war in
South Africa.'’
" M.K. Gandhi, "The Doctrine of the Siaord", in Yeung India 11 August 
1920, p. 3.
M.K. Gandhi, An Autobiography: The Story of my Experimaits with Truth 
(London: Phoenix Press, 1949. Translated from the Gujarati by Mahadev 
Desai.), p. 179.
"  See ibid., pp. 289-291; and Longer, op.cit., p. 170. For a first-hand 
account of the formation, training, duties and experience of serving in 
the Indian Volunteer Ambulance Corps, see Thapar, The Morale Builders.
pp. 2-10.
'* See M. Bckjardes, Nehru: A Political Biography (London: Allen Lane The 
Penguin Press, 1971, p. 39; and ^ »ar, op.cit., p. 191.
' ^ Gandhi served in a volunteer ambulance corps during the Boer War and 
helped nurse wounded Zulu prisoners during the Zulu "Rdpellion". See
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Nor was Gandhi enamoured of military discipline. Vtiile serving with 
the volunteer ambulance corps he raised in London at the outset of the 
First World War, he had become uhhs^py with the British commanderas 
unequivocal strictness and failure to appoint section leaders by 
democratic vote, m  response, Gandhi naively organized a "miniature 
satyagraiia” ' When this attempt at subverting what was correct military 
procedure failed, he wrote to the Secretary of State for India, 
"acquainting him with all the facts and enclosing a copy of the 
resolution".”  Ihe Secretary's reply naturally defended the justness of 
the British commanders' orders.
Gandhi's experience of war and frustration with military discipline 
led to a scathing opinion of the Indian Amy's lowly soldiery. He judged 
their work as inferior to that of true Indian patriots such as the 
humble weaver:
Many weavers of the Punjab have left the handlocn for sword 
of the hireling [during the First World War]. I consider ttie 
former to be infinitely preferable to the latter. I refuse to 
call the profession of the sepoy honourable when he has no 
choice as to the time when and the persons or pec|ûe against 
whom he is called upon to use his sword. Ihe sepoy's services 
have more often been utilised for enslaving us than for 
protecting us, whereas the weaver to-day can truly become the 
liberator of his country and hence a true soldier. [My
italics.]”
Ihe "mercenary" tag cannot have been far from Gancfiii's thou^ its.
Ihat Gandhi's military esqserience (oonsiderably more than any other 
leading nationalist politician) helped him reject armed struggle in 
favour of satyagraha as the chief means of mobilizing the masses against
Gandhi, An Autobiography, pp. 179-180, 263, and "Ihe Doctrine of the 
Siirord", p. 3.
” Gandhi, An Autobiography, pp. 293-296.
”  ibid., pp. 295-296.
”  M.K. Gandhi, "Notes", in Young India 27 October 1921, p. 338.
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the Raj boded well for civil stçjrenacy-of-nile in independent India 
since it precluded the use of CGmoissicned Indian military officers^ 
esqsertise in the management of violence. Itai independence came, there 
was little chance of the Indian pdalic accosting any officer as a worthy 
rival to the hi^ily respected civilian politicians %Ao had led the fic^ 
for stfaraj. Ihe questionnaire re^xndents agree; in Thhle 0.1 the 
"Independence struggle's non-'violent nature" is ranked in joint 14th 
place as a factor contributing to India never having eoqaerienoed a 
military coup. Officers, argues Ocmnander 99, are well aware that "the 
absence of a military father of the country means that if [General] 
!fandcshaw or Uiimayya are sli^ited [by the gcvemment], the armed forces 
may feel rdcuffed but the people would not care".*^  As arms were 
unnecessary in successfully combating the British Raj, no public 
associations were made between might and ri^ ht.
II.C. Jawaharlal N^iru
Nehru, too, had seen the positive side of military action and tasted 
military discipline. Along with the rest of the subcontinent, he had 
closely followed Japan's 1905 defeat of the Russian fleet, the first 
time in modem history an "uncivilized" Asian people had beaten a major 
European power. He describes how, as a lad of 14, "Japanese victories 
stirred up ny enthusiasm.. .Nationalistic ideas filled ry mind.. .1 mused 
of Indian freedom and Asiatic freedom from the tdiralldom of Europe".* ' 
N^iru was thm made "sergeant" in the Officer Training Corps at 
Harrow.* ’ Ihat he must have enjoyed his duties is borne out by his
From an interview with Cocmander 99; Bombay; 6 October 1987.
Nehru, op.cit., p. 16.
M.J. Akbar, Nehru; The Making of a Nation (London: viking, 1988), p.
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enthusiastic re^xxise to the "great deal of discussion [during the First 
World War]...about the new Indian Oefenoe Force (IDF) which the 
Govemment was organising from the middle classes on the lines of the 
European defence forces in India". Débité the "huniliating 
distinctions" between the HF and its European equivalents, Nehru 
decided it was "worth while for our young men to have military training" 
and helped set up a committee in Allahabad to back the scheme. JUst at 
this time however, Annie Besant was arrested for her ft» Rule 
activities leading an angry N^mi to persuade his fellow ccnmittee 
members to cancel their pro-IDF activities and issue a notice to this 
effect.* * But for this coincidence Nehru would have become a soldier 
(albeit a reserve)!
Debits the above (mostly favourable) e9g)eriences, a shikari 
esq^ edition the young Nehru undertook after his return from England is 
more pertinent to an understanding of his later views on the military.
He describes wounding an antelope: "This harmless little animal fell 
down at my feet, wounded to death, and looked rp at me with great big 
eyes full of tears. Those eyes have often haunted me since".* ^ Nehru's 
inability to forget the uglineæ of killing only fortified what was to 
beoome a lifelong disapproval of military methods.
Ndiru's pre-independence views and post-independence actions 
regarding the military reflect the classic liberal belief in the basic 
rationality and innate charitable behaviour of all men. He admired
50.
** N i^ru, op.cit., p. 32. See also S. Gopal, Jawaharlal N^ hru: A 
Biography: Volume I. 1889-1947 (Cambridge: Harvard Uhiversity Press, 
1976), pp. 32-33.
*“ As vised in Akbar, op.cit., p. 81.
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démocratie societies in which politicians had to respcnd to the wishes
of the people. In contrast, he wrote:
Ihe soldier is bred in a different atxno^here where authority 
reigns and criticism is not tolerated. So he resents the advice 
of otiiers and when he errs, he errs tharcu^y and persists in 
error. For him the chin is more important than the mind or tiie 
brain.* ‘
Moreover, this reliance on brute strength rather than reason caused a 
military man to lose his basic civility: **Ihe soldier, stiffening to 
attention, drops his humanity and, acting as an automaton, shoots and 
kills inoffensive and harmless persons who have done him no ill**.*^  
Ndiru's rejection of the armed forces^ Hobbesian viGia of society in 
favour of stressing the individual goodness to be found in edl men and, 
hopefully, harnessed for the good of all, meant he never fully 
understood military thinking or its justification for unpleasant 
actions.**
I\imed off by the military mind, Ndiru readily ^ predated Gandhi's 
belief that the armed forces were unnecessary in the fight to oust the 
British from India. For, though he viewed non-violence as a political 
tool rather than a moral obligation, Nehru disdained violence as 
inimical to Indian interests. Like the Oongress Party's mainstream 
instrumental gradualists and Gandhi, Nehru rejected the military and 
militarism as viable instruments or targets for nationalist propaganda.
Indeed, Ndrcu never gave military matters much serious thou^ it. He 
was far more interested in wresting fundamental political, social and 
economic control over the subcontinent from the British than in wasting
** Nehru, op.cit., p. 448.
*’ From J. N^ iru, Toward Freedom Paperback ed. (1941; rpt. Boston: 
Beacon Paperback, 1958), pp. 3-4; as used in Oohen, op.cit., p. 105.
** See Nehru, Jawaharlal, p. 446.
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time with the ** jctbery** of opening up army recruitment or speeding up 
military Indianization. Nehru did, however, feel the armed farces would 
have to be changed to suit the needs of an independent nation: although 
"our present [1931] army is efficient, we must bear in mind that we 
shall have to reorganise it completely and create out of it and out of 
fresh material a truly national army, with a national purpose and a 
national outlook"/* Par Nehru, India's freedom would ultimately depend 
on the will of its people, not the strength of its armed forces. Raised 
and educated on British ideals of law, justice and democracy, displaying 
the typical liberal's aversion to the military mind, Ndiru— perhcçs 
naively— never questioned that with sL^ xreme political authority would 
come complete control over the military. Cnly then would armed forces' 
concerns demand the attrition of the political leadership.
II.D. Subhas Chandra Bose
The one prominent nationalist leader to appreciate the utility of 
violence was Subhas Chandra Bose. De^ly influenced by Swami 
Vivekananda's "muscular Hinduism" which held that India would become 
strong only by fusing Western "self-confidence, viability, skills, [and] 
above all power" with Hinduism's nearly forgotten scientific, rational 
characteristics and superior traditional spiritual strength,®" he 
believed Indians should not be afraid of defending their ri^its by force 
if necessary. In 1916 Bengal, vAere youths were physically combating 
petty racism on public transport, the "effect was instantaneous.
J. Ndiru, "Ihe Defoxe of India", in Young India. 1 October 1931, pp. 
284-285.
®" M. Bose, The lost Hero: A Biography of Subhas Bose Itk. ed. (London: 
Ojartet Books, 1982), p. 8.
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Everywhere the Indian began to be treated with ocnsideraticn. Hie ward 
went round that the Englishman understands and respects physical farce 
and nothing else”.“  He himself was involved in physical violence %hile 
a student at Presidency Oollege, Calcutta, when he either master-minded, 
led or sinply witnessed the beating of an Ehglish history professor 
critical of Indian nationalism and accused of maiAandling a student/' 
Held responsible and expelled, Bose reccdled the incident with pride/ ' 
Par him, violence as a instrument for winning respect was effective— and 
stimulating.
Bose's belief in Indians standing for their ric^ its as equals 
extended to learning self-defence. "If India was to be a modem 
civilized nation, she would have to pay the price and she would not by 
any means shirk the physical, the military, problem...a nation that did 
not possess military strength could not hope to preserve its 
independence".'^  Upset that Bengalis were denied opportunities to 
receive the training necessary to defend the country, Bose eqpplied to 
join the Indian Amy's newly formed Bengali Regiment (instituted as a 
concession to local sentiment that Bengalis be allowed to participate in 
the First World War) to prove they were not the non-martial race the 
British believed.® * Ihou^ rejected for his poor eyesight, Bose went on
Subhas Chandra Bose, An Indian Pilgrim (r^int ed.; Bombay: Asia 
Publishing House, 1965), pp. 65-66; as used in Cohen, op.cit., p. 100. 
See also Bose, Hie Lost Hero, p. 15.
" Bose, Hie lost Hero, p. 15.
" G.H. Corr, Hie War of the Sorinaincr Tigers (London: Osprey, 1975), p. 
79.
Bose, An Indian Pilgrim, pp. 65-66; as used in COhen, op.cit., pp. 
100-101.
” Unfortunately, writes Chaudhuri, the 49th Bengalees "went to 
Mesopotamia, Wbrld War I's most ill managed canpaign where they 
mutinied". See Bose, Hie Lost Hero, p. 16; Chaudhuri, op.cit., p. 13; 
and Oohai, op.cit., pp. 99-100.
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to gain military esq^ erienoe as a wemter of the Calcutta Uhiversity (he 
had found a place at ScottWi Church College) branch of the lEF.’* He 
revelled in the experience: "Wiat a change it was from sitting at the 
feet of anchorites to obtain knowledge about God, to standing with a 
rifle on my shoulder taking orders from a British Army officer!"" ihe 
beginning of his life-long taste for military methods and love of 
uniforms next manifested itself during his student days at Cambridge 
where he— unsuccessfully— tried to have Indian undergraduates admitted 
to the university's Officers' Training Corps."
Bose's background, beliefs, military training and considerable 
charisma combined to propel him as a real alternative to the nationalist 
leadership duo of Gandhi and Hdmi %Aose non-violent tactics too often 
appeared to delay winning independence. Recalling üie terrorist tactics 
of early Bengali revolutionaries, he boasted: "We in Bengal r^resent 
the real revolutionary force. Jawahar[lal Ndiru] only talks. We act"." 
Later, when faced with many Indian nationalists' caution at the first 
Round Table Conference, Bose pressed for the setting vp of parallel 
administrative and legislative institutions: "I am an extremist and my 
principle is— all or none"." His radicalism made him very popular, both 
within Congress and especieilly among the Bengali public. Yet his 
sometimes overbearing militaristic streakf ^ and unwillingness to toe the 
Gandhi/Ndiru religious/liberal line led Gandhi to force Bose out of
" See Cohen, op.cit., p. 101; and Corr, op.cit., p. 80.
Bose, An Indian Pilorim. p. 80; as used in Cohen, op.cit., p. 101. 
" See Bose, An Indian Pilorim. p. 91; as used in Cohen, op.cit., p. 
100; and Corr, op.cit., p. 80.
" Bdwardes, cp.cit., p. 73.
" ibid., p. 78.
" During the 1928 Congress session in Calcutta, for exanple, Bose 
organized a volunteer corps outfitted with military uniforms and 
designated himself commanding officer. See Cohen, op.cit., p. 101.
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Congress in 1939 and into the political wilderness. Early in 1941 he 
left India to fight British rule with methods considerably more militant 
than those of the mainstream independence movement (see Chapter Pour).
II.E. Questionnaire Re^xndents
Were commissioned Indian officers aware of Gancfiii's and 
respective negative views of the military and its methods? See Table 
3.7. More importantly, would these perceptions have any effect on 
indi^ )endent India's civil-military relations?
TABLE 3.7
Vtat was the attitude of nationalist politicians 
towards the pre-indi^ )endenoe Indian Army?
Re^xrdents All Ere-1945 Post-1945 Lhknoun
Percent(No.)
Positive 32.35 (22) 21.05 (4) 36.11 (13) 38.46 (5)
No Particular Notice 19.12 (13 ) 26.32 (5) 16.67 (6) 15.38 ( 2)
Negative 29.41 (20) 31.58 (6) 27.78 (10) 30.77 (4)
No Answer 19.12 (13 ) 21.05 (4) 19.44 (7) 15.38 (2)
Total 100.00 (68) 100.00 (19) 100.00 ( 36) 99.99 (13)
A third (32.35%) of "All" respondents remember nationalist leaders
as having a "Positive” opinion of the armed forces before independence.
Major-General 52 emphasizes the politicians' understanding of the future
need for a professioned army:
[Nationalist leaders had a] great respect for its [the 
military's] professional competence and need to maintain it for 
use after independence. Hence no effort was made to politicise 
the army or do anything to subvert its discipline, morale or 
professional loyalty to the then government.
Moreover, adds Brigadier 31, "the politicians knew that [the] sympathies
of all [Indian armed farces'] personnel were with the movement and the
leaders". Brigadier 40 supports Nehru's somxaAat naive belief that with
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political rule would cane control of the military; nationalist leaders
had "a recognition of the fact that, as long as the azny served the
centred, govemnent, it could not help being loyal to the government”.
Nonetheless, almost a third (29.41%) of "All” respondents argue that
nationalist politicians displayed a "Negative” attitude towards the
military. "Indian politicians were very ignorant in military matters and
regrettably even more so of the Indian Army”, writes Brigadier 44.
Ihey didn't even try to understand the background of the origins 
of the Indian Amy.. .Ihey saw the Indian Amy as a kind of 
police force meant only for domestic settlement of strife. They 
thou^it it to be indoctrinated, wholly forgetting the lessons of 
1857; whereas the Indian soldier was a man «holly consumed with 
pride in the military performance of his regiment, which he 
thouÿxt of as a family possession.
Nationalist leaders are also criticized for their dismissive attitude.
"They looked down i^ xxi us as mercenary soldiers, slaves of the British",
writes Brigadier 69. And if nationalist politicians did not interfere
with the careers of commissioned Indian officers, others were not so
fortunate. **Wiile they kept away from the amy personnel”, says
Brigadier 70, "they openly ridiculed, insulted, abused and incited
subordinate gov't servants of other d^mtments".
Despite the almost even split between the "Positive" and "Negative"
cprticns above, the re^xaidents' overall perception is of nationcdist
politicians holding a pejorative attitude towards the military. This may
be seen when adding the fifth (19.12%) of "All" officers who believe
swaraj leaders took "No Particular Notice" of the armed forces to the
virtual third (29.41%) who choose the "Negative" characterization, on
the basis that to ignore such an iicportant instrument of contemporary
British and future Indian rule denotes a ccnteaiptucus or, at the least,
dismissive attitude. Together, these two choices reveed half (48.53%) of
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"All" respondmts understood nationalist politicians as scornful of the 
military- "They were, with the exception of a handful of persons, [an] 
ignorant lot and knew very little about the armed forces", recalls 
Brigadier 45. Diis ignorance appears particularly prevalent during the 
interwar years: almost three-fifths (57.90%) of "Pre-1945" officers 
remember nationalist politicians having either a "No Particular Notice" 
(26.32%) or "Negative" (31.58%) attitude towards the military.
Ihe respondaits' perception that nationalist politicians had a lowly 
opinion of the armed forces could prove very dangerous to continued 
civil svçrenEtcy in an independent India. As seen in Thble 3.6, most 
officers in pre-ind^DOident India held the freedom struggle and its 
leaders in hi^, if undeclared, esteem. At the same time, a majority 
felt that their admiration was not reciprocated by the nationalist 
politicians. Ihe third set of military intervention theorists believes 
that such a situation may readily lead to tense civil-military 
relations, possibly culminating in a coup.
A closer look at Table 3.7, however, mitigates somewhat the fear of 
future military intervention. Par instance, not all "No Particular 
Attitude" respondents feel that this characterization denotes a 
pejorative sentiment. For Lieut.-General 56, "the attitudes of the 
Important leaders is [sic] clear from their writings. Ihey recognized 
that the Indian Amy was a necessity and that they could not disband the 
pre-ind^endence one and re-raise it afresh". Ihe respondents^  
perceptions of the nationalist leaders' opinions of the Indian Amy also 
markedly iirprove over time: while only a fifth (21.05%) of "Pre-1945" 
respondents think that swaraj politicians had a "Positive" attitude 
towards the armed forces, over a third (36.11%) of "Post-1945"
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respondents do. There is a related, if smaller, decrease among officers 
opting for the "Negative” characterization: from just under a third 
(31.58%) of "Pre-1945" respondents to over a quarter (27.78%) of their 
"Post-1945" counterparts. Indian independence and rule by the 
ind^jendence movement's leaders was yet to come; if the above trend 
continues, it may yet develop into a mutual opinion of hi^ esteem 
between the Indian officer corps and the nationalist politicians (see 
Chapter Five).
III. The General Public's Understanding of the Military
III .A. Respect, Ignorance and Indifference
As officers and jawans lived almost exclusively in secluded 
cantonmmTts, most Indian civilians had little opportunity for contact 
with the military. Chaudhuri recalls the prevalent interwar attitude: 
"The local Indian community [of Ahmedabad], who were among the most 
articulate, intelligait and highly commercial in India but not among the 
most martial, ignored the garrison".*' The physical isolation endured by 
commissioned Indian officers only exacerbated the tension of wearing the 
oppressor's uniform while out in polite Indian society. The following 
conversation begins with "a middle-aged Indian in faultless Diglish 
tailoring" (later revealed to be Motilal Nehru)*' asking a question of 
Thimayya and some fellow KdOs during the interval of a play all were 
attending:
"Tell me.. .what does an Indian feel, wearing the uniform of 
our British rulers?"
"Hot", Thimayya answered flippantly. The Indian officers
*' Chaudhuri, op.cit., p. 53.
*' Evans, op.cit., p. 116.
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esq)ected the civilian to be urç>leasant about their being British 
stooges, Ihey prepared to move away...
"I'm serious.. .Does wearing a foreigner's uniform make you 
feel like a foreigner?”
"No...but we don't feel like Indians either"...
"Mix two cultures and you end i;p with no culture at all". 
"It's not the uniform...We don't feel like foreigners. But 
our own people won't accept us as Indians".
"Oh, come new...Isn't it that you don't accept us?"
Ihe four officers denied this emphatically.®*
Perhaps only the aristocratic families vhich siçplied the KCIOs both
knew of, and appreciated, the efforts of the Indian Army and its men as
guardians of the status quo.
Ihe relationship, as it existed, between the general public and the
Indian military during the interwar years was usually a variant of each
party's respective statical in life. Ihorat remembers how
even in 1924.. .the Amy was a closed book to most Indians. Ihe
masses were afraid of it, the middle classes were disinterested, 
and the intelligentsia saw in it the perpetuation of the British 
raj in India. All avoided it; hence not many knew much about the 
Indian Amy.® ®
On the subcontinent as elsewhere, simple rural folk were impressed by 
the stories of heroic derring^ -do and foreign campaigns iidiich most 
soldiers tell. Ihe burgeoning Indian middle-class, chiefly interested in 
enlarging their educaticmial and career possibilities, took their cue 
from instrumental gradualist politicians and gave little thou^it to the 
armed forces except Wien pressing for more commissioned officer places. 
Even the intelligentsia for the most part disregarded the importance of 
the military as the enforcer of British Rule, thinking, like Nehru, 
that with political independence would come control of the military. For 
now, the armed forces were shunned as a tool of imperialism.
ibid., pp. 116-117.
Ihorat, op.cit., p. 1.
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III.B. Questionnaire Respondents
Did lœs see the same class and regional variations in the general 
public's understanding of the Indian armed forces before the coming of 
swaraj? See %ble 3.8.
TAEL£ 3.8
What was the oomncn man's attitude towards 
the pre-ind^)endenoe Indian Army?
Respondents All Pre-1945 Post-1945 Unknown
Peroent(No.)
Admiration/Respect 47.92 (46) 61.11 (22) 36.59 (15) 47.37 (9)
Awe/Pear 13.54 (13) 8.33 (3) 17.07 (7) 15.79 (3)
Mixed Reject/Hostile 7.29 (7) 8.33 (3) 7.32 (3) 5.26 (1)
Mercenaries 13.54 (13) 11.11 (4) 12.20 ( 5) 21.05 (4)
No Particular Notice 13.54 (13) 8.33 (3) 19.51 (8) 10.53 (2)
No Answer 4.17 (4) 2.78 (1) 7.32 (3) 0.00 (0)
Total 100.00 (96) 99.99 ( 36) 100.01 (41) 100.00 (19)
A combined two-thirds (61.46%) majority of "All" officers feel the 
public had either "Admiration/Respect" (47.92%) or "Awe/Pear" (13.54%) 
for the military. "Ihe Indian Army was kept in absolute isolation from 
the civil population", recalls Major-General 34, "this lent [it] a 
mysterious and fearsome image". Like the above KdOs, Brigadier 62 
argues that military personnel were "held in reject, firstly because 
they were on the side of power, and secondly because they lived well 
compared to people of their kind in towns and villages".
A combined fifth (20.83%) of "All" respondents think the gæeral 
public saw the military in either a "Mixed Respect/Hostile" light 
(7.29%) or as "Mercenaries" (13.54%). "Ihe common man", writes Brigadier 
46, "liked the men in uniform— for their sense of fairness, justice, 
wide outlook and also as they provided [a] livelihood for their
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families. Others thou^it they were 'lackeys' and 'slaves' of the 
British". Rank also mattered, adds Major-General 67, for whereas the 
ranks were dismissed as "hired bodies to die for the British", 
comnissicned officers were seen "to belong to a good all-India service".
Just over a tentdi (13.54%) of "All" re^xndents perceive that the
OGoncn man took "No Particular Notice" of the military before
independenoe. After all, writes Brigadier 49, "India has been ruled for
a thousand years by big and small kingdoms.. .Mercenary armies were the
rule and the common Indian took than eill in his stride for centuries.
Ihe British Indian Any was tolerated in the same way". Brigadier 44
describes the jawans' physical isolation from physical life:
Ihe Indian soldier was kept in a oocoon, totally divorced from 
all side-effects of civil administration, ftm he went on leave, 
he spent all his time in the company of ex-soldiers of the same 
regiment, caste and ccnnunity. If he had a civil problem, his 
status as a soldier gave him immediate and favourable 
dispensation. Ihe civilian never understood what made the 
soldier tiok; the soldier disassociated himself from all 
civilian aspects of life. Ihe two sides dressed differently, 
spoke differently and had almost nothing in ocannii except family 
ties which, for the army man, was all military.
Such isolatu.on of the military, continues Brigadier 44, "is a supreme
exanple of British organisation". Ihese respondents believe that the
general public had neither the opportunity nor the inclination tx>
interact with jawans and thus did not form any kind of attitude,
positive or negative, towards him and his institution.
While the respondents generally agree with the above KdOs that 
public opinion of the pre-ind^)endent Indian Amy was a function of 
class and region, their responses reveal some noticeable changes over 
time. From "Pre-1945" to "Post-1945", respectively, "Admiration/Respect" 
plunmets (from 61.11% to 36.59%) while "Awe/Fear" (8.33% to 17.07%) and
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”No Particular Notice" (8.33% to 19.51%) record large rises. Ihe 
readiness of "Admiration/1Re^ )ect" to change into the seemingly 
contradictory "Awe/Fear" or "No Particular Notice" leads to two 
conclusions. One, the ann/'s increasing role in ocnbating the 
independence movement by internal policing actions changed some of the 
gaieral public's "AdmiratigyRespect" of the military into "Awe/Pear", 
and two, that as swaraj was increasingly perceived as both inevitable 
and imninent, the common man lost interest in the Indian Army, rq)lacing 
his "Admiration/Respect" of the British-led armed forces with "No 
Particular Notice". Ihe public, it seems, was merely following the 
exanple of their nationalist leaders.
Ihe iiTpnrtanoe of the public following their nationalist leaders may 
be seen on Table 0.1 where the respondents rank "Political awareness of 
masses" in joint ei^ith place among factors precluding a military coup 
in India. Althou^ it may be argued that the Indian electorate's 
political sophistication is less than that in modem Western 
democracies, elections on the subocntinent have proved people understand 
the power of their vote in changing governments. "Ihe cGnmon man", 
argues Air Chief Marshal 1, "is very aware of who can provide for his 
needs and how to influence them".** Again, the particular methods of the 
Indian independence movement— swadeshi (supporting Indian-made goods), 
hartals (the cessation of all normal activity) and satyagraba (non­
violent non-cooperatigi)— demanded the participation of many millions of 
people from all across the subcontinent's geographical, linguistic and 
socioeconomic boundaries. If nothing else, the struggle for swaraJ gave
“  From a follow^ j^p interview with Air Chief Marshal 1; New Delhi, 9 
S^jtember 1987.
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the diverse cxxmunities of the suboontinsit a novel sense of political 
unity, of together belonging to an entity called "India".
Oonclusicn
The paramount political importance of the nationalist Movement on
the subcontinent during the interwar years had minimal affect on the
loyalty and discipline of commissioned Indian officers. Wiile the
conservative badkgrounds of KdOs made many indifferent to the politics
of swaraj, many lOOs had first- and/or close second-hand experience of
participating in nationalist activities. Yet, although some KdOs and
lOOs questioned the morality of their chosen career as demands for
independence grew, once commissioned Oieir desire to prove their
professional ccnpetence and the armed forces' internal discipline of an
apolitical outlook checked most displays of nationalist synpathies,
however de^ly felt. Par some, this outward indifference was not easily
achieved. Brigadier 40 recalls how commissioned Indian officers
seemad to have a split personality... [a] favourable attitude 
towards the [nationalist] movement trying to overcome... [their] 
"loyalty" to the Crown... [with this] dichotomy building up a 
diffidence in them. While in private they were with the 
movemaTt.. .they seemed to have been aggressively against it in 
their public posture. They generally had a very reverential 
attitude towards the leaders of the movement at the time— the 
latter were not yet politicians! [My italics.]
Despite such internal struggles, commissioned Indian officers' notions
of professional responsibility never ^ lifted from the King Riperor to
nationalist leaders during the interwar years.
The indifférait attitude of most nationalist leaders towards 
military matters was also crucial in ensuring the continued loyalty of 
Indian armed forces' personnel. Father than question the role of the
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cunoy as the chief instrument of British rule, roost Indian politicians 
soumît cnly to open military careers to all Indians, or to better the 
advancement chances of preferred roartisil races' recruits. Even Nehru 
disdained thoughtful reflection of the present and future role of the 
armed forces in favour of assuming that with independence would come the 
armed forces' subservience to civil sipremacy-of-rule. Those few 
nationalist politicians interested in defence issues made it clear that 
a ycung officer's prime duty was to leam his profession to the best of 
his ability as his knowledge would be essential come independence.*^
Nationalist politicians' generally indifferent attitude towards the 
military was shared by the general pdolic. The oopmcai man remained 
ignorant of the armed forces, the educated middle-class were interested 
only insofar as to enplcyment possibilities, vhile the wealthy and/or 
aristocratic Indian families sending their sens to the PMC and IMA were 
unwilling to see their social position reduced by challenges to the 
status guo. The "protective shield of objective control" which separated 
the Indian military from the general societal upheaval caused by the 
independence movement remained firmly in place to the eve of WWII.
That both nationalist politicians and the general public could 
afford a lackadaisical attitude towards the armed farces was due to the 
unique non-violent nature of the independence movement. With no battles 
to be fouÿit, the military's epqpertise of tactics and we^xxiry was
Seme officers came to this conclusion on their own. Chaudhuri 
describes how any naticnsdist misgivings about his choice of career were 
salved with the thouÿit that "After independence, the country would need 
an efficient, national amy and this meant we Indian officers had to 
leam our duties and responsibilities in whatever school they were 
tau^it and the British were conscientious teachers". See Chaudhuri, 
op.cit., pp. 79-80.
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siçjerfluous. Swaraj would be attained by appealing over the heads of 
armed forces' jawans and officers, as it were, directly to the people.
Ihe exclusion of the military in the struggle for ind^jendenoe (with 
the exception of the Indian national armies of WWII; see the following 
ohapter) boded well for the future of civil scpremacy-of-rule in India. 
As no arms were necessary to overthrow the Raj, there was no 
nystification of the soldier as hero. Instead, both jawans and 
commissioned Indian officers had to defend themselves against the charge 
of doing nothing to hasten swara j in cxxrtrast to the personal 
participation of millions of common people in nationalist activities. 
When independence came no one, least of all the military man, would be 
in a position to challenge the ri^it-to-rule of those nationalist 
leaders who became India's demooratically elected representatives.
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CBAPŒt 4
Ttest Che: The Indian Rational Andes of Wbrld War U
Introduction
\
Wbrld War II found oonraissicned Indian officers divided in their
loyalties for the first time. While the vast majority served with
A
distinction on Allied fronts throughout the world, a small but 
significant minority held in Axis prisoner-of-war (PcW) camps joined 
tens of thousands of jawans imprisoned with them to form various Indian 
"national" armies with the express purpose of invading the subcontinent 
and overthrowing the Raj. Although these forces proved to be no match 
for the Allies in combat, their mere existence and raison d^ètre worried 
a British Ekpire contemplating defeat on both the European and Far 
Eastern fronts and facing the nationalist "Quit India" movement on the 
subcontinent. How did Indian officers— and men— react to national 
armies' demands that they switch allegiances and join tiieir brethren in 
fi^iting for swaraj?
I. OcCTtdssioned Indian Officers and Wbrld War II
 ^On 8 August 1942, the All-India Obngress Ocenittee passed what became 
known as the Quit India resolution which demanded: "The inmediate ending 
of the British rule in India as an urgent necessity, both for the sake 
of India and for the success of the cause of the United Nations" (i.e., 
a free India would immediately join the Allied war effort). Gandhi 
declared the "mantra is: 'do or die'...This is an open rebellion...I 
want freedom inroediately, this very ni^it..." and the AICC called on 
Indians to launch a "mass struggle on non-violart lines on the widest 
possible scale". See AMoar, Nehru, pp. 343-347; Bdwardes, Nehru, p. 44- 
45, 147; Longer, Red Coats to Olive Green, p. 242; T. Roy le. The last 
Days of the Raj (London: Michael Jbs^ti, 1989), pp. 77-93; and Spear, A 
History of India, p. 220.
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I.À. Ihe Indian Armed Faroes
With the exception of the formation of the Indian national armies 
(see below) and a few minor mutinies/ the Indian armed forces joined 
wholeheartedly in the war effort. From 1939 to 1945, the Indian Any 
expanded from under 200,000 to over 2,000,000 men and officers, while 
the KEN and the RIAF (the lAF won the "Royal" prefix in March 1945) grew 
from from 1,590 and 200 to 27,650 and 28,540 personnel, re^ jectively.^  
Althouÿi unpr^ared for Will, all three services performed gallantly in 
five separatB theatres.^ "M/ Indian Divisions after 1943 were among the
' In S^±ember 1939, a group of 35 jawans and NOOs deserted from the 
31st Punjab Regiment just before its d^sarture for Egypt, and three 
months later there was a mutiny of Sikhs in the 25th Motorised Tranqort 
Occpany already in Egypt. In JUly 1940, the most serious indiscipline of 
the war h^pened when 106 men of a Sikh unit attached to the Central 
India Horse (CIH) refused to embark at Bombay for overseas service.
Other acts of indiscipline included: two VOOs and 24 jawans of the 
1/llth Sikh Regiment surrendering and/or deserting after being 
inadequately prepared for inmediate action in Burma; seven Indian 
gunners mutinying and then surrendering to the enemy on Christmas Island 
in 1942; and three Indian bombardiers trying to instigate an armed 
uprising on RAF bases in the Cocos-Keeling Islands. All of the above 
incidents were isolated and the eventual punishment severe. See Farwell, 
Armies of the Rai. p. 311; Mason, a Matter of Honour, pp. 490-491, 513- 
514; and Royle, op.cit., pp. 121-122.
’ Indian Army wartime expansion figures vary: Farwell puts the numbers 
at 189,000 and 2,644,323; Heathoote at 150,000 and 1,800,000; Longer at
189.000 and 2,644,323; Mason at 189,000 and 2,500,000; and Royle at 
205,058 and 2,251,050. See Commonwealth War Graves Commission, 
Commemoration of the War Dead of Uhdivj<fed India, pp. 12, 14; Farwell, 
op.cit., pp. 304, 308; Heathoote, ihe Indian Armv. p. 293; Longer, 
op.cit., p. 216; Ifeson, op.cit., p. 495; and Royle, op.cit., p. 74.
* Up to August 1945, the Indian Amy suffered 179,935 casualties 
including 24,338 killed, 64,354 wounded, 11,754 missing and 79,489 PdWS. 
28 of the army's 31 VGs were won by Indians, including 20 of the 27 
awarded for the Burma campaign. The RIN and RIAF also participated fully 
in the war effort, as did the ISF which by January 1944 had grown from*
47.000 to 98,00 personnel. See Ccmimonwealth War Graves Commission, 
op.cit., pp. 9-11, 12, 14; Evans, Ihimayya of India, pp. 230-245; 
Farwell, op.cit., p. 304, 311-312; Longer, op.cit., pp. 214, 216-234,
236; Sin^, Birth of an Air Force, p. 215; Ihapar, The Morale Builders, 
p. 219; Traxh, The Indian Army and the Kina's Fhanies, pp. 143-144; and 
Venkateswaran, Defence Organisation in India, p. 179.
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best in the world”, said Fourteenth Amy oomnander General W.J. Slim, 
"Ihey would go anyvhere, do anything, go on doing it, and do it on very 
little".*
Ihe Indian Amy's huge wartime esqansion necessitated new patterns 
of recruitmait and posting which appeared to signal the end of its 
overdependenoe on traditional martial races. For the first time, 
previously s^aratzed conmunities of jawans were mixed together (although 
harijans, or "childrai of God", recruited for the first time in large 
nuntoers, were usually kept ^ art from hi^ier caste soldiers). Ihe 
military authorities found that proportionate representation of all 
classes from edl provinces was not only necessary in terms of numbers, 
but desirable in promoting a national q)irit of contribution. Ihe Indian 
Amy's stuttering adoption of modem military technology also convinced 
the authorities of the need for better educated jawans who were more 
readily found outside traditional recruiting areas. All of the above 
changes made for an Indian Amy more like the RIN and the RIAF in that 
recruits were chosen in a more meritocratic and non-disoriminatory way.*
I.E. Oonmissioned Indian Officers
Ihe Indian Amy's oonmissioned Indian officers also eoqierienoed 
great changes. Most obvious was their huge numerical increase: whereas 
from 1920 to 1934, 214 Indians had become KCIOs and, from 1936 to 1939, 
279 ICOs, by the war's aid 9540 Indians held conmissioned officer 
positions in the Indian Amy.’ Althou^ the amy's conplement of British
* As used in Longer, cp.cit., p. 227. See also pp. 237-238; and Royle, 
op.cit., p. 90.
* COhen, Ihe Indian Army, pp. 141-143.
’ Venkatea^ a^ran, op.cit., pp. 161, 163.
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officers also rose, the ratio of British to Indian officers (excluding 
those in the IMS) fell from 10.1/1 before the war to 4.1/1 afterwards.* 
Indian officers faced new reqxxTsibilities. Before the war, 
senionnost KdO was (later General) ifeLjcr Cariappa; by its end ewer 220 
Indian officers were lieut.-colonels and above, including four temporary 
or acting brigadiers.’ Other wartime changes included granting ICOs 
powers of command equal to KCIOs and, under the direction of Oin-C 
General Auchinlek, ending the Indianization esqserimant. All Indian Amy 
units (save Gurkha battalions) now took both British and Indian 
officers, commissioned Indian officers no longer replaced VOOs, and 
British and Indian officers altering during wartime %jere paid equally.
On 22 October 1945, Auohinldc announced that permanent commissions in 
the Indian Army henceforth would be granted to Indians only.' ®
In the rush to fill commissioned officer positions, the Indian Amy 
recruited approximately 9,000 Indian Emergency nr— 1>-7imn1 Cffioears 
(BOOb ) by the end of WJII (such commissions ceased in 1946).^  ^Their 
(usually) non-military background and shorter IMA training period, 
combined with a belief that their motivation to join the military was 
solely to gain a government position, raised su^icions that Indian BCDs
* N. Prasad, Exfension of the Armed Farces and Defence Organization. 
1939-45 (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1956) as used in Oohen, op.dt., p. 
144. In 1930, the ratio of British to commissioned Indian officers was 
28/1. See Longer, c .^cit., p. 204.
’ In 1930, the hi^iest-ranking cccmissioned Indian officer was a brevet 
major. See Longer, op.cit., pp. 204, 213, 234-235; and Venkateswaran, 
c^.cit., p. 161.
See Evans, op.cit., pp. 190-228; Longer, op.cit., p. 235; Mason, 
c^.cit., p. 511; Muthanna, General Cariappa, p. 32; Major K.C. Praval, 
Indian Army After Independence (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1987), 
p. 6; Ihapar, op.cit., pp. 151-152; Ihorat, From Reveille to Retreat  ^
pp. 49-51, 53-80; and Venkateswaran, op.cit., p. 160.
“  See Chibber, Military Leadership to Prevent Military Ooup. p. 33; and 
Venkateswaran, op.cit., p. 163.
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lacked initiative and would prove less self-sacrificing than KdOs and
ICOs. They did bring to the army a different attitude. Lieut.-General 93
recalls how "KdOs and prewar ICOs were very pro-British and in most
cases locked upon the British officers as their masters. The [Indian]
Eonergency Oonmissioned Officers.. .no doubt obeyed authority but were
resentful of the British superior attitude". Yet the strong performance
of the majority of Indian BOOs in officer training schools and their
superior knowledge of, and ability to understand the customs of the
jawans compared to British BOOs evoitually won many admirers.^  '
Wiile complaints about the quality of Indian BOOs did not halt their
recruitmait— hardly possible during the war— upon demobilization a large
proportion were found "unfit" for continued military service or other
government employment. T.N. Kaul, then a member of the War Services
Selection Board set up to select civilian govemmait officers from the
thousands of Indian BOOs about to leave the military, describes how
[Although they] were fine young men... [who] had certainly 
benefited from their short service with the military.. .they 
could not all make the grade in the armed forces or the top 
civil services. A few of them were given permanent commissions 
in the armed forces; some were absorbed in the senior and junior 
All-India Civil Services, but more than half had to fend for 
themselves.“
That those Indian BOOs found fit to retain their commissions were high- 
quality officers was shown vhen one, Gaieral K.V. Krishna Rao, served as 
Chief of the Indian Array from 1981-83.“
II. The Indian National Armies
Oohen, op.cit., pp. 144-146.
T.N. Kaul, Remiinisoeioes Discreet and Tndiscrreet. pp. 108-109. 
Chibber, op.cit., p. 33.
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II .A. Formation and D^loyroent
KCIOs, ICOs, Indian BOOs and jawans alike had to face the unique 
test of conflicting loyalties posed by the various Indian national 
armies/' Ihe first two ere the Frei Hind, or Free India legion (FIL), 
raised by Subhas Chandra Bose during his stay in Nazi Germany Axm 
Indian military personnel c^*ured in North Africa, and the OaÉxo 
Militare India (Indian Military Centre) mustered by tfchanoed Iqbal 
Schedai under the patronage of Mussolini from Indians held in Italian 
PoW canps. Both were relatively small forces and of negligible military 
consequence/*
 ^' Of the limited number of works which describe and/or include a 
history of the Indian national armies, those used as principle 
references for this ch^jter are: Bose, Ihe Lost Hero, pp. 165-269; Corr, 
Ihe War of the Springing Tigers; Farwell, op.cit., pp. 329-347; M.W.
Fay, Ihe Fpraatten Army Indians Armed struocrle for independence 1942- 
1945 (Ann Arbor: university of Michigan, 1993); K.K. Ghosh, Ihe Indian 
National Army; Second Front of the Indian Independence Movement (Meerut: 
Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969); Mason, op.cit., pp. 514-522; K.R. Palta, 
Adventures with I.N.A. (Lahore: Lion Press, 1946); and Royle, op.cit., 
pp. 119-126.
*^ Ihe 4,000-strong FIL was used chiefly for propaganda purposes 
(apparently inspiring 47 desertions from the Indian Any in Nortdi Africa 
during JUly-August 1942) and not as a combat army; Rocrael refused to 
accept it into his Afri^ Korps. IWo months after Bose, fed rp witii his 
hosts' cavalier attitude towards both the FIL and Indian nationalism, 
left for Jc^ )an, the force moved to Holland ^ Aere its personnel refused 
to go on active service (despite their newly sworn allegiance to 
Hitler). Its three battalions were then absorbed into the German Array as 
Infantry Regiment No.950 and posted to Bordeaux for non-ocmbat duties. 
Later, during the Allied offensive, the remnants of the FIL were 
incorporated into the Waffen SS v»here they remained until Germany's 
surrmder and their subsequent r^triation to India. Trained as 
saboteurs, the two companies of the Centro Militare India under the 
command of Italian Major Avrea mutinied on 9 November 1942 %hen they—  
falsely— thcx#it they would be sert back to Libya to help counter Allied 
landings. As a result, the force was dissolved. See Bose, op.cit., pp. 
182-185, 187, 198-199 , 201, 246; Oorr, op.cit., p. 190; Farwell, 
op.cit., p. 331; Fay, op.cit., pp. 199-200; Boyle, op.cit., p. 120.
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Ihe third Indian national army was the Indo-Japanese Indian National 
Any (INA) led by Indian PûN Captain Mchan Singh. Ihou^ he had 
initially felt "proud, glorified and dignified" of his rise from the 
ranks to a oonmissioned officer position in the l/14th Punjab Regiment, 
he soon became dissatisfied with the "arrogance" and "debauchery" of his 
new comrades.^  Ihis discontent combined with other grievances over 
promotion dilutes, the racist snubs meted out to Indian troc^ in 
Malaya and Singapore, and the British e9g>loitation of India to create in 
Singh an officer ripe for mutinous action.^  • Placed by the J^janese in 
charge of the 55,000 Indians PcHs who had been separated from their 
British officers after the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942,
Sin^ detected their disillusionment with the Raj and began thinking of 
forming a revolutionary amy: "A few sinple lectures did the miracle, 
and the results were beyond my expectations. In an unbelievably short 
time our men began to consider themselves Indians first and Indians 
last".'" He fostered this new identity by abolishing caste divisions and 
starting a cocmon kitchen for the men and mess for officers of all 
religions, measures thought impossible by the British military 
authorities. Eventually, Sinÿi convinced the Japanese that this new, 
universal Indian identity could be used as the basis of a fighting 
force." While up to 40,000 Indian PbWSs volunteered to serve, a lack of
See Oorr, op.cit., pp. 67-70; and General Mohan Sin^, Leaves From My 
Diary (Lahore: Free-World Publications, 1946), p. 61.
' See Corr, op.cit., pp. 67-70; and Cohen, op.cit., p. 148.
"  See J. Connell, Auchinlek A Biography of Field-Marshal Sir Claude 
Auchinlek (London: Cassell, 1959), p. 794; Fay, c^ .cit., pp. 81, 525; 
and Longer, op.cit., p. 219.
Corr, op.cit., p. 77.
" See Connell, op.cit., p. 794; Corr, op.cit., pp. 49-64.
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resources and suitable officer nuntiers and experience (see below) 
limited the INA to approximately 16,000 armed personnel/'
Whilst (now) "Gaieral" Singh hc^ ied the heroic €9q)loits of a battle- 
hardened, revolutionary liberation force close to India's frontiers 
would inspire the wholesale defection of Indian Army troops to tiie IMA, 
his mai were never edlowed to demonstrate this theory. Debits some 
success in recruiting Indian Army jawans from among the remnants of the 
Slim River engagement and the PoW carps in Kuala Lumpur, the INA was 
used mainly for propaganda purposes and the mundane tasks of guarding 
concentration canps, constructing runways and acting as canp followers 
to Japanese troops. Sink's protests over Jean's unwillingness to 
respect and equip the INA as a fighting force, the tranqxartation of its 
personnel to far-flung labour canps, and the ill-treatment of Indian 
civilians in J;^anese-controlled territories eventually led to his 
arrest and exile at the end of 1942." Ihe INA now contracted to 10,000 
men as thousands of its soldiers reverted to BOW status, a few hundred 
deserted, and all who remained were disarmed.' *
A brief stopgap force organized by the re^jected JapanH^ased Indian 
revolutionary Rash Behari Boss' * under the leadership of Sink's right- 
hand men, (Indian Army Lieut.-Oolcnel) Major-General J.K. Bhonsle and 
(captain) Major-General Shah Nawaz (aka Shah Nawaz Khan) was re-
' ' See Fay, cp.cit., pp. 525-526; a ccpy of the speech delivered in the 
Rajya Sabha on 18 February 1964 by General Mohan Sin^ explaining the 
case of arrears of I.N.A. personnel, All-India I.N.A. Relief and Ehquiry 
Occmittee, Delhi, as used in Ghosh, cp.cit., p. 59; and Lieut.-General 
Sir Francis Tuker, While Memory Serves (London; Cassell and Oocpany,
Ltd, 1950), p. 68.
" See Oorr, op.cit., pp. 92, 95-98, 135; and Farwell, op.cit., p. 333. 
'* Various estimates put the contracted INA at 8,000 to 12,000 men. See 
corr, op.cit., p. 139; Connell, op.cit., p. 796; and Fay, op.cit., pp. 
526-527.
"  Corr, op.cit., pp. 49-64, 139.
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energized by the ^ aril 1943 announcement that the nationalist hero
Subhas Chandra Bose would be ooming from Germany to lead the fi^it for
sHraraj.** D^ xxi his 2 July arrival in Singapore, Bose proclaimed a
Provisional Government of Free India with himself as Head of State,
Prime Minister, Minister of War, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Sapreae
Oomsander, and declared war on the IMited States and Britain.^  ^ "The
time has come”, he said,
when I can tell the whole world.. .as to how it is proposed to 
bring about the national liberation. Indians outside India, 
particularly in east Asia, are going to organise a fighting 
force which will be powerful enou^ to attack the British Army 
in India. When we do so, a revolution will break out, not only 
among the civil population at home, but also among the Indian 
Amy vhioh is now standing under the British flag. When the 
British govemmsnt is thus attacked from boüi sides— from inside 
Indian and from outside— it will collapse, and the Indian people 
will then regain their liberty.**
Bose's reputation and charisma led around 10,000 Indian PoWs to rejoin
thair ocmrades in a revitalized INA now renamed the Azad Hind Fmj, or
Free India Amy (FIA). From throughout Southeast Asia, 20,000 Indian
civilians also enlisted. Their common sedute was Jai Hind (Victory, or
Glory to India) and the FIA battle cry Chslo Delhi (On to Delhi).**
Like Mohan Sin^ and his INA, Bose's dream of making the FIA into a
full-fledged fighting force of 3,000,000 men the equal of the Indian
Any was checked by the Japanese. Althouÿi officially recognizing the
FIA as an allied any (and the Provisional Government of Free India as a
full partner), they agreed œly to li^rtly arm about three-quarters of
its 40,000 personnel. Similarly, whereas Bose wanted the FIA to act as
** See Bose, op.cit., p. 213; and Oorr, op.cit., pp. 91, 148-149.
*’ See Brecher, N^iru. p. 306; and Bose, <^.cit., p. 215.
* • From a speech at a mass rally in Sings^ xsre, 9 July 1943, as used in 
Bose, op.cit., p. 163.
* See Mason, op.cit., p. 571; Ocnnell, op.cit., p. 797; Oorr, op.cit., 
p. 148; and Fay, op.cit., pp. 525-526.
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the vanguard in the Japanese Amy's forthooming Inphal campaign, his 
hosts agreed cnly to accept small groaps of men seconded to various 
formations for propaganda and espionage functions, and not to split the 
FIA's most potent force, the 3,000-strong 1st Guerilla Regiment, into 
units of less than battalion size. Although a FIA unit briefly took 
Indian soil during the Japanese Amy's Arakan operation,' " the Inphal 
campaign proved disastrous." Moreover, Bose's belief that a British-led 
Indian Amy personnel would not only desist from firing Lpon their 
countrymen in the FIA but throw their lot in with the national force %gas 
proved false. Althcu^ an intelligenoe/reoonnai ssance unit under FIA 
Major L.S. Misra sub/erted a picket of the ISF Gwailor Lancers on 4 
February 1944, no regular Indian Amy troops switched allegiance during 
the Imphal offensive."
The importunity for the FIA to make a difference as an Axis fighting 
force had passed long before the Imphal campaign. Now, the Allied 
counter-offensive was in full swing and the J^enese were pressed to 
help themselves, much less the FIA. While some FIA units continued to 
fi^ it, the battle now was for the defence of Burma and not the 
liberation of India; eventually, most quit the field, were captured or 
surrendered.' ' Ihose that remained lost their leader when Bose, while
See Oorr, op.cit., pp. 159-160. Ihe Japanese had previously 
transferred the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to the Provisional 
Govemmait of Azad Hind. Ihese reverted to the British at the end of 
WWII. See Bose, op.cit., pp. 212, 220-221; and Palta, op.cit., p. 90.
' ^ Of the 6,000 FIA mai involved, 400 were killed, 1,500 died of disease 
and starvation, 715 deserted or went missing in action, and 800 
surrendered. Of the 2,600 who returned, 2,000 had to be ho^itadized.
See A.J. Barker, Ihe March on Delhi as used in Oorr, op.cit., pp. 163; 
and Mason, op.cit., p. 517.
' ' Misra had been a captain in the Indian Amy's 5/17th Dogra Regimait. 
See Corr, op.cit., p. 159; Fay, cp.cit., pp. 292-296; and Mason, 
op.cit., p. 513.
' ' According to the British, in WWII the INA and FIA combined suffered
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trying to reach the Soviet Union from where he planned to carry on the 
struggle against the imperialist Raj, died of bums suffered during the 
Taipei stcpover on 17 August 1945.'*
II.A.I. Reasons for Joining: Jawans
Indian Army jawans joined the various Indian national armies for an 
assortment of reasons. FIL recruiters found that while some Indian 
troops expressed anti-British sentiments after their British officers 
had been taken away, the vast majority were unaware of their potential 
propaganda value to the nationalist struggle. Not until Bose ordered 
that the men be cut off from those NOQs championing the military 
discipline of loyalty did many consider his argument that to join the 
Legion was to fi^it as patriots rather than remain as captive British 
mercenaries. Nonetheless, the FIL's most effective recruiting method was 
promises of "more money, more food. Red Cross parcels and access to 
women".' ' Ihe Centro Militare India may be assumed to have followed the 
same pattern in recruiting volunteer rank-and-file BoWs.
Unlike their counterparts held by the European Axis powers, many of
the jawans captured by the Japanese were recent wartime recruits, unused
to combat and bewildered by their sudden change of circumstances. Indian
Army Lieut.-General Sir Francis Tuker thought these men
had ceased to believe in these pecple [the British] or in their 
capacity to win the war. The battlefield and victory had receded 
from them; they were alone with the Japanese conqueror. They had 
joined him, not willingly but because there was no one else and
715 killed, 1500 dead from disease or starvation, 2,000 escapees to 
Siam, 3,000 surrendered or deserted, and 9,000 captured. See Connell, 
c^.cit., p. 797.
'* See Bose, pp.cit., pp. 176-177; Corr, op.cit., pp. 170; and Fay, 
c^.cit., pp. 376-385.
"  Bose, op.cit., pp. 186-187.
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would be no one else they oould join and, with him, perhaps they 
would once more see their homes."
Ihouiÿï never one himself, Lieut.-Genezal Vena describes how many Indian
PbWs had 2Llso seen or heard firstHiand accounts of
capts. [K.P.] Chargalkar and [H.] Badhwar.. .beaten up and hung 
up in cages for weeks on end because they would not coc^ serate. 
capt. Ghanshayam Singh.. .was taken out blindfolded, with hands 
tied b^iind his back, and ordered to assume the position for 
bdieading.. .Three times in a few days he was put throu^ this 
ordeal, but refused to give in."
Many jawans therefore enlisted in the INA/FIA as a last resort and/or to
avoid the cruelty of their J^anese actors.
Most Indian rank-and-file BOMS, however, sinply enlisted in the 
INA/FIA if and when their officers did. As described above, thou^i 
jawans took an oath of loyalty to the King-Enperor ipon joining the 
Indian Amy, their real trust extended only to their immediate outfit 
and its officers. After their British officers had beai separated from 
them, the rahk-and-file relied on the example of their Indian officers 
when deciding whether or not to enlist in the INA/FIA. As a result, 
several units— such as l/14th Punjab and the Garhwali Regimait— went 
over virtually en Jbloc;’ • the men replacing their oath to the King- 
Bcperor with one sworn to the INA of General Sin^.
II .A. 2. Reasons for Joining: Oommi^ioned Indian Officers
"  Tuker, c .^cit., p. 57.
"  Verma, To Serve with Honour, p. 45. Captcdns K.P. Dhargalkar and H. 
Badhwar were both KCIOs. I assume that captain Ghanshayam Sin^ was an 
100. See Ghosh, op.cit., p. 63.
" This was not always the case; %hile all three ICOs of the 2/lOth 
Baluch Regiment— Obtain Prem Kumar Sahgal, Captain Burhan ud-Din and 
Captain?/Major? K.P. Thimayya— switched sides, the men did not. See 
Corr, op.cit., pp. 121-122; Fay, op.cit., p. 454; and Ghosh, op.cit.,
p. 60.
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Ooranissioned Indian officer PbWs needed more convincing to switch
allegiances. Neither Captain Dhargalkar nor Captain Badhwar (nor Captain
Ghanshayam Singh?) succumbed to Japanese pressure to join the INA.^  ’
Initially, many commissioned officers were unconvinced of Mohan Singh's
suitability as an army commander. Captain Shah Nawaz, also of the l/14th
Punjab Regiment, stated he had known Sin^ for 10 years and
with all due regards.. .he had always been a very efficient, but 
very average officer.. .among the Indian prisoners of war there 
were some very senior and brilliant officers like [Lieut.-] Col. 
[N.S.] Gill and [Lieut.-] Col. [J.K. ] Ehonsle with at leai^ 15 
to 20 years service in the army, vhereas Capt. Mohan Singh had 
only 8 to 9 years' service.*®
Finally, having seen the harsh treatment meted out to Allied soldiers
and civilians in Malaya before their own capture, Indian officer PoWs
were suspicious of Japanese intentions, both towards the INA and India.
A variety of factors eventually combined to push Indian commissioned 
officers into joining the INA and thai FIA. Sin^ won over his sceptics 
by replacing Indian officers' long-standing grievances with the Indian 
Army's racial discrimination, slow pace of Indianization, and 
differentiation of pay and cillowances between a over-complex hierarchy 
of officers* ^ with non-communal practices (described above), one class 
of officer, one scale of pay, and a liberal promotion policy. A "very
Ghosh, op.cit., p. 63.
*® Moti Ram, ed., TWo Historic Trials in Red Port An Authentic Account 
of the Trial of Captain Shah Nawaz Khan. Captain Sahoal and Lt.
G.S. ttiillCTi and the TricLL bv a European Military Oommission of Emperor 
Bahadur Sha Tsic] (n.p. : Moti Ram, n.d. ), p. 105. 4/19th Hyderabad 
Regiment Lieut.-Colonel N.S. Gill and 5/5th Mahratta Regimait Lieut.- 
Colcxiel J.K. (or J.R.) Bhonsle were KCIOs. See Connell, op.cit., p. 800; 
Corr, op.cit., pp. 103-104, 139; Ghosh, op.cit., p. 63; and Tuker, 
op.cit., p. 560.
* ^ In WWII, there were KCOs, KCIOs, ICOs, British and Indian BOOs, VOOs, 
ISF Officers, Warrant Officers (WOs; introduced as r^lacements for 
VOOs, they were withdrawn by the end of the war) and NOOs. See Praval, 
op.cit., p. 20; and Ihorat, op.cit., p. 40.
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large number"/* of officers switched allegiances to protect their mai—  
and theamselves— from Japanese tortures. "All my people", said Major 
Rawat, "preferred to be in the INA than to fall into the hands of [the] 
Japanese".** The scope and suddenness of Japanese victories and the 
paucity of British-led forces left to defend the subcontinent led many 
officers to enlist in the INA/FIA to help protect Indian civilians from 
the invasion they believed was imminent. Any remaining reluctance to 
break their oath ended after officers learned of nationalist calls to 
Quit India. "I joined the I.N.A. from purely patriotic motives", said 
Captain P.K. Sahgal, "I wanted freedom for ny motherland and was ready 
to shed blood for it".**
After the removal of British officers, there had remained only about 
250 Indian officers— KCIOs, ICOs, Indian BOOs, VOOs and those seconded 
from the ISF— among the 55,000 Indian PoiWS at Singapore. Approximately 
150 of these officers eventually ailisted with the INA and/or FIA (along 
with a large number of IMS officers, many of vhom joined so as to care 
for the men). Ihe vast majority consisted of VOOs who, because of the 
great shortage of experimced officers in the INA and FIA, were promoted 
to fill positions normally held by commissioned officers (both the INA 
and FIA then abolished this intermediate class of officers). Ihese 
armies' remaining staff and hi^ier coranand positions were thaï filled by 
a "handful" of KCIO majors and lieutenant colonels and "score" of ICO 
and Indian BOO lieutenants and captains. ISF officers also accounted for
* * Ghosh, c^ .cit., p. 69.
** From the statement of [Indian Army Garhwali Regiment ICO] Major Rawat 
before the Defence Counsel of the first I.N.A. court martial, I.N.A. 
Defence Papers, as used in ibid., p. 69.
** Ram, op.cit., p. 115.
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a number of coramissianed officers. Fifteen cultured cenmissioned Indian 
officers who did not switch allegiance remained PdWs for the duration.* ®
II.B. Oourts^fartial
After the surrender of the Axis powers, the Govemmait of India had 
to decide what to do with the Indian military personnel who had joined 
the various Indian national armies. Although all were guilty of "nutiny, 
desertion and waging war against the King-Biperor” for vhioh the Indian 
Penal Code prescribed the death penalty, the authorities could hardly 
execute tens of thousands of men.*' Yet the steadfastness of the almost 
equal number of Indian military perscxmel who "took unflinchingly the 
road of hardship, privation, humiliation, torture and death rather than 
betray the standards of their own honour and loyalty"*^  had to be shown 
to be respected.** "How can we", asked Gaieral O'Conner in a question
*® See Cohen, op.cit., p. 155; Fay, c .^cit., pp. 81, 140, 208-209; and 
Ghosh, op.cit., p. 59.
*' The huge numbers of Indian national armies' personnel who surrendered 
and/or were captured before the çand of WWII dissuaded the Indian Amy 
from giving them the maximum punishment. Nonetheless, 30 such men, 
captured in battle or trying to eiter India by parachute or submarine 
during the war were court-iaartialled, and nine, found guilty of 
espionage or sabotage activities, were executed. See Cornell, op.cit., 
p. 797; Corr, op.cit., p. 190; îfascn, op.cit., p. 519; and P. Mason, A 
Shaft of Sunlight; Memories of a Varied Life (London: Andre Deutsch, 
1978), p. 192.
*’ Connell, op.cit., p. 794.
* * According to Viceroy Wavell, the 25% casualty rate for Indian PoWs 
was almost four times that of Indian nationcd armies' personnel. Ihe 
figures are based on a Wavell address in Calcutta: "Ihe 45,000 Indian 
prisœers of war [held throuiÿiout Southeast Asia] who stood firm are 
estimated to have lost about 11,000 or one quarter of their numbers, 
from disease, starvation and murder; the 20,000 who wæt over to our 
enemy's side lost cnly 1,500 or 7% percent". While the figures may be 
contested the point of the argument is obvious. Note that fully 11,000 
of the 15,000 Indian PdWs in the Western Iheatre did not join the FIL. 
See Bose, op.cit., p. 187; and Connell, cqp.cit:., p. 794; Farwell, 
cp.cit., p. 335; Fay, op.cit., pp. 525-526; and Tuker, op.cit., p. 564.
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pertinent to both the British-led and future independent Indian armed
forces, "ejçect to keep loyalty if we dcxi^ t ccnderan disloyalty?*»**
In the end, the various Indian natiwal armies' personnel were
divided into three categories d^ending on their degree of guilt;
The White were those v*io joined the I.N.A. but vAose conduct 
thereafter was such as to clear them of any act of disloyalty 
beyond the siinple fact of joining that ar%ny; the Grey were 
lukewarm members of the I.N.A. vho had done enouÿi to display 
disloyalty; the Black were those who had takai an active and 
evil part on the side of the Japanese [i.e., the leaders and 
those who had committed atrocities].*®
While the 3,880 Whites were reinstated in the Indian Army without loss 
of seniority, and the 13,211 Greys discharged with the loss of pay and 
allowances due during their period of c^jtivity but with the retention 
of their pension, the 6,177 Blacks were scheduled for oourts-^ nartial.*^  
(In a reflection of the British authorities' high ideal of military 
loyalty, the Indian Indian Army personnel vho refused to join the Indian 
nationcd armies were never awarded specied recognition. )
Althou^ nationalist politicians and the Indian press initially 
accepted the above punishments as fair on enemy collaborators,* ' the 
Indian public soon perceived Indian national armies' personnel to be 
patriots.** Numerous public relations' blunders during the first post­
war courts-martial of three designated Blacks— (Indian Amy Captain) 
INA/FIA division commander Major-General Shah Newaz and two of his 
battalion commanders, (Captain) Lieut.-Colonel Prem Kumar Sahgal and 
(Lieutenant) Lieut.-Colmel Gurbaksh Sinÿi Chilien— at the Red Fort only
** As used in Connell, c^.cit., p. 805. 
*° Tuker, cqp.cit:., p. 70.
5 1 
5 3
Farwell, cp.cit., pp. 339-340.
See Mason, A Matter of Honour, p. 521, and A Shaft of Sunlight, p. 
193; and Tuker, op.cit., p. 67.
** See Connell, op.cit., pp. 813, 817-819, 945; and Kaul, op.cit., pp. 
94-95.
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further increased public sympathy for Indian national armies' 
persamel.®*
The public's change of attitude quickly altered the behaviour of 
Indian politicians— especially as the Red Fort oourts-roarticLl ran 
concurrently with post-war elections to the provincial and legislative 
assemblies. While Congress had c^ ]posed the Indian natiwal armies during 
wartime/ * and notwithstanding Nehru's protest that "there was no desire 
or even thought of e5cploiting the INA issue for political purposes"/* 
the party now provided the "Red Fort Three" with a hi^-powered defence 
team led by Bhulabhkhai Desai and including Nehru.®’ Similarly, vhereas 
the Muslim League had c^ p^osed the Indian national armies on the basis 
that the indiscipline necessary to their recruitment efforts undermined
® * Nawaz had been an Indian Army l/14th Punjab Regiment ICO Ccçitzdn (and 
farmer winner of the Sir Pratap Memorial Prize for best IMA cadet), 
Sahgal a 2/lOth Baluch Regiment 100 captain and Chilien a l/14th Punjab 
Regiment ICO lieubæant. Besides the charge of waging war against the 
King-Diperor, Khan was accused of abetment in the murder of three 
ccnrades, Chilien of four counts of murder and Sahgal of abetting the 
four murders. All of these charges, however, stemmed from the officers' 
carrying out, or passing on, the orders of their superiors according 
INA/FIA procedures. (The authorities' first choice to face a post-war 
court-martial, [Indian Army 2/lOth Baluch Regiment ICO Obtain] INA/FIA 
Lieut.-Colonel Burhan ud-Din, was charged with arbitrarily ordering two 
men attempting to desert "to be hung up by their arms and flogged by a 
vhole battalion" resulting in the death of one but his trial was 
postponed on a late technicality. He was eventually saitenced to seven 
years rigorous imprisœment. ) Selecting a Muslim, Hindu and Sikh 
defendant, respectively, to show religious impartiality only served to 
unify Indians of sdl faiths behind the defendants. Picking Delhi's Red 
Fort— the historical seat of Mu^ul rule and the prize of the mutineers 
of 1857— as the courts-martial site was seen as a deliberate provocaticxi 
to nationalist sensibilities. Finally, opening the trial to the public 
mded any hcpes of a ncrni-coTtentious resolutioi. See Oænell, cp.cit., 
pp. 800, 813, 817, 855; Farwell, cp.cit., p. 341; Mason, A Matter of 
Honour, pp. 520-521; Palta, op.cit., p. 67; Ram, c^ .cit. ; M. Sin^, 
op.cit., p. 54; and Thker, op.cit., pp. 560-561.
®® See Akbar, op.cit., p. 339; and Connell, op.cit., p. 798.
®* See Connell, op.cit., pp. 817-819. The Red Fort trial began in 
November 1945 and ended in February 1946; the elections were held in 
January 1946.
Brecher, N^irUf p. 307.
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the League's bargaining position as the self-styled representative of 
the Indian Amy's large number of Muslims, it too stepped in on the 
defœdants' side.®* Althou^ voicing reservations about the FIA's size, 
efficiency and ill-treatment of the Burmese, leading Socialist 
Jayaprakash Narayan also stçported Bose and the Indian national armies 
for their patriotic motivation.®* Even the CPI modified its wartime 
shunning of Bose as fascism's ally by admitting that his forces had had 
some positive influence on the struggle for swaraj.®*
At the Red Fort courts-martial, Bhulabhkhai Desai countered the 
prosecution's charge that the accused had broken their oath to the King- 
Ehperor by pointing to higher motives: **Uhless you sell your soul.. .how 
can you ever say, when you are fi^iting to liberate your country, that 
there is some other allegiance whioh prevents you from doing so? If that 
were so, there would be nothing but permanent slavery”.*^  Moreover, 
added Nehru, the Indian national armies had not fou^it for fascism; 
"their dominating motive was love for India's freedom".**
Althou^ C-in-C Auchinlek understood the patriotic nature of the 
Indian national armies' "disloyalty", he had to measure any laiiency 
towards the Red Port Three against its effect on the military.* ’ Many
®* See Akbar, op.cit., pp. 321-322; Bose, op.cit., p. 246, pp. 261-262; 
Oohen, op.cit., pp. 157-158; and P. Ziegler, Mountbattai. Ptk. ed.
(1985, New York: Perennial Library Harper & Row, 1986), p. 308.
®* Oohen, op.cit., p. 158.
** Apparaitly, the CPI played a "double-game" of publicly attacking Bose 
vhile privately co-cperating with him in order to keep informed on the 
movements of the fascist powers. See Bose, c^.cit., pp. 177-181; and 
Odien, op.cit., p. 157.
** As used in F. Moraes, Jawaharlal Ndiru: A Biography (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1956), p. 312.
* * From J.S. Bright, The Great N^rcus  ^p. 115 as used in Brecher, Ndiru. 
p. 306.
* * For Auchinlek, the "overriding object is to maintain the stability, 
reliability and efficioxy of the Indian Amy so that it may remain in 
the future a trustworthy weapon in the defence of India, and.. .the
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British officers agreed with Lieut.-General Tuker's belief that jawans, 
NOOs and VOOs were "in the main set against the three accused... [as] 
untrue to the man whose salt you ate".** Auchinlek, hcwever, thou^t 
these men perceived "the whole ^ isode [of the Indian national 
armies].. .urpleasant and discreditable to them as a class and to the 
Army as a whole, and would wish it forgotten and decently buried as soon 
as possible".*® Moreover, he recognized that the future cohesivæess and 
effectiveness of the Indian armed forces depended not on British 
officers nor the rahk-and-file, but on those Indians vho by the end of 
WWII formed the majority of the Indian Amy's commissioned officer 
corps. For Auchinlek, ''Every Indian ocxodssioned officer is a 
Nationalist and rightly so, provided he hopes to attain independence for 
India by constitutional means.. .their feelings are much the same as 
those of the public at large". [)y italics.]** And the public saw the 
men of the Indian naticxial armies as patriots.
Public synpathy, nationalist defence arguments, and the perceived 
pro-swaraj sentiments of commissioned Indian officers effectively 
guaranteed a compromise punishment of the Red Port Three. All were found 
guilty of waging war against the King-Bnperor (and INA/FIA Major-General 
Khan of the additional charge of abetmait to murder), cashiered, ordered 
to forfeit all pay and allowances, and sentaxed to transportation for 
life. While coifirming the guilty verdicts and other punishments, C-in-C
Commonwealth as a vhole". See Connell, op.cit., p. 949.
** Tuker, op.cit., p. 53. See also pp. 56-57, 562; and Connell, cp.cit.,
pp. 794-795, 803-805.
*® See Connell op.cit., pp. 813, 946.
** See Connell Auchinlek  ^pp. 813, 946. Yet many Indian Indian Any 
personnel refused to break their oath and thus remained in Axis PoW
caips for the duration of the war felt Indian national armies' personnel
should not be shown any leniency. See Cohen, cp.cit., pp. 156-157.
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Auchinlek freed the three by remitting the transportaticxi order. He 
appears to have had little choice; later describing hew the majority of 
ocranissicned Indian officers "are sure that any atteazpt to enforce the 
sentence [of transportation] would have led to chaos in the country at 
large and probably to mutiny and dissension in the Amy culmimting in 
its dissolution, probably on communal lines". [My italics.]*’
Fears of a national and array iprising convinced the military 
authorities to court-martial only those Indian national armies' 
personnel suspected of atrocities and to commute any death sentences to 
rigorous imprisonmait. Only 15 such men— two commissioned officers, four 
VOOs and nine other ranks— were tried and sentenced before C-in-C 
Auchinlek ended the operation altogether.* * Ihou^ he spent six months 
in British custody (after two years and eleven months under Japanese 
arrest), and came up before a Court of Inquiry, INA General Mohan Sin^ 
himself never faced a court-martial.*’
II.B.l. KCIOs
Were KCIOs, like C-in-C Auchinlek, willing to prescribe leniency for 
the mai joining the FIL, Centro Militare India, INA and FIA? Or were 
th^ like the majority of the Indian Army's British officers in 
demanding the full punishment of death for traitors? The recorded 
ejgjeriences of the KCIOs used above show these officers most circumspect 
in revealing their c^ inicxis of the Indian national armies. In the
*’ See Connell, cp.cit., pp. 813, 946.
*• See Connell, cp.cit., pp. 813, 817, 855; Fay, cp.cit., pp. 106, 454- 
455, 461, 481-482, 497-498; M. Sin^, op.cit., pp. 54 , 58-59; and TViker, 
cp.cit., p. 561.
*’ Singh was eventually freed on 4 May 1946 without giving his 
signature. See Corr, cp.cit., p. 138; and M. Sinÿi, cp.cit., pp. 13, 31, 
88-91.
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respective (auto)biographies of President Kban, Generals Gari^]pa and 
Chaudhuri, and Ambassador Baig there are no more than passing references 
to these forces despite, in the reflective cases of the first two, 
personal involvemait in the battle theatres in vAich the national armies 
were active/ “ Ihe remaining RdOs— General Ihimayya, Lieut.-Generals 
Kaul, Thorat and Venna— approach the issue from very different angles.
Thimayya's main concern was the pull of opposite loyalties created 
by the mere existence of the Indian national armies. In hindsi^ it, 
Thinayya believes officers joined these forces partly to protect their 
men from Japanese cruelty. In 1942, however, the first rumours told of 
**many Indian P.O.W.s...[were] joining the Japanese in order to help 
drive the British out of the subcontinent"^ "It was difficult", he 
continues, "for us [Indian officers]...to view this action as anything 
but patriotic.. .If we accepted the I.N.A. men as patriotic, however, 
then we who served with the British must be traitors"’ Yet any 
sympathy whioh commissioned Indian officers may have had for the Indian
’ “ While Khan saw action in the Burma Campaign, he did not come 
against any Indian national forces. He notes only that some officers of 
his old battalion, the l/14th Punjab, "joined the Indian National Amy, 
a Jéçanese-inspired force". Chaudhuri, also in Burma and usually 
expansive on matters concerning the professionalism of the Indian Army, 
offers no comment on the Indian national armies. Althou^ Baig resigned 
from the amy in 1930, he describes meeting Mrs. Annu a«aminadhan whose 
daughter Laxmi (aka Lakshmi) "won great renown as the Commander of the 
[FIA's] Ranee of Jhansi Brigade" (see text below), and briefly describes 
the career of Bose's ADC, Abid Safrani. Cariappa's biographer mentions 
but does not elaborate on Cariappa's service as one of the Red Fort 
courts-martial "Presidents". See Baig, In Différait Saddles, pp. 78-79, 
102; Chaudhuri, General J.N. Chaudhuri; Muthanna, op.cit., p. 33; and 
Khan, Friends Not Masters, pp. 13-14.
Evans, op.cit., p. 180.
ibid., pp. 180-181. Knowing that the older of his two brothers in the 
Indian Army, Captain?/Major? K.P. Ihimayya (called up from the Reserve 
Officers Training Cor]ps to 2/lOth Baluch Regiment), had joined the INA 
exacerbated Ihimayya's inner conflict. See Evans, cp.cit., pp. 173-174, 
181, 226; Fay, op.cit., p. 106; Muthanna, op.cit., p. 39; and Palta, 
op.cit., p. 65.
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nationcd armies soon was tempered by a growing scepticism about Japan's
future plans for the subcontinent. Better to stick with the ruler tiiey
knew, at least until the war was over.’ ^
Professional and personal loyalties also came to the fore for
Ihimayya: "to sign with the British, to leam from them, and then to go
over to the enemy was reprehensible; I doubt if I could have done it".’*
When the authorities demanded commissioned Indian officers sign a paper
attesting that they were "not in sympathy with the Oongress Party and
would support the British with force",’® Thimayya convinced his
"incensed"’ * ccmrades to acquiesce. He echoed Motilal N^mi's advice to
resist nationalist-motivated taptations to resign:
Refusing to sign it would have had little political 
significance. But signing the peper, carrying on with our 
duties, and supporting the Britdsh by force meant that we oould 
leam the proper use of force. Vho else oould teach us? And when 
the time came to fight for our oountzy, we would be able to 
fight effectively.”
A scepticism of Japanese aims, professional and personcd loyalties, and
concern for independent India's fighting effectiveness combined to
ccxTvince Thimayya and other KCIOs to remain loyal to the Raj.
As two of the battalion commanders in the famous "All-Indian
Brigade" operating in the Aralcan,’* Thimayya and Thorat had to deal with
the possibility of fig^ iting fellow Indians in Bose's national army.
Thimayya recalls how FIA propaganda efforts— tapping telephone lines,
cutting in on radio communications— came to nourÿit since those targeted
7 3 Evans
’* ibid. 
’= ibid. 
’* ibid.
op.cit., pp. 180-181.
p. 181. 
p. 181. 
p. 181.
7 7 
7 •
80
—160—
i ici., 
ibid., p. 181.
See Evans, op.cit., pp. 190-228; and Thorat, op.cit., pp. 49-51, 53-
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were Allied officers knowing more than the enemy about the war
situation, could shrug off such acticns. When, however, intelligax»
r^»rts warned him that the Japanese were set to d^lcy FIA ocnbat
farces against his battalion, Ihimayya became %#orried that, at the
least, his men would be demoralized. Unsure of whether to warn his men,
he said nothing in the hope that the situation would not arise. It did
not, and Ihimayya was spared having to lead his men against fellow
Indians.’ * Ihorat just mentions his plan to say that he was a FIA man
escaping from Indian Array captivity if caught by the enemy while out on
a two-man reconnaissance patrol.*®
Ihorat does, however, offer an ^ nlogy for those joining the Indian
national armies. Saddened that his former regiment, the l/14th Punjab,
went over to the INA en masse, Ihorat points out tiiat
the officers and men whose loyalty had fcdled or quailed [sic] 
under the Japanese heel.. .and what they did or did not do, had 
no connection with their fine record of duty in the Malayan 
campaign until it was lost. Prior to their capture 1/14 Punjab 
had lost three officers, five VOOs and one hundred and thirty- 
ei^it men killed in action. Ihereafter a further one hundred and 
twenty men died in Ccptivity." ^
For Ihorat, the men of the l/14th Punjab Regiment may be partly excused
their switch of allegiance after having been reduced to a state of utter
bewilderment by the time of their surræder.
Verma, who also saw action in the Eastern Iheatre, has little
sympathy for those enlisting in the various Indian national armies and
none for the politicians defending the Red Fort Ihree. Althcu^ Verma
allows that many who broke their oath mi^t have done so as a result of
”  Evans, cp.cit., p. 205.
•® Ihorat, cp.cit., p. 56.
* ^ ibid., p. 84. Ihorat also mentions that both Mohan Sin^ and Shah 
Nawaz of the 1/14 Punjab Regiment joined the INA. See ibid., p. 39.
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being told of the inminent defeat of the British worldwide, while
"perhaps seme"* * were motivated by patriotism, "by and large the
majority gave in to avoid harsh treatment and to have an easier, more
comfortable life"." He backs this iç by pointing out the discr^ency
between the words and deeds of 1±e national armies:
If they had put i:p even one good fi^it one would have readily 
agreed to their bona fides. But at the slightest opportunity 
they surrendered.. .Yet whilst strutting about Rangoon, Ban^cck 
and other places they lived a life of ease with plenty of money, 
wine, women and song. The Indian trading ocraiunity in these 
towns was bitter about the money, valuables and jewellery, etc., 
these heroes had "liberated" from than.* *
Verma also believes staging the courts-martial of Khan, Sahgal and
Dhillon at so public a venue as the Red Fort was a mistake:
The atmosphere at the time was such that every little episode 
was grabbed to get political mileage out of it. The trial of the
I.N.A. "heroes" was e>^oited to the full and all tiie national 
leaders vied with one another to defend them. As a result th^ 
were all let off and put on a pedestal.**
For Venna, neither the Indian national armies nor their politician
defaiders emerge with any credit.
In contrast, Kaul believes those joining the Indian national armies
were, with some exc^bions, true nationalists:
** Verma, cp.cit., p. 45.
** ibid., p. 45.
** ibid., p. 45. Verna's belief in the unprofessional ism of the Indian
national armies was confirmed during a postwar encounter %dth the 
c^jtured INA/FIA Major-General Bhonsle during whioh
he handed me a large packet and asked me to keep it for him and
return it if he ever got out alive. I agreed to do so and
discovered it was wad of new Thai currency notes stapled 
together. He kept moaning about all the gold and jewellery he 
had in Ban^ odk, vbioh the British officers who had captured him 
had relieved him of.. .About two years later, when he had become 
a deputy minister, I returned the packet to him and felt better 
for having k^yt ray promise.
See ibid., pp. 45-46.
** ibid., p. 46.
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No Indian worth his salt oould ever have any doubt about Bose 
and his patriotism... [the national forces had] broadcast many 
massages— with telling effect— accusing us of fighting under a 
British flag whilst they were laying down their lives under lAe 
Indian tricolour and for Indian Independence.**
Kaul stoutly defends the Red Fort Ihree's switch of allegiance:
It was alleged.. .that the accused had violated the amy oath 
they had taken. In point of fact, however, they had siyerseded 
that oath by the pledge they had taken to fi^it for the liberty 
of their country a cause which transcends all other 
considerations in life. It was alleged they had fought against 
their King. How could the British King, a foreigner, who %#as 
keeping their country enslaved, be their King? In fact, they 
were patriotic mai, like De Gaulle and others vho had led open 
revolt for freedom in Europe and els^ diere.'^
Kaul also discounts those like C-in-C Auchinlek and "some senior Indian
officers"* * vho thouÿit that freeing designated Indian national andes'
Blacks (see below) would damage Indian Army discipline. He advised Nehru
that the British anticipation was wrong and that if the IMA 
personnel under trial then, who had fought under an Indian flag, 
were released, it would in fact be generally welcomed. As for 
those Indians who echoed British sentimaits, I said they were 
merely their Master's Voice and should be ignored.* *
•* Kaul, The Untold Story, p. 72.
* ibid., p. 73. To the authorities' displeasure, Kaul once attended the 
Red Port trial. He claims to have helped in the defence of the Red Port 
Three by acceding to Bhulabhbhai Desai's request
to try and procure.. .a document, in possession of the British 
Intelligence authorities, whioh could prove valuable to the 
defence of these men. I must to the credit of Colonel Rudra, 
a senior Indian officer, at the Army Headquarters then, that he 
assisted me to extract this paper, for a few hours, to read, 
from the ric^t quarters by great ingaiuity. I was thus able to 
conv^ its contants to Bulabhai Desai, as premised.
Kaul also describes helping Colonel M.S. Hinmatsinhji, a newly nominated 
member r^resenting the military in the Legislative Assembly, to draft a 
speech on the Indian national armies. See ibid. pp. 74-75.
•“ ibid., p. 74.
** ibid., p. 74. Kaul writes that Nehru had "been visibly moved" to hear 
his account in late 1945 of FIA efforts in Burma and the Arakan. See 
ibid., pp. 70-71.
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As with his strongly pro-ind^ )erx3enoe s^rtiments and activities 
described earlier, Kaul's views on the Indian national armies appear 
indistinguishable from those of nationalist politicians.
The differences in the four above officers' respective approaches to
the Indian national armies are reflected in the actions of the
"about...half a dozen***® KCIOs surrendering in Singa^ xsre. As described
above, two of these six. Captain Dhargalkar and Captadn Badhwar, refused
to switoh allegiances. Ihe four who did were hardly fervent converts.
C^jtain Gurdip Singh Dhillon, for example, enlisted in the INA with the
e^ qiress— and later realized— purpose of getting closer to the front
lines from where he could re-defect to the Indian Amy.* Ifejor N.S.
Bhagat refused to join the INA as he *'did not trust the Japanese at
all". Ihou^ he later enlisted in the FIA to escape the deprivations of
c^Ttive life in Borneo and make himself "more useful in resisting the
Japanese" (he rose to ccmnand the FIA's second division), his insistence
on opposing the Japanese whenever possible pushed Bose to dismiss him in
1944 for "insubordination and disloyalty".*^  Lieut.-Colonel Niranjan
Sinÿi Gill, the hic^ iest-ranking Indian officer BOW, enlisted in the INA
after "just drifting eüLong":**
I was puzzled and confused, ur^ irepared to meet the circumstances 
that suddenly faced me. On the one hand there was the attraction 
of doing something for one's country. And my attachment to the
9 0 
9 1
Ghosh, op.cit., p. 63.
Ihe information Dhillon gained as head of an INA infiltration unit 
and later revealed to the British is thou^it to have compromised the 
force's eitire covert infiltration prograrme. See Cohen, op.cit., p.
153; Corr, op.cit., p. 131; Ihorat, cp.cit., p. 20; and inker, op.cit., 
p. 561.
*' From [FIA] Col. Ehagat's statement to the defence Counsel of the 
first I.N.A. court martial, I.N.A. Defence papers, as used in Qxssh, 
cp.cit., p. 63.
*^  As used in Corr, op.cit., p. 103. Gill was the hi^iest-rahking (xmbat 
officer (there were some IMS Indian officer PdWs of hi^>er rank). See 
ibid., p. 103.
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British was not strong encu^ to prevent me trying. On the other 
hand all my life had been spent in a pro-British atmosphere, the 
effects of which still remain with me. I oould not suddenly get 
away from it and start hating the British as Premier To jo said 
we loust do.. .^ain, there was the question of safeguarding 1±e 
lives and interests of Indian soldiers and civilians...**
Later, Gill testified "that this I.N.A. was not genuine and I could not
believe that this will [sic] result in [the] freedom of the country".*®
Lieut.-Colonel Bhonsle's motives for joining the INA are unclear.**
KCIOs, then, constituted a far from monolithic bloc on the issue of
the Indian national armies. Ihimayya concentrates on these forces'
effect on Indian officers' loyalties, Ihorat looks to post-war
reconciliation efforts, Verma unhesitatingly condemns both those
switching their allegiances and the politicians defending them after the
war, while Kaul ccinneitte the motivation of national armies and the
efforts to lessen their personnel's punishments. Yet the almost
unanimous reluctance of those six KCIOs surrendering at Singapore to
afitch allegiances points to Ihimayya's understanding of the paramountcy
of personal and professional loyalties, scepticism of Japanese aims, and
patience for the future good of independent India's armed forces as 1±e
most widely held view of KCIOs. Certainly, the hi^ily individualistic
responses to the national armies of all the officers described above,
especially those with the opportunily to join them, suggest the British
had little reason to question the loyalty of KCIOs.
II.B.2. ICOs and Indian BOOs, or QuesticxTnaire Respondents
** As used in Corr, cp.cit., p. 103. 
*® As used in Ghoeh, op.cit., p. 64.
** Ghosh, op.cit., p. 64.
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That the majority of coranissioned Indian officers joining the
INA/FIA were lOOs and/or Indian BOOs suggests the latter two did not
share their KdO predecessors' g^ieral disapproval of the Indian
national armies. Lieut.-General Tuker saw the loyalty of Indian officers
as a function of their respective contact with the British. Ihus, while
the older regular [Indian officer] had been to Ehglish public 
schools and had maintained their contact with Ehglish ways of 
life and thcu^it, [and] now held precisely the same 
[cœservative] view as the British officer.. .those whose sole 
contact with the British had been with the instructors in the 
Indian Military Academy in Dehra IXm and who, for racial 
reasons, had avoided further contact.. .maintained that the
I.N.A. were patriots and much to be praised.*^
"Djker's proof lay in the fact that the 1/I4th Punjab, one of the Indian
Army's original ei^it Indianized units which by the time of the British
surrender at Singapore was almost fully staffed by comnissioned Indian
officers, provided the bulk of the INA/FIA's leadership.* *
Yet what of the thousands of lOOs, Indian BOOs, VOOs and ISF
officers in the Indian armed forces remained loyal to the British
throu^iout WWII? Did they ke^ their allegiance only because they lacked
an opportunity to join the Indian national armies? See %ble 4.1. As
above, in Table 4.1 respondents are divided into the four groL^ of
"All", "Pre-1945", "Post-1945" and "Unknown" according to their date of
joining. KCIO Lieut.-General 92 is omitted. Ihe examination below
focuses on the views of the two lOOs and 33 Indian BOOs constituting the
"Pre-1945" groL^ of respondents.*®
9 7 
9 8
Tuker, op.cit., p. 64.
INA/FIA officers drawn from l/14th Punjab include (Indian Army KCIO 
Captain) Gurdip Singh Dhillon, (ICO Captain) General Mohan Singh, (ICO 
Captain) Major-General Shah Nawaz (ICO Adjutant G90 3 Intelligence) 
Major-General Zaman Kiani (aka Mohammed Ziani Kiani), (Indian BOO 
Captain) Major Abdul Rashid, and (ICO Lieutenant) Lieut.-Colonel 
Gurbaksh Sin^ Dhillon. See above and Palta, op.cit., pp. 65-67; and 
Ibker, op.cit., pp. 52-53, 55.
*® After excluding KdO Lieut.-General 92, the "Pre-1945" respondents
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TABLE 4.1
During VWII, what was the attitude of Indian officers 
towards those who joined the Indian national armies?
Respondaits All Pre-1945 Post-1945 Uhknown
Peroent(No.)
Negative 24.21 (23) 37.14 (13) 17.07 (7) 15.79 (3)
Indifferent 16.84 (16) 22.86 (8) 12.20 (5) 15.79 (3)
Sympathetic 20.00 (19) 20.00 (7) 24.39 (10) 10.53 (2)
Supportive 13.68 (13) 14.29 (5) 14.63 (6) 10.53 (2)
No Answer 25.26 (24) 5.71 (2) 31.71 (13) 47.37 (9)
Total 99.99 (95) 100.00 (35) 100.00 (41) 100.01 (19)
Almost two-fifths (37.14%) of "Pre-1945" respondents feel Indian
officers during WWII had a "Negative" attitude towards those who joined
the Indian national armies, making this the most popular choice.
"Practically the entire officer class considered the INA as an absolute
sham", writes Brigadier 29, since those who switched allegiances did so
only because they "could not stand the rigours of life under the
Jc^ Danese in a PoW camp". Thou^ some respcndsits, like Major-General 72,
believe "the majority of serving officers did not approve of the change
of loyalty and abrogation of oath", most cite the PdWfe' submission to
coercive recruitmait methods as their prime failing. Respondents
fighting in theatres ^ rfiere the national armies were active saw them as
the enemy. "In the Central Burma front", writes Lieut.-General 16,
we came in contact with INA personnel acting as 'jitter parties' 
or tapping our telephone cables.. .they were termed JIFFS 
(J^janese Indian Fifth Columnists). Ihe jitter parties used to 
fire into our defences to draw our fire and the line tappers 
sou^Tt informaticxi from the exchange operator. So we saw them 
rather in the role of an adversary snoc^ing around. In my 
experience the INA was not seai as a liberation force.
consist of two ICOs commissioned in 1932 and 1938, respectively, and 33 
Indian BOOs commissioned as follows: five in 1940, three in 1941, eight 
in 1942, seven in 1943, five in 1944, and five in 1945.
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During and after the Red Fort oourts-martial, neither tales of hardship 
nor declarations of patriotic motives altered these reqxandents  ^minds. 
"While I synpathised with them at the hard choice they had had to make 
in those trying oonditicns of c^jtivity and Japanese brutality", writes 
Brigadier 70, "I could not, then and now, condone it". "You don't heoome 
a patriot at the &nd of a gun", concludes Oolonel 97.
Just over a fifth (22.86%) of "Pre-1945" respondents renarioer an
"Indifferent" attitude towards the Indian national armies. During the
war, Indian officers were simply too busy with professional duties to
ponder the political issues raised by the national forces' existence.
"Servicemen", recalls Air Chief ïfarshal 1, "just wanted to fight...to
prove [to] themselves, their units and their countrymen that Indians
could fi^t as well as the British, Australians or the Japanese..."
Afterwards, however, many respondents' eyes were opened by the Red Port
courts-martial. Lieut.-<3eneral 49 describes the change:
during the war we did not have synpathy with them— they were 
shooting at us. Also, we suspected that many had joined the INA 
to find a life easier than that of a POW. As time passed we 
found they were poorly motivated at the soldier's level and 
tended to desert from the INA to the Indian side at the first 
cpportunity. They never foucfit well as a cohesive team... [after 
the war] we individually contributed towards their legal 
defence. In 1948 many rejoined the army and performed well.
There was no stigma but also no credit for INA service.
Liait.-General 93 was similarly converted. Whereas during the war, he
feels Indian officers saw national armies' personnel "as traitors whose
loyalty was very flimsy.. .this attitude started changing and [officers
began] showing some sympathy when Pandit Nehru, Bhulabhbhai Desai and
other top leaders came to their defence".
A fifth (20.00%) of "Pre-1945" respondents recall a "Sympathetic" 
attitude towards those vho enlisted in the Indian national armies, not
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because they agreed with the forces' motives or methods, but because 
they identified with the predicament of those c^tured. Lieut. -Oolonel 
11 "did not believe that a person v*jo took the oath to the Ehglish Crown 
voluntarily would renounce it except by propaganda and reverse 
motivation”. Again, some respondents' attitudes began to change after 
peace had been secured. Lieut.-Gaieral 17, put in charge of rebuilding 
the Rangoon docks where former national armies' personnel were being 
used as hard labour, saw these men as "a disciplined body" with "an aura 
about them that they were fitting for a cause.. .a cause with vAich I 
later began to identify with".^®“ For these respondents the Red Port 
oourts-martial was, in the words of Colonel 79, "exemplary" in its 
strict prosecution but eventual leniency. "Senior Indian officers", 
writes Air Chief Marshal 18, "supported the trial of the INA personnel 
followed by clemency at the hi^iest level of government. Those against 
whom action was taken were eifter the trial neither shunned nor rejected 
by the officer cadres of the armed forces".
Finally, a seventh (14.29%) of "Pre-1945" respondents recall a
"Supportive" attitude towards those who joined the Indian national
armies. "Heart in heart", says Brigadier 65, "we were all for the
officers and jawans who formed the INA, thou^ we remained Icyal to the
British Army.. .these hidden feelings did come out openly and this
affected the trial". Lieut.-General 10, who saw action in the Burma
theatre, adds that
During the war little was knowi about the INA. However, there 
was no feeling of hostility towards the INA. In fact we admired 
them for what they had done.. .Ihe post-war trials made the INA 
greater heroes, notwithstanding allegations against sane for 
having maltreated Indian prisoners vho had not joined the INA.
From a follow-tp interview with Lieut.-General 17; London, 26 
November 1987.
-169-
other officers are unequivocal in their stçport. TEhose Indian officers 
who were in the J^anese prison [cançs]", says Brigadier 55, "and didn't 
join [the] I.N.A.— [I] didn't like them". "If I had an opportunity**, 
recalls Lieut.-Oeieral 10, "I would have joined the INA".
In the end, however, **Pre-1945" reqxxidents disapprove of their 
comrades who enlisted in the various Indian national armies by almost 
two-to-cne (37.14% "Negative" plus 22.86% "Indifferent" versus 20.00% 
**Syitpathetic" and 14.92% "Supportive"). Even thou^ Indianized units 
like the l/14th Punjab could be expected to contain higher 
concentrations of disgruntled Indian officers prepared to reconsider 
their ultimate personal and professional responsibilities when 
circumstances allowed, most lOOs and Indian BOOs agree with the anti­
national forces sentiments held by KCIOs. C-in-C Auchinlek need not have 
been so concerned with oomnissioned Indian officers equating their own 
pro-nationalist sentiments with the the necessity of leniently treating 
the national armies' designated Blacks.
II.E. Aftermath
Ihe question of what to do with former Indian national armies' 
personnel continued to vex the authorities. The Interim Government, 
formed on 2 S^ ytentoer 1946,^“  ^met demands that the 15 imprisoned for 
committing atrocities be freed by referring each case to the Federal 
Court.^  ° ' After independence on 15 August 1947,^ °^  the government
Ccnnell, op.cit., p. 849.
See Ocrmell, op.cit., pp. 857-858 and p. 869-871; S. Gc^ pal, ed., 
Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nfhru: Volume 1 (Series 2. New Delhi: 
Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1984), pp. 347-351, 357-358; and 
Ziegler, op.cit., p. 372.
 ^° ^ Collins and Lapierre, freedom at Midni^t, pp. 284-295.
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released all national armies' personnel still in prison and offered them 
reinstatement into the Indian Arrny at the reqaective levels at which 
they had left. (As this meant forfeiting up to three ranks relative to 
those Indian military personnel who had remained true to their oath, 
only one man took iç) this offer. ® * Yet both Any HQ and the Defence 
Ministry continued to oppose the "persistent pressure" to reinstate 
Indian national armies' personnel of all "colour" designations.^ ®®
Ihis composition had a sound basis. The third military intervention 
theory views cxmups as a result of officers' corporate grievances such 
as, writes Ihocpson, a perceived threat to the army's "monco»ly...[or] 
functional cladm to existence as the nation-state's principal, 
legitimate organization of armed foroe".^ ®* Mi^ht Indian Army officiers 
see the resurrecticxi of FIL, Centro Militare India, INA and FIA units as 
just such a threat? Welch and Staith warn that "a mission that 
differentiates between service to 'the government' and service to 'the 
nation' encourages the armed farces to move directly into politics".^®’ 
Bose, Schedai and Sinc^ recruited men into their forces with the 
"patriotic" argument that the Indian Army was serving the interests of 
the Raj and not Indians themselves. Mi^it re-admitted Indian national 
armies' personnel again differentiate between loyalty to a govemmart 
and loyalty to the nation? In the fourth theory of military 
intervention, Decalo argues that cxxps are a result of clientelist 
motives. With their unicjue shared ejq)erienoe, mi^it the more ocranitted
®^* See Oohen, cp.cit., p. 157; and Farwell, op.cit., p. 343.
 ^® ® See P.V.R. Rao, India's Defence Policy and Organisation Since 
Independence. USI National Security Lectures (New Delhi: The United 
Service Institution of India, 1977), pp. 3-5.
Thorapscxi, The Grievances of Military Ooup-%kers, p. 15.
Welch and Smith, Military Role and Rule, pp. 12-13.
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Greys and Blacks of the Indian national armies be more ready to find 
occasion to organize themselves into a cohesive clique(s) than other 
Indian Amy personnel?
Despite his personal sympathies, Prime Minister (FM) was aware
that re-admitting Indian national armies' personnel into the regular
arrry mi^t create problems for civil siçreraacy-of-rule. At a 1948
meeting, (future) Defaice Secretary P.V.R. Rao recalls that
Ihe Prime Minister.. .patiently listened iiAile we [Rao and senior 
military officers advised him] that the Indian National Army 
personnel should not be reinstated and may be compensated 
otherwise. After a few minutes silence, [the] Prime Minister 
suddenly observed— these were not his exact words but in effect- 
-"I do not agree with your arguments but I agree that the Indian 
National Army should not be reinstated. Do you know why? I do 
not want politics to enter the Services, lAich will be the 
result if these men are reinstated. Ihe day politics enters the 
army, it will be a sad day!"'®*
Nehru oould not have articulated better the military's own fears and the
Indian national armies soon faded from public consciousness as their
Grey and Black rank-and-file returned to village life (and other members
found a future in public service).'®*
II.F. A Fifth Military Intervention Iheory?
Mohan Sink's INA and Bose's FIA may be argued to fit into a fifth 
theory of military intervention vhioh uses Marxist analysis to argue 
that true military professional ism should positively push officers into 
politics on the side of those societal forces demanding radical social
'°* Rao, cp.cit., pp. 4-5.
' ° ’ In 1974, Mohan Sinÿi and others convinced FM Indira Gandhi to award 
a state pension to the approximately 16,000 surviving members of the 
various Indian national armies. See Baig, op.cit., pp. 78-79; Chaudhuri, 
op.cit., p. 63; Oohen, op.cit., p. 163; Corr, op.cit., pp. 103-104, 139, 
184-185, 190; Farwell, op.cit., p. 343; Kaul, Ihe Uhtold Story, p. 97; 
Palta, cp.cit., p. 91; Tuker, op.cit., p. 561; and Verma, op.cit., pp. 
45—46.
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ciiange.“ “ M. Wolpin argues that in developing societies vhere socio­
economic and political inequalities are usually extreme, and where
the r^jeated failure of attempts to alter h i ^ y  inegalitarian 
and ejq)loitative socioeconomic structures in those systems by 
adopting policies of incrémental reform suggests that radical 
social change and economic national ism (the defence of national 
resources) is the most likely route far those who want to ^catch 
up', even slowly, with the north,
officers should actively support "socially radical and economically
nationalistic civilian political movements".“  ^ Only then will the
gaieral socioeconomic welfare and status of the masses from which the
military draws its personnel be able to provide the fit, intelligent,
and hic^y motivated soldiers and officers capable of
maintaining and using ever more sophisticated weaponry. Additionally,
while Wolpin advises against officers resorting to the extreme measure
of the military coup— since "most well-intentioned radical military
regimes... [offer] poor performance*" ^ ’ — he does suggest they refuse
orders to repress socialist insurrectionary movements, expose themselves
to sociedist thou^rt and criticisms of the existing regime and, vhen
possible, become members of such revolutionary movements.
 ^^ ° M. Wolpin, "Marx and Radical Militarism in the Developi^ Nations", 
Armed Forces and Society 4:2 Fdmruary 1978, and "j^iopolitical 
Radicalism and Military Professional ism in the Third World", Comparative 
Politics 15:2 January 1983.
 ^^ ^ Wolpin, "Socic^litical Radicalism and Military Professionalism in 
the Third World", p. 209.
 ^^ 2 By this, Wolpin means movements aitailing the
redistribution of wealth, income and status as well as the 
diffusiai of previously restricted sociocultural benefits such 
as medical care, education, unemployment insurance, and so on.
The concomitant structural institutional changes involve 
nationalization, democratization and mass participatory 
organization.
See ibid., pp. 203, 216. 
ibid., p. 215.
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Singh's INA and Bose's FIA were socially radical. By banning 
casteism, creating a non-oamunal kitchens for the men, a comnon mess 
for officers, one officer class and one scale of pay, Sin^ attempted to 
unite all the various races and classes of the Indian Army PoWs into a 
liberation any based on "nationalism, social idealism, and 
equalitarianism".“ * Bose's FIA carried cxi with these radical reforms; 
for instance, raising a unit of women soldiers known as the Rani of 
Jhansi Regiment after the heroine of the 1857 Great Ritiny.^  ^ * Moreover, 
not only Singh and Bose, but many senior Indian armed forces' commanders 
and Indian nationalists believed officers joined the Indian national 
armies expressly to prcmote revolution on the subcontinent.
It is, however, difficult to envision how armed farces' officers are 
expected to draw the line between participating in the highly charged 
politicEü. activities described above and executing a ooup when they are 
personally ocnmitted to revolutionary change. Viiile seme military coup 
executors do overthrow governments with promises of radical sociad 
reform, most are content to justify their actions as strai^itforward and 
necessary remedies to readily identifiable problems sixh as regime 
corruption, widespread lawlessness in society, and government sloth or 
inefficioxy in instituting modernization. It remains highly unlikely 
that any traditionally conservative professicxial military officers would 
justify their ootp in blatantly revolutionary socialist terminology, 
rauoh less carry out such acticns when in power. Short of a successful 
cOTKjuest of the Raj, even the INA and FIA could only provide Indian
Oohen, op.cit., p. 151.
See Bose, op.cit., p. 209; COrr, op.cit., p. 151; Fay, op.cit., pp. 
215-222; and Palta, op.cit., pp. 60, 91-97.
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civilian society with an outside (and distant) example of a successful 
radical reform organization.
Conclusion
Wiile most Indian nationalists demanded the termination of the Raj 
before participating in Britain's VWII effort, Indian military personnel 
foutît for the King-Bmperor all over the globe. IMS lieut.-Genezal 
describes how this stark difference was possible:
[British] brigadier asked me vAat my mental reaction and that 
of the average Indian officer would be if suddenly we found 
Congressmen bossing over us. As I hesitated a bit, he said he 
wanted to know the real feelings and did not want a 
sophisticated answer. I told him that our loyalty was to the 
government in power and not to any particular people or party.
We had been trained from the very beginning to keep out of 
politics and have only one loyalty. [My italics.
What if there was an alternative claim to governing legitimacy?
The creation of the FIL, Centro Militare India, INA and FIA tested 
the loyalty of the British-led Indian armed forces' Indian men and 
officers. By defecting to the Indian national armies, argued Mohan Singh 
and thai Subhas Chandra Bose, Indian military personnel would hasten an 
Axis invasion of the subcontinent and thus swaraj. Althou^ seme tens of 
thousands of Indian PdWis, including the great majority of Japanese-held 
ooranissioned Indian officers, did eventually switch their allegiance, 
almost as many chose to endure the harsh regime of Axis prison carps.
More inportantly, those jawans and commissioned Indian officers on 
active duty with the British-led Indian armed forces remained loyal to 
the Raj, believing their allegiance to the government in power and 
efforts during the war would have to be rewarded by indepaidæce.
General Thimayya describes how, after the peace had been won,
Ih^ar, op.cit., p. 179.
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We Indian officers felt the excitement of great eoqpectaticns... 
We knew that we had made a good showing in the war. We no longer 
lacked confidence. We knew, also, that the British Raj was 
irrevocably finished. We were impatiait for the day when the 
Indian Army would serve its own country under its own 
leaders.
The feeling that swaraj would not be long in coning buried post-war 
qualms about those who had joined the various Indian national armies. So 
long as this "clique" of ostensibly politicized men were not eHlowed 
back into the armed forces— and they were not— even commissioned Indian 
officers could agree with the public and nationalist politicians that 
such men had been true, if misguided, Indian patriots.
Evans, op.cit., p. 230.
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CHAPTER 5  
T e s t T\K>: th e  T ra n s fe r o f  R w e r
Introduction
After the test of the Indian national armies cane the challenges of 
independence; ininediate post-war strikes and mitinies, the division of 
the armed forces between India and Pakistan, the d^arture of British 
military personnel, and ininediate actions in Punjab, Junagadh,
Hyderabad, and Janmu & Kashmir. Skaraj also saw the transfer of power to 
an Indian political and administrative elite. This chapter will examine 
oocmissioned Indian officers' confidence in their own personal and 
professional abilities to meet these challenges, and in the capabilities 
of the new governing elite. Would independeice necessitate any changes 
to the country's established civil-military relationship boundaries?
I. The Armed Forces
I.A. Mutinies and Strikes
On 18 February 1946, Indian ratings of the RIN Training Ship HMIS 
Talwar began a mutiny which in days encompassed nearly 3,000 sailors on 
naval ships in Bombay harbour. While its flashpoint was Talwar Commander
F.W. King's mendacious denial of having used abusive language towards 
the ratings, the sailors had long-standing grievances over their food, 
pay and conditions. The mutiny took on a nationalist character and three 
days of urprecedented violence swept Bombay as sailors and protesters
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shouting "Jai Hind" and "Quit India" fought running battles with British 
Amy troc^. Seamen on vessels and in shore instcillations in Karachi, 
Madras, Vizagapatam, Calcutta, Cochin, and the Andamans cdso ocnmitted 
acts of indiscipline/
The ratings' mutiny led other units of the Indian armed forces to 
vent their own grievances. Indian airmen of RIAF Kohat refused to cb^ a 
supposed order to take aerial action against Bombay's naval mutineers, 
and less serious strikes occurred at Secunderabad and at Delhi's Factory 
Road Camp and Palam air base. The Indian Array also experienced minor 
acts of indiscipline.*
Yet the British ni^tmare of a general Indian Army incising never 
appeared likely. Some thought the simple jawan had less time for 
indiscipline than their more educated and politically aware counterparts 
in the RIN and RIAF.* Others, like IMS Lieut.-General Tbapar, felt "it 
was the sense of loyalty to the army on the part of the Indian officers 
that was keying the s^xys in check-.."* Indeed, ccranissioned Indian 
officers of all three defence services understood that unchecked
* While there are ary number of books which describe the 1946 strikes 
and mutinies, those used as principle references for this cheater are 
Akbar, N^iru. p. 369; Bose, The Lost Hero, pp. 262-264; Brecher, Nehru, 
p. 308; Oohen, The Indian Army, p. 98; Gcpal, Jawaharlal N^ iru: A 
Biography. Volume I. pp. 311-312; Katari, A Sailor p. 45-46;
Longer, Red Coats to Olive Green, pp. 248-250; Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru, 
pp. 313-315; Royle, The Last Days of the Ran, pp. 126-132; and Thker, 
While Memory Serves, pp. 80-98.
* In Calcutta, two units of Pioneers refused orders and assaulted their 
officers. In Jabalapur, the men of the Signal Training Centre staged a 
city-centre protest; in Santa Cruz, Bombay, an infantry battalion 
vociferously complained of bad food and the over-zealous custcns 
examination to which it had been subjected to on its return from active 
service. In addition, large numbers of ex-Middle East and Caitral 
Mediterranean Forces personnel grumbled about returning to markedly 
inferior living conditions. See Longer, op.cit., p. 250; Sin^, Birth of 
an Air Force, pp. 218-220; and Tuker, op.cit., p. 87, 89, 92-95.
* Tuker, op.cit., p. 92.
* Thapar, The Morale Builders, p. 244.
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indiscipline, whatever its cause, endangered the effectiveness and 
efficiency of their units.® That the RIN's Indian Chief Petty and Petty 
Officers (equivalent to Indian Army VOOs) shared their superiors' 
feelings may be seen from their refusal to join in the ratings' mitiny.* 
Discipline was also evident in the use of Indian Army units in often 
bloody actions against mutinous naval personnel in Bombay, Karachi and 
Calcutta with no breakdown of discipline.’ As in WWH, Indian officers 
opposed postwar strikes and mutinies not because they underestimated 
their men's grievances, but because discipline was— and in an 
independent subcontinent would be— inviolable if the armed forces' 
fitting effectiveness was to be maintained.
Most nationalist politicians themselves were unwilling to risk 
develcping the Bombay mutiny into a general revolt against the Raj. The 
actions of the ratings and their civilian sympathizers, and tte reaction 
of the British authorities occasioned extreme violence anathema to 
Congress of N^mi and Gandhi. Widening the mutiny would also enhance the 
power and prestige of those Occnunists increasingly influential in 
leading the strikers— urpalatable to both Congress and the Muslim 
League, neither of vhom wanted to endanger the future military 
discipline of independent India and Pakistan. Thou^ Patel, writes 
Admiral Katari,
saw that the event could provide a handy we^xn in our climatic 
struggle for independence, he nevertheless realised clearly 
that any encouragement to, or glorification of, the mutineers 
would have a seriously deleterious effect on the embryo Navy of 
an independent India vbioh was to come into being shortly.*
* Katari, op.cit., pp. 45-46.
* Tuker, op.cit., p. 88.
’ See Longer, op.cit., p. 249; Royle, op.cit., pp. 128-129; and Tuker,
op.cit., p. 87.
* Katari, cp.cit., p. 45. See also Khan, Leader bv Merit, pp. 275-280;
and D.V. Tahmankar, Sardar Patel (London: Allen & Lhwin, 1970), pp. 191-
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When both Nehru and Jirmah joined Patel in advising the ratings to lay 
down their anus in return for promises that their grievances would be 
addressed and no retribution taken, the mitiny came to an aid.'
I.E. Ihe Military ^ lits
Despite the reluctance of most nationalist politicians to use the 
mutinies and strikes overtly to hasbai the transfer of power, British 
politicians took the hint.^“ On 18 February 1947, British Prime Minister 
Clement Attlee told the House of Cccinons that "His Majesty's Government 
wished to make it clear that it is their definite intention to take the 
necessary steps to effect the transference of power into responsible 
Indian hands by a date not later than June 1948".“  Attlee's oonmitment 
and the work of Mountbatten, Nehru, Gandhi, Jinnah and many others led 
to the "Bartiticn" of the subcontinent into the independent nations of 
Pakistan and India on 14 and 15 August 1947, respectively.
Partition meant dividing the personnel, materials, stores, and fixed 
installations of the British-led Indian military in a g^ieral 2/1 ratio 
between India and Pakistan to form "new" armies, navies and air forces. 
The Indian Any and Pakistan Any were allocated regiments rcu^ily on a 
communal basis. In mixed regiments, each man in every unit or training 
institution was allowed to choose Wiich na^ nation to serve. Muslims 
hailing from Pakistani territory could not, however, join the Indian
193.
’ Moraes, op.cit., p. 314.
“ See Akbar, cp.cit., pp. 371-389, 395-434; Bose, op.cit., p. 264; 
Brecher, op.cit., pp. 309-333; Collins and Lapierre, Freedom at 
Midnicht. pp. 1-297; Bdwardes, Nehru, pp. 166-214; Gcpal, cp.cit., pp. 
313-362; Moraes, cp.cit., pp. 314-345; Royle, cp.cit., pp. 133-178; 
Ziegler, Mountbatten. pp. 372-403.
“ As used in Collins and Lcpierre, cp.cit., p. 67.
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Array nor oculd ncxi-MLisliins with roots in India for the Pakistan 
Anny. The RIN and RIAF were similarly divided, and the ISF (drawn from 
the new defunct Princely States; see below) integrated into the new 
farces of India and Pakistan.“ Cn 14 August 1947, C-in-C Auchinlek 
signed the last order of the British-led Indian Array, and in December 
1947 the second regular batch of post-war IMA cadets graduated into the 
array of independent India.^  ^
On top of the expected organizational and logistical difficulties^ * 
care worries that the severe Hindu versus Muslim disturbances sweeping 
civilian society were beginning to affect the military, especially after 
it became apparent that two independent nations were to be formed and 
each serviceman given the choice of which to serve. "Wien senseless 
Icilling started at the time of partition, ocnnunal feelings among the 
ranks did run hi^", recalls President Ayub Khan. "It was feared at the 
time that the two [Hindu/Muslim] factions mic^ ocme to an open 
fight..."^ ® Katari describes similar worries in the RIN.^‘ Pressures on 
Hindu and Muslim servioemai to ohoose "correctly" became intense. "By 
inference", remembers Lieut.-General Venoa, then a saiior instructor at 
the Staff College, Quetta,
 ^' In a separate agreement, the 20 Guridia regiments were allotted 12/8 
to India and Britain. See "Appmdix XII Class Composition of Indian 
Infantry" in Tuker, op.cit., p. 653; Longer, op.cit., pp. 253-268; 
Praval, Indian Array After Independence, p. 7; India and Pakistan Year 
Book Including Who's Who. 1950: Volume XXXVI (Bombay: Times of India), 
pp. 81-89; and Venkateswaran, Defence Qroanisaticyi in India, pp. 34-49, 
52-68, 177-186.
“ The first post-war regular class of cadets had graduated from the IMA 
in December 1946. See Chibber, Military Leadership to Prevent Military 
CcRpp. p. 33; and Connell, Auchinlek. p. 898.
See Evans, Thimavya of India, pp. 248-249; Ih^par, op.cit., pp. 246- 
247; Venkateswaran, op.cit., pp. 59-65; and Verraa, To Serve with Honour, 
p. 53.
Khan, Friends Not Masters, p. 13.
Katari, op.cit., pp. 48-49.
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it was assumed that all Muslim officers would opt for Pakistan. 
One Muslim Cc^ jtain was married to a Hindi girl and wanted to 
cçt for the Indian Ancy was bullied and threatened by the 
militant element of Muslim officers, and I had to arrange 
protection for him and his family.
Air Marshal 5, a Muslim with family roots in Lucknow who "always thoaÿit
of India as hone" and c^ Jted for the Indian Army "without any
hesitation", e3g)erienced "some pressure" from fellow Muslim officers.
Nothing "heavyHianded", just arguments that he would have better
prospects in the Royal Pakistan Air Force.
For all the tensions, however, the break-up of the British-led
forces was hard on officers vdio had served together on the subcontinent
and all over the world. Verna recalls that during the Staff College
celdaration of ind^endenoe.
Major Yayha Khan (later General Yajta Khan and Pakistan 
President) came to me and with tears streaming down his 
oheeks, he said, "Sir, what are we celdarating? Ihis should be a 
day of mourning. As a united country we could have been a strong 
and powerful nation. Now we will be flatting with each other." I 
consoled him that as soldiers we had to carry out orders.^ *
In the end, the break-rç) of the British-led Indian armed forces was
completed with no major indiscipline, especially as the ever-quickening
timetable for indepmdence forced the quick resolution of most problems.
I.B.l. The Shortfall of Commissioned Indian Officers
The d^arture of British military personnel upon India's 
independence exposed the armed forces' lack of e^qarienced commissicxied 
Indian officers.^ " Despite wartime commissions, the Indian Anny was left
^' Verm, op.cit., p. 51. See also Ihapar, cp.cit., p. 245.
From a follcw-ip interview with Air Chief Marshal 5; New Delhi, 17 
August 1989.
Verm, op.cit., p. 52. See also Farwell, Armies of the Ran, p. 358; 
and Katari, op.cit., p. 49.
' ° British troops began leaving on 17 August 1947 and, exopt for those
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with just five substantive and 88 acting/temporary lieut.-colonels.’  ^
Note too that Indian EOOs had undergone a short training period geared 
to producing battlefield cccmanders, not peacetime "managers", and that 
the first Indian to hold an anny HQ staff appointmæt, essential for 
learning the techniques of planning and strategy and the fanailation of 
policy, did not do so until after the commencement of Wttl.”  The pre- 
Fartition RIN had 211 British and 25 ooomissioned Indian officers (the 
hi^iest ranking of whom were two Captains with over 10 years'
officers volunteering to stay on in the new Indian and Pakistani forces 
(see below), the last British serviceman d^erted the subcontinent on 28 
Fdaruary 1948. Post-WWII demobilization reduced the Indian Army to 
approximately 400,000 men of vhom about 260,000 went to India and
140,000 to Pakistan. See Times of India, op.cit., p. 82; Farwell, 
op.cit., p. 359; and Royle, op.cit., pp. 208-222.
’ ’ For the shortfall in the new army, see Table FT 5.1. Figures adapted 
from Venkateswaran, cp.cit., pp. 164-168.
TABŒ FT 5.1
Ihe shortage of e)q)erienoed ooranissioned 
Indian Amy officers at independence
Nomal Nunber of Officers Officers
Rank Experience Positions Available Appointed
Generals 30-40
years
21 5 substantive 
Lieut.-Colonels 
(all KCOs with 13-27 
years experiaice)
6 Major- 
Generals and 
17 Brigadiers 
appointed from 
the 93 total
Brigadiers 
and Colonels
20-35
years
51 88 acting/temporary 
Lieut. -Colonels 
(all KCOs with 13-27 
years experience)
substantive/ 
acting/ 
temporary 
Lieut.- 
Colonels
Lieut.- 
colonels
20-30
years
530 560 ICOs and EOOs 
(90 with 10-15 years 
esq)erience, the rest 
with 5-10 years)
All needed
’ ’ Diraediately after the war, there were only 242 ooranissioned Indian 
officers, just 17 of whom had been trained pre-4#fll, qualified to fill 
the undivided Indian Amy's approximately 500 graded staff ^ pointments. 
See ibid., pp. 163-164.
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ejqjerience), and lost most of its mainly Muslim Indian warrant officers 
and SQiior ratings to Pakistan.” Although the RIAF was from the outset 
completely Indianized, wartime e}^ )ansicn had necessitated that 100 RAF 
officers (and 500 RAF airmen) be loaned to join its 33 commissioned 
Indian officers (among them one Air Oommodore with over 11 years of 
service) * All three services had to deal with acute shortages of 
qualified technical officers.
India's shortage of esqierienced senior commanders was met by the
loan of British officers formerly in the pre-swaraj Indian armed forces
(with the exception of the RIAF which accepted RAF officers) / ’ and the
r^id promotion of relatively ine}q)erienced, junior Indian officers.”
Ih^ar adds that when Partition became inevitable, many Indian officers
previously deemed unsuitable were re-examined by the War Services
Selection Board:
This resulted in a few geese turning into swans.. .severed 
previously rejected officers were put on the selected lists and 
placed in the order of their origiral seniority; everyone of 
them became hopeful again of a quick promotion and considered 
the partition as a god-sent blessing.' ’
” See Katari, op.cit., p. 62; and Venkateswaran, op.cit., p. 168.
” Venkateswaran, op.cit., pp. 168, 175.
”  Initially, 1,200 British officers stayed on in the any, including 
the new C-in-C, Sir Rob Lockhart. Althou^ almost all the approximately 
300 British officers remaining in the any in January 1948 left soon 
after, a few held technical appointments until 1956. In the RIN, about 
60 commissioned and 70 warrant officers stayed on, including Rear 
Admiral J.T.S. Hall in the new post of RIN C-in-C. Indianization was 
only complete whai the British Chief of Naval Aviation left in 1962. In 
■the air force, Indian officers assumed all senior staff and operational 
appointments with only a few technical posts given to RAF officers. Ihe 
RIAF's need for hi^dy specialized knowledge did, however, result in an 
increase of RAF personnel in some years after 1947. Not until C-in-C Air 
Marshal Ivelaw Chapman's departure in 1954 was the force completely 
Indian. See ibid., pp. 172-175.
” See Table FT 5.1 above.
” Ihapar, op.cit., p. 247.
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Inevitably, cmments !fejor K.C. Praval, standards were lowered: "Of the 
several officers who quickly rose to the rank of major-gaieral after 
independence, one was a censor officer during the war and another was in 
charge of 'Dilldiush Sabhas', troupes that toured various theatres to 
entertain the Jawans".** Yet roost Indian offioers rose to the (Aallenge, 
satisfactorily filling the top command and staff positions in all three 
services. On 15 January 1949, General cariappa reached full general rank 
when appointed the first Indian Indian Array Oin-C; on 1 April 1954 Air 
Marshal S. Mokerjee became the first Indian head of the air force; and 
on 22 April 1958 Admiral Katari became the first Indian navy chief.**
I.B.2. Questionnaire Respondents
Did Partition change the lives of commissioned Indian offioers? See 
lable 5.1. In 'fôbles 5.1 to 5.4 and 5.6, respondents are divided into 
the four categories of "All"; "Pre-1947" (those joining up to 1947 
inclusive); "Post-1947" (those enlisting after 1947); and "Uhknown" 
(those with no known date of joining).
TABLE 5.1
Did the break-up of the British-led Indian armed forces into the 
s^erate forces of India and Pakistan affect you personsdly?
Respondents All Pre-1947 Post-1947 Uhknown
Peroent(No.)
No 57.97 (40) 43.33 (13) 69.23 (18) 69.23 (9)
Yes 36.23 (25) 53.33 (16) 19.23 (5) 30.77 (4)
No Answer 5.80 (4) 3.33 (1) 11.54 (3) 0.00 (0)
Total 100.00 (69) 99.99 (30) 100.00 (26) 100.00 (13)
* ' Praval, op.cit., p. 6.
** Venkateswaran, op.cit., pp. 173-175.
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Mare than two-fifths (43.33%) of "Pre-1947” respondents say "Yes",
the division of the armed forces at Partition affected them personally.
"Even today", says Brigadier 90, a Hindu originally from Pakistan, "it
is difficult for people like me to reconcile to the loss of some very
good friends [choosing to go to Pakistan]". Lieut.-General 94, another
Hindu with Pakistani roots, describes a more tragic result:
I belonged to the Baluch Reg^t which was allotted to Pakistan. 
Most of my friends, who were Muslims, wart away to Pakistan...I 
had developed very close ties with my men fi^iting alongside 
them in Burma and Malaya. Not only were these ties snapped, I 
had to fi^t against some of them in 1947-48 Indo-Pak war in 
Kashmir.
Several redondants sacrificed more than their regiment. "We became
refugees due to Partition", says Brigadier 28, Hindu from Rawalpindi. "I
had to move from my original regiment— 15 Punjal>— to the Jats and lost
home and hearth. It affected me in a bad way", adds Major-General 7, a
Jat Sikh raised in Pakistan. Others remember Partition's bloodshed
affecting their choice. "I hailed from West Pakistan and was in two
minds whether to opt for Pakistan or India. However, the communal riots
changed ny attitude", says Major-General 75, a SiJdi from Lahore. Lieut.-
General 49, a Hindu Brahmin hailing from Srinagar, describes how
I was in [the Second World] war with Punjabi Mussalmans and 
Pathans. I nearly stayed with them after Partition was 
announced, confident that a Hindu soldier would be the same as a 
Muslim. The unanticipated bloodshed in 1947 (not 1946) changed 
everything and I came to India in Nov. '47 from Pakistan.
Yet for Major-General 85, a Hindu Brahmin with Calcutta roots, the
choice between India and Pakistan was clear:
By joining the Pakistan Amy I could have saved ny properties, 
but I clearly saw where ny loyalties lay and I decided to 
continue to remain in India with the Indian Amy. In any case, I 
could not reconcile nyself to being a national of a state 
founded on Islamic fanaticism.
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India's cxnstitutional secularism was crucial in convincing many 
minority officers of their equality in the new nation.
Did the personal difficulties of Partition influence the 
professionalism of commissioned officers? See %ble 5.2. No; "Pre-1947" 
respondents unanimously (100.00%) reject the suggestion that Partition 
altered military professionalism.
TABŒ 5.2
Did the break-iç of the British-led Indian armed forces 
into the separate forces of India and Pakistan 
affect the professional ism of the new Indian armed forces?
Reqmndents All Pre-1947 Post-1947 Uhknown
Percent(No. ) 
No 100.00 (27) 
Yes 0.00 (0) 
No Answer 0.00 (0)
100.00 (17) 
0.00 (0) 
0.00 (0)
100.00 (4) 
0.00 (0) 
0.00 (0)
100.00
0.00
0.00
(6)
(0)
(0)
Total 100.00 (27) 100.00 (17) 100.00 (4) 100.00 (6)
Of course, there were difficulties. "Reorganisation takes time",
says Major-Gaieral 13, "We lost much of our cantonments and lived in
tents for a long period". "Obviously", adds Air Marshal 3,
various slots had to be filled. Much of the infrastructure of 
cantonments and training centres was in Pakistan and in 
particular the Quetta Staff College. Nearly all Air Faroe 
stations were in Pakistan— the post '47 build-tp of the lAF was 
sorely affected.
"Certain skills peculiar [sic] to certain castes and sects led to a 
deletion of taleit in those areas which had to be made good at short 
notice", continues Vice Admiral 6, "for instance, in the Navy large 
nunbers of engine room personnel moved across to Pakistan".
Yet any problems encountered at ind^endence provided an incætive 
to improve the organization and leadership of the Indian armed forces. 
Air Marshal 7 explains;
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No doubt [the military's] fighting potential was reduced due to 
Partition and [the] British withdrawal. [But] Ihe bceak-tç> did 
not affect the professional ism of the new Indian military as 
everyboc^ [was] imbibed with nationalism [and] tried their best 
to maintain the tradition imbibed over centuries to defend 
efficiency and culture.
Shortages of officers and materials, writes Lieut.-General 17, only
"generated more enthusiasm and the will to achieve greater ocmpetenoe".
Ihe respondents focus on professionalism's carporateness, that 
shared sense of organic unity and consciousness as a groL^ sqaarate from 
society. Ihey unanimously agree that dividing the British-led Indian 
military into two separate forces had no negative effect on the armed 
forces' organizational effectiveness. India's military officer corps 
would need both their professional corporate and ej^ertise best to face 
the immediate combat actions thrown up by independence.
I.e. Immediate Actions
In the midst of partitioning its personnel and resources, the 
British-led Indian Army was pressed into trying to stem the communal 
atrocities viiioh killed up to half a million of the refugees moving 
between the two new nations of India and Pakistan.' ° A Bouncbry Faroe of 
approximately 50,000 men under the British Major-General T.W. Rees was 
set up in July 1947 to keep peace in the Punjab border area.' ' (On the
G.P. Khosla's Stem Reckonino puts the figure at 500,000; P. Moon's 
Divide and Quit and H.V. Hodson's Ilfô Great Divide give estimates of
200,000 to 250,000. As used in Oollins and Lapierre, cp.cit., p. 399.
' ^ Rees' staff included the Indians Brigadier Digambar Singh Brar and 
(then Brigadier) General Ihimayya, and the Pakistanis Brigadier Nasir 
Ahmed and (then Brigadier) President Ayub Khan. While any number of 
books describe Partition and/or the Boundary Force, those used as 
principle references for this section are Oollins and L^ierre, op.cit., 
pp. 318-322, 334-400; Connell, op.cit., pp. 902-911; Evans, op.cit., pp. 
249-263; Khan, op.cit., pp. 15-17; Praval, cp.cit., pp. 14-18; and 
Venkateswaran, op.cit., pp. 49-52.
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Eastern border Gandhi was just as, if not more effective as a "one-man 
boundary force".' While the force did nuch good work, the daily 
e^ qxDsure to communal violence began to comçt its iirpartiality and on 
25 August 1947 Rees told C-in-C Auchinldc that Muslim versus non-Muslim 
fi^iting in the ranks could be provoked at any time. Concomitant 
pressure from both Indian and Pakistani quarters to hand over the 
Boundary Force's duties to their respective own military forces resulted 
in just this step on 1 S^jtenber 1947. Ihou^ peace on the borders was 
slew in coming, it was now ccnpletely the responsibility of India and 
Pakistan.
Military cocmitmaits did not end with Partition as immediately after 
independence India's armed forces were deployed to help integrate the 
Princely States of JUnagadh, Hyderabad and Jannu & Kashmir (JSK)' In 
the first, the ruling Muslim Nawab's decision to opt for Pakistan—  
debits Junagadh being wholly inside Indian territory and having a 
peculation 80% Hindu and Jain— failed when Indian military forces 
threatened invasion and forced him to flee.'^  In the second, the ruling 
Muslim Nizam's declaration of independence— despite Hyderabad's size, 
geographic position and predominantly Hindu population— and failure to 
control the Razakars (a 200,000-strong militant armed wing of the 
IttAad-ul-Musilmeen party of feudal Muslim landowners) led to the 
Indian Amy forcing his surrender in "Operation Polo".'' In the third.
"  Venkateswaran, op.cit., p. 49.
' ' Travanoore, the cnly other Princely State (out of 565) not to have 
acceded to India or Pakistan by 15 August 1947, acc^Jted Indian rule on 
17 August 1947. See Farwell, op.cit., p. 353.
See Bdwardes, op.cit., pp. 220-222; Imiger, op.cit., p. 291; Praval, 
cp.cit., p. 32; and Venkateswaran, op.cit., pp. 73-74.
”  While Indian military casualties were li^it (66 killed or missing and 
97 wounded), the Hyderabad Amy lost 490 men with 122 wcunded, and the 
Razakars 1,200 killed or wcunded. See Chaudhuri, General J-N. ^
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procrastination by J&K's Hinchi Maharaja over which country his 
strategically located and overwhelmingly Mijslim populated state would 
join led to a bloody 15-month war between Pakistani proxies and Indian 
military forces, the repercussions of \*ich continue to this day.'*
Ihe Junagadh, Hyderabad and J&K actions deanonstrated officers' 
ability to meet professional conmitmaits. In Junagadh, they massed 
forces on the state's borders while awaiting hic^^ political 
machinations. In Hyderabad, they commanded an operation which 
overwhelmed the state's army and the Razakars in just 100 hours, and 
(then Major-General) General Chaudturi went on to serve a 13-month term 
as military governor. In J&K, they successfully r^ielled a proxy- 
Pakistani invasion in extreme conditions and at very short notice. In 
October 1947, the Indian Army C-in-C was General Auchinlek and the amy 
commander with responsibility for J&K General Dudley Russell; by the 1 
January 1949 cease-fire these posts were filled by General Cariappa and 
(then Lieut.-General) General S.N. Srinagesh (already the second Indian 
to command the area amy), respectively.*’ Lieut.-Gaieral S.K. Sirha, 
the only staff officer directly involved in the J&K Conflict from the 
initial despatch of personnel to Srinagar to the post-war peace 
conference, remembers how
pp. 145-165; Bdwardes, op.cit., pp. 222-225; Longer, op.cit., pp. 317- 
323; Praval, cp.cit., pp. 107-125; Venkateswaran, op.cit., pp. 74-75, 
84-85; and Verma, op.cit., pp. 64-73. MGOE: Chaudhuri and Longer report 
cxily 10 Indian Amy casualties.
'* Ihe Indian armed forces suffered 1,500 killed, 3,500 wcunded and
1,000 missing (mostly PoWs). Pakistan's casualties were estimated at 
20,000, including 6,000 dead. See Bdwardes, op.cit., pp. 225-227;
Longer, cp.cit., pp. 292-317; Praval, op.cit., pp. 32-106; Majcr-Ganeral 
S.K. Sinha, Cperaticn Rescue; Military Cperations in Jammu & Kashmir 
1947-49 (New Delhi; Vision Books, 1977); and Vaikateswaran, op.cit., pp. 
75-83.
*’ Sinha, op.cit., pp. 6-7 , 59, 66, 88, 130.
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Everyone [in the Indian Amy] was fully aware of the fact that 
this was free India's first operation being fou^t entirely by 
Indian troops led in the field by their Indian commanders. Ihey 
kn^ that the eyes of the Naticxi were focused on them and that 
they must shoulder their grave responsibility, both cheerfully 
and successfully.’*
Ihe RIAF and RIN also provided a measure of support in J&K, and Major
Som Nath Sharma became the first (posthumous) recipient of ind^^aident
India's sL^ ireme gallantry award, the Farsm Vir Chakra.’ '
I.C.l. Nationally Representative Military Personnel
Ihese actions also established the reliability of those Muslim 
persŒinel who had opted to serve ind^)endent India. Most conspicuous was 
the Muslim 00 of 50 Parachute Brigade, Brigadier Mohamned Usman. He was, 
writes Lieut.-Gaieral Sinha, "a patriotic Indian and the Government had 
very ri^tly given him a position of trust— the command of one of our 
forward brigades in the [J&K] fitting line. He anply justified the 
trust r^xDsed in him and had very deservedly won popular accladm".* ® 
Lieut.-General 94 (a Hindu originally from Pakistan who opted for India 
because he did not feel "prepared to die" for Islamic ideals) says the 
actions of Usman and other Muslim personnel meant "no more questions as 
to the loyalty of Muslim Indian Army officers".*’ Haioeforth, the armed
" Sinha, cp.cit., p. 26.
See Sinha, op.cit., pp. 25-27, 55-56, 62-64, 91, 99, 113; and Ihe 
Military Year Book: 1974. p. 250.
*“ Sinha, cp.cit., p. 80. Sinha adds that Usman's loyalty did not sit 
well with Pakistan, which "formed an the basis of the two-nation theory 
sprung from religious intolerance, ccxild not appreciate the role of a 
Muslim in 'Hindu India'. We used to hear that in Pakistan a prize had 
been announced for Usman's head. By virtue of serving in the Indian Army 
he was regarded as a "traitor to the holy fold". When Usman was killed 
by enemy shelling, the government gave him a state funeral to whicdi 
"Delhi citizens turned out in their thousands". See Muthanna, Gaieral 
Cariappa. p. 39; and Sinha, op.cit., p. 81.
*’ Lieut.-General 94 also repcarts how a senior Indian intelligence 
officer suggested he mi^it best serve India by opting for the Pakistan
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forces of independent India could admit and promote to the highest 
positions a wide mix of minority officers— reflected in the 
questionnaire respondents/interviewees* ' — free from doubts that personal 
background mi^it overrule professional behaviour.
This ability to recruit and promote ooranissioned officers— and men—  
from all India's coramnities also has helped ensure civil siçremacy-of- 
rule. While traditional, British-designated martial races' coranunities 
continue to be disproportionately repres^rted, India has continually 
sou^t to open recruitment to all coraiunities.** Remember the fourth 
military intervention theory's argument that personal/clique self- 
interest can provide sufficient impetus for staging a armed forces'
OCXÇ). An over(%3endence on martial races' officers may provide reac^
Army and thai passing on information to the Indian Anny. There was, he 
adds, "no question" of him agreeing to this. From a follow-tp interview 
with Lieut.-General 94; New Delhi, 15 August, 1989.
* ' Among the questionncdre respondents and/or interviewees are the 
Christians Brigadier 44 and Lieut.-Colonel 80, the Roman Catholics Vice 
Admiral 6 and Brigadier 83, the Buddhist Major-General 85, the 
Zoroastrian Brigadier 76, the Jewish Lieut.-General 101, the Muslim Air 
Marshal 5, and 16 Sikh officers.
* ’ As the Indian govemmaït refuses to give the specific ethnic or 
religious origins of its military personnel, the exact nunbers of 
martial versus non-martial men and officers cannot be completely known. 
However, from independence onwards new Indian Army units such as the 
Parachute Regiment have been constituted on an all-India basis. In 1949 
C-in-C Cariappa formally scraped the concept of martial and non-martial 
races, in 1954 a policy (further modified in 1963 by the CEbdnet 
Military Affairs Ooramittee) began which disallowed any one Indian state 
from having a dominant position in military recruitment and, most 
recently (despite no official confirmation) it has become coraoon 
knowledge that the Indian Army is making efforts to ensure that all 
units reflect a cocpletely mixed and all-India character. From an 
interview with leading Indian defence journalist Shekar Gipta; London,
21 ^ aril 1994; and S. Oohen, "The Military and Indian Democracy" in 
India's Democracy; An Analysis of Chancrina State-Societv Relations, ed. 
A. Kbhli (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uhiversity Press, 1988), p. 133; 
Editorial, "Cooking Kiohiri— Army Style", The Sikh Review (Calcutta)
Vol. 41:2 No 471 March 1993, 3-4; Longer, op.cit., pp. 288-289; Palit, 
War in Hic^ Himalaya^  pp. 12-13; Praval, op.cit., pp. 133-134, 602; and 
Brigadier H.S. Sodhi, "Punjab: The Trendsetter", India Today August 
1993, p. 29.
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made, homogenous groups more amenable to unite around by a oonmon 
grievance and therefore more likely to further their own agenda at the 
expense of the military, the government, and/or the state.
Ihat the questionnaire respondents recognize the importance of 
recruitment open to all may be seen in Tsdale 0.1 in whioh "Nationally 
representative military personnel" is ranked as the fourth most 
important factor contributing to India never having esgerienced a coup. 
Both Major-General 106 and ex-Govemor Mr. C7, an ICS officer for 42 
years, stress that the "heterogoieity" of Indian Army officers (who 
numbered 40,000 in 1990)** plays a crucial role in preventing the 
formation of ethnic, linguistic, regional, and religion-based cliques on 
a sufficient scale to organize a forcible take-over of government.** For 
exanple, says Vice Admiral 2, "a Sikh coranander wouldn't follow a 
Bengali coup leader".** The "disloyalty" whioh prevents an officer of 
one particular ethnicity from obeying the command of a ccmirade of a 
different background pertains only to extra-legal orders, and it does 
not hinder the normal corporate efficiency and effectiveness of the 
officer corps. Therefore, argues ex-Principal Defence Secretary Mr. 04, 
"what mi^it be a source of weakness is instead a source of strength"*^  
for India's civilian governments.
I.e.2. Questionnaire Respondents
** W.P.S. Sidhu, "Quelling Sordid Affairs", India 31 October,
1990, p. 66.
** Ftcm interviews with Major-General 106; New Delhi, 12 S^jtenber 1987; 
and Mr. C7; New Delhi, 13 August 1989, re^jectively.
** From a follow-ip interview with Vice-Admiral 2; Bombay, 7 October 
1987.
From an interview with Dr. C4; New Delhi, 4 September 1989.
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Hie perfonaanoe of the armed forces in Punjab, Junagadh, Hyderabad 
and J&K and the re^ xxidents' unanimous faith in the officer corps' 
ability to retain a high degree of professional ism does not translate 
into a universal agreanent that the military was reac^ to meet the 
challenges of swaraj. See %ble 5.3.
TABLE 5.3
Were the aimed forces properly pr^ared for independence?
Respcxidents All Pre-1947 Post-1947 Uhknown
Yes
Qualified Yes 
No
No Ana^sr
Percent(No.) 
53.13 (51)
18.75 (18)
18.75 (18) 
9.38 (9)
53.19 (25) 
19.15 (9) 
23.40 (11) 
4.26 (2)
53.33 (16) 
20.00 (6)
13.33 (4)
13.33 (4)
52.63
15.79
15.79
15.79
(10)
(3)
(3)
(3)
Total 100.01 (96) 100.00 (47) 99.99 (30) 100.00 (19)
Almost a quarter (23.40%) of "Pre-1947" officers say "No", the
military was not reaày for swaraj. Brigadier 63 writes:
Cne cannot say that the army was properly prepared as there were 
only a few senior Indian officers of the rank of Colonel and 
above. Most of the other officers were wartime emergaicy 
recruits. After Independence very quick promotions of 
comparatively junior and ineiqierienoed officers had to be 
resorted to. Naturally [the] effectiveness and professionalism 
of the army suffered considerably.
The navy esqierienoed similar difficulties. Before indqiendenoe, says
Vice Admiral 6, commissioned Indian officers %#ere "invariably given
limited responsibility in areas outside the direct chain of command. In
ships the commanding officer and executive officer were invariably a
Britisher". Despite problems occasioned by the rush towards swaraj, the
timetable set by the political leadership had be obeyed. "[Ihe] armed
services were badly pr^ared for independence and also partition of its
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personnel”, recalls Brigadier (Dr.) 55, **but, being a disciplined force, 
[they] had to acc^>t the orders of the then government".
The "No" "Pre-1947" respondents are far outjiunfcered by the three- 
quarters (72.34%; or 53.19 "Yes" plus 19.15 "Qualified Yes") of their 
comrades who feel the Indian armed forces were fully prepared for 
swaraj. Although some express doubts about the lack of esqieriaioe at 
senior level, all agree with Air Marshal 3 that "there was a solid 
foundation to build vçcn". Any "lack of professional maturity and 
administrative ejq)erience", adds Major-General 72, "was somewhat 
overoome by keenness and enthusiasm".
Ihe key to the respondents' confidence remains their universal
belief that, however poor the military's state of pr^aredness at
ind )^endenoe, professional expertise and carporateness would remain
high. "Ihe calibre of Indian Amy officers of permanent cadre was good",
adds Brigadier 30, "some of them showed excellent performances up to
brigade level during World War H". Major-General 96 describes how
the amy was subjected to [the] terrible strains of the break-up 
of units, mass change of persosnnel, duties in disturbed areas in 
aid of civil power, non-existOTt at times, loss of their own 
homes and [tragic] news of their relatives; this was topped by 
the conflict in J&K. Ihe amy also successfully managed to 
cope... [indicating] that they were psychologically ready.
Professional expertise and corporateness in isolation, however, may
readily endanger for civilian siçcemacy-of-rule.
Ihe respondents' ccnroaits also reveal a belief that independent 
India's officers retained their professional characteristic of 
responsibility; that is, using their eaq)ertise only at the discretion of 
their client, society. Althou^ "most of us did not have long 
experience", says Brigadier 31, "our seniors were top class, devoted
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patriots". All offioers, adds Brigadier (Justice) 47, "were very well 
trained, well led and disciplined— and fully dedicated to their new role 
of guarding the freedom of the country". Brigadier 40 argues that the 
suitability of the military's new role as guardians of the nation came 
from their "tradition— like the civil service— of being 'apolitical'. In 
addition, they had the tradition of being thoroughly professional, in 
outlook and functioning". The army, agrees Lieut-Gaieral 35, was "one 
groL^ vAo imnediately converted to a national ethos". What remained to 
be seen was whether independent India's conmissioned officer corps 
understood professional responsibility to mean loyalty to the nation—  
inoreasing the chances of an armed forces' coup— or to its legitimate 
government— decreasing the likelihood of military intervention.
II. Ihe Civil Forces
II.A. Ihe Political Leadership
Although the first set of military intervention theorists perceives 
military officers as reluctantly pulled into staging a coiç) while the 
second sees them pushing their way into power, both describe such 
intervention as taking place in newly emerging states suffering from 
ineffective and therefore vulnerable civilian rule. In India, however, a 
core group of nationalist leaders hrouÿït to government de^ly held, 
personal beliefs in the moral superiority of democratic rule vhich they 
enshrined in the Oæstitution, and long epperience of political 
responsibility at the provincial and central levels in which the 
techniques essential to self-rule were absorbed. In addition, mass 
participation in satyagraha had given many people an understanding of
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swaraj as government by the pc^ jular political leaders— and their one, 
Congress, party— vAich had led the nationalist movement. Yet, however 
popular and e^ qjerienced the nationalist politicians may have been 
fitting the Raj, India would not long enjoy stable democratic rule if 
its military offioers did not also perceive the political leadership as 
fully pr^jared for the challenges of swaraj.
II.A.I. Questionnaire Respondents
Before independaooe, relations betweai cccmissioned Indian officers 
and politicians was somewhat mixed. In Table 3.6, two-thirds of 
respondents were "Generally Stçportive Ihouc^ Passive" towards the 
independence movement and its leaders, while in Table 3.7, they are 
divided in recalling nationalist politicians as having had a "Positive", 
"No Particular Notice" or "Negative" attitude regarding the military. 
How do these contrary views affect officers' understanding of Indian 
nationalists' readiness to face the challenges of swaraj? See %ble 5.4.
In view of their opinions described above in Chapter Hiree, a 
surprising third (34.04%) of "Pre-1947" offioers think "No", the 
political leadership was not properly prepared for ind^jendence. "Going 
to jail", argues Brigadier 60, "does not train you in administration". 
Lieut.-Colonel 80 asserts that nationalist leaders had "a lack of trust 
in the then bureaucrats...[as well as] inexperi^ice in administration... 
[and] political diplomacy". Brigadier 45 reveals a mounting frustratiœ 
with politicians: "With the exception of a handful of politicians...[the 
leadership was urprepared. ] Ihe results are there for anyone to see. 
Within 40 years we are almost back to the medieval times so far as law 
and order and morality are concerned".
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TABLE 5.4
Was the political leadership properly prepared for independence? 
Respondents All Pre-1947 Post-1947 Unknown
Percent(Nb.) . ^
Yes 51.04 (49) 44.68 (21) ( 60.00 (18) 52.63 (10)
Qualified Yes 16.67(16) 17.02 (8) ^20700 (6) 10.53 (2)
No 21.88 (21) 34.04 (16) 6.67 (2) 15.79 (3)
No Answer 10.42 (10) 4.26 (2) 13.33 (4) 21.05 (4)
Total 100.01 (96) 100.00 (47) 100.00 (30) 100.00 (19)
The ”No” respondents cite the inability to avoid Partition as the 
politicians' greatest failing at inds>endence. "[Our] political 
leaders/* writes Brigadier 55, »*betrayed the country in accepting [the] 
partition of India and played into the hands of the British leadership's 
policy of 'divide and rule'". **Our leaders", adds Lieut.-General 49,
"had no practical concept of exactly viiat freedom would mean.. .if they 
were prsared. Partition would not have takai place". "If the leadership 
was properly prs>ared”/ continues Vice Admiral 2, "Partition could have 
been avoided. Mountbatten's hustling only impaired the political 
judgement of Ndiru and co. Patel remained one of the few realists.
Jinnah did not want Partition [ ! ]". Air Marshal 5 agrees Indian 
politicians were urprepared for SKraraj, "otherwise they would have found 
a way to avoid Partition or if not that, the bitterness that followed".
Yet the **No" "Pre-1947" respondaits are greatly outnumbered by the 
three-fifths (61.70%, or 44.68% "Yes" plus 17.02% "Qualified Yes") of 
their comrades iAo feel that politicians were ready for independence. 
Some "Qualified Yes" respondents do, however, question the politicians' 
administrative esqjerience. For Lieut.-General 4, the leadership was 
"prepared— yes, in that the Congress had grass-roots organisation and
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wide public siçport. But they lacked the experience of governing and
administration". Brigadier 90 describes how
there was a feeling of relief at being free and the leaders on 
the stage were great men and so perhaps there was a degree of 
idolatry by everyone. However, for the sacrifices made by these 
leaders any mistakes made were overlooked and passed over. 
Political leadership and agitation is quite different to 
administering such a large country...
Other respondents, like Major-General 13, feel politicians "had little
knowledge of military and strategic considerations". Ihey were prepared,
adds Brigadier 51, "except [for] their knowledge of defence problems".
Major-General 85 argues that the political leadership of any newly
ind^jendent nation could never be described as fully ready:
No d^endent country can ever be properly primed to shoulder 
the responsibilities of independence. Ihe leaders must 
necessarily learn through a process of trial and error. Our 
leaders were much better prepared than others elsewhere in the 
world.
Major-General 85's final cornnaits and Brigadier 90^s opening ranarks 
above show that, despite the "Qualified Yes” respcndaits' doubts over 
the leadership's oonpetence in specific areas, all agree on the 
politicians' all-around quality. "Whilst they had no experience in 
running governmental machinery, they had the intellect and the will to 
serve the country", says Air Chief Marshal 18.
Respect for the political leadership's personal qualities is the 
touchstone of "Yes" respondents. "At that time", says Brigadier 63, 
"India had a galaxy of great men". Lieut.-Colonel 80 adds that "there 
was one Indian in whom every serviceman had the utmost faith. Pandit 
Nduru.. .all that Pandit Nehru did and stood for was acc j^ted".
Furthermore, the "Yes" "Pre-1947" respondents believe the political 
leadership did have sufficiert administrative esperiaice. Iheir
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pr^>aredness for swaraj, argues Lieut.-General 17, came from "adequate 
exposure and consequent experience gained: (a) during the [independence] 
struggle; [and] (b) the running of state legislatures... [the leadership 
was] composed of eminent persons with intellectual honesty and integrity 
of purpose".
The majority of "Pre-1947" respondents' belief in the personal 
experience, eminoioe and integrity of independent India's initial 
political leadership want a great \ray to ensuring civil sipremacy-of- 
rule. See %ble 0.1 in which the respondents rank "Initial political 
stability, quality and/or democratic rule", and "Wisdom and stature of 
natioral leaders" as the third and joint eighth most important factors, 
respectively, in India never having experienced a military coup. 
Oonmissicned Indian officers' recognition of the political leadership's 
quality at ind^)endenoe meant their professional seise of responsibility 
was not limited to loyalty to the state as separate from the government, 
but embraced the civilian political leadership as well.
II.B. The Civil Service
unlike the British-led Indian armed forces, the Indian Civil Service 
(ICS) had always been open to Indians.** However, not until the 
develcpment of wide^iread Indian educational facilities along British
" Particularly informative and/or interesting histories of the ICS 
include N.B. Bonarjee, Uhder IVro Masters (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1970); P. Mason, The Men Who Ruled India (London: Pan Bociks in 
association with Jonathan Cape Limited, 1985. First published in two 
volumes as The Founders [1953] and ThA Guardians [1954]); D.C. Potter, 
India's Political Administrators. 1919-1983 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986); 
R.P. Sikka, The Civil Service in India: Europeanisation and 
Indianisatinn under the Fast India Company— ( 1765-1865) (New Delhi: 
Uppal Publishing House, 1984); and V.D. Sharma, Through TVo Systems 
Encounters and Experiences of an I.A,S. Officer (New Delhi: Associated 
Publishing House, 1982).
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public school-lines and the passage of the Gcwemmait of India Act of 
1919 (allowing ICS examinations to be held in India and Burma as well as 
in London) did Indian candidates begin to win a significant proportion 
of ICS places.** Indian representation in the ICS further increased with 
the sui^ )ension— never to be rescinded— of British recruitment in 1939.*“ 
(From 1942 to the end of WWII Indian reeruitanent into the ICS was also 
stopped in an effort to get educated young men to join the military. )* ^ 
Like commissioned Indian officers, however, Indian ICS officers had 
to deal with the complexities of r^aresenting the British ruling elite 
vhile their countrymen struggled for swaraj. At "a personal level the 
relationships between the ICS officers of Indian origin and the ICS 
officers of British origin were good**,** recalls ICS officer Govind 
Narain. Yet his colleague Charma Vira describes how Indian ICS officers 
was stranded betweai the ruling and the ruled:
*’ See Farwell, op.cit., p. 63; G. Moorhouse, India Britannica KJc., 
(London: Paladin Books, 1984. First published by Harvill Press, 1983), 
p. 198; and Royle, op.cit., pp. 31, 57. See also Table FT 5.2. Conpiled 
from Royle, op.cit., p. 31; Verikateswaran, op.cit., pp. 162-163; and 
J.E. Woolacott, India: Ihe Truth (London: Philip Allan & Co. Ltd., 
1930), p. 27.
tabu: ft 5.2
Ratio of Indian to British ICS Officers (1909-1947)
Year Indian British^ (Total) Ratio
1909 60 1082 (1142) 1/18.03
1922 208 1179 (1387) 1/ 5.67
1929 367 894 (1261) 1/ 2.44
1939 540 689 (1229) 1/ 1.28
1947 (1 August) 128 98 (226) 1/ 0.77
Includes all European officers.
*“ Moorhouse, c .^cit., p. 198.
*" Raul, Reminiscences Discreet and Indiscreet, p. 105.
* * As used in Royle, op.cit., p. 272.
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% e  Indians ocnpared him with his British colleagues in regard 
to ccnpetâioe and dignity while the British closely watched his 
loyalty to the Crown. To than he was the Trojan Horse in the 
outfit. The Indian nationalists, on the other hand, while h^jpy 
at the advent of Indians on the high administrative scene, did 
not quite know what to make of these highly^iaid minions of the 
govemmaTt.* ^
Ex-ICS officer and ex-Defenoe Secretary Mr. 05 recalls how the famously 
inçartial ICS officers began "modifying their behaviour in anticipation 
of ind^ jendenoe". While serving as a senior magistrate, he himself freed 
Indians jailed for the "petty** crimes of hoisting Congress and Indian 
flags and shouting nationalist slogans. In "an exertion to the norm", 
his British siç)erior not only understood but condoned his actions.® •
Whatever their personal working relationships and/or opinions of the 
freedom struggle, at inde^ xandenoe Indian ICS officers provided their new 
nation with an invaluable cadre of top administrative experience in the 
new Indian Administrative Service (IAS).®® Indian representation in the 
provincial civil services was even more numerous and experienced. Still, 
as in the case of the political leadership above, Indian democracy would 
not long endure if military officers themselves remained unconvinced of 
the civil service's readiness for independence.
II.B.l. Questionnaire Respondents
D. Vira, Memories of a Civil Servant (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House 
Pvt Ltd, 1975), p. 17.
®* From an interview with Mr. C5; New Delhi, 14 August 1989. See also 
Mason, c^.cit., pp. 315-316.
®® By 1 August 1947, 43 Indian ICS officers were Secretaries, Joint 
Secretaries or their equivalent in the Government of India Secretariat 
compared to 14 British (and European) counterparts (with 13 others on 
leave). These nuirbers do not include Eurc^ sean and Indian officers 
serving in the Indian Political Service (IPS). See Moorhouse, cp.cit., 
p. 198; and Venkateswaran, op.cit., pp. 162-163.
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Did ooiiaissioned Indian officers regard the country's administrators 
as ready for swaraj? See Table 5.5. Ihe focus below will be on "Pre- 
1947” respondents.
TABLE 5.5
Was the civil service was properly prepared for independence?
Respondents All Pre-1947 Post-1947 Uhknown
PeroQTt(No.)
Yes 52.08 (50) 57.45 (27) 56.67 (17) 31.58 (6)
Qualified Yes 20.83 (20) 21.28 (10) 16.67 (5) 26.32 (5)
No 17.71 (17) 12.77 (6) 20.00 (6) 26.32 (5)
No Answer 9.38 (9) 8.51 (4) 6.67 (2) 15.79 (3)
Total 100.00 (96) 100.01 (47) 100.01 (30) 100.01 (19)
The just over a tenth (12.77%) of "Pre-1947" respondents %Ao say 
"No", civilian administrators were not ready for swaiaj, use arguments 
equally applicable to the armed forces. Lieut.-Colonel 81 says 
"ind^)endence came too soon and too suddenly" for Indian administrators 
%*o Major-General describes as "trained to run a colonial system only". 
Major-General 86 criticizes these former servants of Idle Raj as 
"sycophants". Brigadier 22 argues that they "did not really know— and 
could not know— what was in store for them", and Brigadier 60 points out 
that "cifter ind^aendence everyone got accelerated promotions. For higher 
rarik, they did not have enou^ experience".
Despite such sentiments, over three-quarters (78.83%, or 57.45%
"Yes" plus 21.28% "Qualified Yes") of "Pre-1947" respondents believe the 
country's administrators were ready for independence. There are some 
reservations. Brigadier 29 saw the civil service as "handicapped because 
of the void created by the British leaving.. .there were inadequate 
numbers left to fill the vacancies". Brigadier 51 felt the ICS was
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prepared "except [for] their lack of e)^ )erienoe of welfare problems of 
cccmon people". While "this attitude of 'carry on as before' added 
stability", continues Lieut.-General 49, it "deprived independence of a 
physical impact on the cociipn Indian. It took some years to grow into 
our social system". Yet most have nothing but praise for a civil service 
composed, recalls Air Marshal 3, of "well trained and experienced men of 
integrity and administrative capability". For Vice Admiral 6, the ICS 
constituted the cream of our intelligentsia. Having been closely 
associated with their British counterparts in various administrative 
functions they soon gained confidence in managing their tasks 
independently and eff icieitly".
Most respondents are confident of the reflective prfsaredness of the 
political leadership and senior civil service to meet the diallenges of 
swaraj. Moreover, they are fully aware of the importance of conpetait 
administration in a democracy; ranking "Administrative efficiency" in 
Table 0.1 as the joint ei^ith most crucial factor contributing to India 
never having had a military coi:p. Indian military officers' confidence 
in the refective abilities of their politicians and civil service at 
independence goes some way in negating the first and second set of coup 
theorists' shared characterization of newly independent nations 
struggling to modernize because of Ineffective governmental leadership. 
However, it remains to be seen whether civilian politicians and 
bureaucrats would fulfil the armed forces' high expectations— failing to 
do so mi^it certainly endanger the democratic civil-military 
relationship (see Chapter Six).
III. Civil-Military Relations
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Ill .A. What Type of Armed Ftarœs?
The Transfer of Power raised questions as to the role of the armed 
forces in an independent India. Gandhi saw no use for conventional armed 
forces; "if I could carry India with me, I would want nothing beyond a 
police force for protection against dacoits and the like. But so far as 
Defence is concerned unarmed peaceful India would rely içon the good­
will of the whole world".** However much other nationalist leaders might 
have shared Gandhi's disdain for military mi^t, the AIOC in July 1940 
resolved that non-^olent methods were insufficient as a means of 
external defence.*^  Undeterred, Gandhi then sought to harness the 
organizational skills and mar^ xawer of the armed forces:
If Swaraj is round the bend, we can now look upon the military 
as ours and need to have no hesitation in taking all the 
constructive work we can from them. Up till now they have only 
been eanployed in indiscriminate firing on us. Today they must 
plou^ the land, dig wells, clean latrines and do every other 
constructive work that they can, and thus bum the people's 
hatred of them into love.*'
While aid-to-the-civil duties were vital, nationalist leaders were well
aware that India's defence resting on the military's organizational
efficiency and effectiveness in its primary role as the nation's
defender must be k^± to a minimum.** For all his talk of transforming
independent India's military into "a truly national array, with a
national purpose and a national outlook",“* and belief that "all
5 7 
S 8
M. Gandhi, Editorial, Hariian. 10 February 1940.
BAvardes, op.cit., p. 133.
From Hariian. 21 ^ i l  1946 as used in Oohen, The Indian Army, p. 
103.
*’ K.F. Rustomji, Chairman, "Part HI Aid to the Civil Authority", in 
USI Seminar fNumber TWelvel Military and Society (New Delhi: Uhited 
Services Institution of India, 1986), p. 35.
** Nehru, "The Defence of India", p. 284.
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barriers between the armed forces and the civilian pc^ xilaticn must
disappear",“  Nehru left the services virtually unchanged, allowing
officers to get on with perfecting their professional eoqjertise in the
management of violence.®*
Nonetheless, there were some scares as to the future intentions of
ooranissioned Indian officers in the run to the Transfer of Power. As
a member of the postwar Armed Forces Nationalization committee. General
IhiiDQyya recalls British colleagues warning nationalist leaders that
Indian officers "were getting too ambitious", that the Indian Army was a
powerful organization capable of taking control of the country", and
that "in Burma army officers had assassinated the new premier". Biimayya
and other Indian officers had to "convince their own leaders that they
were without political ambitions"— partly by pointing out that the ^ oove
arguments were made by British officers who "merely wanted to ke^ their
jobs until retiremart age".*’ British officers were not alone in
suggesting unusual potentieil scenarios. Lord Ismay, Viceroy
Mountbatten's closest advisor, recalls how
[then Brigadier, later Field Marshal] Cariappa came to see me 
yesterday [9 May 1947] and volunteered the amazing suggestion 
that [the] Indian Army with either Nehru or Jinnah as commander- 
in-chief should take over power when we left in June 1948.
I at once said that the proposal was dangerous, that 
throughout history the rule of an any had always proved
*’ Gqpal, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru; Volume 1, p. 412.
* * Nairn's only suggestions concerned Indianizing the armed forces' 
officer corps as soon as possible, opening military recruitmaTt to all 
segments of the population, and aisuring that the military received 
sufficient praise and recogniticn of their performance in the J&K 
Conflict. See Gcpal, Selected Works of Jawaharlal N^ iru: Volume 1. pp. 
363-368, 370-372, 380-381; and S. Genial, ed., Selected Works of 
Jawaharlal Nehru: Volume 3 (Series 2. New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru 
îfemorial Fund, 1984), pp. 47-48, 307-308, 488-492; and Selected Works of 
Jawaharlal N^ iru: Volume 4 (Series 2. New Delhi: Jawaharlal N^iru 
Memorial Fund, 1984), pp. 327-328, 340-345, 375-378, 486-487.
*’ Evans, op.cit., p. 246. See also Kaul, Ihe untold Story, pp. 81-83; 
and MUthama, op.cit., p. 35.
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tyrannical and inoonpetent, and that the army must always be 
servants and not masters. I added that the Indian Army, by 
remaining united and refusing to choose sides, could wield a 
tremendous influence for good in disturbed days tiiat lie ahead 
but that they must always be subservient to civil power. I 
concluded by begging him to put the idea right out of his mind 
and never to mention it again even in the strictest secrecy...
It is hard to knew whether Cariappa in putting forward this 
idea was ingerttous and ignorant or ingervous and dangerous. [1^  
indents, my italics.]**
"Ingenuous and ignorant" is the more likely characterization; Cariappa/s
suggestion was just the most extreme manifestation of the frustration he
(and many of the respondents in Table 5.4 above) felt at the impending
partition of both the subcontinent and the armed forces.* “
Crucially, this frustration was not allowed to interfere with the
Indian military retaining virtually all its British organization and
traditions come swaraj. For Lieut#-General Ihimayya, those wanting to do
away with everything British simply because it was not Indian were
denying history's effect on shaping the armed forces:
Ihe regiments were now completely Indian, and no less so because 
of the old traditions. Ihe fact that they were entirely Indian 
gave Indians the chance to add even greater glory to the proud 
records of each unit. Thus the attitude of the Indian officers 
was that we should show our patriotism, not by rejecting the 
past, but by making [an] improvemæt on it.**
Reding old regimaital practices, including the mass and other trappings
of the British officer and gentleman, reinforced commissioned Indian
officers' historical understanding of themselves as apolitical servants
* * As used in Akbar, cp.cit., p. 407. Ayub Khan also heard Cari^pa's 
plan; see Khan, cp.cit., pp. 19-20. On 25 ^ aril 1947, Cari^pa wrote to 
NdTTU urging the retention "at any cost" of an undivided British-led 
Indian Amy for the "good of the country". See S. Gcpal, ed., Selected 
Works of Jawaharlal Nehru: Volume 2 (Series 2. New Delhi: Jawaharlal 
Nehru Memorial Fund, 1984), p. 376.
** Gcpal, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru: Volume 2. p. 376-377.
** Evans, Ihimayya. p. 284. See also pp. 283-285. Nonetheless, the 
debate over British traditicans' relevanœ to ind^aendent India 
continues. See, for example, Lt. Gen. S.K. Sihha, Of Matters Military 
(New Delhi, Vision Bocks, 1980), pp. 120-134.
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of the ruling civilian government during the avdcward transfer of
power.* ’ As the first Indian Indian Arroy C-in-C, Cariappa constantly
sought to reinforce his British predecessors' avoidance of "politics in
the mess" while at the same time promoting a new nationalism, saying:
Politics in the Army is a poison. Ke^ off it. But as citizens 
of India you must know, only know, about it.
Army is there to serve the Government of the day, and we should 
make sure that it does not get mixed \jp with party politics.
A soldier is above all politics and should not believe in caste 
or creed. As to nyself, I am an Indian, and to the last breath 
would remain an Indian. For me there are only two SHWANS, 
Hindusthan and Poujistan (the Army).
At 2dl times, in everything you do and say, be an INDIAN first 
and Indian always. DO NOT disintegrate the country into little 
'penny-packets' of your own class, your ccnmunity or your 
religion.* •
Thus, the traditional British ideal of military professionalism would 
continue to be the guiding ethos for indqiendent India's officer corps.
III.B. Civil-Military Hierarchy Modifications
Like the British ideal of officer and gaitleman, the established 
civil-military hierarchy of the Raj— with certain modifications—  
continued as the model for independent India. After assuming formal 
ccxTtrol of the East India Ocnpany's holdings on the subcontinent, the 
Crown had set up a governing structure— from Monarch (later Biçeror) to 
Prime Minister, Cabinet and Secretary of State for India to Governor^
*’ Worlckfide, only the respective armies of India and Pakistan retain an 
intermediate officer class— ex-VOOs re-designated after indepaidenoe as 
Junior Ocamissioned Officers— to serve as a buffer between commissioned 
officers (former KdOs, lOOs and Indian EOOs) and troogs . See S. Ali, 
"The Raj is dead but the Sahibs live on" Fhr Eastern Economie Review. 31 
May 1984, pp. 28-30; and Venkateswaran, Defence, p. 145.
*• Muthanna, op.cit., pp. 47-50. See also Cariappa's speeoh to Indian 
officers, October 8, 1948. Ri^ nrinted in U.S.I. Journal, LXXVIII 
(January, 1948), 4 as used in Cohen, The Indian Army, p. 166.
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DIAGRAM 5.1
Ejqplanation of abbreviations
H.M. = His Majesty
POC RIN = Flag Officer Comnnanding, Royal Indian Navy
CGS Chief of the General Staff
AG = Adjutant General
QM3 = Quarter-Master General
M30 = Master-General of Ordnance
E-in-C = Engineer- in-Chief
MS = Military Secretary
AOC RAF in India = Air Officer Commanding, Royal Air Force in India
GOC-in-C Conmands = General Officer Commanding in Command Conmnands
HQrs. = Headquarters
Source: A.L. Venkateswaran^ Defence Oroanisation in India: A Study of
Mai or Developments in Organisation and Administration since Independence
(Publications Division Ministry of Information and Broadcasting
Government of India, 1967) .
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General (later Viceroy) of India advised by an Executive Council which 
excluded the Indian Army C-in-C but included a hi^i-ranking officer—  
entodying the principle of civil supremacy over the military/ * Having a 
Military Nenber inferior in rank but sipericr in influence to the O-in-C 
caused numerous confrontations. The most serious of these, the C-in-C 
Kitchener versus Viceroy Curzon controversy in Ihe early twentieth 
cQTtury, resulted in the the former being made principal defence advisor 
to the Raj as well as the armed farces' supreme administrator and 
operational commander/ ° While Kitchener felt able to decide on all 
matters under his authority, the demands of the First World Wcur led 
later C-in-Cs to accept advice from various military and civilian 
quarters. Nonetheless, all policy, administrative, operational and 
financial decisions concerning Indian defence matters were ultimately 
tak«i by the C-in-C.’^
Fortunately for civil sipnemacy-of-rule in independent India, Nehru 
understood the dangers of one man acting as both the government's chief 
defence advisor and armed forces C-in-C, especially in a young democracy
* * The Crown had long attempted to ensure this principle in the 
Company's Bengal, Bombay and Madras Presidencies. See Cohen The Indian 
Army, pp. 15-16, 22; Heathoote, The Indian Army, pp. 15-16, 19; Longer, 
cp.cit., pp. 42-43; and Spear, A History of India, p. 94.
See CohQi, The Indian Armv. pp. 22-28; Heathoote, op.cit., pp. 21-22; 
S.S. Khera, India's Defence Problem (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1968), pp. 
6-10; Longer, op.cit., pp. 137-146; and Mason, A Matter of Honour, pp. 
392-402.
’ ^ As the Executive Council's Defence Member, the C-in-C listened to the 
Defence Department Secretary, an officer of the ICS ibo also had access 
to the Viceroy. As the armed forces' chief administrator and supreme 
c^ Derational commander, the C-in-C was advised by the Indian Army Chief 
of Staff and three other Principal Staff Officers (PSCs). The C-in-C's 
power was further circumscribed by the Finance Advisor, Military 
Finance, a senior ICS officer directly responsible to the Executive 
Council's Finance Nesftxr vho ensured that any military demand which 
necessitated the Government's approval was first discussed with its 
civilian financial rqresentatives before being put to the Any 
D^ertment for ^ jproval. See Mason, A Matter of Honour, p. 397.
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DIAGRAM 5 .1
The Defence Hierarchy in India, 1938 and 1949*
OiuvuatATiOMAL S«TMjr »  lt38  
H. M . tSo Kins
The British ParlUmeot—Tb« Brldih O  Tbc SecroUry of Sute for India 
Tb< Viceroy and GovCrnor-Gcocral of India
IleflnriThe COTimaDdor-m-Chlc  In In  Ji» tnd Defence Member
Defence Dcpertraent 
(Defence Secretary)
f I c  T o  
R W  ---
S AO QMG M OO E^inC MS AOC
-----------  RAF
in 
India
COcLa-C
Command*
1
Finance Member
Military Finaaoo Department 
(Financial Adviser)
General OfiBCirt Commanding Military DWricta
Dzfcaoa
SciaooaAdvtexy
CsamittM
HiOM DwaMc* Ccwraoc (1949) 
Dofcoco Commlttea of the CabiiMt 
Th e M io ittir  o f VrîctKx
Dcfooce
Commitxco Defooc® Mlnmor** Army/ 
Navy/Air Force 
Committee
Miniitry o f Defeooo
Q)lof* of Staff I
Committee Dofcnce Science
I Policy Board
,Hew Weapon* A 
New Eqnipmoot 
Product ioa and 
Sapoly Committee
Moitcai
Sendee#
Committee
Priocipal PrimzlLal
PeraoQoel Supply
OOcen* Offioon* 
Committee Committee
Naval llQ r ,. A ir l l o r t -
(Chief o f the (Chtof o f the (Chief o f the  
Navy) A ir  F o r» )
Joint Ptannloj 
Committee
Joint Admlni#tr«t|ve 
Planning Coovruiieo
Joint Intelligence 
Commit Ko
Joint Training  
Committee
later-Sendoea 
Wotla Prtofity 
Commitiee
r-iervklatc so * 
Organitattotks
Only the more Important o f the com m ltte:* havg been Included in th b  chart.
* See over for explanation of abbreviations.
Source: A.L. Venkateswaran, Defence Organisation in India: A Study of 
Manor Develoaroits in Organisation and Administration since Independence 
(Publications Division Ministry of Infonration and Broadcasting 
Government of India, 1967).
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viiere politicians, administrators and military officers eare daily 
learning the limits of their respective organizations^ powers.’ ' He 
modified the civil-military defaice hierarchy by ^ Dpointing an elected 
civilian politician as Defence Minister, "reqxnsible for obtaining 
policy decisions of the Government, for traneanitting those decisions to 
and seeing to their inplementation by the three Service The
military's power was further reduced by replacing the office of C-in-C 
with a Chief of Staff at the head of each of the three s^erate armed 
services who would meet with the Defence Minister and the Defence 
Secretary only in this capacity and not as the suprême field 
cocmander(s).’* The army, navy and air force were thus under three tiers 
of civilian control: political— the Cabinet and Parliament as 
represented by the Defence Minister; bureaucratic— the Defence Secretary 
at the head of a Defence Ministry staffed entLrely by civil servants; 
and financied— the Financial Adviser at the head of the Ministry of 
Finance (Defence) responsible to the Finance Minister.’ ' Nehru also 
began a process of adjusting the Warrant of Precedence to reflect the 
armed forces' loss of power ocnpared to govemmart civilians.’*
Conclusion
”  ibid., p. 401.
” Times of India, op.cit., p. 82.
’ * The official title for these three posts were Chief of the Any Staff 
and CCnmander^in-Chief, Indian Amy; Chief of the Naval Staff and Flag 
Officer Ocmnanding, Royal Indian Navy; Chief of the Air Staff and Air 
l^rshal Ocnmanding, Royal Indian Air Force. In April 1955, these offices 
re-designated as Chiefs of their respective staffs. The head of the air 
force was upgraded from Air Chief to Air Chief I^rshal on 15 January 
1966. See Venkateswaran, op.cit., pp. 139-140.
Sinha, Of Matters Military, p. 43.
’* See Oohen, The Indian Army, pp. 172-173; Lt General Hridaya Kaul, 
Wiither the Army** Indian Defence Review January 1989, p. 62; Kukreja, 
**Civilian Control of the Military in India**, p. 490; and Praval, Indian 
Arrovr. pp. 131, 137-138.
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Upon their victorious return from VWII, Indian armed forces'
officers faced military mutinies and strikes, and the partition of
personnel and materials into the respective military forces of newly
inde^ )endent India and Pakistan. And yet, marvels Major-General 20,
We got rid of the British officers from the units within two 
months of independence [ty rapidly promoting relatively junior 
officers to the hi^iest positions of command], carried out the 
most difficult task of evacuating millions of people from India 
and Pakistan, restored normalcy, brought the erring Princely 
States within India, quelled oommnal riots, and still fought a 
full-fledged war in Kashmir.. .No other any in the world could 
have achieved so much in so little time.
The navy and air force shared in the any's proud record of achievement,
the basis of vhich was the constant belief of Indian officers that their
professional expertise and corporateness were equal to any challenge. In
great part this confidence was due to the armed forces enjoying a
virtually unchanged tradition of professional training and organization
throuÿi the Transfer of Power. IMA GOs continued to be taught British
standards of military efficiency while regiments kept their centuries-
old battle honours and intermediate officer class, and the amy its
martial races— and nationally representative personnel— and izzat.
Nonetheless, many officers felt their efforts went unappreciated. 
"Outside the military", recalls Air Chief Martial 1, "everyone was 
convinced that since non-violence won ind^)aidenoe, it would also 
suffice now".”  Ihe very existence of the armed forces ^ jpeared in 
jeopardy. "If the Kashmir thing had not happened in '48", argues Colonel 
24, "they [the government] really might have abolished the army".”
” From an interview with Air Chief Marshal 1; New Delhi, 3 September, 
1987.
” From an interview with Colonel 24; New Delhi, 12 S^^tember 1987. Ihis 
did not stop officers from criticizing the political leadership of the 
J&K Conflict. See R. Rikhye, Ihe War Ihat Never Was. Ftk. ed. (Delhi: 
FKE3! India Paperbacks, 1989; Delhi: Chanakya Publications, 1988), pp.
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Despite such fears, most Indian armed forces' officers believe their 
new political and administrative leaders were fit to meet the challenges 
of independence. Indeed, the respondents gauge the latter as more 
equipped for snaraj than the military. See Table 5.6 which sumnarizes 
the "Pre-1947" respondents' responses from Tables 5.3 to 5.5..
TABUS 5.6
WereAes the armed forces/^litical leadership/civil service 
properly pr^ared for indqaendenoe?
"Pre-1947"
Respondents Armed Faroes Political Leadership Civil Service
Yes
Qualified Yes 
No
No Answer
Percent
53.19
19.15
23.40
4.26
44.68
17.02
34.04
4.26,
57.45
21.28
12.77
8.51
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
Ihe hi^ marks gained by all three choices in TËdble 5.7 bode well 
for the future of civil supremecy-of-rule in independent India. Remenber 
that in Table 0.1 respondents rank "Professionalism of the armed forces" 
as the nunber one factor in preventing a military coup in India. While a 
belief that their professional esq^ ertise and corporataiess equipped 
military officers to cope with the many challenges of the Transfer of 
Power, their fciith in the ability of the country's new political and 
bureaucratic elite to govern effectively after swaraj allowed them to 
transfer their professional responsibility from the British Raj to 
independent India's new civilian rulers— and to accept their downgrading 
in the reorganized civil-military hierarchy.
66-67; Sinha, (^Deration Rescue, pp. 31-32; and Ihorat, From Reveille to 
Retreat, p. 101.
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The loyalty of the Indian armed forces to their new civilian roasters
was re-affirmed when India became a sovereign democratic republic on 26
January 1950. Previously, only VCOs, NOOs and soldiers— and their
equivalent ranks in the naval and air forces— had been required to take
an oath of allegiance to the King-Ekpercr. Henceforth, all personnel of
the Indian Army, and the renamed Indian Navy (IN) and Indian Air Force
(lAF) would share in a new pledge:’*
I do swear in the name of God/do solemnly affirm that I will 
bear true faith and allegiance to the Oonstitution of India as 
by law established and that I will, as in duty bound, honestly 
and faithfully serve in the Navy/Regular Amy/Air Force of the 
Union of India and go wherever ordered by sea, land or air and 
that I will observe and obey edl commands of the President of 
the Union of India and the commands of any officer set over roe 
even to the peril of my life.*®
Only tiros would bell if the armed forces' personnel of independent India
would take this new oath to heart.
’* Venkateswaran, Defence, p. 225. 
"® Venkateswaran, Defence, p. 225.
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aaPTHi 6
Test three: General Ayub Khan's 1958 PaJdstan "Revolution"
Introduction
Just a decade after the Transfer of Power, coBcdssioned Indian 
officers saw Pakistan Army C-in-C General Ayub Ran lead former oomrades 
into government with the justification that the civilian leadership had 
ccnpletely mismanaged the country. To see if Indian officers were 
tempted to follow this example, this chapter will compare the general 
state of civil-military relations in India and Pakistan in the fist 
decade of their re^)ective ind^ sendence. Particular emphasis will be 
placed on both officer corps' perceptions of the (in)oonpetence of the 
politiced and administrative elite, as well as on post-Partition 
differences in their professional and societal experiences.
I. Civil-Military Relations in India, 1947-1957
I.A. Indifference and Ignorance
Despite proving themselves in Punjab, Junagadh, Hyderabad, and J&K, 
the Indian military felt neglected during the first decade of 
independence. Ndiru saw national defence as more a function of long-term 
economdc planning than military mi^t.^ His championing of a Non-Aligned 
Hcvement not beholden to the American or Soviet superpowers, and belief 
that international disputes should be handled by the Chited Nations (UN)
 ^Copal, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru; Volume 2, pp. 363-368.
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and diplomacy further contributed to governmental disinterest in the 
armed forces/
From 1947-57, civil-military relations cLLso suffered from Nehru's
choice of defence ministers/ Sardar Baldev Sinc^, having joined the
cabinet more as a compromise SiMi member than for any knowledge of
military matters, left the day-to-day running of the ministry to H.M.
Patel. Then Chief of the General Staff (ŒS) Tient.-General Ihorat
recalls the damage done by the mutual antagonism of "His Majesty*" Patel
and the proud and stubborn army C-in-C cariappa;
We.. .had cause to believe that they and most of the senior 
officers of the Defence and Finance (Defence) Ministries had an 
exaggerated (pinion of their own ability and status, and rather 
looked down ipon the saiior army officers. Some of them even 
believed that they knew more about Army affairs than we 
professional soldiers did.”
Althou^ civil-military relations briefly improved when N. Gopalaswami
Ayyangar, an able administrator respected by military officers for his
wddc as Chairman of the Armed Forces Nationalizati(xi Committee, became
defence minister after the 1952 general elections, he died after just
ten months in office.” Relations again suffered when Nehru assumed the
' See Brigadier J.P. Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder, (Delhi: Hind Pocket Books 
(P) Ltd., n.d. in arrangeroait with lhacker & Company Ltd., Bonbay), p. 
38; Katari, A Sailor Raneambers. pp. 94-96; Rao, India's Def&nce Policy 
and Organisation Since Independence, pp. 5-6. and Ihorat, Ftom Reveille 
to Retreat, p. 117.
' See Council of Ministers. 1947-1984: Names and Portfolios of the 
Members of the Union Council of Ministers ('Frcro August 15. 1947 to 
December 30. 1984) (N^ Delhi: Lok Satha Secretariat, 1985); L. Kavic, 
India's CXiest for Security: Defence Policies. 1947-1965 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1967), pp. 147-149; and Khera, India's 
Defence Problem, pp. 66-69. NdE: Khera is mistaken in his ordering of 
defoTce ministers. Ihe correct order appears in the thesis text.
* **His Majesty*' was a nickname for Patel given by his colleagues in the 
Defence Ministry. From an intervia^ with Indian defence esqjert Mr. C8; 
Cambridge, 15 May 1989.
* Ihorat, op.cit., p. 116.
‘ Ihapar, Ihe Morale Builders, pp. 287-288.
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defence portfolio for the next two years but left (junior) Minister for
Revenue and Eqieiditure Mahavir Tyagi, in his role as Minister for
Defence Organisation (MDO), to run the ministry. While TVagi, writes
Lieut.-General Venna, was
a very kind-hearted person and very likeable in many ways, none 
of us [at Army HQ] knew what exactly the MDO was supposed to do, 
nor did he. He was apt to visit an ordnance [sic] depot and 
start counting nuts and bolts to see if they tallied with ledger 
balances.^
Civil-military relations were not helped, adds Verma, by the "lack of 
self confidence"" of then Array Chief Gaieral S.N. Srinagesh when dealing 
%idth civilian defence bureaucrats. Yet the latter still got most of the 
blame; in 1954 even ex-Defenoe Secretary Patel admitted the "ignorance 
of civilian officials of defence matters is so complete as to be a self 
evident and incontrovertible fact".* Wiile the next defence minister.
Dr. Kailash Nath Katju, was a Congress stalwart and the first in this 
position with a full politiccLL background, his ignorance of military 
matters continued to impair civil-military relations and he gained a 
reputation for not being able to decide upon anything— careful to do 
nothing wrong, he did little right.After two years he became Chief 
Minister of Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister and for the next three months 
Nrfttu again held the defence portfolio.
In the decade after swaraj and before the 1957 ^jpointment of 
Krishna Menon as defaice minister (see Chapter Seven), India's nascent 
civil-military relationship develcped along unawiable lines. Nehru's
’ Verma, To Serve with Honour, pp. 89-90. See also Katari, op.cit., p. 
76-77; and Ihapar, op.cit., p. 289.
* Verma, op.cit., p. 95.
* From an article in USI Journal ^ aril 1954 as used in Sinha, Of Matters 
Military, pp. 43-44.
See Verma, op.cit., p. 91.
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antipathy for all things martial led him to ^ çoint defence ministers
with little knowledge of military issues. Par the most part, they thaï
delegated day-to-day administration to equally ignorant civil servants
who, writes IMS Ileut.-General Ihapar, were "out to grab as much power
as they c o u l d . F r o m  1947 to 1957, adds ex-Defenoe Secretary Rao,
the Services eked out their existence, it may not be far wrong 
to describe, like a neglected wife. She was there, her presence 
was comforting, on occasions, even useful as when Pakistan or 
Portugal proved difficult or mischievous, but esserrtiadly 
Governmental policy did not prescribe any definite objective for 
the Services.“
How long before this sad state of affairs led to crisis?
I.A.l. Questionnaire Respondents
Do the questionnaire respondents share the above, dismal 
characterization of civil-military relations from 1947 to 1957? See 
Tstle 6.1. (Note the limited total of 69 respondents.)^ '
“  Ihapar, op.cit., p. 284.
“  Rao, op.cit., p. 5.
"  Ihhle 6.1 is based on the 69 respondents of Questionnaire H. Ihe 27 
respondents of Questionnaire I answered the more general question posed 
on Table FT 6.1. A a general similarity is evident, especially whai 
comparing the latter to the former's category of "Political Leadership".
TABLE FT 6.1
What was the attd.tnde of the central government towards the armed forces 
in the first decade of independence?
Percent(No. )
Antagcxdstic 37.04 (10)
OcKplacent 11.11 (3)
Fair 22.22 (6)
Fine 18.52 (5)
No Answer 11.11 (3)
Total 100.00 (27)
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Three-fifths of respcrdorts feel the "Political Leadership" had an 
"Antagonistic" (37.68%) or "Oonplacent" (21.74%) attitude towards the 
military. India's politicians, writes Lieut.-General 56, "thou^it that 
since they were such 'good guys' they didn't really need nuch of armed 
forces, unlike the 'British Inperialists'". The freedom movement's 
"creed of non-violence had overshadowed [the] thinking of our leaders 
vho possibly did not consider armed forces of much use to inûepeanàent 
India", adds Brigadier 31. "Most of our leaders", concludes Lieut.- 
Gaieral 94, "believed that since India had no evil intentions against 
any other country, there was no need for us to have an array".
TABU: 6.1
Wiat was the attitude of the political leadership/senior civil service 
tcwards the armed forces in the first decade of independence?
Political leadership Senior Civil Service
Percent(No.)
Antagonistic 37.68 (26) 66.67 (46)
Oocplacent 21.74 (15) 4.35 (3)
Fair 11.59 (8) 11.59 (8)
Fine 27.54 (19) 13.04 (9)
No Answer 1.45 (1) 4.35 (3)
Total 100.00 (69) 100.00 (69)
Apathy bred ignorance. India's political leadership, opines Lieut.- 
General 19, "could not appreciate the difference between militarism and 
military as an instrumart of policy in the hands of the Government". 
"Barring a few exertions at the top", adds Brigadier 38, "the 
politicians did not have many clues of the defence forces and their 
operations". Yet this ignorance could be a plus, argues Brigadier 46: 
"fortunately [the] political leadership had no knowledge or expertise to 
deal with the defax» forces and did not interfere much".
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The "Antagonistic” and "CDnplacent" respondents aOso cite reasons of
economy for the military's poor treatment. Lieut.-General 66 recalls how
India's elected leaders "thought the aimed forces were an umecessary
luxury ^ Aich the developing country could ill afford". Lieut.-General 54
agrees: "at that time government policy was to build up the economy of
the country by saving money on defoice". For Major-General 96, this
policy explains why the armed forces were "consistently down-graded,
starved of essaitial weapons...equipment and other necessities".
All in all, writes Vice-Admiral 8, India's politicians saw the armed
forces as "a necessary evil". At ind )^end@Tce, concludes Lieut.-General
5, the country's "Political Leadership" had an attitude "very nuch as
that of a teetotaller who had inherited a brewery". [1^  italics.]
Nonetheless, two-fifths of respondents feel the "Political
Leadership" had a "Fair" (11.59%) or "Fine" (27.54%) attitude towards
the military in the first decade of indepmdence. Débité some
"indifference in the earliest years", writes Brigadier (Dr.) 55,
attitudes "changed dramatically following the J&K war, liberation of
Hyderabad, Goa, Junagadh, etc. Leaders then became greatly interested in
the armed forces". For Major-General 52, even if politicians had "no
realisation of its [the military's] inportance as an effective
instrument of [the] state for pursuance of an independent foreign
policy... [their attitude was] one of de^ respect for its hi^
traditions and professional competence". Air Chief Marshal 1 agrees:
The Présidait and the FM showed much consideration to the 
defence set-tp. They were in touch with the senior leadership 
and listened to their views. I held senior (in our context) and 
responsible positions as Groiç) captain and Air COnmodore during 
1947-57 and had contacts in the higgler echelons of Government.
The administration takes its cue from the FM and he was generous 
and understanding.
-221-
Again, ecxnomic factors are seen to shape civil-military relations.
Major-General 85 describes how
The [political] leadership set about planning methodically to 
build the available resources of the defence farces into an 
efficient war machine. Admittedly the pace of progress was 
somewhat slow, but perh^o it oould not have been expedited 
under the circumstances then existing.
Major^ -Gaieral 20 has no such doubts: "Every officer and man realized
that we were a poor country and the first priority should be to raise
the economic level and fight poverty. At no time did we [begrudge] the
neglect of the armed forces during 1947 to 1962". "Ihe attitude of the
central government, thanks to the wisdom of the political leadership,
was correct and balanced", concludes Air Chief Marshal 18.
In contrast, only a quarter (24.63%) of re^cndents describe the 
attitude of the "Sailor Civil Service" towards the military as "Fair" 
(11.59%) or "Fine" (13.04%). Brigadier 40 recalls "a brotherly and 
friendly attitude [on the part of bureaucrats] characterised by a sense 
of equality of status and perhaps a saise of professional scperiority 
vis-a-vis the politicians". Relations were not perfect. Although, 
recalls Air Marshal 3, "professional matters [were] left to the armed 
forces' HQs, bureaucrats tried, unsuccessfully then, to take over more 
oontrol in the mistaken belief that civilian control meant bureaucratic 
control— this was resisted firmly by [the] top brass". Nonetheless, 
Brigadier (Dr.) 55 saw bureaucrats and officers generally enjoying "good 
companionship".
"Envy and jealousy" are two elements of the almost three-quarters 
(71.02%) majority of respondents who think the "Senior Civil Service" 
had an "Antagonistic" (66.67%) or "Oonplaoent" (4.35%) attitude towards 
the military. Brigadier 90 recalls how
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Initially, the civil servants had very little knowledge of 
affairs 'military'; they therefore [were] inclined to aocq± 
what the services laid down. However, there was a definite shift 
in as much as the civil servant tended to take shelter behind 
his political si^ )erior to enforce certain decisions.
Seen, writes Brigadier 30, the "Senior Civil Service"
took great advantage of [the] politicians' indifference towards 
the Indian Amy. Ihe top level.. .tried to denigrate top brass of 
[the] military, [and] took away many privileges mainly due to 
jealousy.. .it was not [at] all good for the top civil officers 
to look down on the military in general.
For Brigadier 76, differences in the bureaucracy's and the military's
respective viavs of civil supremacy generated much ill-will:
In a democracy, it is accepted that the military remain 
subordinate to the SLpremacy of the civil government. However, 
vhereas in Western democracies the term 'government' meant the 
parliament and its elected members, in India, unfortunately, it 
also enoonpassed the civil servants, which was never the 
intention when we became a republic. Thus there was a constant 
battle between the bureaucrat and the soldier.
By the eand of the first decade of ind^endenoe, writes Brigadier 69,
"power had gone to their heads... [Defence] secretaries oould twist
generals around their little fingers. In meetings our officers were made
fools of by the finance 'wizards'". India's top bureaucrats, concludes
Brigadier 76, had a "bad, positively bad" attitude towards the military.
Many "Antagonistic" and "Oonplacent" rei^mndents feel the "Senior
Civil Service" happily inflated what Vice Admiral 103 describes as
Nehru's "constant ni^itmare that the military will one day carry out a
coup".^ * Lieut.-General 94 explains hew
most of the [political] leaders Wx) came in contact with the 
Armed Forces became aware of the fact that military officers and 
men were as patriotic as the old Congress leaders. But there was 
also a lurking fear in their minds, especially after the 
military take-over in Pakistan, that the military mi^it be 
having political ambitions.
 ^* From an interview with Vice Admiral 103; New Delhi, 18 September 
1987.
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%x)tting these suspicions, writes Lieut.-General 10, "bureaucrats tried 
to play on the fears of politicians of a military coup". "Unhelpful and 
petty" bureaucrats "were not adverse to sewing seeds of suspicion in 
their [politicians'] minds", agrees Brigadier (Jbstioe) 47.
Indian civil-military relations in the first decade of independence 
suffered from what re^xndarts describe as a generally negative attitude 
towards the armed forces by both the "Political Leadership" and the 
"Senior Civil Service". "If there wouldn't have been a war in J&K in 
1947-48.. .the political leadership would have thought the array an 
unnecessary burdai on the country", sums up Brigadier 60. Ihat 
bureaucrats receive relatively more blame is most obviously shown by the 
difference in respondents recalling an "Antagonistic" attitude towards 
the military on the part of politicians (37.68%) versus civil servants 
(66.67%). It was the latter, charges Lieut.-General 49, "starved the 
military of essentials with deliberate care..." More insidiously, adds 
Vice Admiral 103, even thouÿi senior bureaucrats "did not seriously 
believe that the military would attempt a ootp, they were only too happy 
deliberately to fan this fear of Ndiru's".^ * Regardless of vhich branch 
of civilian government was held more responsible, would the poor state 
of Indian civil-military relations during the first decade of st/araj 
endanger civil sipreraacy-of-rule in India— specially if officers were 
confronted by the exanple of a successful armed forces' coup next door?
II. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan, 1947-1958
II.A. Ihe Military Takes Over
 ^® Fran an interview with Vice Admiral 103; New Delhi, 18 September 
1987.
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On 7 October 1958, Pakistan President Iskander Mirza abrogated the 
constitution, proclaimed Martial Law, difanissed the central and 
provincial governments and assemblies, and appointed Pakistan Ar^ C-in- 
C General Àyil> Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator. IWenty days 
later, Ayub pressured Mirza into surrendering all governing power to him 
in what he described as a "Révolution".^ * There is not the ^ aoe here to 
describe Ayub's period of rule; his creation of "Basic Democracies",
1960 election as President of Pakistan, fooaulation of a new 
constitution, 1965 re-election and eventual r^lacement in office four 
years later. What will be examined below are the circumstances lecding 
to Ayub's Revolution, their similarities with the Indian experience 
over the same period and Indian military officers' recollected opinions 
of the Pakistan Amy takeover.
Pakistan's government had alreac^ weathered one attempted military 
coup. In faring 1951, the government uncovered the "RauaTpindi 
Oonspixacy", a plot led by Major-General Akbar Khan to assassinate FM 
Liaquat Ali Khan, Army C-in-C (the British) General Sir Douglas Graoey, 
and other top officials. Tried and convicted by a ^ )ecial Civil 
Tribunal, the plotters were freed sane years laber.^’ Ayub understood 
the conspiracy as having "de^ roots; it grew in the soil of discontent 
and distrust" created by the spate of rapid post-Partition promotions 
vhich raised officers' career expectations to unreasonable and 
unobtainable heists, the J&K Coiflict wtiioh saw junior officers "out on 
their owi with little direction from headquarters and with considerable
See Oohoi, The Indian Army, p. 178; and Khan, Friends Not Masters, 
pp. 70-76.
See CcAien, op.cit., p. 178; Khan, op.cit., pp. 70-76.
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responsibility" and, most icçiortantly, "the disoorrtent... [caused by] a 
government vihich failed to discharge its functions properly".
Ayub main justification was the political leadership's mismanagement 
of Pakistan:
Those who followed Liacyxat Ali Khan [assassinated a few months 
after discovery of the Rawalpindi Oonspiracy] in political 
office proved unequal to the task. They did not understand the 
problems facing the country, nor did they have the courage to 
try to solve them. One after another they made a mess of 
things...and the country started slipping very fast.^ *
Chronic political infi^iting also affected civil servants, writes Ayiib:
The politicians were naturally d^endent on permanent services, 
but the more powerful among the services had developed political 
ambitions of their own. Everyone seemed to have a group of his 
own and his sole occupation was to grind his own axe regardless 
of whether the country was ground to pieces in the process.' ®
Finally, adds Ayub, the deterioration in the political and economic
situation in the run-up to the 1958 elections led "Perfectly respectable
pecple...[to] come to me and say, 'You can save the situation...'""
The factors leading to the 1958 ooip illustrate the danger of 
relying on only one of the cocpeting military intervention theories. The 
first set of theorists would argue that the ineffectivmess of 
Pakistan's politicians and bureaucrats would eventually pull its "model 
citizen" professional military officers into assuming power for the good 
of the country. Ayub himself describes the Pakistan Amy in 1958 as "the 
only disciplined organization that could give the country the necessary 
covering fire, in order to enable it to steady itself and extricate 
itself from the evils whioh heid surrounded it"." The dilesina is that
" Khan, op.cit., pp. 37-38. 
" ibid., p. 49.
" ibid., p. 49.
ibid., pp. 56, 58. 
ibid., p. 58.
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the hi<^ degree of professionalism which creates officers perfectly 
suited to take over government demands they refrain from doing so. 
Indeed, Ayub laments the Rawalpindi Ocn^iracy's damage to the army's 
"great tradition of loyalty, sense of duty, patriotism, and complete 
subordination to civil authority".“ As 0-in-C, he claims to have fou^it 
against the incursion of politics into the army, banning their 
discussion among senior officers, and accepting a cabinet position in 
1954 only "to act as a buffer between the politicians and the armed 
forces".'*
For the second set of military intervention theorists who see third 
world officers as inclined to become enmeshed in their transitional 
society's political and socioeconomic conflicts, this acceptance was 
ultimately futile. Ayub himself acknowledges that his officers oould not 
remain forever unaffected by "all the political chicanery, intrigue, 
corruption, and inefficiency manifest in every ^ here of life"." For 
the second set, seddng to terminate developmsntal pressures may lead 
officers to shift their professional sense of responsibility to serve 
their client— society— from the legitimate government to the state 
itself. As in the case of Ayub's ousting of President Mirza 20 days 
after being invited to serve as Chief Martial Law Administrator, this 
shift allows military officers to reedize their potential as political 
actors, pushing their way into power with the seemingly irreproachable 
justification of "serving the natioi".
Paradoxically, Ayub also justifies leading the array into government 
in order to protect it from domestic politics. This may be understood in
" ibid., p. 39.
" ibid., pp. 42, 53.
" ibid., p. 58.
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the li^Tt of the third theory of military intervention which sees 
officers' defence of their organizational oorporata^ess as the prime 
motivation for a coup. The Rawalpindi Oonspiracy came as a "great shock 
to me and to all right-thinking pec^le in the amy"/' recalls Ayub—  
apparently, as much for violating the professional chain of command as 
for its goal of overthrowing the government.' ’ Ayub was similarly 
scandalized during the 1958 general election run-t^ %hen the Pakistan 
Army's professional respect for civil siçremacy-of-rule was threatened 
by various politicians "making cœtact with certain mEmhers of the armed 
forces.. .^sreading adl kinds of rumours to isolate senior officers and 
to create groL^ of army officers to si^port them in the pursuit of 
their ambitions".’* Finally, writes Ayub, the impending threat of 
electoral violence meant "Whether the any liked it or not it would get 
embroiled [in politics], because in the final analysis it would become a 
question of maintaining some semblance of law and order in the 
country".’* Thus, even thou^ he worried that "a well-organized, 
trained, and disciplined army would find it extremely distzasteful to be 
turned into an instrument for securing power",’® Ayub deemed his 
Revolution necessary to protect both the Pakistan Army's traditional, 
corporate non-involvement in politics and its role as ultimate guarantor 
of domestic law and order.
II.A.l. Questu.onnaire Respondents
’* ibid., p. 39.
” Cohen, c^.cit., p. 178. See also Ool. Mohanmad Ahmad, My Chief 
(Lahore: Longmans, Green and Co., 1960), pp. 37 ff as used in Cohen, 
op.cit., p. 178.
’• Khan, op.cit., p. 57.
” ibid., p. 57.
’® ibid., p. 58.
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What did Indian armed farces' officers think of their former 
oomrades-in-iarms taking power next door in Pakistan? See Table 6.2.
TABL£ 6.2
What were your feelings cn Ayub Khan's "Revolution"?
Peroait(No.)
Necessary and/or Unsurprising 33.33 (32)
Unnecessary and/or Surprising 32.29 (31)
No Particular Notice 26.04 (25)
No Answer 8.33 (8)
Total 99.99 (96)
For a third (33.33%) of the respondents, the military intervention
was **Neoessary and/or Unsurprising". Brigadier 27 could see that
Pakistani politicians were "not iç) to the mark" in, adds Lieut.-Oolcnel
14, a country suffering from a "general breakdown of [the] parliamentary
system". Lieut.-General 16 offers a telling ccoparison:
Pakistan.. .suffered from lack of institutionalisation of the 
body politic. India was lucky in its leaders like N^iru and 
Patel who gave it stability and built institutions. In Pakistan 
Jimah died in 1948, Liaquat was assassinated a few years 
later...in these circuoastances, the oaip was not a surprise.
Indian officers, argues Major-General 96, "generally e^ aproved...Someone
had to fill the vacuum in political leadership and the Amy was as
qualified to do so if not better than a host of weak parties and self-
serving politicians". Moreover, argues Major-General 34, "Ayub stepped
in to take the reins of govemmait at the request of Pakistani
politicians. He had no choice in the matter". "It was a case of
politicians virtually pushing the military into politics", agrees
Lieut.-Goieral 19. "At least", offers Brigadier 40, "the Pakistan Army
was.. .more natioralistic in outlook than the civilian coterie ruling the
country at the time".
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Some **Nec3essary and/or Unsurprising** respondents hoped Pakistan's
Revolution mi^it have a salutary effect at home. ""Pakistan's political
system had ceased to effectively exist, from %Aich India should learn a
lesson"", writes Brigadier 44. Brigadier 73 recalls Indian officers as
happy that at least some array general is exerting himself in our 
subcontinent and [hopeful that] our politicians %dll [sic] 
change for better towards the armed farces. Considering the 
situation, that action was necessary and desirable. However, the 
same could not have been enacted in India.
Not so, argues Lieut.-Colonel 81, ""the people of the subcontinent—
whether Pakistanis or Indians needed to be disciplined and the
politicians were no good for this. A dictator %jas good for Pakistan"".
Mi^t one also irprove India?
No; even those respondents most enthusiastic over Ayub's Revolution
soon saw that military rule fc d le d  to inprove the general situation, and
damaged the armed forces themselves. Lieut.-General 56 ejq^ lains:
Initially one felt good about the stories coming across about 
army NOOs checking [on] civil servants and chasing them into 
their offices on time and such like, but things were soon back 
to normal...In retrospect [military rule was] neither necessary 
nor desirable, at least as far as Pakistan is concerned.
Brigadier 62 offers a similar recollection:
[From] what one could gather from [the] press and occasional 
visitors, corruption was rampant in all walks of life, there 
were signs of unrest in East Pakistan and a drastic change had 
become necessary. Initially Ayub Mian did a commendable job but 
later military rulers themselves got affected by greed.
Ihoui^ some Indian military officers originally ^ proved of Pakistan's
Revolution, they ""had no idea of vhat damage it will [sic] cause in the
long run"", ccxTcludes Major-General 52.
Another third (32.29%) recall Ayuto's Revolution as ""Unnecessary
and/or Surprising*". ""The [Indian] army was shocked"", recalls Lieut.-
General 4. "I do not think that a coup is a correct answer to any
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country's problems", argues Brigadier 50. Seme officers worried about a 
knock-on effect. Ayub's Revolution was "a bad development for the 
region", writes Lieut.-Gaieral 95 and, adds Brigadier 37, "spelt danger 
to India's security".
A few respondents see the 1958 Revolution as the result of the 
dominance of one ccEmmity, Punjabi Muslims, of both comtry and any—  
at ind^Dendmce, they made vp ^ iproKinately 60% of Pakistan Any 
personnel.'^  Althcu^ Ayub was a MWFP Pathan (also Muslims), Air )brshal 
5 argues that his takeover was "not entirely unexpected given the strong 
feudal interests of the dominant Punjabi mussalman.. .who also dominated 
the any and provided the cohesive 'caste' kinship for a successful 
C01Ç)". Remember that on Table 0.1 respondents rank "Nationally 
representative military personnel" as the fourth most impartant factor 
contributing to India never having had a ooip. In contrast, writes 
Major-General 89, Ayub's Revolution was "a natural extension of the 
Punjabi Muslim officer class...in their quest for power".
Other "unnecessary and/or Surprising" respondents describe military
rule in Pakistan as more undesirable than unexpected. For Lieut.-General
94, civil-military antagonism was apparent long before 1958:
I visited Pakistan unofficially for a day in 1954. I was 
somewhat surprised to see that the Any had quite a hold over 
the civil administration. One could see that they would ttrow 
out their political leaders for whom they had nortdiing but 
conteanpt. Quite a few of them told me that we were lucky to have 
people like Jawaharlal Nehru and others.' '
Yet, recalls Brigadier 90, if
" See S. Oohen, The Pakistan Armv (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1984), pp. 40-47, 113-117; and Khan, cp.cit., p. 1.
" **Most senior Pakistani officers", adds Cohen, "have a grudging 
admiration for the Indian accomplishment [of democracy], but quite 
typically.. .attribute the difference to the Indians' being lucky in 
their [civilian political] leadership". See Oohen, The Pakistan Army^  p. 
106.
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one felt sorry for the Pakistanis, one also felt that in a vast 
country such as ours, with so nuch diversity, poverty, 
illiteracy, there was some justified need to have discipline and 
a degree of authoritarian administration. To that extent, Ayub's 
action was not too harshly condemned.
For Brigadier 29, the reaction of Indian officers to the Pakistan Amy's
take-over of government was "generally unfavourable but predictable in
the circumstances prevailing in Pakistan at the time".
Some respondents esgsress regret for the Revolution's effect on their
former comrades-in-arms. Major-Gaieral 20 describes how
We felt that the military coup in Pakistan will bring the end of 
the high military traditions of the Pakistan Army. We felt that 
once the army entered politics and started ruling Pakistan, the 
army will deteriorate and its officers and men will get involved 
in comption, nepotism and unmilitary [sic] professions. All 
this came out true.
Brigadier 60 agrees: "Pakistan had a good army and after the coip
d'état, once the army got used to having power, the army will [sic] not
be as good as previously".
A final quarter (26.04%) of respondents took "No Particular Notice"
of Pakistan's Revolution. "Once we have [sic] accepted Pakistan as a
s^arate country it was none of my concern to think of their internal
affairs", adds Brigadier 30. TWo other reactions are discernible. In the
words of Lieut.-General 87, the first was a
feeling.. .of appréhension, not because of any altruistic 
attitude towards the place of the military in a democracy but 
because of the likelihood that Ayub Whan providing Pakistan with 
a good administration and thus posing a threat of some magnitude 
to India.
The second was the opportunity to denigrate Pakistan. Ayub's take-over 
"exposed [the] hollowness of Pak. political leadership and [the] utter 
helplessness of [its] people and political leaders", writes Brigadier 
31, and "it is so even today". "Pakistan cannot survive as an
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ind^ 3enc3ent entity", adds Air Chief Marshal 12, "it needs outside (US) 
assistance and dictatorships". "If cur politicians were inexperienced 
and lacking in understanding of the military, the Pakistani politicians 
and elite were cutri^it grabbers", argues Lieut.-General 49, "Ayub with 
his siçporters grabbed the most".
The respondents' reqxmses reveal most Indian military officers as 
able to dispassionately observe the political upheaval taking place next 
door by their ocrarades-in-arms of only 11 years before. "Ihe army was 
sirply [the] most organized actor in Pakistan", opines Lieut.-Colonel 
25. Yet, however "Necessary anchor Unsurprising", the particular 
circumstances perceived to have led to Ayub's takeover of government—  
incompetent political and administrative leadership, the dominance of 
one ethnic group in society and anoy, a feudal socioeconomic structure—  
were dismissed as irrelevant to India. "Anything", writes Brigadier 69, 
"oould h^jpen in Pakistan". Even so, concludes Brigadier 39, a "civil 
government and politicians are always the right people to govern any 
country".
III. Contrasting Experiences
III.A. A Hindu Versus Muslim Predisposition to Military Rule
A number of Ihble 6.2's "Necessary and/or Not Surprising" and "No 
Particular Notice" re^xndents explain their choice by arguing that a 
national religion of Islam predisposed Pakistan to military rule.
Lieut.-General 88 "took [Ayub's coup] as a part of Muslim culture". 
Brigadier 76 saw it as "no différait than such coups in almost all 
Muslim countries. Perhaps these countries thrive best on a military
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dictatorship". "Islam, its faith, culture and tradition lend themselves 
to a military dictatorship the world over and continue to do so in 
Pakistan and elsewhere", concludes Major-General 74.
Are Islam and democracy incompatible? JUdith Broun esqplains how, 
since Muslims believe "the heart of reality is Allah, one God is 
creator and arbiter of all things", they must strive to order their 
perscngd and public life as laid out in the holy Koran and by Shariah 
(Islamic law) as developed and tauc^ it by the ulema. Politically, this 
means creating "a theocratic state, where God rules in practioe because 
his ministers and law order life".’* Althou^ most Muslim rulers are 
unwilling to hand over power to religious leaders on the basis of non­
political arguments, they do appear rea^ to use Islam's "well- 
formulated and powerful belief structure"* * in absolutism to sustain 
autocratic rather than pluralistic rule:* ® of the 13 coups %dorld-wide 
from 1950 to 1957, five occurred in three Islamic states ccnpared to 
ei^it in sevai other countries; giving ratios of 1.67/1 and 1.14/1,
** Brown, Modern India, pp. 27-28.
** ibid., p. 27.
3 S Ayub Khan recalls that, after his Revolution,
the demand for an Islamic Constitution was.. .ardently advocated 
by the ulema. Since no one had defined the fundamental aqaects 
of an Islamic Constitution, no Constitution could be called 
Islamic unless it received the blessing of all the ulema. Ihe 
only way of having an Islamic Constitution was to hand over the 
oountry to the ulena and beseech them, 'lead kindly 
li^t'.. .This was a position which neither the people nor I was 
prepared to acc^*, opposed as it was to the fundamental 
democratic principle that all authority must vest in the people.
Khan did, however, acc^t that the history of Islamic states showed that 
"the leader, once he is chosen by the cocmunity, should have sufficient 
power to co-ordinate, supervise, and control the activities of 
government. Delegation of authority was permissible but central control 
must remain in the hands of the chosen leader..." See Khan, op.cit., pp. 
190, 198-204.
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respectively. From 1958 to 1985, 32 ootçs occurred in 13 nations where 
Islam was the chief religion compared to 89 in 45 other states; ratios 
of 2.46/1 and 1.98/1, respectively.’* À 1990 survey of 17 Arab nations 
(all embracing Islam) revealed six absolute monarchies and six secular 
dictatorships, cnly five were in the process of introducing "an element 
of pluralism"” and not one displayed European democratic standards.
Before the 1958 Revolution, however, Islam played little part in the 
professional development of cocniissioned Pakistani military officers.’ • 
Although it was used to unify the Pakistan Army on a general, emotional 
level (e.g., in the introduction of Islamic battle cries) the country's 
political and military leaders were more concerned %rith constructing a 
viable defence establishment than wildi revanping officers' ideology 
whioh continued to remain that of the British officer and gentleman. 
While senior military conmanders under Ayub's government and General 
Yayha Khan's subsequent martial law regime (1969-1971) increasingly 
referred to the "q)irit of jihad [holy war] and dedication to Islam",’* 
there was no concerted effort to incorporate religious measures into the 
armed forces' training, organization or strategy. Cnly during 
General/President Zia al-Baq's period of military rule (1977-1988) were 
more formal measures (e.g., the introduction of Islamic teaohings into
’* The nations and the year(s) of coups are taken from O'Kane, The 
T.ikAl ihood of Ooups. pp. 141-144. In judging which countries have Islam 
as their chief religion, I include Nigeria, Sudan and Indonesia as well 
as obvious choices such as Syria, cman and Afghanistan.
”  N.a., "Dicing with Democracy", The Economist. 3 February 1990, p. 66. 
’• unless otherwise noted, the following discussion of Islam and 
Pakistan officers and dates of subsequart military regimes is takai from 
Oohen, The Pakistan Army, pp. 37, 86-104; and N.a., "Pakistan: A 
troubled history**. The Economist. 23-39 November 1991.
’ * From a speeoh by Pakistan Lieut.-General Tikka Rian as used in Oohen, 
The Pakistan Amy, p. 86. The definition of jihad is taken from Brown, 
op.cit., p. 28.
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the Mdstan Military Academy; HA) adopted. Yet, while most Pakistani 
officers today h^pily observe Islamic law in their personal lives, many 
continue to question the incorporation of religious strictures into 
their professional careers.
In contrast to their belief that a national religion of Islam 
predisposes a country to military rule, many re^xxidents are convinced 
that Hinduism helps ensure continued civilian government. See Table 0.1 
in vAich the questionraire re^ondents rank India's "Dominant Hindu 
culture against military rule" as the sixth most inportant factor in the 
country never having experienced an armed forces' coup.
Ihe respondents stress they are not iq^ eaking of Hinduism in a strict 
religious sense but, explain Lieut.-GeTeral 19 and Oolonel 24, 
respectively, more as a "philosophy** or "way of life".*® Nonetheless, 
«hile Hinduism lacks the discipline of a revelatory text, organized 
churoh and congregationaLL worship oommon to most other world religions, 
its adherents' search for dharma— what Brown describes as the 
"fundamental laws of existence, to which men and women must conform 
through performance of their own.. .religious duty*** ^ — has created a 
rigid caste system which, argues Lieut.-General 94, "keeps people in 
their place".*' Given the inescapability of caste, continues Air Chief
* ® From follow-up interviews with Lieut.-General 19; New Delhi, 10 
September 1987; and From an interview with Oolonel 24; New Delhi, 12 
S^jtember 1987.
* ' Browi, (p.cit., p. 23. Paul Younger argues that dharmst has come to 
mean "'order'" and to describe all the religious, legal, customary and 
political efforts to identify an area of stability of both roots 
[primordial loyalties expressed in social institutions such as family 
and caste] and vision [a primordial conmitmait to the idea of a 
universal vision of human existaioe]". See Brown, op.cit., p. 23; and P. 
Younger, From Ashoka to Paiiv; An Analysis of Indian Political Culture 
(Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1987), pp. viii, l-io, 20-24, 39-42.
* ' From a follow-iç) interview with Lieut.-General 94; New Delhi, 15 
August 1989. Traditional Hindu society is divided into four great and
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Marshal 12, "Hindus are not like Muslims...[Hindus are] very cxmplaoent,
god-fearing...total worriers".*^  Hinduism, agrees Major-General 105, is
'^ milder by nature [than Islam; it is] oonformist.. .traditionalist"^
For Lieut.-General 17, such qualities mean Hindus cannot "reocncile
themselves to such a drastic form of action [as a military cotp].. .Ihe
Hindu doesn't want to hurt a bloody fly** .* “
Ihe respondents offer historical proof that Hinduism has helped keep
independent India free from military rule. Mr. d, a leading Indian
journalist and commentator, describes how
in Indian history kings ruled with the aid of their chief 
advisor, usually a Brahmin. Uhder the king came his commander-in 
chief. A king mic^ lead his army into battle but always in the 
role of king, not military commander. Ihe king always retained 
his political authority.**
Vice Admiral 103 agrees:
In the days of the ancient Aryan civilization— whioh introduced 
the caste system in India— civil/tailitary relations were at 
their peak in understanding and delineation. Brahmins ruled, 
wrote laws and administered while warriors enforced law. Both 
were interested in keying bottom two classes from real power.* ’
For Major-General 74, Mu^ml rule in India was an exception when, "as in
any Muslim oountry, the rulers... [implemented] usually dictatorships and
changes...[were] made by violent means".* * In contrast, argues Vice
mutually exclusive castes: brahmans (priests), kshatriyas (warriors and 
aristocracy), vaishyas (merchants), and stvdras (cultivators). See 
Ihapar, A History of India, pp. 37-40.
* ^ From a follow-up interview with Air Chief Marshal 12; Pune, 11 
October 1987.
* * From an interview with Major-Geieral 105; New Delhi, 12 September 
1987.
*“ From a follow-up interview with Lieut.-General 17; Londæ, 26 
November 1987.
From an interview with Mr. CL; Delhi, 13 Sq±ember 1989.
From an interview with Vice Admiral 103; New Delhi, 18 September 
1987.
*• From a follow^np interview with Major-General 74; New Delhi, 21 
August 1989.
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Admiral 2, "the Hindu mind is not militaristic, the Hindu concept of a 
just king is not a militarily just king"./*
While the Indian armed forces today provide facilities for all their
personnel to observe the rites of their re^sective religions, and do not
allow any one faith to dictate their recruitment, training, organization
and/or strategy, the country's dominant Hindu culture inevitably affects
their standing in society. Lieut.-General 94 e)q)lains:
In a Muslim culture soldiers see themselves as 'guardians of the 
nation', enjoying a unique position in society as defenders of 
the country's ideals, [i.e., those of] Islam. A Hindu soldier 
does not occi%r a special place in society. Though he and his 
institution are respected, he is not thought of as particularly 
specicil or different. He does not think he has a ^ )ecigd status.
He sees his role purely as relating to his military eidvisors.*®
Lieut.-General 107 agrees that "Hinduism has much to do with an
apolitical military.. .Ihe Hindu way of life [is] not a fanatical way of
life unlike the Muslim".*^  "In Hinduism", adds Oolonel 24, "there are
things more powerful than the sword— the strength of the mind, of being
moral, and the weakness of being immoral"."
Hinduism's lack of definition relative to other world religions does 
lead to some disagreement as to its influence in preveiting military 
rule in India. If you can "find me a Hindu and bring him to me I shall 
be very grateful", says GOcmodore 99; "Ihere is no 'Hinduism'...It is
** Admiral 2 concedes that "Shivaji [a Mahratta ruler from 1659-1680, he 
established a state ind^sendent of Mughul rule] is an exc^*ion.. .but 
even he administered the civil side throu^ a council of civilian 
ministers". Younger concurs with the respondents' description of a pre- 
Mu^ul India ruled by kings advised by Brahmins within "firmly 
demarcated" boundaries of authority. From a follow-up interview with 
Vice Admiral 2; Bombay, 7 October 1987; ^»ar, A History of India, pp. 
59-60; and Younger, c .^cit., pp. 27, 45r-47.
From a follow-up interview with Lieut.-Gaieral 94; New Delhi, 15 
August 1989.
From an interview with Lieut.-General 107; New Delhi, 20 S^Ttember 
1987.
** From an interview with Oolonel 24; New Delhi, 12 S^Jtember 1987.
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like the Diglish language in that you can find everything in it". Any 
anti-coup intervention attitude, he continues, is due to the more 
gmeral "envirœmental influence of being an Indian...[which includes] 
resistance to unnatural change...it is difficult to...change the 
motivation of an Indian as by nature we are subjugated [sic] to the 
beaten track".“ Ex-Defence Secretary Mr. C5 also doesn't "want to use 
the word 'Hindu'. But there is an Indian culture which is basically law- 
abiding and peaceful. Cne can't call it Hindu as Indians still do not 
believe in the two-nation theory**.** Par some respondents all India's 
religions have contributed to the make-up of contemporary society.
How widespread among commissioned Indian officers of all religions 
is ti)e notion that Hinduism has been a major factor in prevarting a 
military coup in India? With the exoqtion of the Zoroastrian Brigadier 
76, every one of the 16 respondents quoted above in this section—
Lieut.-Coierals 17, 19, 88, 94 and 107, Major-Generals 74 and 105, 
Oolonel 24, Vice Admirals 2 and 103, Commodore 99, Air Chief Marshal 12, 
journalist and commentator Mr. Cl, and ex-Defenoe Secretary 05— is 
Hindu. Debits the respective assurances of Lieut.-Generals 17 and 107 
that their Muslim and/or Christian ccmrades agree as to the existence of 
a **Domdnant Hindu culture against military rule" in India,** each of the 
three non-Hindu respondents who offers an opinion disagrees. Ihe Shia 
Muslim Air Marshal 5 does not "think that you can get away with saying 
that a Hindu culture is inherætly democratic. Iheir culture doesn't
** Fromi an interview with Ocmmodore 99; Bcmbay, 6 October 1987.
** From an interview with Mr. C5; New Delhi, 14 August 1989.
* * **A Muslim or Christian officer would say the same thing" comments 
Lieut.-General 17; **Muslim officers in the lA would agree with this", 
adds Lieut.-General 107. From a follow-tç> interview with Lieut.-Gagerai 
17; London, 26 November 1987; and an interview with Lieut.-General 107; 
New Delhi, 20 S^Dtember 1987.
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suggest this. Islam as a religion is very democratic, only its practice 
is not”.®* Ihe Jewish Lieut.-Goieral 100 dismisses the notion that 
Hinduism has created respect for the civil authority as "Rubbish! Look 
to Indian history, [it's] extremely bloody, [and full of] extreme 
conraunal feelings".*’ Wiile conceding that "being ruled by outsiders for 
over 1500 years has affected the Indian oharacter, skewing its values 
towards sycophancy and ccmçtion", the Si)di Major-General 75 argues 
that "it is not [a Hindu] culture but other circumstances... [whioh have] 
resulted in a laok of oharacter".**
Of course, not all Hindu respondents believe in a dominant Indian 
culture of Hinduism or its anti-cot^ influence. For Brigadier (Justice) 
47, the idea is "nonsense".** Major-General 85 asks: "Wiat is the 
definition of 'Hinduism'? Wiat is India's ethos, character? Our strength 
has beai that we have absorbed invading cultures not just tolerated 
them. So we have absorbed many Western ideas as well".** Ex-Govemor Mr. 
C7 agrees: India's civil siçremacy-of-rule has "nothing to do with 
Hinduism... [the idea] is to a very great extent nonsense. While we 
cannot escape the influence of the Hinduism of 80% of Indiems, too many 
people who think about Indian problems put them in a religious 
context".* ^ "If we lock to history", adds Admiral 58, "we can see that 
the caste of kshatriyas were warriors and kings. One could argue that if
®* From a follow-tç) interview with Air Marshal 5; New Delhi, 17 August 
1989.
*’ From an interview with Lieut.-General 100; New Delhi, 9 September 
1989.
** From a follow-iç) interview with ^ fejor-General 75; New Delhi; 14 
August 1989.
** From a follow^ interview with Brigadier (Justice) 47; New Delhi, 19 
August 1989.
** From a follow-up interview with Major-Gaieral 85; 16 August 1989.
*^  From an interview with ex-Govemor C7; New Delhi, 13 August 1989.
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you have the ri^it to bear arms you also have the right to rule".** 
Ihouf^ aco^Tting the existence of a dominant Hindu culture, ex-Principal 
Defence Secretary Dr. C4 argues it has had "no influence in prev^rting a 
ccxç>. Hinduism is very arbitrary, very authoritarian, very feudal. Uhder 
the British it was even more so, more syoophantic" .* *
TABLE 6.3
À breakdown of Table 0.1's sixth-place choice, "(C) Dominant Hindu 
culture inherently against military rule", by respondents' religion
No. of officers/^eligicn/Rankings of (C): 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Total
48 / Hindu 3 2 3 5 2 15*
12 / Sikh 1 0 0 2 1 4“
4 / Christiaif 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 / Buddhist 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 / Zoroastrian 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 / "No Religion" 0 0 0 0 0 0
69 Respondents Total 4 2 3 7 3 19
* The 48 Hindu reqmndents give (C) eight other rankings: one 9th, three 
lOths, one 11th, one 13th and two 15ths.
“ The 12 Sikh respondents give (C) two other rankings: one 7th and one 
10th.The four Christians include two Reman Catholics.
Nonetheless, that non-Hindu officers are more soq^tical of Hinduism 
as a factor helping to ensure continued civil supremacy-of-rule in India 
is shown in Tcdale 6.3. Combined, the 21 Si]di, Christian, Buddhist, 
Zoroastrian and/or "No Religion" officers muster just four (one 1st, two 
4ths and a 5th) top five rankings for "A Dominant Hindu culture against 
military rule"; giving a ratio of 5.25/1. Hindu officers account for the 
remaining 15 (three Ists, two 2nds, three 3rds, five 4ths and two 5ths) 
top five rankings; or a ratio of 3.2/1.
* * From a follow-iç) interview with Admiral 58; Gurgoan, 28 August 1989.
** From an interview with ex-Principle Defence Secretary Dr. C4; New 
Delhi, 4 S^jtember 1989.
—241—
whatever the views of Hindu versus næ-Hindu officers as to the 
existence of a dociinant^ Hipdu culture in India and/or its role in 
helping to prevait a coup, there is no escaping the question of 
applicability. Ihat is, while respondents can point to the proliferation 
of ooL^ in Muslim countries to support the view that a national 
religion of Islam predisposes a state to military rule, they can offer 
only India as an exanple of a nation with a dominant Hindu culture. Ihat 
it has never experienced a cotp is neither here not there: if there was 
a military takeover in India, would respondents still view Hinduism as 
an anti-coup influence? If, instead of a strictly Hindu culture it is an 
"Indiamess"— created from the totality of the subcontinent's historical 
e>periences in which a multitude of often conpeting religions and 
cultures have contributed— which has helped prevent military rule, the 
Indian example is even more inapplicable to other countries.
III.B. Military Peference-Grcup Experiences
More easily comparable are the distinctly different referaice-groLp 
experiences of Indian and Pakistani armed forces' officers from 1947- 
1957/8. Remember Price's theory of military intervention: so powerful is 
the desire of Ihird World officers to retain all adjects of their 
prestigious Western acadesiy training that they develop a positive 
reference-grotp identification with the officer corps of the educating 
state, sometimes to the extait of becoming non-nationalistic— sharing 
the latter's dislike for politicians, especially anti-colonial leaders—  
and ncn-puritanical— demanding First World standards of compensation and 
social liberties. If such officers judge their country's new leadership
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and/or status in society as inferior to that previous to indépendance, 
they may forcibly overthrew the government/ *
Ihere was little danger of ind^)endent India's oonmissioned officers 
becoming non-nationalistic and/or non-puritanical. Àlthou^ they 
continued to be tau^it according to the ideal of a British officer and 
gentleman, since 1932 all Indian officers had received their 
professional academy training at the IMA. And, while a number of 
officers participated in UNO c^ )erations in Korea, Indo-Ctiina, Egypt and 
Lebanorf ® and/or enjoyed hi^ier command and technical training training 
courses in the UK, the vast majority had no opportunity to compare 
directly their resource allocation, corporate status and/or rewards with 
their foreign counterparts. With the exception of some Brindians, 
officers did not ape British military attitudes nor expect to receive 
Western rates-of-pay. (Even so, the Indian armed forces continued to 
receive a significant share of public esqjenditure: from 1950 to 1958, 
"defoxe as a percentage of current expenditure" only slowly declined 
frcmi 29% to 24.3%.)“  Ihe poor quality of Defence Ministers also helped 
ensure that the military's corporate qhere of decision-making was left 
(perhaps too) inviolate. Most importantly, most officers had long 
appreciated the ccmpetenoe of their political and administrative leaders 
and had had complete confidence in their preparedness for ind^ aendenoe.
“ Price, "A Iheoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States", pp. 
390-402. Note also that Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, 
members of the third coip prediction groip, argue that the "likelihood 
of domestic military intervention rises to the extent that external 
military assistance facilitates role esqansion and greater autonomy for 
the armed forces". See Welch and smith. Military Role and Rule, pp. 18- 
19.
“  See Evans, Ihiroayya of India, pp. 291-303; Longer, Red Coats to Olive 
Green, pp. 333-341; Praval, Indian Army After Independence, pp. 147-170; 
and Ihorat, c^.cit., pp. 124-163.
“  Kavic, op.cit., Appendix I.
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In oontrast, joining the US-sponsored Baÿidad Pact and South East 
Asia Tteaty Gtganization (SEAIO)^  ^ exposed Pakistan's "1950-1965 
generation"** of military officers to the full force of the American 
defoxje establishment. In addition to receiving a great quantity of 
equipment, the Pakistani armed forces revised their tables of 
organization to US suggestions, switched their subscriptions from UK 
military journals to American competitors, and even modified the strict 
traditions of the mess— crucial in forging tha professional qualities of 
a Briti^ officer and gentleman and regimental izzat— to accommodate 
American ways.** Most inportantly, Pakistan's 1950-1965 generation of 
officers underwait a considerable amount of prestigious professional 
training in the US.’® In the end, their reference-groip identification 
with the American armed forces combined with their role in US-led 
international alliances to give Pakistan's military officers the over­
confidence to think themselves capable of governing.’^
m.C. Initial Political Stability
*’ See Khan, op.cit., pp. 116, 154-158.
*• Oohen, Ihe Pakistan Army, p. 63.
** One Pakistani officer recalls how "Some of our messes, against clear 
Army orders, admitted ladies, perhaps imitating some aspects of the 
American Officers' clubs. From the introduction of ladies it was but a 
step to providing singing girls, presumably under the influence of some 
cultural move. Not very edifying for the \jp and coming young officer". 
See M. Attiqur Rahman, CXrr Defence Cause (London: White Lion, 1976), p. 
44 as used in Oohen, The Pakistan Army, p. 67. See also pp. 64, 68.
’® Cohen, The Pakistan Army, p. 64.
’ ^ For Cohen, the huge US presence compromised the "purely national 
image" of the Pakistani armed forces, and imbued officers who had no 
direct experience of the British-led Indian Arry with "an exaggerated 
view of the weakness of both India and the Indian military... [and] an 
overblown estimate of their own and Pakistan's martial qualities". 
Ultimately, continues Cohen, this exaggerated self-confidence led to 
"defeat" in the 1965 war with India and the creation of Bangladesh in 
1971. See ibid., pp. 63-64, 68.
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The first and seomd grotçs of military intervention theorists argue 
that the crucial determinant of an armed forces' cotç) is the quality, 
stability and popularity of a country's politiceil and administrative 
leadership during the turmoil of post-independenoe modernization. Other 
factors, including officers' perceptions of government attitudes towards 
the armed forces, a national religion's (im)probable prediF^osition to 
military rule, and officers' referenoe-group identification are unlikely 
to lead to a coup if a government is widely perceived as legitimate and 
effective. On this matter, the respective experiaices of Pakistan and 
India from 1947-1957/8 oould hardly have been more different.
In Pakistan, political inflating after the death of two outstanding 
leaders, Jimah and Liaquat Ali Khan, soon after Partition and the lack 
of a constitution led to chronic government instability. With the civil 
service increasingly politicized and the economy suffering, many people 
openly demanded intervention by the one remaining organization, the 
army, seen as enable of uniting the country. India, in contrast, 
mjoyed a surfeit of experienced politicians belonging to one party. 
Congress, which by 1958 had won two general elections under an 
established constitution.’ ' India also inherited experienced senior 
civil servants confidmt of their ability to administer an indqaendent 
nation. Most importantly, there was Nehru's towering authority.
The respective majorities of respondents on Table 6.1 who recall 
India's political and administrative leadership as having an 
"Antagcxiistic" and/or ”Ocnplacent” attitude towards the armed forces in 
the first decade of independence must be seen against their siçportive
’' See Bdwardes, fWiru. pp. 243-244 , 246-252 , 256-257 , 264; and Gopal, 
Jawaharlal N i^ru; A Biography Volume I. 1889-1947. p. 347.
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attitudes expressed for these two groups before and cn the verge of 
swaraj as shewn on l^ übles 3.6, 5.4 and 5.5. Officers' hic^ eoqsectaticns 
for independent India's civil-military relations had not been fulfilled. 
Yet neither had they deteriorated to the extent of overshadowing the 
deanonstrated ability, authority and popularity of India's civilian 
governing elite. Indian armed forces' officers had no opportunity to be 
pulled or to push themselves into power. The respondents acknowledge 
this; see Table 0.1 in which "Initial political stability, quality 
and/or democratic rule" and "Wisdom and stature of national leaders" are 
ranked as the third and ei^ith roost important factors, respectively, 
contributing to India never having had a military coup.
III.C.l. Questionnaire Respondents
Did India's civilian and military population recognize their 
government's ability to rule? See Thble 6.4-
TABLE 6.4
Did civilians/tailitary officers feel the Indian armed forces 
should follow the example of Ayub Khan's Revolution?
Civilians Military Officers
Percent(No.)
No 81.25 (78) 
Yes 15.63 (15) 
No Answer 3.13 (3)
92.71 (89) 
4.71 (4) 
3.13 (3)
Total 100.01 (96) 100.01 (96)
Large majorities (81.25% and 92.71%, respectively) of respondents 
recall "No" "Civilians" or "Military Officers" as desirous of 
replicating the 1958 Pakistan Revolution in India. Many praise the first 
Indian Indian Amy Chief for the country's safe civil sipremacy-of-rule.
Brigadier (Dr.) 55 epplains:
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The Indian Anny had a ve^ good leader in Field Marshal carie^ ipa 
who dnnnaed into all officers day in and day out that our job is 
to protect the country, obey the government and protect the 
peculation from strife. Every officer had to carry these 
coranandmaTts in his pocket— [in] a small book.
India's officers, argues Lieut.-General 49, had both "respect for our
political leadership at that time...[and] a clear knowledge of our own
inc^jability of running things other than the military"
The small minority (15.00%) of "Yes" respondents recall "Civilians"
discussing the attraction of the Pakistan Revolution. "One often heard
it said at social gatherings 'Why don't you military inai copy Pakistan
and throw out these political ninoonpoops'", recalls Lieut.-General 4.
Lieut.-Generals 56 and 95 point to the business oomunity as the one
segment of civilian society "viewing a military takeover as being
beneficial". Major-General 96 remembers that "such talk was from sources
vhich.. .wanted to gain power themselves, like the l.B. [Intelligence
Bureau; see Chapter Ei^ xt]".
Just four (4.17%) respondents answer "Yes", "Military Officers" did
discuss following Ayub's example. Brigadier 70 remembers some "vague
conversations among people both military and civil". Major-General 72
protests that this was only an "academic discussion amongst the
military". Brigadier 73 disagrees: "Ayub Khan's action was favoured by a
large portion of the amy officers. 1 should say it [this view] was held
fairly strcxigly". Lieut.-Colonel 81 goes further: "We could have done
better with a form of military dictatorship for seme time. We would be a
better country". Officer 81 retired a Lieut.-Colonel.
OOTClusicn
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Fears that the poor state of Indian civil-military relations in the 
first decade of indepaidenoe mic^ lead officers to copy the 1958 
Revolution of their Pakistan neighbours proved unfounded. For, vAile 
Ndiru disdained the military as almost irrelevant to his government's 
policies for domestic and international conflict resolution, he 
continued to respect the armed forces' corporate i^tere of decision­
making and adequately reward its personnel. For Vice AAniral 103,
Any anger towards politicians was always of an indirect nature 
in that officers felt they had more time for the bureaucrats 
than the military. Ihe military was liçset with Warrant of 
Precedence and the open humiliation, unconcealed arrogance of 
the IAS regarding the military. But this is insufficient 
motivation for a coup. One wants to change the [Defence] 
Minister, not the system. [My Italics.]’*
Moreover, argues Major-General 74, officers understood the reasons
b^iind vAat they perceived to be the neglect of the armed farces: "the
priorities of [the political] leaders were consolidation, development in
core sectors and [the] creation of industrial base, rural development
and [a] reduction in disparities". Although "there was some grousing
about pay and allowances being lowered", recalls Major-General 105, "a
good soldier always grouses".’*
Indeed, the "Antagonistic"/**OcnplaceTt" relations between military
officers and senior bureaucrats described in Table 6.1 may have helped
ensure civil siçreraacy-of-rule in India. Dowse argues that a developing
country's military officers and "bureaucratized [sic] middle class"
share "primary socialization and educational patterns... [and] structural
positions.. .vis-a-vis the politicians". As "alternative elites" with "a
’ * 109 From an interview with Vice Admiral 103; New Delhi 18 September 
1987.
’* From an interview with Major-General 105; New Delhi, 12 September 
1987.
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firm interest in ordered modernization and économie growth”, one or both
of these two grxx^ "oust" assume leadership responsibility if the
political elite fails to deliver national "growth, unity, stability,
etc." Since the military do not have the ruobers nor expertise to
administer the complex state machinery and civilians cannot physically
overthrow a regime, continues Dowse, the most effective instruments for
replacing regimes are "mi 1 itary-bureaucratic coalitions".^*
While India's military officers and senior civil servants shared a
socioeconomic background of privilege and their re^aective organizations
a history of elitism, their hostile relationship in the first decade of
ind^aendæce precluded developing a coalition against their political
masters. "In British times", recalls Lieut.-General 101,
the military enjoyed a ^ ecial place where even a jawan's needs 
would be seal to by civil servants. Tbday the civil servants 
couldn't care less. Civil servants never liked the military 
because previously they were overawed by Idle military. Now they 
wanted to put the military in its place. After independence the 
IAS thouÿit that if they could gain the backing of the 
politicians against the military tdiey could completely command 
the country.^ *
So, whereas Dowse argues that the military-bureaucratic coalition most 
effective for ousting a regime is fostered by its two elements sharing a 
similar position vis-a-vis the politicians,’ ’ Lieut.-General 101 points 
out that in India, "the situation is civil servants and politicians 
versus the military. Contrast this with Pakistan where it is the civil 
servants and military versus the politicians".’*
’* Not that officers and bureaucrats "plot cou^ with one another, [and] 
carry them out", writes Dowse, for the "need for secrecy would preclude 
such an arrangement". See Dowse, "Ihe Military and Political 
Develc^ iaent", pp. 228-232.
’* From an interview with Lieut.-General 101; New Delhi, 18 August 1989: 
”  Dowse, op.cit., pp. 229, 231.
’“ From an interview with Lieut.-General 101; New Delhi, 18 August 1989. 
After assuming power in Pakistan, Ayub Khan found cooperative partners:
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After Partition, India and Pakistan developed in different ways. 
Contrasting religious predispositions to military rule, referenœ-grtxç) 
identification ejçerienoes and initial political stability 
differentiated and distanced Indian officers from their fanner comrades 
in the British-led Indian military who seized the reins of government in 
Pakistan. Ihe respondents' low, 14th place ranking in TstHe 0.1 of the 
"Exanple of ineffectiveness of military rule in Pakistan and Bangladesh” 
among factors contributing to India never having had a military cotç) 
shows their unwillingness to relate neighbouring countries' respective 
experiences to their own. In 1958, concludes Air Marshal 5, "only a few 
nutters”,’* civilian or military, suggested that Indian armed forces' 
officers copy Pakistan's Revolution.
The basic structure of the civil administration was sound: all 
that it needed was a sense of confidence and freedom to operate 
without having to worry about extraneous considerations. The 
civil institutions re^xnded to the situation admirably and 
started functioning efficiently and ind^iendently %dthin a very 
short time.
Nonetheless, some scholars, like V. Kukreja, maintain there was in India
no necessity of the kind of "alliance” betweai the politicians 
and civil service against the military (which had hardly any 
military organization to speak [of] at the time of ind )^endgioe) 
nor was here any such thing. Ihere was the more or less natural 
order of institutionalization that develc^ sed under Ndiru under 
very favourable circumstances especially in comparison with 
Pakistan.
See Khan, op.cit., p. 78; and V. Kukreja, ”Civilian Oontrol of the 
Military in India", The Indian Journal of Political Science 50:4 
October-December 1989, pp. 491-492.
’* Fxxm a follow-up interview with Air Marshal 5; New Delhi, 17 August 
1989.
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ŒAPIBt 7 
Test Pour: Tüe Menon-Kaul Nexus
Introduction
Ihe time of greatest civil-military conflict in India began in the 
late 1950s with the rise of Krishna Hsnon and Lieut.-General B.M. Kaul 
to the tc^ rank of the defence establishment. As defence mi nigt^r and 
chief of the general staff, both used their close personal relationship 
with Hi N^mi to vaunt over established civil-military procedure, 
playing favourites and upsetting colleagues to the point of being 
charged with politicising the armed forces. A Menon-Kaul nexus appeared 
to split the officer corps into pro- and anti-Menon-Kaul factions. Was 
there a danger of either bloc intervening against tiie civilian 
government to aisure the furtherance of their own respective interests?
I. f^enon
I.A. A New Beginning?
After a decade of governmental neglect of the armed forces, India's 
saiior military officers, the farmer KdOs,^ warmly welcomed the almost 
simultaneous appointments of V.K. Krishna Menon (haxjeforth cited by 
surname only) and General Diimayya as defence minister and Indian Army
 ^ Vfliile KdOs, lOOs and Indian BCXfe had been re-designated as "officers" 
after independence, "KdOs" will continue to be used below vhen 
referring to those ei^rt illustrious Sandhurst graduates described above 
and, as a section heading, will include the written (auto)biographical 
accounts of pre-WWII-oconissioned officers from all three armed forces 
who rose to senior military posts.
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Chief, respectively, in the l^ing of 1957.* Menon, hi^ily intelligent,
eloquent, admired for his London-based efforts in pursuance of swaraj,
service as India's first Hi^ Oomnissioner to the UK, and defence of
Indian interests as head of the country's UN mission, was also known to
be an influential confidant of Nehru.* As such, writes Lieuk.-General
Kasul, the new CM "could be described as universally popular in the
Services when he first came".* Ihiinayya, too, writes Major-General
Palit, was "a pc^ular general. Open, outgoing and with a glowing
operational record, he had during his career gsdned the loyalty and
affection of the officer cadre as no other Indian officer before or
after him".' With Menon and Ihimayya at the top of the India's defence
hierarchy, esqiectation were great and, recalls (then Major-General)
C h ie f o f  th e  G e n e ra l S ta f f  (CGS) L ie u t.-G e n e ra l V e rm ,
During the first few months of the regime, it appeared that 
cocperaticn between Army Headquarters and the ministry of 
defence would be really effective, and an atmosphere of mutual 
confidence would be created by the new CM...
Ihe CM started off by being very pleasant and friendly with 
most of the senior officers, which was reciprocated by the 
officers concerned. Tinny and I were given ^ lecial attention in 
this "wooing".'
* Menon was appointed defence minister on 4 ^ pril 1957 and Ihimayya 
became amy chief one month later. See Oouncil of Ministers. 1947-1984; 
and N. Maxwell, India's China War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970), p. 
189.
* See T.J.S. George, Krishna Menon; A Biography (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1964), pp. 19, 31-35, 46-47, 51-57, 67-93, 90-91, 94-97, 102-107, 120- 
132, 148-151, 162-165, 167-199, 212-218; and Vira Memories of a Civil 
Servant, pp. 61-63.
* Kaul, Ihe lAitold Story, p. 215. See also Longer, Ihe Defence and 
Foreign Policies of India, p. 81; Nbxwell, op.cit. ; and Praval, Indian 
Army After Independæoe. pp. 218-220.
' Palit, war in High Himalaya, p. 72. (NOTE: Althou^ an 100, Palit's 
relative seniority and familiarity with the principle characters of 
India's civil-military hierarchy during this period qualify him for 
inclusion in this and subsequent **KCIO" sections. ) See also Evans, 
Ihimayya of India, pp. 190-228; Longer, Red Coats to Olive Green, p. 
235; and Ihorat, From Reveille to Retreat, pp. 49-51, 53-80, 175.
* Verma, To Serve with Honour, p. 100. See also Ihorat, op.cit., p. 175.
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When, in 1958, Achiral R.D. Katari and Air Marshal S. Mokherji joined 
Ihimayya as heads of the IN and lAF, respectively, Indians comnanded all 
three services for the first time. Katari describes his two peers as 
"both fine, upri^it men and good friends of mine and I could not have 
wid^ed for more congenial team-mates.. .the degree of imtuaT respect and 
harmony we developed would have been difficult to repeat".^  India's 
defence establishment seemed poised to begin a new and fruitful era.
I.A.l. Questionnaire Respondents
Ihe Indian military's more junior officers, as represented by the 
questionnaire re^xndents, diqday a somewhat cooler attitude to Maion's 
appointment. See Ihble 7.1. (Views on Menon s tenure as CM are examined 
in a separate section below.)
TABIZ 7.1
What were your initial feelings on Menon s appointment 
as Defence Minister?
Percent(No.)
Positive 39.58 (38)
Mixed 38.54 (37)
Negative 12.50 (12)
No Answer 9.38 (9)
Total 100.00 (96)
A small minority (12.50%) of respondents had a "Negative" opinion of 
Menon becoming EM, mainly because of his reputation. Lieut.-General 56 
doesn't "recall having any [feelings] in particular, except insofar as I 
despise cheek and arrogance. We had been hearing and seeing him (in news 
films) boring the UN General Assembly (and his own delegation) to tears 
on the Kashmir issue, and lying to boot". Menon's "arrogance was a well
’ Katari, A Sailor Remembers, p. 92.
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known trait", agrees Brigadier 43, "and no cne in the country was happy 
with his appointment".
IVjo-fifths (38.54%) of re^xndents had a "Mixed", or mainly 
disinterested, re^xnse to the new EM. "We were never concerned as to 
who hecame the Defence Minister", esg)lains Major-General 20; "it is up 
to the Prime Minister to choose". "One politician %*as as good or bad the 
other", grumbles Brigadier 44.
Another two-fifths (39.58%) of re^cndents had a "Positive" re^xxise 
to Msnon's appointment. Vice Admiral 6 recalls "jubilation", while 
Major-General 96 saw Menon as "a vast improvement over superannuated 
politicians like Katju". Brigadier 61 favoured Msnon^s "reputation as a 
go-getter... [who would] get things done for the defence services".
"Above all", writes Brigadier 63, "he enjoyed the confidence of the IM" 
and therefore, adds Major-General 72, "We felt that he would be able to 
help the army in gaining status, social respect and better equipnsnt".
Ihe respondents share their seniors' hi^ opinion of Ihimayya. He 
was, says Major-General 97, "very well respected, hi^ily competent, a 
fine diplomat".* For Lieut.-General 10, Ihimayya was "undoubtedly one of 
the Indian Army's best field commanders. I have a great reflect for his 
professionalism and dynamic qualities as a leader of men. His becomxing 
the Chief added lustre to the office rather than the other way around".* 
"I think the army as a vhole hero-^ jorshipped Ihimayya", adds Lieut.- 
General 17. He also recalls how, as chief-designate, "Ihimayya spoke to 
us [Indian Amy personnel] at Dehradun in 1956 and said that he was 
going to improve the lot of the common soldier and officer. [He said, ]
• From an interview with MajorKSeneral 97; New Delhi, 15 September 1989.
* Fromi a follow-njp interview with Lieut.-General 10; Patna, 29 September 
1989.
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"In ny left pocket I have ny letter of confinnation, in ny right my 
letter of resignation".^® Increasing civil-military tensions eventually 
forced Ihimayya to use the letter in his ri^it-hand pooket.
l.B. As Defence Minister
Ihe Indian armed forces aooonplished some notable achievemaits under 
Menon. Abroad, military personnel were d^loyed in peacekeeping missions 
in Ldcanon, Laos, the Oongo and Gciza.^  ^At heme, the armed forces 
forcibly liberated Goa, Daman and Diu, Portugal's remaining colonies on 
the subcontinent, in ^ Operation Vi jay".Menon himself also carried out 
a nunber of important military reforms, most notably in the field of 
indigenous defence production.^ '
While Menon's successes as EH may be traced to his forceful 
personality and fierce concentration on the problem at hand, his working 
habits did not always impress civil service colleagues, ttiile "a very 
well-intentioned person.. .reqxnsible for the great achievement of 
starting vp [a] sound base of indigenous military production", recalls 
Ek-Defence Secretary Mr. C5, Menon was also "brash, inpatient; [he] 
wanted quick results... [and therefore] rubbed people the wrong way".^  *
From a follow-tp interview with Lieut.-General 17; London, 26 
November 1987.
“  See Longer, op.cit., pp. 358-360; and Praval, op.cit., p. 170-182. 
“  See P.D. Gaitonde, ihm T.ibpration of Goa; A Participant's View of 
History (Londc^ : C. Hurst & Company, 1987); George, op.cit., pp. 231- 
232; Longer, op.cit., pp. 361-362; Palit, op.cit., pp. 119-121, 132, 
135; Praval, cp.cit., pp. 236-236; and Rao, India's Defence Policy and 
Organisation Since Ind^JOTdmce. p. 44.
 ^' See George, op.cit., pp. 222-223; Rao, op.cit., pp. 34-35; R. 
Venkataraman, "Krishna Menon: Architect of India's defence 
modernization". Link (New Delhi) 34:42 31 May 1992; and Vehkateswaran, 
Defence Organisation in India, pp. 279-310.
 ^* From an interview with ex-Defenoe Secretary Mr. C5; New Delhi, 14 
August 1989.
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Ex-ICS officer Charma Vira agrees Menon was both **a man with a sharp
intellect who could speak well and work hard" and one who "had a
tremendous ego and an inflated notion about himself.. .In his view one
who did not agree with him was either a fool or a knave".^  ® In the end,
continues Vira, Msncn's personal mdaiess "succeeded in
neutralizing...[any] advantage [of his innate brilliance]".^ *
KdCs amplify the above senior civil servants' opinions— positive
and negative— of Menon. Cn one hand, writes Air Chief Marshal P.O. Lai,
the EM "was dynamic...a visionary"^’ and, adds Katari, "some of his
programmes were to result in lasting good to the country".^ • Cn the
other hand, recalls Palit, Menon "had no previous ministerial or
administrative experience and found it necessary to disguise this
deficiaicy by affecting a perpetual sneer at officialdom".^ * Ihe EM,
continues Lai, had a "vitriolic, acerbic, unnecessarily devastating
tongue and tenper".** Menon, adds Katari, vias
a very intelligent man with a sharp mind a prodigious memory... 
[but] also had in abundant measure other traits that go with 
hi^ intellect— supreme arrogance... [and] ill-ooncealed 
impatience with those less endowed.. .at the human, personal 
level, I felt that he was something of a bully who took pleasure 
in harassing those who were pr^aared to take it lying down.*^
Débité his notable achievemaits, Menon's arrogance and onerous working
methods doomed India's armed forces to what Verma dubs "Menonitis"."
I.B.l. Questicmaire Respondents
Vira, op.cit., p. 82. See also pp. 55-58; Katari, op.cit., p. 99; and 
Verma, op.cit., p. 108.
Vira, cp.cit., p. 82. See also Venkataraman, op.cit., p. 15.
Lai, My Years with the lAF, p. 84.
' Katari, cp>.cit., p. 100.
Palit, <^.cit., p. 72.
Lai, op.cit., p. 75.
Katari, op.cit., pp. 97, 99. See also Verma, op.cit., pp. 107-108.
1 9 
3 0 
3 1
” Verma, cp.cit., p. 97.
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with less opportunity to work closely with Menon, it is not
surprising that the relatively junior respondents' additional cooments
made on their respective answers to l^ble 7.1 show them more impressed
with Menon's push for indigenous defence production than concerned with
his arrogant, off-hand manner. While some, like Lieut.-Ceneral 95,
recall "hearing of Menon's autocratic ways", most others offering any
comment on Maion agree with Major-General 36 that he was "a go-getter
and dynamic Defence Minister". For Brigadier 90,
Menon produced results and therefore no one was interested in 
whose protege he was. He gave the services a degree of 
respectability and say and we had a ^ litical figure who was 
prepared to stand ip) for us whether his political contemporaries 
liked it or not. He clearly showed a straightforwardness in 
Defence Production and [the] need for being self-sufficient in 
military hardware.
Menon, concludes Major-General 74, was "a genius in his own ri^ht who
was instrumental in creating defence R&D to be self-reliant".
The three respondents who r^xxrt working with Hsnon at close hand
offer divergent opinions of the CM. Lieut.-General 16
was serving in the military wing of the cabinet secretariat and 
came into feuLrly close oontact with him [Menon]. Initially 
he electrified the MoD. It soon became apparent that he was bad 
at conducting conference; inpatient, bad tempered. He would call 
conferences without agenda or adequate preparation. He could not 
run a happy team or carry people with him.
In contrast, Major-General 33 "attended the first defence production
conference.. .Menon made a lasting impression on me %dth his very strong
plea for indigenising the defence production base". As Director R&D
(Engineering), Brigadier 76 "worked very closely with him...[Menon was]
a brilliant man, whose major oOTtribution was setting up the indigenous
manufacture of military hardware and defence R&D".
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The above oomoents do not necessarily mean that the aimed forces' 
more junior officers had a more charitable view of Menon than KdOs. 
unsolicited views always tend to favour the subject specially if, as 
with Menon, conventional opinion is negative, and all of the above 
respondents who praise his work belong to the "Positive" group on Thhle 
7.1. Thus, some of the above six "Positive” officers may be seeking to 
defend their initial view of Menon by concentrating on his programme of 
indigenous defence production. In contrast, no respondent having a 
"Mixed” or "Negative” (pinion of Menon's appointment on Table 7.1 goes 
on to compliment his efforts as EM. In the end, the respondents' 
unsolicited praise of Menon s performanœ as CM must be heavily 
discounted in the face of the sharply negative opinions of those RdOs 
who dealt daily with the man.
II. Kaul
II.A. Rise Up the Ranks
Like Menon, Kaul had cultured N^iru's imagination, standing out from 
his peers in several ways. For one, Kaul engaged in nationalist acts 
while a youth and, contrary to all tenets of military professional ism, 
had ccntinued such actions after being commissioned into the arny.^ ^
' ^ Diring the hei^t of the Quit India movement, he met Valsa Mathai, a 
19-year old "revolutionary leader", who
dared me to address a students' anti-British rally which I did 
and at viiioh I spoke on the need of youngmen [sic] cxming 
forward to join the war effort and its significance in the 
future free India.. .1 expressed many nationalist sentiments 
publicly which amounted to 'sedition' from the British point of 
viaf.
After his (British) CD failed to punish him for speaking out, Kaul
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Kaul's charitable attitude tcwards the Indian national armies' 
personnel, and his ocnfidenoe in the army's ability to cvezxxxae the 
conmissioned officer shortfall at independence further pleased the PM.’ * 
Ihat Kaul, like Nehru, was a Kashmiri Brahmin, a small and readily 
identifiable community much in evidence in independait India's foreign 
service and higher administration, also did him no harm.’ * Kaul soon 
became Nehru's advisor/confidant during his rapid rise in the army,’* 
impressing the PM during his various official stints as military attaché 
in Washington, military advisor to India's delegation to the UN Security 
Oouncil, commander of the J&K militia, chief of staff to Neutral Nations 
Pkpatriation Commission (NNRC) Chadrman (then Lieut.-General) Ihimayya, 
Uttar Ptadesh Area Ocnmander, quartermaster-general (CHS), and CGS, and 
his unofficial duties as the PM's trcchleshooter in J&K and «rmotimA 
factotum. Kaul also caught Nehru's eye vhen as ocnmander of 11th 
Infantry Brigade 00 and then of 4th Infantry Division he twice led his 
men in constructing much needed military housing and, at the request of
continued his nationalist activities "in the underground moveroart and 
thorou^ily enjoyed the experience". He again breeched military 
discipline during the Red Port Ihree courts-martial by acceding to chief 
defence counsel Bhulabhbhai Desai's request to procure "a document, in 
possession of the British Intelligence authorities, which could prove 
valuable to the defence of these men". Kaul also helped Colonel M.S. 
Himmatsinhji, a nominated military r^aresartative of the Legislative 
Assembly, to draft a speech defending the Indian national armies. See 
Chapter Four; and Kaul, op.cit., pp. 9-11, 62, 70-71, 74-75.
ibid., pp. 71, 74, 81.
See Khera, India's Defence P>roblem. p. 220; and Maxwell, op.cit., p. 
187.
’* Unless otherwise noted, the following details of Kaul's military 
career are taken from W. Hangen, After Nehru. Who? (London: Rupert Hart- 
Davis, 1963), pp. 251-255; Maxwell, op.cit., pp. 186-189; Kaul, op.cit., 
pp. 87, 95, 97-98, 104-120, 122-124, 133-135, 140-153, 169, 175, 182- 
191, 196; and Khera, op.cit., pp. 223-224.
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Menon, oversaw the building of the Defenoe Pavilion of the India
Ebdiihition in Delhi, a project inaugurated by Nehm.*’
With Nehru's "patronage", Kaul appeared headed for the top. An
editorial in the Bombay Current stated:
If Nehru ever felt inclined to name a suooessor to to himself, 
it is even possible that discarding all the old and known 
Congress t^pes, he would not be adverse to making so unarthodoK 
a choice as General Kaul.. .Kaul is the man to watch. He will not 
only become the Chief of the Army Staff; he may one day even 
become Prime Minister of India.^ *
Kaul was also included by Welles Hangen in his book. After Nehru. Who?.
as the only non-civilian among the nine people (including Indira Gandhi
and eventual N^iru suooessor Lai Bahadur Shastri) he tipped as
favourites to replace Nehru.' * How high would Kaul rise?
II.A.l. KdOs
Like Menon, Kaul had his strong points. PEdit was
much attracted by his ebulliait, outgoing personality. Often 
irpulsive and ixipredictable, he nevertheless.. .was tolerant, not 
suspicious, of a subordinate with professional curiosity and 
intellectual pursuits. • .he was professionally competent, 
resourceful and innovative.*®
Lieut.-General Ihorat agrees Kaul "was above average in intelligence and
had immense drive. He was a tireless worker and a good qieaker though
given to unnecessary dramatisation".**
Yet any number of factors combined to convince his colleagues that
Kaul lacked the "ri^t stuff" for hi^ cocmand. Ikilike the majority of
his KdO peers, he was not from a princely, privileged or martial
Kaul, c^.cit., pp. 123-124, 187, pp. 190-191.
Ihe editorial is dated 7 October 1961. As used in Kaul, op.cit., pp. 
285-286. See also Maxwell, c^ .cit., pp. 196-197.
Hangen, op.cit.
*® Palit, op.cit., pp. 71, 76.
* * Ihorat, op.cit., p. 177. See also Palit, op.cit., p. 76.
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family, nor did he play polo, hunt, smoke or drink alochol.’  ^Kaul's
passion for swaraj politics was also unusual for a *^ gentleman and
officer”, and Neville Maxwell describes him as ”a nationalist in a way
that set him quite apart from his Indian fellow-officers of similar
Sandhurst background, who were only patriots”/' Perhaps— but, as
described above, Raul's nationalist fervour led him to break his
professional code of non-involvement in politics, behaviour abhorrent to
his fellow KdOs/ *
Even after ind^)@Tdenoe, Kaul's politics set him apart from his
peers. In Korea, recalls NNRC Custodian Ftroe of Tndia (CFI) GoC Ihorat,
Kaul "emerged as an ardent admirer of mwrnnigm and seriously
embarrassed Tinny [Ihimayya] and me by his partiality towards the
communist prisoners".'' Ihimayya adds that when Kaul returned from an
official visit to China towards the end of his NNRC posting
singing their praises. • .1 sacked him. He offered me his 
resignation. I refused and urged him to take long leave in 
India. We were all under pretty heavy strain in those days.
Ihe other officers though I was a fool not to have accepted 
Kaul's resignation. Now I'm inclined to think they were right.'*
Kaul himself records both positive and negative impressions of China in
his autobiogr^hy but omits any offer to resign.' ’
His colleagues also disliked Kaul's ready access to NAru and the
building projects which cau^it the FM's eye. While the former initially
" See Evans, op.cit., pp. 19-22, 306-307; Hangen, op.cit., p. 244; and 
Kaul, op.cit., pp. 3-8, 14-16, 20, 36-37; Ihorat, op.cit., pp. 104-107, 
169-172; and Verma, op.cit., pp. 18-21.
Maxwell, op.cit., p. 187. See also Kaul, c^.cit., pp. 41, 82.
Ihorat, op.cit., p. 177.
Ihorat, op.cit., p. 177. See also pp. 131, 155, 160; Kaul, op.cit., 
pp. 157-160; Longer, op.cit., p. 337; and Praval, op.cit., pp. 160-161. 
As used in Hangen, op.cit., p. 254.
Kaul, op.cit., pp. 154-157, 159-160.
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3 3 
3 4
3 5
3 6 
3 7
might be dismissed as mere jealcxjsy,’* Nehru's willingness to see Raul
outside of normal civil-military channels would have grave implications
for the defenoe of India's northern borders. Similarly, ^Aile the latter
work may have been imperative, Kaul's seniors saw using troops for
construction as detracting from the military's effectiveness in its
primary role of defenoe of the nation.' * When Kaul went ahead with his
projects, he found himself the butt of a i^ de-j^ aread and hurtful—
personally and professionally— caricature of him as a "houseHDuilder" .* ®
Most damaging in his colleagues' eyes was Kaul's lack of combat
experience. After graduating from Sandhurst and serving a mandatory year
with a British Army regiment in India, Raul was accepted into a
prestigious Indian Amy infantry unit. Altirxigh "anxious to remain in
the Rajputana Rifles in which I was not doing too badly", he then
rec^ jested a transfer into the Service Corps because its higgler salary
%dould enable him to service dd^ts incurred by his "constantly ill"* ‘
mother. Ihorat picks \jp the story:
Cn the outbreak of World War U  he [Kaul] asked my advice as 
what he should do. Naturally I told him to seek posting to a 
unit which was likely to proceed overseas on active service. To 
my utter surprise he argued that his talents would be far better 
utilised in the Publie Relations set-tp which he had decided to 
join.. .he certainly saved himself from being eoposed to to the 
dangers and discomforts of war. Keul was one of the few officers 
of his time who never served with combat troops in the field,
[My italics.]*'
3 9
4 0
* See Kaul, op.cit., pp. 70-74, 83-84, 95, 97, 140-147, 194, 219, 315; 
Khera, op.cit., p. 221; and Verma, op.cit., pp. 101-102.
See Kaul, op.cit., pp. 182-184; and Verma, op.cit., pp. 102-103.
See Hangen, op.cit., p. 257; and Kaul, op.cit., pp. 123, 191-196, 
201.
*' Kaul, op.cit., pp. 50-51.
*' Ihorat, c^.cit., p. 176. See also Kaul, op.cit., p. 63; and Verma, 
op.cit., p. 101.
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ïhis lack of acrobat experience was remarkable given the Indian Amy's 
huge wartime esçansicn. Either the infantry judged Kaul inc^ahle of 
fighting duties or he shied away from live action or both.* ' Althou^ he 
returned to a fighting unit in 1948 as llth Infantry Brigade Ocnmander 
and went on to lead the 4th Infantry Division, Kaul was never able to 
live down his lack of ccnbat esgierienoe.* *
II.A.2. Questionnaire Re^xxidents
Did the relatively junior questionnaire respondaits share their 
si^ eriors' negative impression of Kaul? See "DAle 7.2. Ihe following 
ccnments are limited to Kaul's qualities as an officer. Responses which 
touch on other aspects of his career are examined in separate sections.
TABLE 7.2
Vhat was your opinion of Lieut.-General Kaul before the Autumn of 1962?
Percent(No.)
Ifegative 69.79 (67)
Mixed 12.50 (12)
Positive 8.33 (8)
No Answer 9.38 (9)
Total 100.00 (96)
A small minority (8.33%) of respondents had a "Positive" opinion of 
Kaul before Autumn 1962. For ïfejor-General 96, he was "one of the most 
dynamic senior officers I have ever seen. Lieut.-General 95 describes 
Kaul as a "bundle of aiergy... dynamic".*® Brigadier 28, Kaul's PSO "in 
a particular appointment when he was Major General", describes him as "a
*^  Kaul states his "r^aeated requests for a transfer back to the 
Infantry" were always refused. See Kaul, op.cit., pp. 68-70, 87.
** See Palit, op.cit., p. 76; and Verma, op.cit., p. 121.
* ® Ran a fcllcw-ip ihbarvdew with Iia±.-Gaaal 95; New Delhi, 13 apbaiter 1989.
-264-
brilliant staff officer particularly in the logistics field.. .He was a 
real 'go getter'".
Ihe tenth (12.50%) of respondents who had a "Mixed" reaction to Kaul
express some doi±ts about his professional abilities. Lieut.-General 93
"wcxrked very closely with Gen. Kaul as GSO [General Staff Officer] 1
vhen he was GoC 4th Ind Div... [Àlthou^] he had many good
qualities.. .tactically he was weak". While "an intelligent and capable
soldier", agrees Air Chief Marshal 18, Kaul "could not be considered an
elite strategist". Lieut.-Gæeral 94 describes Kaul as
a very intelligent and hard-working officer. He was hi^ily 
anbitious. He did not enjoy a good r^utation as a combat 
officer. To overcome this difficulty he made full use of his 
relationship with Nehru.. .He was a good peace time officer who 
could not bear the strain of battle.
Yet, if "Kaul was never an outstanding field oonmander", writes
Brigadier 64, "he was.. .dynamic in many other fields".
Ihe two-thirds (69.79%) majority of respondents who recall a 
"Negative" opinion of Kaul's career pre-Autunn 1962 beg to differ.
Lieut.-General 10, one of his staff officers, describes Kaul as 
"essentially a political being who %was highly ambitious and tried to 
e)q)loit his Kashmiri connections". Major-Gaieral 85 recalls how "Kaul's 
r^Mtation was destroyed vhen he turned soldiers into masons" for 
Project Araar".*‘ Kaul's lack of combat experience is particularly 
resorted. "Kaul", adds Major-General 96, "did not have much of an army 
career to speak of. He had passed the war in Public Relaticsrs and then 
as a Service Corps officer. No ri^rt-thinking soldier took his 
pretensions to gaieralship seriously". Lieut.-General 49 concurs;
From a follcw-iç) interview with Major-General 85; New Delhi, 16 
August 1989.
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As a soldier Kaul vras all theory and no practical grasp... [he] 
had an inflated ego which blocked his mind to learning even the 
easiest experiences of combat.. .He would have served India best 
as a Minister with drive and energy— not as an army ocranander at 
any level (not even a platoon).
All in all, Kaul generated a remarkable amount of contempt from his
comrades in all three defaioe service. Par Air Chief Marshad 12, he was
”a totally self-centred officer with no professionalism or real
patriotism", for Vice Admiral 2 "a strutting egoist", and for Brigadier
69, a "piss-poor officer.. .vho never heard a shot fired in anger".
Lieut.-General 4, a battalion oonmander in Kaul's division, "knew him to
be a hoax and a bully long before 1962...[he was] just bloocfy
mad...insane".*’ "Ihere is hardly any officer in the amy who did not
have contempt for this man", concludes Brigadier 76,
Having had far more opportunity to work viitti and/or observe Kaul
than Menon, the respondents' overall opinion of the former is much
closer to that of the RdOs than of the latter. Both sets of officers
think Raul used his Kashmiri background to ingratiate himself with
Nehru, both ridicule his house-building e&ctivities, and both are
appalled that he could rise so high without any combat eaqperienoe. Are
these criticisms fair? Could Kaul's rapid rise be due to his
acknowledged administrative drive, or was it attributable to political
favouritism?
Ill. Politicization?
Ill .A. KCIOs
From a follow-ip interview with Lieut.-General 4; Pune, 12 October 
1987.
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For the KCIOs, Menonitis went beyond the CM's rudeness to his
colleagues to include a disregard for professional advice and a
deliberate manipulation of the civil-military decision-making hierarcdiy.
VAen Msnon, writes Ihorat, "discovered that Timy [Ihimayya] was not as
pliant a Chief as he would have liked him to be.. • [he] started to bypass
him and began to deal directly with his SLhordinate officers".* • Any
officer daring to disagree with Maion, adds Verma,
was branded an obstructionist or [one] not having an opinion of 
his own...In the absence of the Chief, he wanted me to ohange a 
policy, and when I S c d d  I would have to discuss it with the 
Chief first, he shouted, "Haven't you got an opinion of your 
own?" I said that I had, but in the amy we did not work the way 
he wanted us to. We did not try to stab our colleagues in the 
back. I %#as never forgiven for that...**
In an attempt, write Palit and Air Chief Marshal Lai, reflectively, "to
dominate 'tiie military bureaucracy by trying to make dent in the
solidarity of its senior ranks"** Menon "encouraged officers whom he
liked to be in direct contact with him, ignoring the Chiefs, and that is
not only unethical but a foolproof method of undermining [military]
discipline".*^  Ihe EM began favouring officers who agreed with him,
regardless of rank and/or capabilities, continues Verma:
Before long.. .it became generally known that the EM expected 
loyalty to his person even at the expense of the service and the 
individual's superior service officers. He started by making 
subtle promises, hinting at better future prospects to certain 
officers in reward for doing his bidding. Hiis wocbis operajndl 
was extended equally to the navy and air force as well.
He would seand for a junior officer and question him with 
regard to the advice givai to him (EM) by the individual's 
superiors. He would get the junior officer to agree with his own 
views and thereby create a feeling of disloyalty among junior 
officers to their superiors...
*• Ihorat, op.cit., p. 176.
* * Verma, cp.cit., p. 101.
*“ Palit, op.cit., p. 72.
Lai, op.cit., p. 85.
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He was thus able to locate officers viio vrould play ball with 
him and give him the answer he wanted. [Ity indents. ]® '
No officer was more willing to "play ball" with Menon than Kaul who,
writes Palit, "emotional, insecure and ambitious— fell for his
blandishments"' Kaul, ekdds Verma, was used by the EM "as a quisling
amongst senior officers to accomplish his own designs".'*
lU.B.l. Sipersessicn, Resignation, and Witch-hunts
For many, the proof of Kaul's undue influence in the armed forces 
came with his controversial May 1959 ^ pointment to (JC, ^ parently over 
the heads of two more highly recornmended officers." While those ri^it- 
wing politicians who had been seeking to lessen Menon's influence on 
Nehru and on the armed forces now targeted Kaul, senior RdOs worried 
that the new would use his seat on the army Selection Board to 
hasten the rise of his followers diAbed "Kaul-boys"." One so accused 
was (then Brigadier) Palit who served under Raul in 4th infantry 
Division and then was appointed by him as EM9 when the latter became OGS 
(see below and Chapter Ei^ht). Diis promotion, writes Palit, was débité 
"at least two senior brigadiers openly aspiring to this most coveted of 
cppoint3nents...[and myself being] by formal standards...one of the least 
qualified among my contea^ poraries..."*’ He does not, however, count 
himself among those Kaul "subordinates, mainly those of mediocre
"  Verma, op.cit., pp. 100, 101. 
" Palit, op.cit., p. 72.
5 4
5 S
Verma, op.cit., p. 102.
See Maxvrell, op.cit., p. 188; Kaul, op.cit., pp. 215-217, 224-225; 
Khera, cp.cit., p. 222; Praval, cp.cit., pp. 222; Ihorat, cp.cit., p. 
173; and Verma, cp.cit., p. 103.
" Maxwell credits General S.H.F.J. Manekshaw with originating the term. 
See Maxwell, op.cit., p. 194.
"  Palit, cp.cit., pp. 70-71.
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capability, from whom he demanded and obtained a personal and almost 
feudal oocmitment, and whom he did not on cocasicn scnple to use as his 
confidential henchmen".”' "For the moment Kaul had made his mark and was 
believed to be one of the chosen few of Krishna Menon", writes Verma, 
"and he made full use of it".** "'Are you prcHK. or anti-K.?' needed no 
spelling out in most messes", ooncludes f^xwell."
Ihree months after Kaul was appointed CMS, Ihimayya could no longer
tolerate the CN's personal rudeness or professional disregard.*  ^On the
afternoon of 31 August 1959, writes Katari, he
walked into my office.. .with his letter of resignation in his 
hand and his mind made up.. .he had come to the conclusion that 
the only honourable course left for him was to quit. He was cn 
his way to hand in the letter, and there was nothing I could say 
or do to alter his decision.' '
Katari imnediately sent off an encrypted message to lAF Chief Air
Marshal Si±roto Muddierji, abroad at the time, relating Ihimayya's
decision and "including the fact that I would most probably follow
suit".'* The next morning, The statesman led with the news, adding that
the "likely" resignation of all three service chiefs "is the result of
prolonged but evidently unsuccessful efforts to keep politics out of the
Army, Navy and Air Farce...[and] other areas of disagreement, partly
arising from reasons of temperament and personal preferences".' '
ibid., p. 76.
Verma, cp.cit., p. 103.
Maxwell, cp.cit., pp. 189-190.
See Katari, cp.cit., p. 101; and Ihorat, op.cit., p. 176. 
Katari, cp.cit., pp. 102-103. 
ibid., p. 103.
5 •
5 9
6 0 
6 1 
« 3 
6 3
" Ihe Statesman (Calcutta) 1 September 1959. See cilso Longer, Ihe 
Defence and Forei^ Policies of India, p. 82; and Kavic, India's Oiest 
for Security; Defesnce Policies. 1947-1965. p. 161.
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That evening N^iru suniaoned Katari to a private meeting. Katari, vho 
had decided to "put in iny paper [of resignation] if Tinny went*/* 
describes the PM opening their conversation with
"Well, I have received Thimayya's letter of resignation. I 
understand that you also intend to resign. Is that true?"
I told him that I was considering doing so.
He then remarked that he was grieved that the three Chiefs 
of Staff should gang vp against the Defence Minister.
I...pointed out that if the three of us, individually, were 
working under such severe disabilities that we found it 
difficult to function honourably, it could hardly be tenned 
ganging \jp...
[Nehru] went on to say that he realised that Krishna Menon 
was not the easiest of men with whom to get on. But, he said, 
Menon possessed one of the finest intellects that he, Nehru, had 
had come across, and it should be utilised for the benefit of 
the country.
At that I quite spontaneously blurted out, "But why as 
Defence Minister, Sir?"
I was relieved to find that he laughed at that, we then 
talked for some while, • ,as I was taking my leave at the end of 
about an hour, he revealed that Ihimayya had agreed to withdraw 
his resignation.. .The question of resigning was no longer 
immediate. [My indents. ]“
Ihimayya, the "sirple soldier*"’ and long-time admirer of Nehru, had
apparently been unable to resist the PM's promise of personally looking
into every one of his complaints against Menon.* *
Instead, Nehru castigated Ihimayya and praised Menon in the next
day's session in Parliament. Ihimayya, he said, had come to him a week
ago "not feeling very happy about various matters connected with the
Defence Ministry** but these were "rather trivial and of no consequence".
The general's resignation the day before yesterday was "peculiarly
unwise". With the exertion of Kaul's prcmoticxi to OGS, N^iru denied his
Government had interfered with the arny's recommendations in the
*“ Katari, op.cit., p. 103.
** Katari, op.cit., p. 103.
*’ Ihorat, cp.cit., p. 178.
*• See Maxwell, op.cit., p. 191; Kavic, op.cit., p. 160; and Verma,
op.cit., p. 121.
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pranotion of saiior officers. In any case, the government was entitled 
to hawe the final word as under the Indian Oonstituticn and in practice, 
"civil authority is and must remain supreme". Nehru concluded by 
praising Menon for the "great energy and enAusiasm he has put in his 
work and v*dch has resulted in so much progress". Only after being 
pressed by composition menbers did the fM acknowledge that "Ihimayya and 
cur senior officers, ei^ mecdally the Chiefs of Staff, are people %Ao have 
done good service, whose experience and gallantry we have appreciated 
and we appreciate.. .Ihat is why I went out of ry way to get him to 
withdraw his resignatd.cn".*’
KCIOs suffered two shocks. Ihe first, writes Ihorat, came when Ndiru 
"humiliated [General] Ihimayya in Parliament and in the press".”  The 
second occurred vhen Ihimayya subsequently refused to re-submit his 
resignation. "Many of us", writes Katari, "felt that if there ever was 
total justification for him to resign it %>as then, in protest against 
such merciless castigation of him".”  "It was a nystery why even after 
this public castigation Timy did not press his resignation again", adds 
Ihorat; "Failure to do so tarnished his own image in the eyes of 
civilians and amymen alike" ' Even Kaul saw the "action of Ihimayya—  
of resigning first and withdrawing his resignation latei~—did not 
eihanoe his popularity".” Ihorat and Katari, re^)ectively, recall how 
Ihimayya's "word carried but little wei^it"’* before he "retired [on 8 
May 1961] practically unhonoured [sic] and unsung".^ *
*’ Ihe Statesman. 3 S^tember 1959.
”  Ihorat, cp.cit., p. 178. See also Katari, op.cit., pp. 104-105.
”  Katari, op.cit., p. 104.
”  Ihorat, cp.cit., p. 178.
”  Kaul, op.cit., p. 219.
”  Ihorat, cp.cit., p. 199.
See Katari, cp.cit., p. 105; and Ihorat, op.cit., p. 214.
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If KCIOs needed any further reminders that Menon and Raul
effectively controlled the civil-military decision-making hierarchy,
they got them in early 1961 with three contrasting promotions. The first
used strict seniority to justify designating Lieut.-General P.H. Thapar
and not Thorat as successor to Thimyya as army chief. R&lit describes
the decision as
a disappointment to many senior officers. (J^ ri^ it and 
conscientious by r )^utation, professional 1 y well-groomed, 
Thapar's was nevertheless a lacklustre personE&lity and he did 
not possess the réclam and professional r^utation of Thorat 
who, though a name lower in the amy list, %#as a more 
charismatic figure and one of a handful of Indian officers %Ao 
had had operational experience at battalion-oonmand level during 
the Second World War. Most people had eqaected that Thorat would 
be nominated as the next Amy Chief. Thus, Thapor's appointment 
was regarded as another exanple of the Maion-Raul axis.^ *
In contrast, seniority was discarded in a second promotion when Verna,
associated with Thimayya and Thorat as an anti Menon and Raul officer,
was superseded twice in the appointment of two any commanders (and so
promptly resigned)’ The third promotion involved Raul's move to OGS
after Thimayya had apparently "givai in"’* by allowing the incumbent,
Lieut.-General Sen, to sipersede Verma and take up the post of GoC
East.”
All of the above machinations were taken to be the wcack of what had 
emerged as a Menon^aul nexus. On 5 ^ nril 1961, Current printed a letter 
from "Demoralized Any Officers" which accused "the evil genius" Menon 
of tampering with military promotions in order to create a grtxp loyal
Palit, c^.cit., p. 73. See also Ratari, op.cit., p. 105; Longer, 
op.cit., pp. 128, 134; Thorat, op.cit., pp. 178, 191-200 , 204; and 
Verna, op.cit., p. 122.
”  See Raul, op.cit., p. 266; Praval, op.cit., p. 228; Thorat, op.cit., 
p. 214; and Verma, op.cit., pp. 107, 122.
’* Icpger, op.cit., p. 99.
”  See Longer, op.cit., p. 99; and Maxwell, op.cit., pp. 202, 295.
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to himself and warned of Kaul being cleared a path to Indian Amy
Chief.* “ Six days later, former Congress President Archarya Kripalani
confronted Menon in Parliamait:
I charge him with having created cliques in the Amy. I charge 
him with having lowered the morale of our armed services. I 
charge him with having wasted the money of a poor and starving 
nation. I charge him with the neglect of the defence of the 
country against the aggression of Oommmmist China [see Chapter 
Ek^].*^
Menon managed to face down these accusations and MAru himself replied 
with a i^irited defence of Kaul.** The EM and the new OGS were free to 
cleanse the military of officers perceived hostile to their rule.
Kaul's reign as OG8 began with witch-hunts against those officers
who crossed his and/or Maxn's path. Ihe first target was Thimayya, on
leave pending retirenent but formally Indian Amy Chief until 8 May
1961. Palit reveals that
one of Raul's first acts as OGS had been to institute a secret 
Intelligence Bureau inquiry into Thimayya's alleged treason, 
citing a number of careless and indiscreet remarks made by him 
on various occasions, while he was still in service, regarding 
the amy's possible role in a political emergency. I do not know 
if Menon had a hand in this shabby attempt to persecute 
Thimayya.. .but I doubt it. The faux pas was pure Kaul and earned 
him nothing but calumy [sic] for a bungled intrigue.**
Althou^ nothing came of this investigation (and Thimayya died soon
afterwards vhile serving as commander of the EN peace-keying force in
Cyprus) ,* * Thorat and Verma also had to endure retributive attention
from Menon and Amy KQ at the end of their military careers.** (Then
Major-General) S.H.F.J. Manekshaw was perhaps Raul's most significant
As used in Maxwell, op.cit., p. 193.
Lbk Sakha Debates, vol. UV, no. 41, col. 10577 as used in Maxwell, 
op.cit., pp. 193-194.
* * See Kaul, c^.cit., pp. 265-268; and Maxwell, op.cit., p. 194.
•* Palit, op.cit., p. 74.
** Ratari, op.cit., p. 105.
** Verma, op.cit., pp. 123-126.
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witcMiunt target in that he was still a serving officer and a rising
star. Like Biimayya, Thorat and Verma, Manekshaw was the antithesis of
Kaul: although an IMA graduate, he was "British” in bearing, had won the
Military Cross fic^ iting in Burma, openly criticized military officers—
especially Kaul— mixing with politicians, and stood rp to Henon's
attempts at driving a wedge between senior officers and their
subordinates.** While chief, Thimayya had chosen l^mekshaw to head the
Staff College and announced his selection for promotion to lieut.-
geieral. Kaul, however, had other plans and in a passage from his
autobiography which eppears to single out Ifenekshaw but which is also
reminisoart of his dealings with Thimayya and Thorat, he describes how
Some of our senior army officers were in the habit of making 
tenacious and indiscreet remarks openly against our national 
leaders and extolled the erstwhile British rulers of India. They 
suggested, at times, that some sort of dictatorial rule was the 
only way to get our affairs out of the mess in which they were 
[see below].. .1 came to know of specific cases of anti-national 
and indiscreet utterances.. .on the part of a few senior 
officers. I, accordingly, brought them to the attention of my 
Army Chief, General P.N. Thapar, in writing, who put this matter 
to Defence Minister Menon, vho, in turn, reported it to the 
Prime Minister.*^
A military board under Lieut.-General Daulet Singh dismissed the charges 
against Manekshaw (including one of hanging portraits of British 
Viceroys, Govemor-Generals and O-in-Cs in his office) as ridiculous and 
recoranmded disciplining the accusing officers. While Kaul escaped 
formal censure— he had had seme of his junior sycophants accuse 
Manekshaw— the latter continued to suffer, being twice superseded before 
the former resigned (see Chapter Eight) .**
** See Maxwell, cp.cit., pp. 194-196; and Praval, op.cit., pp. 228, 230.
Kaul, op.cit., pp. 317-318.
"* See Maxwell, op.cit., pp. 194-196; Palit, cp.cit., pp. 319, 334-335; 
and Praval, op.cit., pp. 228-230.
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III.C. Questionnaire Respondents
Most respondents, in opinions culled from "%ble 7.2 and in follow-^ 
interviews, agree with the KCIOs' negative assessment of the Msnon-Raul 
nexus. Air Chief Ifeunshal 18 cites Raul's closeness to the CM as 
"instrumental in his acquiring an importance much beyond healthy norms". 
Kaul "pandered to [the] politicians' willingness to believe that all 
other senior military commanders were fools", eidds Brigadier 44, and 
"the mildest term that could be used to describe him is 'show-boy'". For 
Lieut.-Gaieral 17, Kaul "got into the politics more than the functions 
of command".** "As someone very rightly put it", continues Brigadier 60, 
"'B.M. Kaul, when he was amongst the politicians, he was a General and 
when amongst Generals, he was a politician'". "He was the syoophant-in- 
chief", concludes Lieut.-Gaieral 56.
Ihe respondents also saw Kaul's extraordinary influence attracting a 
number of their comrades. "Ihouÿï the large majority of officers were 
behind [General] Thimayya", recalls Lieut.-General 17, "they were a few 
%Ao got onto B.M. Kaul's bandwagon because he was seen as a rising 
star.. .A shame because some of these men were very good officers and 
would have gone far anyway. But they were in too much of a hurry".*®
Kaul, argues Brigadier 41, "tried to build his own empire whioh 
ultimately caused his downfall". "His team was weak, did not have the 
courage to contradict him and basked in his glory and political 
backing", agrees Brigadier 31.
•* From a follow-ip interview with Lieut.-General 17; London, 26 
November 1987.
•° From a follow-up interview with Lieut.-General 17; London, 26 
November 1987.
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Ihe respondents are most forthcxmng about Ihimyya's resignation 
^isode. Uniquely, Major-Goieral 85 calls Hiimayya's resignation "a very 
bad thincf”,*^  Lieut.-General 10 is unhappy that Hiimayya resigned over a 
"trivial issue, the disputed promotion of a major-general [Kaul] to 
lieut.-general.. .He should have chosen a more substantial disagreement 
like the Himalayan policy"* ' (see Chapter Elg^). Wiile Lieut.-General 
95 thouÿit Diimayya's resignation honourable, he also ^ predated his 
subsequent decision to "stay on for the good of the nation". But, he 
adds, he and his comrades were "very upset" when Nehru censured 
Ihimayya in Parliament: "We didn't forgive him [the ÎM] for it".**
Yet, like their seniors, many respondents fault Thimayya himself for 
not re-submitting his resignation eifter his public dressing^ -down. "He 
should have stuck to his guns",** says Major-General 105. Lieut.-General 
10 agrees:
When Nehru castigated him in Parliament Thimayya should have 
resigned. Not one, not a hundred Nehrus should have been able to 
convince him otherwise.. .When he did not [resign], he became a 
different person in office. Afterwards, [Lieut.-General] Kaul 
used to openly flaunt him.**
Lieut.-General 4 argues that Thimayya withdrew his resignation
because he was a very sirple man who believed the entreaties 
of Nehru... [and] because the government had a file on him...
[and] may have some pictures of him.. .Thimayya was a routed 
womanizer and N^iru was not above using this method. But even if 
this was the case, Thimayya should have said publish and be 
damned.**
** From a follow-ip interview with Major-Goieral 85; New Delhi, 16
August 1989.
* * From a follow-up interview with Lieut.-General 10; Patna, 29
September 1989.
* * From a follow-rp interview with Lieut.-General 95; New Delhi, 13
S^ jteanber 1989.
* * From an interview with Major-General 105; New Delhi, 12 Septeamber
1987.
’ * From the questionnaire and a follcw-tp interview with Lieut.-General
10; Patna, 29 S^ Jteanrber 1989.
* * From a follow-ip interview with Lieut.-General 4; Pune, 12 October
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Lieut.-General 17 r^xarts that Hiimyya, after having withdrawn his 
resignation, asked one of his junior officers:
didn't you tell me to offer ny resignation a second
time?"
He had not realized the depth of feeling in the amy about 
the withdrawal of his resignation. But it was not the jiaiicr 
officer's place to advise him either. • .Ihimayya was a broken 
man.. .Ihe withdrawal of his resignation shocked the any.* ^
It was a "terrible shame, [a] mistake when Ihimayya withdrew his
resignation", agrees Major-General 98; "Indian officers all knew of his
clashes with Menon and if he had held firm I am sure that the other two
Chiefs would have followed his example".** Like the KdOs, respondents
recognized their best chance of countering the influence of the Menon-
Kaul nexus ended with Ihimayya's refusal to re-submit his resignation.
Ihe re^xndents were well aware of the machinations taking place at
senior levels. Iheir syspathy went out to Ihorat, "a good man, a good
commander" (Lieut.-General 17),** when he failed to become Indian Any
Chief. Lieut.-Gaieral 4 describes Ihorat as
a simple man.. .heppy that his honour was vindicated after 1962 
with his inclusion on the Defence Flaming Oomnissicn [CPC or 
National Defence Council (NDC) ]. Nevertheless he stood ip to 
politicians. Ihere was a certain order he refused to carry out. 
He also refused other jobs from the government immediately after 
retirement. He should have refused the DPC post as well.^ **
Ihe respondents were equally sure Ihorat's rival, Ihapar, would be an
unsuitable chief. For Lieut.-General 108 and Major-General 105,
1987.
*’ From a follow-up interview with Lieut.-General 17; London, 26 
November 1987.
*• From an interview with Major-Goieral 98; New Delhi, 15 S^tenber 
1989.
* * From a follow-ip interview with Lieut.-General 17; London, 26 
November 1987.
Item a follow-up interview with Lieut.-General 4; Pune, 12 October 
1987.
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respectively, the latter was "thorou^y weak,. .ineffective", 
"inoompetaTt and everyone knew this".^ "^  It was otwious wty Ihapar was 
proQoted, add Major-General 97 and Lieut.-General 17, respectively; "he 
was cnly kanou^ it in on Menon's desires", "it was Krishna Msnon s sway 
all the way".^*’
One respondent, Lieut.-General 108, volunteers information on the 
Ifenekshaw witch-iumt. Kaul instigated an inquiry against [Major-Gaieral] 
Manekshaw for "trivial reasons" (calling the famous fWiratta conmander 
Shivaji a "mountain rat" and for "being more British than the British") 
and got "seme lieut.-colonels" to speak against him. Althou^ Kaul 
eventually "lost this round of the power^lay between himself, Mandoshaw 
and Chaudhuri. Still, Mandcshaw was on his way out and only the '62 
debacle saved him [see Chapter (Fbndoshaw became Indian Army
Chief in 1969 and was appointed the country's first Field Marshal for 
his leadership during the 1971 Bangladesh W&r.)*"*
III.C.1. Menon
Did the respondents think the above incidents added up to the 
politicization of the Indian armed forces? See Table 7.3.
A small minority (14.58%) of respondaits say "No", Maion did not 
politicize the armed forces. "It was not he vbo politicized the army", 
writes Brigadier 41; "an ambitious general [Kaul?] went out of his way
From interviews with Lieut.-General 108; Meerut, 14 S^ Jteanober 1989; 
and Major-General 105; New Delhi, 12 S^jtember 1987.
From an interview with Major-General 97; New Delhi, 15 September 
1989; and a follow-tp interview with Lieut.-General 17; London, 26 
November 1987.
From an interview with Lieut.-General 108; Meerut, 14 Septeanber 
1989.
 ^“ * Mandcshaw was the first IMA-trained officer appointed India Army 
Chief. See Praval, op.cit., pp. 421, 432-434, 488, 585.
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to politicize it and Krishna Menon unwittingly got into the fray. Ihe 
gaieral had his own 'chamchas' [sycophants] whom the rest detested". 
While Kaul "and his fans... [were] overanbitious square pegs in round 
holes", concedes Brigadier 69, *They had no politics. Mary were not 
capable of understanding.. .politics. Hhe^ were not brought up that joay",
TABL£ 7.3 
Did Menon politicize the military?
Percent(No.)
Yes 50.00 (48)
Qualified Yes 29.17 (28)
No 14.58 (14)
No Answer 6.25 (6)
Total 100.00 (96)
Most other "No" respondents think any rumours of politicization were
spread by disgruntled officers. Menon, argues Brigadier 37, "wanted
quick results and was an inpatient man, so many times he antagonised
senior camonders". "I don't believe there was any politicizing", writes
Brigadier 90 of a EM who only "accepted the right people for the right
job. He was intolerant of the incompetent and some thus eiffected ^ lelt
this as politicizing". Menon, adds Vice Admiral 6,
handr-picked his team and in the process superseded quite a few 
senior officers that must have been displeased as they belonged 
to that category that were of the firm view that prcmotions 
should go by seniority and not by such subjective judgements as 
"performance ratings".. .those adversely affected [thought Menon] 
politicized the services.
"Menon's objective in placing his own officers was to get his own way
done faster", adds Lieut.-General 4, "nothing more ccmplex or sinister
than that".^“® "It cannot be said", continues Major-General 85,
From a follcw-Hp interview with Lieut.-General 4; Pune, 12 October 
1987.
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that Churchill had politicized the army when he r^laoed first 
Wavell by Auchinlek and later, Auchinlek by Montgomery... 
[Although] everyone in the any knew of his special treatment of 
Kaul...[and] Menon was also tainted by the je^ scandal...he was 
also a great man, a thinker.. .the man had magic in him and was 
responsible for beginning indigenous defence production 
edacities...We owe a lot to Menon.
"To show that government in power is sipneme seems correct", concludes
Oolonel 79.
Nonetheless, dose to a third (30.21%) of respondents opt for a 
"Qualified Yes", conceding Menon played favourites among officers but 
refusing to term this "politicization". Par Major-General 33, it was 
"not so much politicizing, as patronizing a chosen few". Politicization 
"was just not possible", continues Major-General 20, although Menon "did 
have his favourite officers who were prepared to toe his line ignoring 
professional soldiering". The CM, admits Lieut.-General 17, ’kSid 
surround himself vâth a chosen few who generally tended to say only what 
they felt he would be responsive to". Despite describing his refused, to 
"play along" with Menon's attempt to consult him without going through 
(then lAF Chief) Air Marshal MuOAerji, Air Chief Marshal 1 says "we 
can't say that he politicized the military.. .The major fault he had [was 
that] he adopted...favourites...that undercut [the] chain of command and 
to some extent eroded the authority as exercised in the defence 
services. This proved ruinous".
Why, according to the "Oialified Yes" respondents, did Menon favour
selected officers? "More than [as] a deliberate action", writes
Brigadier 40, "I feel his efforts were due to his own sense of ego— a
sense of being [sic] a superior brain". For Brigadier 70, Maion's
 ^“ * From the questionnaire and a follow-up interview with Major-General 
85; New Delhi, 16 August 1989.
 ^° ^ From the questicrmire and a follow-up interview with Air Chief 
Marshal 1; New Delhi, 9 September 1987.
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bdiaviour while he was Defence Minister appeared to me to be 
that of a boy vAo has received a large set of toys vdth which he 
plays around at random. I do not think he had any other motive 
but his whim to motivate him. A man unused to power suddenly 
invested with ccntrol of a mighty machine just went berserk.
Other respondents saw a definite purpose in Henon's methods. For
Brigadier 43, the CM "played favourites.. .at hitter levels. Ihe action
was deliberate and more to show his authority rather [than to]
politicize the military". Menon, adds Brigadier (Dr.) 55, interfered in
promotion to "seme tc^ posts.. .to have a better control over the army".
Unlike their "Qualified Yes" counterparts, the "Yes" half (50.00%)
of respondents say Menon politicized the military precisely by playing
favourites. "He encouraged fawning and advanced the sycophants", wzrites
Vice Admiral 2 (edthough "this is a historical failure of Indian ruling
classes rather than a ^ secific failure of Menon"). Other re^xxidents are
less charitable. Vice Admiral 8 accuses Menon of "planting non-
professionals as lackeys", while Major-General 36 blames him for "not
heeding the advice of the military leadership and breaking the chain of
occmand which is so iirportant for the well-being of the armed forces".
Althouÿi it was "very well known that he played favourites", argues
Lieut.-General 94, "this affected only the officers at the hi^iest
levels".^“• Not so, counters Major-General 106:
Probably his intentions were good.. .the military %ms in a bit of 
a rut and needed seme shaking up... [But Menon] did politicize 
the array and everyone (save the mai who were certainly not 
affected in the way which their more knowledgeable counterparts 
of today would be) knew it.. .It was demoralizing hearing all the 
gossip.^  “ ®
From a follow-ip interview with Lieut.-General 94; New Delhi, 15 
August 1989.
From an interview with îfejor-General 105; New Delhi, 12 S^tamber 
1987.
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Lieut.-General 16 agrees "the military was well aware of Msnon s doings.
Look to the trial of [Major-Gaieral] )tuid(shaw who was oonpletely
vindicated by an internal military board".^ '®
The "Yes" respondents offer further details on Menants fawurites
and working relations. "[Lieut.-General] Kaul [and] Air [Vice] Marshal
Harjinder Sinÿi [were] favoured", recalls Lieut.-General 10. ”Onoe an
individual enjoyed [the CM's] confidence he could not, in Mr. Menon s
eyes, be wrong", writes Air Chief (fershal 18. Moreover,
his favourites were instrumental in undermining discipline and 
established codes of conduct...Suoh names as Air Vice Marshals 
Harjinder Sin^ and Ranjan Dutt... [Lieut.-]General B.M.
Kaul...and Vice Admiral [[).] Shankar... come to mind. These 
individuals and their pet boys were Mr. Menon s blue eyed boys.
If Menon s %#ays had continued, there could have been trouble 
in the sense that under his system officers were jookeying for 
power. They could have collected men under them personally and 
become very powerful.
Althou^ "Menon politicized the top levels [of the armed forces
and]. .used Kaul and others, and through them a network of officers and
men", adds Lieut.-General 49,
He and his si^porters made the cardinal error of miscalculating 
the basic resistance of the any to such "favoured" infiltration 
and compounded this by opposing Gen. Thimayya who, as an 
individual, was the one and only senior military leader 
universally respected.
Yet senior officers themselves were adso to blame for Menon's domdnation
of the armed forces. Miile "the military was very well aware of what was
going on", says Lieut.-General 19, there remained the
tendency of senior military officers to sit back and sulk.. .They 
are trouÿit up in the tradition of not going strai^it to the 
political leadership but throuÿi proper channels of hierarchy.
From a follow-i:p interview with Lieut.-General 16; New Delhi, 3 
September 1987.
 ^^ ^ From the questionnaire and a follow-iç) interview with Air Chief 
Marshal 18; New Delhi, 3 September 1987.
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[Hiis was] unfortunate because the anny is very d^sendent on 
[the] Chiefs to presort the military's views.
Lieut.-General 17 was "shcxdced and ashamed to see that [General]
Thimayya was scared of Menon". He describes serving as a military
attaché in the Middle East in 1959 when Thimayya stopped by on his way
bade from a meeting in London. Realizing that he had forgotten to pick
up "some trifle" for a friend back in India, the amy chief asked "What
shall I do"? Lieut.-General 17's suggestion that he himself could get
the item and send it edong via diplomatic pouch was "adamantly opposed"
by Thimayya who worried "if Menon ever found out.. .?"^  ^ ’
Somewhat surprisingly, those "Yes" respondents who opine as to
Menon's motives for politicizing the armed forces do not cite ulterior
ambitions. Like several "%alified Yes" respondents. Brigadier 91 thinks
any political measures were undertaken "mostly for self-glorification".
Menon played favourites, adds Brigadier 31, because he "was an egoist,
approved yes-men, did not like anyone opposing him and ill at ease with
stiuy men and views". "It was his style due to his political leanings",
continues Brigadier 46, but "I doubt if it [politicization] was
deliberate". Brigadier 76 agrees "it was not a deliberate action. He
[Menon] was too overbearing and the military leadership rather weak
(with [a] few exc^itions like Thimayya, Manekshaw and Thorat) to resist
him. Besides, he was thm number two only to Mehru".
III.C.2. Personally Affected?
 ^^ ' From a follow-LÇ> interview with Lieut.-General 19; New Delhi, 10 
S^jtenber 1987.
From a follow-ip interview with Lieut.-General 17; London, 26 
November 1987.
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Did the intrigues of the Menon-Kaul nexus enmesh the re^xnlents? 
See %ble 7.4.
TABUS 7.4
Were you affected by political favouritism 
during Msnon's tenure as Defence Minister?
Bercait(No.)
No 82.29 (79)
Yes 16.67 (16)
Indirectly 81.25 (13)
Directly 18.75 (3)
No Answer 1.04 (1)
Total 100.01 (96)
Of the fOLxr^ fifths (82.29%) of respondents who say "No", most were
then too junior to be affected by upper level political machinations.
others, like Major-General 20 remained unaffected
primarily because I was one of tile frontline comsanders. Rumours 
did filtrer [throu^] that.. .Maion is backing his favourite 
officers for higher command and that there %«as a witch-hunt 
against Ihimayya and Maneikshaw. We also 3mew that conparatively 
inefficient officers who were known to bend were posted in 
Delhi. But these had no effect on the rank and file of the arny.
The "No" respondents «iso include those officers on Thhle 7.3 who argue
that Menon did not politicize the armed forces.
Of the small minority (16.67%) of "Yes" respondents %Ao acknowledge 
being affected by political favouritism under Menon, four-fifüis 
(81.25%) were involved "Indirectly". Brigadier 29 recalls hew "a 
psychological feeling had permeated that all was not functioning well in 
the services". Althou^ "not personally [affected]", Major-General 52 
felt "professionally.. .demoralized and frustratied". Two res^ndents were 
almost cau^t \jp in the intrigues of the Menon-Kaul nexus. "Nearly", 
writes Air Chief Marshal 1, "but [I] refused to go along". Brigadier 9
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admits the politicization of the armed forces affected him in that he
refused to "join sides". All closely followed the ill-treatment of their
seniors. Lieut.-General 49 recalls hew, cdthcu^
the talk [of politicization] was psychologically bed, it had no 
effect on the vast majority of officers and men. Wiat did have 
wide^sread effect was the clash of NAru/Mencn with Gen. 
Ihimayya. The chief himself [Thimayya] took steps to allay this 
reaction by touring and speaidng to officers of all ranks.
Brigadier 70 adds that "the injustice to Thimayya, who I held in great
esteem having served with him, hurt me intensely".
Finally, three officers (18.75% of "Yes" respondents) were "Yes,
Directly" affected by political favouritism in the armed forces.
"Menon's proteges were directed to put me in my place", writes Lieut.-
General 4, and "they very nearly did":
After ocmmanding ny battalion for five years with distinction, 
[and having] been GSO 1 (Ops) Eastern Oconand, and Dy leader of 
India's first mission to Bhutan, I was deliberately posted to 
canaand a girl's battalion on the MOC [National Cadet College] 
as a snub. I have personal knowledge that this posting was 
contrary to the Military Secretary's plan for ry career, and 
occurred due to the personal inb^venticn by [Lieut.-General]
B.M. Kaul. I was rehabilitated only because of the Sino-Indian 
conflict [see Chapter Elg^].
Air Chief Marshal 18
was Air Officer in Charge of Policy and Plans at Air HQ in 1960 
iiAen I came into active and close contact with Mr Menon. Due to 
his interest in R&D, he became instrumental in my having to 
serve a three year period with R&D much to ny unhappiness and 
resulted in some misunderstandings with ny siperiors.. .He 
sumnarily ordered roe back to ny job at I.A.T. [Indian Air 
Transport?] Poona, after Air HQ had deputed roe to work in Assam 
with the Eastern Command.
The third respondent directly affected by the Mæon-Kaul nexus, Lieut.-
Geieral 92, was one of the KCIOs described above whose open defiance of
political machinations led to his early exit from the amy.
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Ihe results of Ihble 7.4 are scmewhat misleading. For, although a 
few among the majority of four-fifths (82.39%) of "No" respcrdents 
explain their choice by saying that no political favouritism existed, 
most appear to have understood the question as "Were you directly 
affected.. •?" and refer to tdieir relatively junior rank at the time as 
shielding them from the political intrigues they knew were going on at 
senior levels. In contrast, the small minority (16.67%) of "Yes" 
respondents seem to have read the question as "Were you indirectly 
affected...?" since over four-fifths (81.25%) of these officers describe 
gaieral psychological anc%/or professional concerns witii political 
favouritism under Menon, while only three officers (one a KdO) s ^  they 
were "Directly" affected. Despite this apparent misinterpretation, it is 
evident most re^xrdents agree political favouritism existed during 
Maion' tenure as CM.
Thble 7.3 reinforces the above conclusion. Although the third 
(29.17%) of "Qualified Yes" respondents refuse to call what they admit 
was Menants deliberate favouritism of selected officers 
"politicization", the half (50.00%) who answer "Yes" define 
"politicization" as just that. Adding these two groups together shows 
that, despite their relatively junior rank, the vast majority (79.17%) 
of respondents shared their superiors' belief that Menon promoted his 
favourite officers, bypassing the military's established decision-making 
hierarchy and advancing sycophants to the detriiaait of the armed forces' 
corporataiess and professionalism.
IV. ODup D'État?
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IV.A. Corporate Grievanoes
Ihe third ooL^ prediction theory sees military interventions as the 
result of officers acting to defend and/or enlarge any nunber of what 
they perceive to be their corporate interests. Pour of Ihonçson's ten 
"corporate" grievanoes leading to a coup are particularly relevant to 
Menon's tenure as CH:
[a] Hierarchy: Military coiymakers apparently perceive a threat 
to the military's organizational ohain of ccnmand.. .Disn^ting 
hierarchical stability is a threat to the military leadership's 
continued capacity for both self-control and organizational 
effectiveness.
[b] cohesion: Military coLp^makers apparently perceive a threat 
to the military's organizational unity.. .Perceived attempts to 
render military organizations less cohesive or united are seen 
as threats to the stability of its authority system as well as 
continued organizational effectiveness.
[c] Political Position: Military coLp-nekers apparently perceive 
a threat to the military's organizational relationship with the 
political system.. .Odd as it may seem, civilian attacks on an 
"apolitical" preference can bring about a military cct .^
[d] Resource Conflicts Type A: Military ccn^Moakers are 
£^ 3parently dissatisfied with the state of one or more of the 
following concerns: pay, prcmotions, appointments, assignments, 
and/or retirements.. .Ihe less political and more professional 
personnel are aggravated by policies favouring inocnpetent and 
unqualified but loyalist officers, while those most directly 
affected by the personnel policies may realize that tiiey must 
remove the incumbents before their own political control 
capabilities are seriously weakened. Either grcup or both in 
coalition m y  resort to the cxxç) in order to eliminate a very 
direct threat to their career possibilities.^  ‘ •
Did the Menon-Kaul nexus' disregard for the armed forces' decision­
making hierarchy, prcmotion of officers personally loyal to it and 
persecution of those opposed endanger civil supremacy-of-rule in India?
IV.B. Ihimayya
Ihompson, Ihe Grievanoes of Military CoigHfakers, pp. 14-20.
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Just before he was due to go cn leaive pending retirement, a rumour
circulated in government circles that Ihimayya was planning a ooup for
30 January 1961. S.S. Khera describes hew both Nehru and Home Minister
Govind Ballahh Pant became concerned about
an order given by Ihimayya moving a Division from Antaala to 
Delhi. At the same time an Armoured brigade was located at 
Mathura, 90 miles from Delhi on the Agra Road, a Brigade which 
was part of the Armoured Division at Jhansi imder the ccnmand of 
Gen. Ihorat. Kaul, %Ao was then g c  [but already officiating as 
OGS], was asked to ascertain from Ihimayya about the purpose of 
the move; it spears that the order had been sent from Array H3 
direct to the Divisional Oonmender, and the PSOs did not know of 
it. In any event, the order was countermanded.^^ *
V.I. Longer adds that Lieut.-Geieral Sen, içset at being "pushed out" of
the office of OGS in order to free it for Kaul, was said to be
Ihimayya's coup co-conspirator.  ^“
Ihe government was already nervous. Field Marsbal Ayub Rian's 1958
Revolution in Pakistan had shaken India's political and administrative
elite and caused a nunber of civilians openly to wonder why their own
officers did not "do something". Althou^ he retired as Indian Amy O
in-C in 1953, General carieçpa's vocal public support for ric^-wing
policies during this decade already had become more than just a
nuisance.^  ^ ’ Ihe ex-ohief had suggested "it would do good to have
military rule under civil control in places where things had gone bad"
and "democracy and socialism could wait till India's teeming millions
were assured of a square meal a day".^ *^ Cari^pa also admired some
aspects of Ayub's military regime but stc^ jped short— just— of advocating
an Indian cqpy. Instead, he "preferred President's rule in India for at
“ * Khera, op.cit., p. 74. See also Maxwell, op.cit., p. 194 
Lcxiger, op.cit., p. 99.
Muthanna, General Cariappa. pp. 82-90. 
ibid., pp. 85-86.
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least two years with i±e assistance of the Army, civil acJministraticn
being made subordinate to the Anny".^  ‘ * With Cariappa also critical of
Menon, Kripalani derided Ndmi as "our Hamlet [who] is terribly afraid
of an expert man of action like General Cariappa, showing up the
skeletons in the cxçboard of the Defence Minister...Did Gariappa's
opinions reflect the mood of Ihimayya and his admirers in the military?
Ihimayya and his followers did have a history of speaking "out of
turn". Major-General 104 says that when Thimayya was promoted from GoC
West in May 1953, he "did say.. .that you ch^ss must be reac^ to take
over".“ ‘ When Ihimayya later offered his resignation as chief, Verma,
"certain that my telephone was tapped and ny mail censored under orders
of Menon and Kaul.. .rang him up to say that we were all with him. That
was held against me as it tran^ired later".^  ^' IWo months after the
supposed date of Ihimayya's rumoured coup, Khera reports Ihorat making
a somaAat remarkable statement... [for] a serving officer, 
criticising the Government, and appeeiling to the troops for 
their loyalty to the Array Chief, with no word about loyalty to 
the Government or to the Constitution of India... [Ihe] general 
theme of Gen. Ihorat's statement was "Do not let Ihimayya go 
away".^
Verma also relates being "accused of having tried to incite the officers 
and men against the government in my farewell speeches, when I was 
leaving XV Corps [subsequent to his resignation]
A number of respondents agree Ihimayya was the one officer vi» may 
have had the stature and pcpularity to lead a military coup in 
independent India. Brigadier 61 writes that 
ibid., p. 86.
Vioil. 21 November 1959, as used in ibid., p. 83.
From an interview with Major-General 104; London, 24 JUne 1989. See 
also Evans, op.cit., pp. 289-290.
Verma, op.cit., p. 121.
Ktera, op.cit., p. 74.
Verma, cp.cit., p. 125.
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whai this general [Thimayya] put in his resignation letter and 
later had to withdraw it at the instance of N^ïtu, Nehru chided 
him like a school boy in parliament. The general taking it like 
a man.. .showed tremendous moral courage and professional 
military leadership. This was the only occasion when his 
popularity in the array and the forces' reaction was so strongly 
felt... [t±at it] mi^it lead to a military takeover.
Thimayya, adds Air Chief Marshal 18, "mi^ït have been able to pull off a
coup because of his immense popularity and respect [among officers]".^ ''
"Thimayya was an excellent professional officer and a great gentleman",
continues Lieut.-General 108, and the "one and only ohief who could have
pulled off a cot?) witdi the military and civilians behind him".” ‘
Débité the government's fears, all of the above events and opinions
have more than sufficient counter^arguments. Although he reports
Thimayya as having warned array persomel to "be ready to take over",
Major-General 104 adds that "Kaul started the rumours about Thimayya and
a coup".^'^  Perhaps Thimayya was advising his troops to be prepared to
follow the orders of their next chief? He was most unlikely to have been
referring to the men intervening against the government. Indeed, Lieut.-
General 94 recalls Thimayya
talking to a closed-door session of amy officers about the 
exanple of the Pakistani military cotp. He asked, "If soldiers 
saved Pakistan from chaos, why shouldn't we?"
He illustrated the answer with a story. "If a soldier is 
wounded in battle we give him imoediate first aid to lœeip him 
alive for as long as it takes to get him to hospital. If we do 
not give him first aid he will die. If the hospital doctors do 
not treat him properly, he will die. To each his own speciality. 
We soldiers are trained to give first aid but we are not 
doctors".^"
From a follow-ip interview with Air Chief Marshal 18; New Delhi, 3 
Septenber 1987.
From an interview with Lieut.-General 108; Meerut, 14 S^ Jteraber 
1989.
 ^" Frcro an interview with Major-General 104; London, 24 June 1988.
" From a follow-ip interview with Lieut.-General 94; New Delhi, 15 
August 1989:
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Finally, however popular with the armed forces, Thimayya's r^xrtation 
hardly matched that of India's outstanding Bf. "If Ndiru and Msnon %#ere 
worried about the popularity of Thimayya regarding leading a cotç it was 
very silly", says Major-General 105, "there was no oomparison between 
the standing and esteem of N^iru versus that of Thimayya".'
Neither were Thimayya's comrades trying to force him to lead a 
military intervention against his convictions. In telqhoning Thimayya 
with his stçport, Verma was only expressing a widely held feeling that 
Thimayya was in the ri^t over his dispute with the Menon-Kaul nexus. 
And, although Verma remembers Thimayya as "quite bitter about being let 
down by Mr. Nehru after he had withdrawn his resignation at the latter's 
behest","® the ohief did not think to re-submit his offer. As described 
above, this failure to judge the depth of his colleagues' resentment 
with the Menon-Kaul nexus caused Ihimayya's once formidable prestige in 
the armed forces to rapidly drain away. Thus Thorat's call for "loyalty 
to the Amy Chief”, coming as it did during a Kumaon Regiment offioers- 
only reunion mess dinner with Thimayya as the special guest in virtually 
his last official function,' ' ' may be read simply as a personal wish for 
officers not to forget their once beloved leader.
Thorat and Verma also dismiss suspicions that they themselves 
harboured any post-military ambitions. Thorat acknowledges that "Thapar 
was one term ahead of me at Sandhurst, so I had no cause to nurse a
From an interview with Major-General 105; New Delhi, 12 Septenber 
1987.
Verma, cp.cit., p. 121. Thimayya vras used to getting his way; his 
biography includes five separate instances where threatening to resign 
and/or refusing to follow conventional procedure resolved matters to his 
liking. See Evans, cp.cit., pp. 95, 125, 158-161, 183-186 , 226-227 , 247, 
251-252.
S.R. Johri, Chinese Invasion of Ladakh (Lucknow: Himalaya 
Publications, 1969), p. 191.
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grievance against the government— certainly none against Pran 
[Th^ar]".“ * Verm refutes any accusation that he "tried to incite the 
officers and men against the government" by suggesting "that a cross- 
section of the people who listened to my ^ leeches mi^it be examined on 
oath as to %Aat they had heard me say. Of course, it was never dcne".^ **
In the end, the rumour that Diimyya (and/or Verm and Ihorat) was 
(were) planning to stage a oaap was, as Longer writes, "wild and 
malicious".Althou^ Biimyya and Katari— and, most likely. Air 
Marshal Mükher ji— were pn^sared to resign in protest at the Menon-Kaul 
nexus' interference in the armed forces' chain of oomnand, promotions 
and appointments, neither contemplated violating their ultimate 
professional r^ponsibility to their client, the legitimate govenmaent 
of India, because of such grievances. "Those who at that time...^read 
stories about a projected coup did so out of sheer mischief and self 
advancement",^ '' concludes Katari.
IV.C. Kaul
Did Kaul envisage a political career? Kaul, writes Hangen, has "an 
Indian's respect for horoscopes, and his foretells that he will one day 
rule India.. .He has none of the Indian officer's traditional disdain for 
politics. He is political to the end of his swagger stick"."* Kaul's 
only autobiographical reference to political ambition comes in re^xxise 
to the 1961 Current editorial quoted above which mentions him possibly 
replacing/succeeding Nehru. He describes hew various "politicians and
Thorat, op.cit., p. 204.
Verma, op.cit., p. 125.
Longer, cp.cit., p. 99.
Katari, cp.cit., p. 104. 
Hangen, cp.cit., pp. 245, 247.
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soldiers.. .out of jealousy, wanted to rule out this possibility and took
steps to assassinate my image in public by all possible manner and
means”.^ ^^  Of course, there would be nothing ur^mofessicnal about Kaul
going into politics after retiring from the any.
Yet there did exist the spectre of Kaul attaining the leadership of
India through military intervention. In conversation, writes Hangen,
Kaul makes no secret of his synpathy with what the military has 
done in Pakistan and Burma [i.e., assumed power]. He thinks the 
Any is mistakai to leave power in civilian hands in Indonesia.
At the height of the Hindu-Moslem-Sildi communal slaughter in 
1947, Kaul suggested privately to Jay^acakash Narayan that a 
"strong** government was needed to prevent Indian drowning in 
blood. Narayan interpreted this as a suggestion for amy rule 
and he rejected it.
Kaul mi^Tt find more synpathetic listeners if India were 
again plunged into chaos. Be has made it clear in private talks 
recently [1962] that the Arwy should not hesitate to seize power 
if the civil government were incapable of ruling or India were 
about to fall prey to Ccemmists, foreign or domestic. [My 
indents, ny italics, y ^ *
Kaul, warns Thorat, had "unbridled ambition— in the pursuit of which he
was ruthless".***
Unsurprisingly, Kaul never publicly acknowledged the possibility
that he or any other officer mi^it end civil supremacy-of-rule in India.
In his only ooraaerrt: on the subject, he writes that vhen asked about the
chances of a oovp in India by a member of a Harvard University audience
to which he had beei invited to speak soon after his resignation from
the array (see Chapter Ei^ it), he
snapped back at my questioner i^ether a coup vras likely to 
succeed in a big democracy like [the] USA. Also, whether he had 
seal a picture recently e>diibited called "Seven days in May". I 
said if a coup could fail in [the] USA— as shown in this movie—  
it was unlikely to succeed in democratic India.**®
**’ Kaul, op.cit., p. 286.
**• Hangen, cp.cit., p. 246.
*** Thorat, cp.cit., p. 177. 
**“ Kaul, op.cit., p. 462.
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Was the possibility of failure the cnly factor holding Raul back?
If Kaul did entertain the notion of ruling India as a man on 
hors^Dack he would have had to have been certain of the backing of his 
fellow officers. Would the KaulHxys suffice? With Kaul as OGS, recalls 
Katari, there
were alreac^ signs that a parallel line of ccnmand was 
insidiously developing in the army with its own power group 
gradually taking shape. It was the fortuitous shake-up created 
by the Chinese invasion of 1962 [see Chapter Eiq^] that 
fortunately arrested what was becoming an alarming ^ lit down 
the middle in that service.^  * ^
Katari is unduly pessimistic. Despite Ihimayya's loss of prestige and
retirement, Ihorat's retirement and Verna's resignation, the Indian Army
still contained many officers— like Mandcshaw and the vast majority of
respondaits— opposed to Kaul for all his backgrcuid, political and
career factors listed above. Hangen quotes a "Delhi editor «to professes
to know" saying "Kaul is a house-builder, not a military man. He
couldn't pull a coup because the amy wouldn't follow him". Hangai
(writing in 1961) says this statement is "probably true today and for
the next year or two".‘ * ' "Armed forces with hi^ internal cohesion have
a greater c^aacity to intervene in domestic politics than armed forces
with lesser cohesion...",^ ** write Welch and smith. Ihe Indian armed
forces' officer corps in the months and years leading up to the 1962
Sino-Indian War was anything but internally united.
IV.D. Menon
Katari, op.cit., pp. 101-102.
Hangen, op.cit., p. 270.
Welch and Smith, Military Role and Rule, p. 14.
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Despite the içroar caused by charges of politicizing the armed
forces^  officer corps, Menon was becoming increasingly indif^ensable to
his FM. "Somehcw, Nehru could never see anything wrong in Krishna
Mencn**,^ ** writes Verma. "Indeed", adds Gopal,
as Menon became the chief figure in the denonology of Indian 
politics and many at home and abroad saw him as Nehru's chief 
advisor in such matters as Goa, the Prime Minister's defeioe of 
him became correspondingly more vigorous and unqualified. He 
thought Maion was a substitute target for himself and saw in 
criticism of Menon a general assault on the policies of the 
Congress.^ **
In the 1962 general election, Ndiru's spirited siçport of Menon against
Kripalani, the candidate supported by all the right-wing parties and
even significant sections of Congress, resulted in the CM increasing his
Bombay North majority by almost 100,000.‘^‘ Menon now had to be treated
as one of the favourites to succeed N^iru as EM.
Hew far was Menon willing to go to ensure his succession to N^mi?
Air Marshal 12 reports hearing from
two brigadiers at the time that Menon deliberately wanted China 
to invade India and create chaos, men he would take over with 
the aid of his loyal military officers [e.g., ] Admiral Shankar, 
Major-General Ram Kapoor and Air Marshal Ranjan Dutt.
I can't believe it... [althou^] I wouldn't put anything 
beyond Krishna Menon ...he's a Rasputin.^
Lieut.-Gaieral 17, one of the "Qualified Yes" respondents on Thbie 7.3,
recalls how Menon's "aim seemed to be to place officers who he could
trust in places of power and vho were amenable to his dictates. My own
suspicicxi was that it was being done to take over with the help of the
military after Jawaharlcd Nehru". Brigadier 38, among the "Yes"
Verma, op.cit., p. 104.
Gc^ pal, Jawaharlal fWrru: A Biography; Volume III, p. 210. 
George, op.cit., p. 242.
From a follow-iç) interview with Air Chief Ifershal 12; Pune, 11 
October 1987.
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respondents on Table 7.3, argues that Menon politicized the military 
because "perhaps he thought he might succeed Ndiru with the assistance 
and siçport of top brass in [the] defence services".
Yet, among those respondents offering an opinion, a more popular
belief is that Menon politicized the armed forces to counter the threat
of any military ocxp. De^>ite his ocpments above. Air Chief Marshal 12
says "Menon appointed his own military men portly to counter any
possibility of a military cotp".^ ** For Major-Ceneral 97, Menon
had a swollen head [and] harboured ambitions to become the next 
prime minister... [he] promoted his own favourites, his "yes- 
mai"...[and] went over the heads of senior officers to instruct 
their juniors... [because of] some lurking fear that the military 
would take over.^  * *
Three "Yes" respondents on Thhle 7.3 concur. Lieut.-General 56 writes:
If it [politicization] had a purpose other than to build his own 
self-esteem and inpcrtance, it was to cause a rift in the hi^ier 
echelons, in the amy eqiecially. In this he succeeded. Possibly 
he suspected an intamal threat from the military which didn't 
exist, and he ignored the external threats.
Menon politicized the amy, adds Brigadier 29, "by deliberately creating
a cleavage among the hi^ier echelons of senior officers with a view to
minimise any chances of a military coup imaginary or otherwise". Major-
General 96 agrees the EM wanted "to create dissension among senior
officers so that any chance of a military take-over was obviated".
While there were worries that turmoil mi^it follow Nehru's exit from 
office, fears that M a m  would use his ties with certain senior military 
officers to ensure his ascent to îM were unfounded. Air Chief Marshal 12 
argues that any coiç) "plot would have failed since Menon had too few
From a follow-iç> interview with Air Chief Marshal 12; Pune, 11 
October 1987.
From an interview with Major-General 97; New Delhi, 15 September 
1989.
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personally loyal military officers to effect a takeover...**^ *® Also, as 
described above, the CM's most arobitious eilly, Raul, harboured his own 
hopes in this direction before the d^Dacle of the 1962 Sino-Indian War 
intervened (see CbE^ Jber Eic^) • Finally, while an enemy of Oongress' 
ri^it-wing and unusually dqaendent on Nairn's patronage, Henon ocminanded 
respect among the left of the party and was considered a serious 
candidate to become FM by the normal democratic process.
Oonclusion
Althou^ Indian civil-military relations seemed poised for a 
fruitful era with the almost simultaneous elevation of Menon to CM and 
Ihimayya to amy chief, it was not to be. Operation Vi jay, successful 
peaceke^ing duties, military reforms, the promotion of an indigenous 
defence production capability were just the beginning, writes Air Chief 
Marshal Lai; Menon "could have achieved even more if only he had been 
able to curb his inpatienoe and arrogance with some self-discipline... 
The Service Chiefs he treated worse than school boys, with no 
consideration, fairness or courtesy".More worrying was his disregard 
for normal civil-military decision-making procedure, by-passing senior 
officers resistant to his ideas in favour of flattering their 
subordinates into carrying out his wishes. His "basic design", observes 
Verma, "appeared to be to create a rift between senior officers by 
playing one against the other. Insinuations, sly refermces, [and] 
disinformation would be passed round by word of mouth".^'
From a follow-tp interview with Air Chief Marshal 12; Pune, 11 
October 1987.
Lai, op.cit., p. 85.
Verma, op.cit., p. 101.
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Menon found a ready partner in Kaul. Hi^ily antoitious, Raul used his 
close relationship with N^iru, undoubted talent for administration, and 
willingness to obey Menon against the wishes of his superiors to 
surmount numerous professional liabilities in a quest to reach the 
office of OSS and beyond. Sycophantic Raul-boys became a real threat to 
the careers of their brother officers openly critical of what appeared 
as a Menon-Kaul nexus. "A q y  system seemed to operate at this time 
within the Amy, with certain officers clandestinely sending r^xsrts to 
Kaul about the (activities of their seniors vho did not belong to his 
circle**,'*’ writes Major K.C. Praval.
Although only a small minority of the relatively junior 
questionnaire re^mndents were directly affected by the machinations of 
the Menon-Kaul nexus, the great majority were well aware of the turmoil 
going on above then. The Ihim^ya resignation episode, the preference 
for Ihapar over Thorat for amy chief, the supersecessions of and witch­
hunts against various senior officers all ocntributed to the 
respondents^ sharing their scperiors' belief that the officer corps was 
being politicized by Menon and Kaul manipulating personnel to their 
will. In the words of ex-ICS officer Vira,
There is no wonder that there was complete demoralization in the 
ranks of our armed forces because Krishna Menon was functioning 
in the Defence Ministry according to his own whims and fancies. 
Even senior promotions and gppointments were determined by his 
whims and fancies, with the result that there were a large 
number of disgruntled officers in the armed forces.'**
Mi^Tt such disgruntlement lead to a military ootp?
Despite several (unfounded) rumours, no, for any number of reasons. 
For one, although the armed forces had performed creditably abroad (in
'*' Praval, op.cit., p. 228. 
'** Vira, cp.cit., p. 82.
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Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Gaza and the Congo) and at hone (in Junagadh,
Hyderabad, J&K, Goa, Daman and Diu), their non-participation in the
ind^)@idenoe struggle continued to limit pLdüic re^^ect for them as
agents for positive ohange— especially vAien ocnpared to the towering
authority and popularity of N^ iru. "Could he [Thimayya] have ohallaiged
Ifâiru? asks Lieut.-General 108; "Not really".^ **
Moreover, the nature, if not extort, of the Menon-Kaul nexus'
disregard for India's formal civil-military decision-making processes
was not without precedent. Althou^ many officers resented Kaul's
frequent and informal access to Nehru, recalls Palit, a "similar
relationship, though not quite as exceptionable, existed between Nehru
and Hiimayya.. .The latter was no way a 'political' general, but Ndrru
grew fond of him and 'Tinny' did not scruple to exercise his presumed
ri^rt of access to the Thorat agrees that Nehru, who had known
Diimayya "since 1947 whar he was serving in the Boundary Force.. .had
much respect for his ability...[and] Ixeated Timmy as a friend".^”
Palit includes the PM in tdie blame for the Menon^Caul nexus'
politicization of the armed forces:
Menon was greatly in awe of the Prime Minister and it is 
unlikely that he would have dared breach military procedure so 
blatantly had he not had Nehru's precedent before him.. .Ihus, if 
anyone was to blame for breaches of propriety and procedure that 
had cr^ït into tdie Defence Ministry, it was Jawaharlal Ndiru. 
Menon esqploited the precedent for his own purposes. *^*
Lieut.-General 10 even criticizes ïhimayya for not using his initially
good relationship with N^iru more effectively:
From an interview with Lieut.-General 108; Meerut, 14 S^ jterober 
1989.
Palit, op.cit., p. 74. See also Khera, op.cit., pp. 74-75. 
Ihcrat, op.cit., p. 176.
' Palit, op.cit., p. 74. See also Kaul, op.cit., p. 210.
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Ihiitayya should have fcuÿit harder against the putting down of 
the anny's iinportanoe by the civil servants and the politicians. 
He had a golden opportunity with his big name and a big 
background.. .plus he was initially on a very good wicket with 
Nehru. But he lacked vision...he was a very poor chief.^ **
Thimayya's failure to stick to his resignation further revealed his
weakness as an independent actor and, as such, he was hardly likely to
lead a military ootç) against the government.
Also, however disgruntled, FM3 and IMA graduates continued to adhere
to the British notion of a professionalism based on perfecting
••management of violenoe^  ^skills at the expeanse of political awareness
and/or activity. Despite his intuition to resign along with Ihiraayya and
his sadness at the extent of Nehru's subsequent Lok Sabha castigation of
the army chief, Katari acknowledges that the ÏM
quite properly sought to emphasise the supremacy of the civil 
authority over the military. None of us in the armed farce [sic] 
had the remotest doubts about this, nor was there evai any 
thou^it of defying it.. .1 can say %dth absolute honesty that any 
idea that they should take the law into their own hands, despite 
frustrating provocations sometimes, never entered their heads 
and, God willing, never will.^‘®
••I do not think that Thimayya would have wanted to disturb the running
of the country, agrees Air Chief Marshal 18; ’•it is quite clear that the
military cannot suooessfully run a country and that once in, democracy
is gone forever”.^Chapter Six showed that Pakistan's 1958
••Revolutions^  did anything but inspire Indian armed forces' officers.
Most irportantly, thou^ now tarnished with the failures inevitable 
to governing, Congress' convincing victory in the 1962 general
From a follow^^ interview with Lieut.-General 10; Patna, 29 
Septecber 1989.
16 0 
16 1
Katari, op.cit., p. 104.
From a follow-up interview with Air Chief Marshal 18; Na# Delhi, 3 
S^jbenber 1987.
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elections^  ‘ ' showed the party and its leader still cxxnnanded respect.
For WelcA and Sknith, **Ihe ease with Wiich the armed forces a^ume 
political power varies inversely with the legitimacy enjoyed by the 
existing civilian government”.^India's government— and the democratic 
process which placed it in power— continued to be seen as moral and 
effective. Officers would not be pulled into governing as "saviours" of 
an inoonpetOTt civil regime struggling to modernize (the first set of 
coup prediction theorists), nor push their way into power as a result of 
general political and/or socioeconomic chaos (the second group of 
military intervention theorists). Neither would the corporate grievances 
aigendered by the Menon-Kaul nexus provide sufficient cause to propel 
officers into seizing the reigns of power (the third set of cxxç 
prediction theorists). Rumours that Kaul, or even Menon, mi^it use their 
clique of Raul-boys to displaoe the elected civilian govemmait (the 
fourth military intervention theory) could eilso— for the time being— be 
confidently dismissed.
"  Bdwardes, Nehru, p. 295.
Welch and Staith, c^.cit., p. 30.
-301-
Civil-Military Relations in British and Indepqident India. 1918-1962.
and Ocup Prediction Theory
ŒAMBt 8
Test Five: lbs 1962 Sino-Indian War
Introducticn............................................ 303-303
I. Ibe "Forward Policy"................................... 303-328
A. The Build-Up....................................... 303-304
1. **NGn-Confrontaticnal Containment"................. 304-306
B. Fornulation........................................306-307
1. The Political Leadership......................... 307-309
2. Intelligence................................... 309-312
3. The Military Leadership.......................... 312-314
C. XnplenaitatiGn....................................... 314-317
D. Final Days...............................   317-326
E. Questionnaire Respondents............................326-328
II. War................................................. 328-344
A. Invasion to Ceasefire....................   328-335
B. Performanoe........................................ 335-336
1. KdOs..........................................336-340
2. Questionnaire Respondents........................ 340-344
III. Aftermath........................................... 344-361
A. Coup D'État?....................................... 344-346
B. Attitudes Towards the Political Leadership............. 346-350
C. Attitudes Towards the Military (Leadership)............ 350-355
D. Post-Ceasefire Changes.............................. 356-361
Conclusion.............................................. 361-363
(Includes Tables 8.1 to 8.9.)
-302-
CHAPIHi 8 
Test Five: Die 1962 Sino-Indian Mür
Introduction
The 1962 Sino-Indian War posed the siçxrerae test of civil supranacy- 
of-rule as Indians exposed for the first tine to the psychological 
burdai of defeat in battle evenly called into question the conpetaioe of 
their civilian regime. Whether this govemmait would remain in power or 
be forcibly replaced depended in great part on who armed farces' 
officers— and the public— held responsible for the d^Dacle. To help 
understand postwar attitudes, this chapter first will examine how ths 
civil-military hierarchy first countered the growing threat of Chinese 
aggression in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and then performed during 
wartime. It will then look at the factors which decided the future of 
civilian rule in India.
I. Ihe "Forward Policy"
I.À. The Build-Up
The build-iç) to the 1962 War was slow but stea^.‘ The 29 April 1954 
agreement in vhich India recognized China's suzerainty of Tibet and
 ^ The period leading to the 1962 Sino-Indian War is perhaps the most 
closely examined in Indian civil-military relations; see the review of 
works in S. Oohen, "India's China War and After", Journal of Asian 
Studies (Ann Arbor, Michigan) August 1971, pp. 847-857. Uhless otherwise 
noted, the following text is taken from Albar, N^iru. pp. 533-559;
Gcpal, Jawaharlal Nduu: A Biography: Volume III. 1956-1964. pp. 78-83, 
127-144, 204-214, 218-221; A. Kundu, "Civil-Military Relations in India: 
Why No Ooiç)? Asian Affairs (Dhaka) 7:3 July-September 1985, pp. 12-15;
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bound Asia's two great powers to the Pancha Sheela (Five Principles) of 
TBLitual respect and peaceful ooexistaioe ostensibly ushered in a mid- 
1950s period of co-operation characterized by Nehru's slogan "Hindi- 
Cbini, Jbboi-hbai* (Indians and Chinese are brothers).' But tensions over 
the demarcation of their shared borders in NSA (Northeast Frontier 
Agency) and LadaMi continued to grow. By November 1959, nine months 
after Chinese brutalities in Tibet had been publicized by the Dalai 
Lama's post-Kampa Rebellion fli^it to India, news that the NEFA frontier 
post of Longju had fallen to the Chinese on 25 August and that fighting 
forty miles inside Indian territory at Leh in ladakh 20-21 October had 
claimed the lives of nine maibers of the paramilitary central Reserve 
Police Focoe (CKPF) forced Nehru to transfer responsibility for the 
defence of the northern borders from the Home Office to the Ministry of 
Defence and thus to the army. But the situation continued to deteriorate 
and border skirmishes continued through 1961.’
I.A.I. **Non-Confrontational Containnent"
While welcoming the Indian Amy's Eastern and Western Coranands 
respective takeovers of the defence of NEFA and Ladakh, respectively 
(the Assam Rifles in NEFA and the CRPF in LadaJdi remained deployed in 
some advanced positions), top KCIOs effectively disregarded the
Maxwell, India's China War, pp. 19-179, 199-225, 232-256; and Palit, War 
in HicA Himalaya, pp. 22-45, 52-53, 155-236.
' Lai, My Years in the lAF. p. 90.
’ See Akbar, op.cit., pp. 481, 547-551; Chaudhuri, General J.N. 
Chaudhuri. pp. 168-172; Raul, The Untold Story, pp. 178-179, 225-227, 
231-232, 244; Lai, op.cit., p. 91; Longer, Ihe Defeice and Foreign 
Policies of India, pp. 84-88, 89-90; Palit, op.cit., pp. 43-44, 52, 90, 
107-108, 231; Praval, Indian Army after Independmce, p. 251; Ihorat, 
From Reveille to Retreat, p. 200; Maxwell, op.cit., p. 79; and Verma, Tq 
Serve with Honour, pp. 110, 115.
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government's defensive strategy. Local cocinanders r^ jeatedly complained
about the poor tactics of the policy which may be described as "Non-
Ocnfrcntaticnal Oontcdrment"— in NEFA patrols were ordered not to enter
a self-imposed, three-kilonetre buffer zone behind the Ndfahon line
while in LadaMi, small outposts were to be established as far forward as
possible without confronting Chinese encampments— and their lack of
resources to implement it.* For (then GoC XV Corps) lieut.-General
Verma, governmental instructions ordering him to add the defence of
Ladakh (from China) to his existing commitment of protecting J&K
(against Pakistan) were
almost comic.. .Firstly, vidiere exactly was the Indian territorial 
boundary? The small maps available were vague and inaccurate... 
Secondly, how were we to man this additional area? I already had 
approx [sic] 750 miles of the cease-fire line with Pakistan to 
look after. Now this additional 450 miles of border with Tibet 
was given to me, but no additional troops or equipment, except 
one newly raised J&K militia battalion.®
Lieut.-General Ihorat, ^pointed GoC East in 1957, had an "unshakeable
conviction that if I were to listen to the Defence Minister [Menon]...
and send trocps to the McMahon Line without adequate maintenance cover,
I would be sending them to certain defeat and death".® Agreeing that the
army was logistically unable to sipport anything but the snallest
"penny-packets"’ of troops in forward positicxjs, army chief General
* Ncm-OonfrontaticxTal Containment was not the only possible defence. 
Lieut.-General Thorat's "Vital Points" Plan would establish easy-to- 
sipply defensive points at rail and/or air heads in an east-west line 
running throu^ the middle of NEFA. Above the line would be the Assam 
Rifles, on and below it the army, all lines of supply and reserves. The 
Assam Rifles would "put up maximum resistance" before either closing off 
the retreat lanes of oiemy forces deliberately allowed throuÿi, or using 
delaying tactics while fedling back to the Vital Points where, promised 
Ihorat, the army would "stop the enemy and proceed to drive him back 
across the McMahon Line". See Thorat, op.cit., pp. 190, 196-199.
® Verma, op.cit., p. 115.
® Thorat, c .^cit., p. 202.
’ Palit, op.cit., p. 165.
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ïhimayya deliberately "toned down" operational instructions to his 
cccmanders in the field.*
I.B. FooDulation
Althoo^ the army could not meet the essentially defaisive 
ocraaitments of Nbn-Oonfrontational Oontainment, Ndmi's worsening 
relations with the Chinese leadership and the discovery of further 
Chinese encroaohmaits in 1961 led to the adoption of a more offensive 
strategy for NEFA and Ladakh which became known as the "Püocwarti Balicy". 
At a 2 November 1961 meeting/ Ndiru laid out his strategy:
(a) So far as Ladakh is ccnoemed, we are to patrol as far 
forward as possible from our present positions towards the 
international border. ïhis will be done with a view to 
establishing our posts which should prevent ths Chinese from 
advancing further and also dominating any posts which they may 
have already established in our territory. This must be done 
without getting involved in a clash %dth the Chinese, unless 
this becomes necessary in self-defence.
(b) As regards UP [Uttar Pradesh] and other ncrthem areas 
[i.e., NEFA], there are not the same difficulties as in ladakh. 
We should therefore, as far practicable, go forward and be in 
effective occupation of the whole frontier. Vtere there are any 
gaps, they must be covered either by patrolling or by posts.
(c) In view of numerous operational and administrative 
difficulties, efforts should be made to position major 
concentrations of forces along our borders in places 
cŒweniently situated b^iind the forward posts from where they 
could be maintained logistically and from where they can restore 
a border situation at short notice.^ *
* See Dalvi, Himalayan Blunder, p. 70; and Palit, cp.cit., pp. 92, 201.
* In attendance was India's top civil-military decision-making 
hierarchy: N^ iru, Menon, Foreign Secretary H.J. Desai, Joint Secretary 
(Defence) Harish Sarin, Intelligence Bureau Director B.N. Mullik, IB 
Joint Director Dave, Indian Amy Chief Thapar, OGS Kaul, CM3 Palit, and 
Director of Military Intelligence Brigadier Bim Batra. See Akbar, 
op.cit., pp. 556-557; S.A. Hoffmann, India and the China Crisis 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), pp. 97-99; Maxwell, 
op.cit., pp. 221-222; and Palit, op.cit., pp. 84 , 86, 105.
See Maxwell, op.cit., pp. 221-222; and Palit, op.cit., p. 107.
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While this Forward Policy might ^ jpear perfectly reasonable— how could 
any country, asked Menon later, be said to have a "forward** policy on 
its own territory?^  ^ — it effectively changed Indian military strategy in 
Ladakh and NEFÀ from one of Non-Oonfrontational Oontainment to one of 
confrontational advance and hold. With hic^y reflected KdOs like 
TJiimyya, Verma and Ihorat deliberately neglecting to carry out the 
former strategy, how did India's civil-military decision-making 
hierarchy come up with the more demanding Forward Policy?
I.B.l. Ihe Political leadership
To a large extent, numerous mistakes made in the build-up to the 
1962 War may be ascribed to Nehru's towering authority. Miile democracy 
had flourished, collective cabinet decision-making had not; it was left 
to the FM and a few trusted eidvisors to decide India's appcoacti to 
international issues. Nehru's belief that Pakistan remained the chief 
threat led the former to dismiss Field Ifegshal Ayida Khan's 1959 proposal 
of a joint Indo-Pak defence of the subcontinent with the giestion:
"Joint defence— against whcm?"^  ' In contrast, writes Ihorat, the FM and 
Menon "refused to believe that China would make any inimical move 
against us, and, therefore, saw no reason v*y they should make warlike
“ See Brecher, Indian and World Politics, p. 153, as used in Gcpal, 
op.cit., p. 138; and Krishna Maion's talk with Inder Malhotra, **Black 
November and After", published in a 1968 Supplement of Ihe Statesman, as 
used in both Dalvi, op.cit., p. 127 and B.N. Mullik, My Years with 
Ndiru: Ihe Chinese Betrayal (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971), pp. 318- 
319. Akbar says China authored the aggressive phrase. See Akbar, 
op.cit., p. 556.
 ^' Rajya Sabha 4/5/59; P.M.S.I.R. I i, p. 42 as used in Maxwell, 
op.cit., p. 206. See also Gopal, op.cit., p. 104; Hoffmann, op.cit., pp. 
56-58; Khera, India's Defence Problem, p. 200; and Palit, op.cit., pp. 
255, 302-303.
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preparaticais...vilich, they feared, mi^ït anncy China".Nehru, argues
V.I. Longer, believed that in the unlikely eventuality of attack, his
success on the world stage would protect India:
China will not attack; if China attacked there would be a large 
sccde war which would become international; no limited military 
action was possible; India could, through its diplomacy, 
skilfully steer itself to a position of safety where 
international forces would be exerted to its advantage and would 
block any Chinese aggressive moves; China would be deterred by 
fear of the Soviet union and China would not want to alienate 
international opinion by attacking China.
That Nehru never assessed the Chinese threat in proper military terms
was also due to his continued abhorrmoe of violence as a means of
settling international disputes.^  “ The political leadership's belief
that negotiation was si:periar to violence reached absurd heic^ its: Manon,
recalls Thorat, "said that,. .in the most unlikely event of there being
one [a Sino-Indian War], he was quite capable of fi^iting it himself on
the diplomatic level".
To the political leadership's dismissive attitude towards the 
Chinese threat was added the parsimony of the treasury. For example, 
while a 1960 study of Italian alpine troops had led Thimayya to 
reccmmnend raising some lic^ itly equipped and mobile mountain divisions 
vhich would have proved vital in the 1962 War, his proposal was refused 
on grounds of e>^ )ense and the unlikelihood of such formations ever being 
used.^  ^ Replacing Non-Oonfrontational Containment with the Forward
 ^^ Thorat, op.cit., p. 196. China's numerous and pressing domestic and 
intematiOTial problems also conspired against N^iru and his the 
administration taking the Chinese threat seriously. See Kaul, op.cit., 
p. 339; and Palit, op.cit., pp. 160-161.
 ^* Lcxiger, op.cit., p. 110.
See Gc^ )al, op.cit., p. 203; and Rao, India's Defence Policy and 
Organisation since mdependenoe. p. 6.
Thorat, op.cit., p. 191.
Kavic, India's CXaest for Security, p. 96.
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Policy cxily cccçourded the ancy's shortfall in resources. For Lieut.-
General Kaul, the army was
in a vicicus circle. On the one hand, we were required to raise 
additional Forces at the earliest, failing \iiiich there was risk 
of our territory being ooci^ied by our potential foes; on the 
other hand, our shortages in weapons, equipmait and annunition 
were so great that we found it inpossible to equip the 
additional Faroes we raised.^ *
Moreover, adds Kaul, when any of his and Chief lhapar's representations
for additional resources adong the northern borders finally did get the
backing of the the civilians of the Defence Ministry, the "clash of
personalities"^  * between Menon and the parsimonious Finance Minister
Morarji Desai (on the Congress ri^it and in ccnpetition with the EM as a
successor to Nehru)^ ® produced an "inpasse.. .at this oritical juncture.
Ihe Finance Ministry, therefore, nust also bear responsibility for the
Array remaining urprqpared for war".'^
Finally, the success of Operation Vi jay stilled raany claims that the
armed forces were being mismanaged and/or under^resouroed. Despite the
limited scale of the operation, the political leadership's repeated
assurances that the array was in top condition now combined with the
public's delimit with the defeat of Portuguese forces to create a
popular demand that China be expelled from Indian territory.® ®
I.B.2. Intelligence
Kaul, c^ .cit., p. 329. See also Palit, op.cit., p. 89.
 ^® Kaul, op.cit., p. 332.
See Council of Ministers. 1947-1948. pp. 4-5; and Hangen, After 
Mdiru. Who?.
Kaul, op.cit., p. 332. See also pp. 242-243, 320-321, 328-336, 337- 
339, 349; Akbar, op.cit., p. 551; Khera, op.cit., p. 201; and Palit, 
op.cit., p. 89.
® ® See Ihe Hindu (Madras) as used in Palit, op.cit., p. 113; Hoffmann, 
op.cit., p. 100; Palit, op.cit., pp. 111-112; Praval, op.cit., p. 236.
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The civil-military hierarchy's urpr^»redness also steraned from a 
lack of comprehensive intelligence gathering.' ' The political and 
military leadership became over d^endent on the civilian Intelligenœ 
Bureau (IB),'* an unawiable situatiai compounded by IB Director B.N. 
Mullik's long and close relationship with N^ iru.'® He had, Kaul says, 
"direct access to the Prime Minister at all times".'* And "sinoe in 
those days anyone operating within the reaches of that aura enjoyed 
automatic prestige and authority**, adds EMD Major-General E^ lit, "B.N. 
Mullik became a sort of eminence grise within a small and ad hoc 
decision-making cell".'’
Like Maion and Kaul, Mullik's special relationship with Nehru meant 
he had a disproportionate effect on formulating Indian defence policy.'*
" In 1951, internal and external intelligence duties had been 
transferred from Military mtelligenoe (MI) to the civilian Intelligenœ 
Bureau. By 1962, writes Palit, MX Director Brigadier Batra "deployed no 
agent, inside or outside the country; his sources of information were 
all seoondHiand". Even in the Joint Intelligenœ Onwaittee (JIC; chaired 
by a Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Joint Secretary and including 
Defence and Home Ministry representatives, the respective Directors of 
Intelligence of the three armed services, and a senior IB officer), 
continues Palit, the IB represaitative "was the only member who could 
make an original contribution... [He] had taken to presenting.. .reports 
as conclusions rather than as items presented for... assessment". See 
Maxwell, op.cit., p. 310; Mullik, op.cit., p. 305; Palit, op.cit., p. 
84-85; and Venkateswaran, op.cit., p. 96.
'* See Dalvi, op.cit., p. 119.
MUllik was appointed IB Director in July 1950. For his view of his 
relationship with N^iru see B.N. Mullik, My Years with N^ru: Kashmir 
(Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971), My Years with Ndiru, 1948-1964 
(Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1972), and The Chinese Betrayal.
'* Kaul, op.cit., p. 273.
Palit, op.cit., p. 100. See also p. 163; and Maxwell, cp.cit., p.
310.
' “ Although his exact role may never be known, Mullik appears to have 
been greatly responsible for the rejection of Thorat's Vital Points 
Plan. Not until the major battles of the 1962 War were decided did 
Thorat leam that Ndiru had never seen his plan, signed and submitted on 
8 October 1959. The meeting at which Thorat makes this discovery also 
reveals a lot about Nehru's attitude towards Maion. Thorat, then 
Maharashtra Public Serviœ Oonmission Chairman, describes being sent for 
by N^iru during the tail end of the 1962 War. The EM begins
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At the crucial 2 November 1961 meeting, his assurances that the Chinese
would not encroach on land nominally held by Indian units of "even a
dozen soldiers”’* led directly to Nehru's adoption of the Forward
Policy. For Neville Maxwell, Mullik's "divination"’® that the Chinese
would not attack forward Indian outposts was based
on extra-sQTSory pero^jtions rather than on the regular 
disciplines of intelligence collections and assessment... [but] 
no doubt part of the explanation for the inordinate and indeed 
irrational trust placed in his predictions is that he was 
telling N^iru and his colleagues exactly what they wanted to 
hear.’ ’
"Thorat, how could this have happened? You were in Eastern 
Ocranand, did you have any inkling of the disaster?"
Yes sir.. .The possibility had occurred to us in Eastern 
Ocranand and the [Defence] Ministry was %#arned.
He said, "Of course I knew that we were having trouble with 
the Chinese over some border incidents, but I never thou^it that 
it would come to this".
Sir, the Array had foreseen this possibility and given a 
warning", I relied.
**Whai?" he asked sharply.
I said, "I had signed the note on 8 October 1959 and sent it 
to the Chief [Thimayya] who told me that he had forwarded it to 
the Defence Minister".
"It was never shown to me", the P.M. snapped.
"Would you like to see ry copy?" I asked.
"May I?" he replied, and I placed the file in front of him.
He read the paragraphs indicated by me. Thai he lit a cigarette, 
offered me one, and proceeded to read the note from the 
beginning. When at the end of about twenty minutes he finished 
reading the p a^er, he half rose in his seat and sadd, "Why was 
it not shown to me?"
"You may like to address this question to Mr. Krishna Menon, 
sir", I replied with ill-oonoealed sarcasm.
"Menon, Menai!" he e>q)loded, "Why have you got your knife 
into him? You pecple do not realise vhat an intellectual giant 
he is".
I do not know from where I got the courage when I said, "If 
he is, sir, I have seen no evidence of it in the case under 
consideration".
See Mullik, The Chinese Betrayal, p. 317; Palit, op.cit., p. 55; and
Thorat, cp.cit., pp. 200, 203, 215-216.
’* Palit, cp.cit., p. 105. See also Akbar, op.cit., p. 556.
’ ® Maxwell, op.cit., p. 310.
”  ibid., p. 311.
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Mullik carried the day and in the final build-up to the 1962 War, Menon, 
Kaul and other senior KCIOs all came to predicate their strategy on his 
assurances that China would never attack in force.’^
I.B.3. Ihe Military Leadership
Responsibility for India's unpr^aredness is also shared by senior 
military officers. In some cases, ambitious anny officers inhibited the 
full and frank disclosure of opinions contrary to the liking of the 
political leadership.”  In others, the military leadership fedled to 
recognize sound tactics even whan prepared by one of their own number.’ *
Ihcuc^ he retired fully 18 months before the war, Ihimayya must 
share the blame. Kaul accuses him of a "defeatist"’ * attitude after a 
MEA meeting at viiioh Ihimayya said: "Against Pak— total war; not against 
China. I cannot envisage taking on China in c^ aan conflict...it must be 
left to the politicians and diplomats to ensure our security".’* Palit 
argues that this attitude towards the Chinese threat adversely affected 
Ihimayya's professioncLL responsibility to prepare for the worst.’ ’ 
Despite the overpowering influence of the Manon-Kaul nexus, as amy 
chief Ihimayya was the dominant member of the Chiefs of Staff (006) and 
must take the lion's share of responsibility. It was not enough to 
modify the govermaait's policy of Non-Oonfrontational Containment vhen 
issuing orders to his cccmanders in LadaWi and NEFA.
’ ' Palit, op.cit., p. 160.
” See Dalvi, op.cit., pp. 86-87; and Verma, op.cit., p. 122.
’* See Maxwell, op.cit., pp. 305, 323-324; Palit, op.cit., pp. 51-52; 
and Ihorat, op.cit., pp. 214-215.
As used in Palit, op.cit., p. 80.
’* ibid., p. 80. Ihimayya made a similar statement after retiring. See 
N.a., Seminar July 1962, as used in George, Krishna Menon, 249.
” Palit, cp.cit., pp. 79-80.
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Ihimayya's retirement did not eand Army HQ's unprofessional strategic
planning. Palit describes a July 1961 meeting on the state of the army's
equipment reserves. D^xity Chief Lieut.-General %dalia said "if we ever
found ourselves at war with China which mi^it predictably be prolonged
beyond six mcnths, we could safely assume 'foreign intervention'".’* For
Palit, Wadalia's "wishful assunption*" * of Western add
represented an unconscious reversion to the colonial era when 
national security was not a function of Indian sovereignty but 
ultimately referable to Whitehall.. .Hiis was also the case with 
s&rdcac bureaucrats in the ministries, the ICS clan.. .Even Prime 
Minister Nehru appeared at tiroes to eitertain this idea.. .* “
Kaul, the youthful arch nationalist, also shared this "colonial"
attitude. In ïferch 1962, he told President Kennedy's special
Representative Chester Bowles that, in the now
likely.. .clash [with China].. .in the sunmsr or autunn of 1962 
[he].. .hoped, like most countries threatened with war, specially 
by a stronger eiemy, powers-that-be in our country would also 
work out, at least as a deterrent, with sane friends a basis of 
mutual co-operation to meet such a (serious) contingaxy in 
advance rather than too late or after the event.. .* ^
That many senior KCIOs— and civil servants— believed outside
intervention would cone to their aid in case of war with China stemmed
not from any formal agreements but from Nehru's judgement that a Sino-
Indian war would inevitably expand into a worldwide confrontation in
which the West woold side with the non-Ocnmunists.* ’
Kaul had Icxig been the most influential officer in India's civil-
military decision-making hierarchy and roust take much of the blame for
the inadequate defaice of the northern borders. Before the fi^iting
’* ibid., p. 88. 
ibid., p. 88. 
ibid., p. 88.
Kaul, op.cit., p. 341.
’ Palit, cp.cit., pp. 88-89.
-313-
started, he was not retiooit in taking the credit: "As late as October
1962, [Lieut.-] General Kaul...told the writer [Maxwell] that the
forward policy had been his own conception, 'sold to Nehru over the head
of Krishna Menon'...*"’ Yet in his autcbiogr i^iy, Kaul writes that at
the crucial 2 Novesnber 1961 meeting, it was Nehru who
said that whoever succeeded in establishing (even a symbolic) 
post, would establish a claim to that territory, as possession 
was nine-tenths of the law. If the Chinese could set i:p posts 
why couldn't we?...
A discussion then followed, the upshot of which I understood 
to be that (sinoe China was unlikely to wage a war with India, ) 
there was no reason why we should not play a game of chess and 
and a battle of wits with them, so far as the question of 
establishing posts was ccncemed. If they advanced in one place 
we should advance in another. • .This was how, I think, this new 
policy on our borders was evolved (which was referred to by some 
as 'forward' policy). [My italics.]**
Kaul's autc±>iographical account of the meeting also states that he added
his weight to Thapar and Palit's point that the logistical difficulties
of establishing, si^ jporting and reinforcing outposts in forward areas
would render them highly vulnerable. Palit recalls him as having
remained silent.*® If, despite his brag to Maxwell, Kaul cannot not be
blamed for thinking up the Forward Policy, neither can he take credit
for trying to forestall it.
I.e. Implemartation
One of the **more compelling**** accounts of how the Forward Policy 
came to be implemented blames Kaul for sending small units of troops 
into wholly indefensible, advanced positions. Palit has revealed that 
the policy's crucial third directive described above— **.. .to position
*’ Maxwell, cp.cit., p. 174.
** Kaul, op.cit., p. 280.
*® See Kaul, op.cit., p. 280; and Palit, op.cit., p. 106.
** Hoffmann, cp.cit., p. 98. See
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major œncentxatioTS of forces along our borders... behind the forward
posts..."— was not menticned by Nehru at the 2 November 1961 meeting but
later inserted into the official minites of the meeting by Foreign
Ministry officials seeking to create an alibi in case the Chinese did
attack in force. When Palit protested to Kaul that this "brazen ploy at
cLLibi-inaking** added logistical commitments which the amy could not then
fulfil, the latter "someWiat she^ishly confessed that he had been shown
a draft of the Foreign Ministry minutes before their issue and.. .had
already accorded his approval". Nor, continues Palit, did Kaul agree the
third directive logically should be given priority over the first two;
that is, that forward posts be established only after the provision of
adequate logistical support.*’ Whoi Palit then suggested forward posts
mi^it prove less provocative to China if occupied by IB personnel, Kaul
said that apart from the fact that such a course would cause 
loss of face for the amy, it was quite unnecessary. The danger 
of the Chinese reacting militarily to our forward policy was 
minimal.. .His only concession was that he agreed not to relay 
the contents of...(c) to Coanend BDs. It was for us to provide 
baok-up troops in Ladakh, not to advise Western Ocnmand to 
organise resources it did not possess. [Ity italics. ]*'
Acting on Kaul's advice, on 5 December 1961 Thapar ordered both Western
and Eastern Commands to patrol as near to the border as possible, to
establish posts blocking any further Chinese advances, and only then to
make a fresh appraisal of the logistic requirements they mi^it need.**
* ’ Palit, op.cit., pp. 107-109. See also p. 108; and Hoffmann, op.cit., 
p. 98.
** Palit, op.cit., pp. 109-110.
* * In his autobiography, Kaul omits any reference to his role in 
deciding Amy HQ's final d^lcyment orders to its forces in Ladakh and 
NEFA. Thapar later intimated that directive (c) was omitted because the 
required baok-ip bases would have taken too long to complete, giving the 
Chinese time to occupy even more Indian territory. See Akbar, op.cit., 
pp. 554-558; Hoffmann, op.cit., pp. 98, 283; Longer, op.cit., pp. 90-91, 
100-101, 106-107; Maxwell, cp.cit., pp. 221-224; Palit, cp.cit., p. 110; 
and P. Thapar, "The Chinese Invasion", The stateKman ^9 January 1971, as
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Hie pattern of the Forward Policy was soon set. Whereas ocnoem for 
the logistical shortocmings had led Thimayya to water down the 
govemraaTt's d^loyment orders of Non-Oonfrontational Containment, 
similar worries did not now prevent Thsçar and Kaul from wholeheartedly 
embracing the Forward Policy.*® When two minor Indian Army units in the 
Aksai Chin, Ladakh, faced down far superior Chinese forces in the 
spring/summer of 1962,*  ^ the press and public became convinced of the 
correctness of the Forward Policy— that the Chinese would not force 
their claim to border territories occiç)ied by Indian personnel— and the 
civil-military leadership was lulled into believing the policy provided 
real security on the northern borders.*' More could be tried. In Lada3di, 
orders were given for penny-packets of Indian forces in to push ever 
forward, and their orders of engagement modified from "fire only if 
fired upon" to "fire if the Chinese press dangerously close to your
used in Gopal, Jawaharlal Volume ttt  ^p. 208;
*“ By the end of 1961, over 50 forward posts had been established in 
LadaWi and NEFA. See Palit, op.cit., p. 160; Kaul, cp.cit. pp. 280-281; 
and Verma, op.cit., p. 120.
* ' The first occurred in early May vhai GoC West Lieut.-General Daulet 
Sinÿi asked for permission to withdraw an isolated outpost in the Chip 
Chap Valley lAiich had been surrounded by Chinese "in assault formation". 
Thapar dismissed Daulet as "jittery** and, when Nehru agreed the outpost 
should stay put so as to study the **behaviour pattern" of the enemy, the 
Chinese withdrew from the immediate area. The second, more serious 
incident occurred in mid-July whm a Chinese battalion surrounded a 
platoon of l/8th Gurkha Rifles sent into the Galwan Valley (against 
Daulet's advice). With the Indian Amy again in no position to 
retaliate, the civil-military leadership resorted to bluff. The MEA, 
writes Kaul, **wamad the Chinese Ehvcy in Delhi that if they persisted 
in this attitude in Ladakh (or elsewhere) we would be compelled to shoot 
cur way out of such trouble." When the Chinese refused to withdraw but 
failed to attack, **a wave of triunph suept the press and the 
politicians'*. See Gc^ el, op.cit., p. 211; Maxwell, cp.cit., pp. 233, 
235-236, 239; Kaul, cp.cit., p. 325; Palit, op.cit., pp. 173-174, 177- 
179; and Praval, op.cit., pp. 240-241.
*' See Mullik, cp.cit., pp. 329-330; and Palit, op.cit., p. 176-177,
182.
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MAP 8.3
The 'Forward Policy' in Ladakh
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positions”.*^  In NEFA, •^ Opearation CrtcEir", the establishment of up to 35 
outposts along the McMahon Line to be oocL^ied by Assam Rifles' 
personnel, cxxrinenced.®* All this forward activity came in spite of local 
comnanders' objections who saw the civil-military leadership in Delhi 
making decisions based on what it wanted to believe was true rather than 
on what they advised was the reality on the ground.*®
I.D. Final Days
Ihe beginning of the end of Indian civil-military overconfidence 
came on 8 September 1962 when an Assam Rifles' outpost near the Cbola 
Pass in eastern NEFA sent out a "frantic”** signal r^xarting being 
surrounded by 600 Chinese troops and asking for imnediate 
reinforcements. In response, GoC 4th Division Miranjan Anasad sent a 
company on the five day march to the outpost and ordered the rest of the 
battalion to prepare to move to lunpu, witdiin easier reach of the 
pass.*^  Ihe next day, 7th Brigade CD Brigadier J.P. Dalvi and his 
battalion cccmanders, all with firstHiand experience of the local 
terrain, advised that unfavourable geogr^hy and the Chinese forces' 
siperioritiy of arms and ease of supply made the Chola Pass position 
"ccmpletely indefensible".**
Ihe response of local corananders contrasts with the decision-making 
of India's civil-military leadership. On 10 S^*ember, GoC East Lieut.-
* ^ ItDweH, cp.cit., p. 239.
** See Maxwell, op.cit., p. 298; Palit, cp.cit., pp. 175-176, 186-187; 
and Praval, op.cit., p. 244.
* * See Dalvi, cp.cit., pp. 151, 165-166; Hoffmann, op.cit., p. 134; 
Maxwell, op.cit., p. 295; and Palit, cp.cit., p. 186-187.
* ® logar, %d Cbats tn Ooean. p. 370.
Dalvi, cp.cit., pp. 154-155. 
ibid., pp. 157-158.
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General Sen, the officer with ultimate responsibility for KEFÀ, 
conferred tel^3honically with Ihapar and then ordered 9th Punjab to move 
iimediately to Lurrpu and 7th Brigade to prepare to leave in 48 hours to 
confront the Chinese at the Oiola Pass.** Ihe two officers had just 
changed army strategy in the northeast from one of backing forward 
patrols to one of direct confrontation by a significant military force*® 
without the benefit of any first-hand knowledge of NEFA and without 
consulting either the local commanders, OGS Kaul, or EMD Palit (all of 
vAom knew the area from current/previous personsLl/cocmand esgjerience) .* ^ 
On 11 September, the civil-military leadership went further, 
effectively changing the Forward Policy from aggressive self-defence to 
outright offence by ordering ’K^ peraticn Leg^xxn", the forcible eviction 
of the Chinese menacing the Dhola Pass outpost and the capture of the 
local highground, the ihagla Ridge. Such was the poor state of India's 
civil-military decision-making that this momentous decision was taken in 
the absence of Ndiru (since 8 S^*enber at the London conference of 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers), Finance Minister Desai (normally cabinet 
chair in the FM's absence but also in London) and Home Minister Shastri 
(the remaining senior member of the Cabinet: Defence Committee). Instead, 
at a New Delhi meeting attended by Mullik, Foreign Secretary M.J. Desai, 
Cabinet Secretary S.S. Khera, Joint Secretary (Defence) H. Sarin,
Ihapar, and (with Kaul on holiday) D^juty OGS Major-General J.S.
Dhillon, chairman Menon accepted Sen's assurance that within 10 days an
** See Dalvi, op.cit., p. 161; and Hoffmann, op.cit., pp. 130-131.
*° Hoffmann, c^.cit., p. 131.
* ^ Kaul had had many adventures in NEFA, both on perscxial missions 
approved by Nehru and as 4th Division 00 and OGS. Palit had commanded 
7th Brigade in NEFA before being appointed EMD. See Kaul, op.cit., pp. 
160-169, 227-237, 276-277; and Palit, op.cit., pp. 46-50.
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infantry brigade oould be concentrated below the Thagla Ridge to expel
all Chinese forces in the area.® *
NEFA commanders were incredulous at their senior's urçrofessional
advice to the political leadership. Dalvi
cannot understand the basis for [Lieut.-] General Sen's... 
guarantee... [which] he did so entirely on his own and without 
any assurance from the Corps, Divisional or Brigade commanders.
I had given no such undertaking, nor was I in a position to do 
so. I did not have a brigade to concentrate.. .to sL^ p^ort 
(^ aerations.® '
What on a map seemed perfectly plausible to politicians and senior 
officers in Delhi and to Eastern Command HQ in Lucknow was unattainable 
in the extreme mountain conditions of NEFA. When Sen personally passed 
on the new d^loyment orders to Pr^ad and GoC 33rd Oocps Unrao Sinc^ on 
12 S^ jteamber, both protested at the impossibility of evicting a Chinese 
force they now estimated as a full division and a half.®® Yet Sen 
remained adamant. Nothing seemed to be thcuÿit inpossible by senior 
commanders eager to please their civilian masters.
Four years into the reign of the Menon-Raul nexus, such 
urpcofessional behaviour had become the norm at Army HQ. For a number of 
months, no proper records of vital decisions had been kept at 
headquarters; now Operation Le^iom saw orders increasingly issued 
telephcxiically instead of in writing.®* On 16 September, Palit returned 
from leave to find
® ' See Dalvi, cp.cit., p. 170; Hoffmann, op.cit., pp. 131-132; Kaul, 
(^.cit., p. 356; Maxwell, op.cit., pp. 303-304; Mullik, op.cit., p. 341; 
Palit, cp>.cit., pp. 196, 203; and Praval, op.cit., pp. 245-246.
® * Dalvi, cp.cit., p. 169.
®® See Dalvi, cp.cit., pp. 173-177; Hoffmann, cp.cit., pp. 132-133, 135; 
Kaul, cp.cit., pp. 356-357; Maxwell, cp.cit., pp. 302-310; and Palit, 
op.cit., p. 205.
®* See Dalvi, op.cit., p. 176; Maxwell, cp.cit., pp. 306-309, 312-314; 
and Palit, cp.cit., pp. 195-200.
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Military OperaticxTS Directorate...in a state of confusion...now 
merely relaying orders on behalf of the officiating GCS [Major- 
Geieral Dhillon, who]...focused on the political decision [to 
evict the Chinese from Thagla Ridge].. .rather than on the 
logistical and tactical factors that clearly daiied the 
feasibility of that option.**
Even more unprofessional— and dangerous to the corporate cohesion of the
Indian Amy— was Amy Ha's interference in the tactical d^loyment of
troops in NEFA. Dalvi states the otvious: "In well regulated armies it
is not the statutory functiœ of siperior commanders to order the moves
of units, or to evict junior commanders from their HQs. A formation is
given a task, and the formation commander executes it".*’ Yet his
brigade's deployment south of the Thagla Ridge was orchestrated down to
the smallest detail by his superiors.*"
Also new typical of Amy HQ vas senior officers' supineness to
government civilians. On 22 S^ tertber, Thapar, worried that a fatal
exchange of fire across the defacto border of the Namka Chu river two
days earlier presaged a attack on vulnerable Indian outposts in NEFA
and/or Ladakh, soumît written confirmation of the "eviction" order given
at the 11 S^tember New Delhi meeting chaired by Maion.** In the absence
of Nehru (still in London), Menon (at a DN Security Council session in
New York), Finance Minister Desai (in Washington), and Home Minister
Shastri (in Kerala), it was left to Joint Secretary (Defence) Sarin to
sign an order confirming the goverrmaTt's directive that the amy expel
the Chinese from Dhola and the Thagla Ridge.’° Thapar accepted this
** Palit, op.cit., pp. 195, 199.
*’ Dalvi, op.cit., p. 176.
** See Dalvi, op.cit., pp. 176, 188-191, 193, 206-207; Kaul, op.cit.,
pp. 359-360; and Palit, op.cit., pp. 90, 211-212.
*" See Dalvi, op.cit., pp. 195-197; Hoffmann, op.cit., pp. 143-144;
Kaul, cp.cit., p. 362,
’ “ Maxwell's assertion that a tel^bone call was made by to Menon in New
York before the issuance of this order is disputed by Hoffmann. See
-320-
oonfirmaticxi and the same day issued the relevant orders to his
ccninanders in NEFA/^
Many officers saw lhapar's acceptance of Joint Secretary (Defence)
Sarin's authority as a failure of leadership. Kaul, an exception to the
majority of his comrades \(Ax) believed Thorat had been the best candidate
to succeed Thiraayya as array chief, felt Ih^ar "had the courage of his
convictions and was not afraid of expressing his cpinicns, even though
unpalatable, in the presence of those above him".’  ^ But for Palit, the
chief's acceptance of Sarin's order shewed otherwise:
I could not understand Ihapar's thou^rt processes. The very fact 
that he asked for a written order from the Minister indicated 
that he was not Wiolly in agreement with the content of the 
verbal one.. .clearly he was alarmed about a possible riposte in 
both Ladakh and NEFA, and he must have known that in either 
evait our forward posts stood no chance of a co-ordinated 
attack. Furthermore, since Menon was away he would not have to 
face any browbeating; so \»^ y did he not resist the pressure on 
him to amount [sic] a reckless offensive at Thag-la?’ '
Dalvi found it "unbelievable.. .that the Chief was satisfied with this
order and passed it cxi. 'To be ri^t and overruled is not forgivai to
perscns in respcxisible positions!'"^ *
Yet, as before, those in responsible positions who contradicted the
received wisdom of the Mencn-Kaul nexus soon found themselves in
trouble. The latest victim was Urarao Sin^ ^ A%o had r^aeatedly protested
against army HQ's thcu^tless deployment of forward posts.’® Siirply
Dalvi, op.cit., p. 203; J.K. Galbraith, Ambassador's Journal An American 
view of India (Kk. ed., Bombay: Jaico Publishing House, 1972. Published 
by arrangemait with Hamish Hamilton Ltd, Loidan, 1969), p. 123;
Hoffmann, op.cit., p. 144; Maxwell, op.cit., p. 315; Mullik, cp.cit., 
pp. 352-353; and Palit, cp.cit., p. 214.
Palit, op.cit., pp. 215-216.
’' Kaul, cp.cit., p. 271.
’ ^ Palit, cp.cit., p. 214.
Dalvi, cp.cit., p. 203.
’® See Dalvi, op.cit., pp. 209, 212, 213, 223-224; Hoffmann, cp.cit., p. 
147; Maxwell, cp.cit., p. 321; and Palit, op.cit., p. 217.
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sacking him would have raised suspicions that sections of the array were
either incompetent and/or displeased at government policy in NEFA (and
left his successor with a potentially hostile staff). Instead, after
meetings cn 2-3 October between Ndiru, Menon, Thapar, Sen and Kaul, it
was announced that Urarao's 33rd Corps would be given exclusive
responsibility for the Sikkim, Nagaland and East Pakistan fronts, vAile
Kaul would be made GoC of a "new** 4 Corps headquartered in Tezpur with
orders to carry out the eviction order in the Thagla Ridge forthwith/*
Ri^lacing the respected Urarao Sin^ and his experienced 33rd Corps
with Kaul and a new (in name only; see below) 4 Corps stunned the armed
forces/’ Not only was Kaul the one senior officer derided for having no
combat experience, he had beæ on leave in Kashmir since 3 S^xtember and
was out of touch with recent develcpnents/ " Palit was "as surprised as
aghast at the news. What new corps? Why him? Who would do the CGS's job
whai he left?"’ • Kaul himself describes the immensity of his task:
[4th Corps] was to consist at the moment of only...two (5 and 7) 
Infantry Brigades, (with the possibility of a third Brigade 
joining me later) vhereas normally there are six to twelve 
Infantry Brigades in a Corps.. .There was also another Division 
to be formed which would be given to me, apart from other 
reinforcements, later...
Normally it takes between six months and a year to raise and 
train and a Corps Headquarters in its operational and 
administrative functions. It takes another six months to a 
year.. .after units and formations have been made available, to 
make a Corps battle-worthy.. .1, on the other hand, was given 
ocmraand of a Corps vAiich was practically non-existant on the 
ground and the headquarters of which had yet to be raised. I
’* Accounts of the meetings vary sli^tly. See Dalvi, op.cit., p. 222; 
Hoffmann, op.cit., p. 148; Kaul, op.cit., pp. 336, 364-365; Maxwell, 
cp.cit., pp. 319-323; and Palit, op.cit., pp. 219-221.
”  See Hoffmann, op.cit., p. 148; Maxwell, cp.cit., p. 322; and Palit, 
cp.cit., p. 219.
’* See Kaul, cp.cit., pp. 337-338, 340-348, 353; MUllik, op.cit., pp. 
338, 348; and Palit, cp.cit., pp. 191, 211.
”  Palit, p.cit., p. 220. See also Dalvi, p.cit., pp. 220-224.
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was, thus, e>q)ected to perfonn a miracle and begin to operate 
ininediately. [My indents.]*®
General Chauliiri, unusually silent in his autobiography cn the events
leading to the Chinese invasion, stops to disparage Kaul's oonplaints:
The newly-appointed C3arps Oonnander had many complaints when 
things went wrong. He complained that thou^ he was the Corps 
Commander, the Corps HQ did not exist on [the] ground forgetting 
that whatever the acts of omission and commission, he was 
himself to blame, being the Chief of the General Staff.* ^
Whatever Kaul's recorded complaints, Palit, in discussion with the new
GoC 4th Corps on the ni^it before his departure for NEFA on 4 October,
oould see that Bijji was greatly pleased with himself and I 
could imagine He was going to war at last, and at the top 
level. Here was his chance to make rp for the past, to fill in 
the blanks in his credaitials and to give lie to his detractors. 
There would be no holding him back.* *
A oocmander ineaperieioed in battle but desperately eager to prove
himself, flying to the front with a staff of **yes-men"** to take over a
severely under-resourced corps was never going to give India's civil-
military leadership the quick victory they still believed possible. Yet
such was Ndiru's belief in the abilities of his favourite officer that
Kaul left for the front bearing just such ejpectations.**
Despite his hopes, Kaul committed an error of judgement on the
evening of 11 October which was to prove the undoing of Indian Anny
defences in NEFA. The day before, he had been shocked at the force of a
Chinese attack on several Indian positicns along the Namka Chu river;
I had now seen with ny own eyes the superior resources of the 
Chinese.. .and the untenability of our position.. .Frankly 
speaking, I had now fully understood all the inplicaticns of our
*“ Kaul, op.cit., 336-367.
*  ^ Chaudhuri, cp.cit., p. 173.
*' Palit, op.cit., p. 222.
* * See ibid., p. 222.
** See Dalvi, op.cit., pp. 225, 231; and Palit, op.cit., p. 223.
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predicament and.. .1 thouÿit we should reconsider the vAole of 
our position in this theatre [NEFA].*®
Kaul agreed with local commanders Prasad and Dalvi that their forces
should pull back to more defensible and easily supplied positions, but
refused to authorize this move until he oould present the hopelessness
of their present situation to his superiors in Delhi.* ‘ Yet, at a
meeting the next ni^t attended by top civil-military decision-makers
including N^iru, Maion, Mullik, Ihapar and Sen,* ^ Kaul offered the IM
three choices: (a) launch an attack débité the overwhelming odds; (b)
hold present positions; or (c) retreat to more defensible locations.**
While accounts vary, it is apparent that when both Ihapar and Sen,
neither with any first-hand knowledge of the relevant terrain, scoffed
at Haul's assessment of the precariousness of the Indian positions and
advised that the troops along the Nanka Chu river hold their present
positiCTis, he did not protest. Nehru agreed and allcwsd the troops to
remain overexposed to the enengr.*" In giving the civil-military
leadership three choices where only one— retreat— was reasonable, Kaul
ignored the first duty of a commander to do what is best for his mai.
Nehru also seemed unable to admit to Indian frailties on the 
northern borders. On 13 S^ jtemober, he told reporters at Delhi adrport 
vA» had come to see him off to Oolcmobo that "Our instructions [to 
military forces in NEFA] are to free our territory...I cannot fix a
*® Kaul, cp.cit., pp. 383-384. Dalvi writes that the Chinese caused Kaul 
to exclaim "Oh my God...You are ri(ÿït, they mean business". See Dalvi, 
cp.cit., p. 255.
** See Dalvi, cp.cit., pp. 255-258; and Kaul, op.cit., p. 383,
*’ See Kaul, cp.cit., p. 385; Mullik, op.cit., pp. 361-364; and Palit, 
cp.cit., pp. 226-227.
* * Kaul, cp.cit., p. 386.
*’ See Hoffmann, cp.cit., pp. 153-154; Kaul, op.cit., pp. 385-386; 
Mullik, cp.cit., pp. 361-364; and Palit, cp.cit., pp. 226-228.
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date, that is entirely for the Arny".*" Althcuÿi he went cn to discuss 
some aspects of the situation which favoured China— their forces were 
more numerous and held the hi^ier ground, their main SLçply base was 
closer to the disputed border, and wintry conditions limited Indian 
mobility— he made no mention of his decision to temporarily su^jend 
Operation Le^iom because of Indian Amy deficiaicies. How could he, 
after years of asserting the opposite? While N^iru's statement may have 
been meant as an innocuous (if naively worded) reiteration of publicly- 
stated policy, the international, Chinese and Indian press and people 
todc it as a virtual declaration of war.*‘
In the few days left before war, the civil-military leadership 
continued to stumble from one bad judgment to another,* ' the most 
notable being the 19 September decision to retain Kaul as GoC 4th Corps 
even thouÿi he had just been diagnosed as suffering from pulmonary 
oedema and flcwn back to Delhi for "complete rest".*’ (Following 
procedure would have seen him replaced by the NEFA theatre's next- 
ranking officer, Prasad) .* * Why, too, when his illness had been 
diagnosed as too serious to be treated at the amy hospital in Tezpur, 
Kaul was allowed to recuperate at home?* * Nonetheless, urged on by the 
cream of India's civil-military decision-makers constantly in attendance
** See ThA Fîta-baçjnanr 13 October 1962, as used in a number of sources, 
including Gopal, op.cit., p. 220; and Longer, op.cit., p. 374.
*’ See Hoffmann, op.cit., p. 154; Maxwell, op.cit., pp. 342-344; Longer, 
cp.cit., p. 374; and Verma, op.cit., p. 127.
*’ See Hoffmann, op.cit., pp. 156-158; Kaul, cp.cit., pp. 388-389; 
Mullik, cp.cit., pp. 368, 370; and Palit, cp.cit., p. 231.
*’ Kaul, cp.cit., p. 391.
When Palit cxxifronted Ihapar on the "bizarre parody of military 
prac±ice" of letting Kaul remain as GoC 4th Corps, the chief "merely 
said that the Defence Minister had so ordered". See Palit, op.cit., p. 
236.
’* Edwardes, Nehru, p. 304.
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at his sickbed, Kaul continued to carder his commanders in NEFA to remain 
in what he knew were untenable positions.* ‘ It was there that he heard 
news of the Chinese invasion along the northern borders on 20 October.
I.E. Questionnaire Respondaits
India's top civil-military decision-makers had insisted on 
implementing the Forward Policy depute the opposition of any nunber of 
senior commanders in the theatres concerned. What of the men who served 
under them? How did the Indian armed forces' field officers whose units 
would bear the brunt of the civil-military leadership's strategy for the 
defence of the northern borders, see the Forward Policy? In 1962, most 
of the (questionnaire respondents were at or around the field rank, and 
their responses may be seen on Table 8.1.
TABLE 8.1
What was your opinion of the Forward Policy?
Percent(No.)
Negative 59.38 (57)
Positive 20.83 (20)
No Answer 19.79 (19)
Total 100.00 (96)
While a fifth (19.79%) of re^xndents say their relatively junior 
rank in 1962 meant th^ cxjuld give "No Answer", an equal number (20.83%) 
(iescribe having had a "Positive"— though (qualified— view of the Forward 
Policy. Some, like Air Chief Marshal 1, fault only its "insufficient 
pr^Daration". Others, like Brigadier (Dr.) 55, use historical 
(qualifications: a "badly prepared army and poor leadership does not mean
See Hoffmann, op.cit., pp. 158-159; Kaul, op.cit., pp. 388-392; 
lËucwell, op.cit., pp. 355-357; Mullik, op.cit., pp. 372-373; and Palit, 
op.cit., pp. 234-236.
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the policy was bad. Rather, Tibet should never have been adlcwed to be
occupied by the Chinese". Officers also blame the civil-military
leadership for cxDçcanising 1±e Forward Policy. Brigadier 40 argues that
as a policy there was nothing %arong %dth it. Vtiat was wrong was 
that execution was also being sought to be influenced by the 
"non-professionals" like Krishna Menon. Because of the then 
ooBnander's [Ihapar] weakness in not resisting such 
interference, the policy came under criticism.
Nonetheless, "Positive" respondents agree that "something had to be
done" (Vice Admiral 8) and there was "no other alternative" (Air Marshal
7) to the Forward Policy.
Ihe almost two-thirds (59.38%) majority of respondents who describe 
the Forward Policy as "Negative" disagree. For Lieut.-General 17, 
Brigadier 76 and Colonel 24, respectively, the Forward Policy was "ill- 
conceived and miscalculated", "rank bravado", and "premature and 
stupid". ^Decifically cited are failures in diplomacy— "an agreement to 
'exchange' Aksai Chin with other areas would have givai long-term 
benefit.. .and would have shown pragmatic and mature political ability 
rather than emotional reactions" (Lieut.-General 49)— intelligence— "a 
political policy based on inadequate/faulty intelligence...in spite of 
warnings given by the more professionally conpetent senior amy 
officers" (Brigadier 29)— and strategic thinking— "it was farced on the 
generals to placate political thinking, 'not an inch of Indian soil will 
be surrendered'. Biis is where both Nehru and Menon went wrong. Uiis was 
a job for generals not politicians" (Lieut.-C3olcnel 80). In the final 
analysis, argues Brigadier 73, "there was no immediate danger to the 
country. We forced the Chinese to enter India".
Some "Negative" respondents acknowledge the military leadership's 
ccnplicity in the Forward Policy. For Lieut.-General 10,
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the vhole thing was totally non-professional. Ihere was no 
strategy behind this policy and there was a childish belief that 
there [would] not be any military conflict between China and 
India. Ihe military hierarchy had acquiesced in this and was 
mesmerized into thinking that it was a politically infallible 
policy.
Some officers, recalls Brigadier 69, tried to protest;
I was in [the] Bcmdila, Sela, Towang area. We tried to tell 
[Major-]Gen Amrit Sin^ that it will be foolish to send troops 
forward without roads and supplies. He said "I know... [but] what 
can you do! Everyday Menon rings up to find out how far have we 
advanced”.*’
Débité their field grade positions, most questionnaire reqxndents 
understood it was civil-military leadership's poor decisions which were, 
in the words of Lieut.-Colonel 25, "unnecessarily creating a critical 
situation for the defence".
II. War
II.A. Invasion to Ceasefire
Just how critical the situation had become became apparent on 20 
October when Chinese forces attacked Indian positions eLLl edong the 
northern borders and, writes Verma, "most of the troops deployed in 
penny packets in pursuance of the so-called 'Porward Policy' advocated 
by Krishna Menon and Biji Kaul...[were] swept away like driftwood before 
a torrent".** In eastern NEEA, the 7th Infantry Brigade "virtually 
ceased to exist"* * and within days Prasad and his HQ abandoned Towang, 
over 20 miles inside Indian-claimed territory. Fierce fi^iting also 
broke around Walong in the previously quiet western a d  of NEFA.
*’ From an interview with Brigadier 69; London, 9 December 1989. 
*• Verma, op.cit., p. 120.
** Palit, op.cit., p. 242.
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Àlthcu^ isolated Indian Array and J&K Militia outposts offered stiff 
resistance in Ladakh, they were eventually overwhelmed by the eneny's 
st^ serior nunters. By 24 October, the Chinese were secure aiough in their 
gains to offer peace if India respected a 7 November 1959 "line of 
actual control" (which effectively ceded the former 12,000 square miles 
of northern border land). Althou^ India refused this offer, there 
occurred a brief lull in hostilities.^ *’®
The Chinese attacks shocked India— and Ndiru. He declared a state of 
Emergency, labelled the Chinese offensive a "major invasion"^  ® ^ in %Aich 
the fate of Asia and the world was at stake, appealed for (and received) 
US and other Western military aid and, under severe pressure from 
Parliament and the press, took over the defence portfolio from Menon 
(demoted to the new post of Minister for Defence Production) ® ' Ndiru 
also handed back to Amy HQ responsibility for military tactics and 
deployment: "It is a matter now for the military to decide— where and 
hew they should fi r^t" [My italics].^®’ From 24 October, he began to 
chair the daily defence meetings introduced by Menon the month before.
Despite these changes, the lull allowed the political leadership to 
convince itself that only the surprise and overwhelming nunbers of the 
Chinese attacks were to blame for Indian reverses and, if the amy oould 
be allowed sufficient time to regroup, civil-military decisicn-making 
could remain unchanged.^ ®* Tactics continued to be decided by small
®^® See Dalvi, op.cit., pp. 105, 316-325; Hoffmann, op.cit., p. 163;
Maxwell, op.cit., pp. 360-371; Longer, op.cit., pp. 375-378, 396;
Mullik, op.cit., pp. 374-377.
®^^  Kavic, op.cit., p. 178.
®^^  See George, cp.cit., pp. 252-254; Longer, op.cit., pp. 382-385; and
Maxwell, op.cit., pp. 360-267.
^®’ Palit, cp.cit., p. 246. See also Hoffmann, op.cit., p. 164; and
Maxwell, op.cit., p. 368.
®^* See Bdvardes, op.cit., pp. 306-307; and Hoffmann, op.cit., pp. 170-
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grxxçs of senior civil-military leaders— Nehru, Menon (decreasingly 
until the aco^Ttanoe of his letter of resignation on 7 November; see 
below), Foreign Secretary Desai (increasingly). Minister of Economic and 
Defence Coordination T.T. Krishnamachari (increasingly),^ ®* Ihapar, Sen, 
Kaul, and Palit— with little imtual consultation and/or regard for 
formal procedure. Perhaps the most glaring example of "business as 
usual" came when Kaul, who had been formally replaced as GoC 4th Corps 
on 24 October returned to his post on 29 October.^ ®* ïhat Kaul's 
reinstatement was likely to harm India's fighting efficiency— he 
r^laced the capable and respected Lieut.-General HarbaMish Singh— and 
morale— frontline troops openly scoffed at their ccnmander's "timely" 
evacuation and "political" rdiabilitation— did not deter Ndiru from 
foisting upon the army his favourite commander.^  ®^
Nowhere is the disastrous effect of the civil-military leadership's 
over-reliance on personal contact better illustrated than in Palit's 
record of the "ni^tmarish*" ® • days of 17-18 November at 4th Corps HQ, 
Tezpur. (Unless otherwise noted, the quotes below are Palit's own. )^ ® *
Cn 17 November, Army HQ received from Walong a signal in vhich Kaul
164.
“ * See Hoffmann, op.cit., pp. 164, 205.
^®‘ See Hoffmann, op.cit., pp. 181-182; and Kaul, op.cit., p. 395-396, 
398.
^®’ See Hoffmann, op.cit., pp. 171-173, 180-183; Maxwell, op.cit., pp. 
389-390; Kaul, op.cit., pp. 396-398; and Palit, op.cit., pp. 236, 244- 
255.
Palit, cp.cit., p. 324.
 ^® * Of the two published narratives which describe the events of 17/18 
November, Palit's recent War is far more authoritative than Kaul's The 
Untold Story as it draws upon his official General Staff r^xart "Sunmary 
of Events and Policies" compiled after the vrar from his daily notes. 
Military Operations files, and TOPSBC [Tcp Secret] documents. From 
private correspondence between myself and Palit, 1995; and Palit, 
op.cit., pp. 248-249, 259, 261, 301-335.
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"sounded so desperate as to be almost demented" / ^ ® Ihapar and Palit 
responded by proceeding to 4th Oorps H3 to join Sen and await Kaul so as 
to bolster his confidence. (Just how ill-suited the "frail and 
distrauc^"^ ‘ ‘ Thapar was for this task became evident cn the flight iç) 
vAen he intimated he was pondering his resignation/dismissal.) Neither 
suspected they were about to fight the crucial battle of the 1962 war.
The lull in fighting had allowed the Indian Army to quiddy 
reconstitute a 4th Division of ten battalions for the defence of eastern 
NEFA. While deficient in hi^-altitude training and reserves, these 
battalions could draw upon artillery and other heavy weaponry, and the 
military leadership was confident of checking the Chinese at the hi^ 
ground of Se La Pass held by the 62nd Brigade with the 65tti in close 
attendance at Sage. Further defensive insurance %as provided by the 
48th Brigade, stationed 60 miles back at the other end of the Se La- 
Sage-(Nyukmadong)-Dirang D2ong-(Thectoang)-flcmdila road.
Yet, within hours of Thapar and Palit's appearance in Tezpur, the 
Indian Array's planned defence of eastern NEFA began to collapse. 
Immediately i:^ xn their arrival. Sen informed them that 4th Division 
Major-General Anant RAhania (who had replaced Prasad on Sen's orders 
and was now in Bcodila) had ordered the 4th Garhwali Rifles to withdraw 
from their position on the outer defences of Se La (at Narangang) 
despite the battalicxi just having r^xilsed four successive attacks by 
"motley"^  ^ ' Chinese forces. Socxi afterwards came information that GoC 
48th Brigade Gurbax Sinÿi had okayed the retreat of 5th Guards
Palit, op.cit., p. 301. See also Edwardes, op.cit., p. 307; 
Hoffmann, cp.cit., pp. 183-185; and Kaul, op.cit., pp. 403-410. 
Palit, cp.cit., p. 304. 
ibid., p. 308.
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battaliOTi, located just off the Se La-Bomdila road at Iheatong, after it
had been surrounded by Chinese troops. Thapar and Palit eilso learnt that
Pathania already had persuaded Kaul to let him move 4th Division % —
acocmpanied by 65th Brigade— down from Senge, just below Se La, to the
Border Roads canp at EXiirang Dzong so as to alleviate his hi^ altitude
headaches. Palit "oould scarcely believe what we were told. None of the
ccmnanders seemed to have the stomach for a fight".^ '^
Matters did not improve when Kaul arrived from waiong to complete,
with Thapar and Sen, the ruling triumvirate of India's military
leadership. Alreac^, Palit had taken a tel^hone call from Pathania in
whioh the latter asked for permission to retreat from Dhirang Dzong
because he feared the Chinese taking the Se La-Bomdila road and cutting
off his escape route. Sen pleaded for Pathania's request to be granted:
"If 4 Infantry Division can make a clean break now.. .it will 
have a clear chance of getting away intact".
Before Thapar could be influenced by this specious argument 
I [Palit] asked the the Amy Oonnander what the Division's 
operational role was: to fight the eneny at Se-la or to keep 
itself intacty
It was becoming obvious India's top three military decision-makers— and 
assorted field conmanders— were not tp to battle conmand. Soon after 
Kaul's arrival, Palit discovered that a signal had been issued granting 
Pathania's request to retreat. When neither Thapar, Sen nor Kaul 
admitted to its authorship, Palit iirplored the chief that "we could 
never face the nation if 12,000 [Indian] troops...'ran away' without 
even facing the enemy",^  ^* and persuaded him to cancel the message. Kaul 
now ordered 4th Division "to remain at Se-la and to fight it out to the
ibid., p. 309. 
ibid., p. 311. 
ibid., p. 315.
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best of its ability and withdraw only if its position became
untenable".“  * Yet just over an hour later, Pathania was on the line
again cfenanding permission to withdraw. Palit, vAo had answered tiie
telephone, made Pathania confirm that there had been no frontal assault
on Se La, only various minor activities in the Dhirang Dzong-Bomdila
area. Then Kaul,
in words whioh will surely remain a classic double entendre in 
our military history bodes... [told Pathania]
"For toni^t you hang on to your defences. Have another chat 
with roe in the morning"
How far that unconventional enjoinroait would stand up as 
an imperative to a jittery subordinate to stay and fight, I need 
not comment upcxi— but it was too late to do anything about 
it.“ ’
In any case nothing was done and, as India's top military leaders slq>t 
that night in Tezpur, Pathania acted as if he understood Kaul's words to 
mean he could begin pulling cut.
The next rooming exposed the consequences of the previous nig^'s 
irresolution. Kaul informed Palit that in the ni^it 62nd Brigade 00 
Brigadier Hoshiar Sinc^ had ordered his troops to pull out of their 
prepared defences around Se La, and that at 0630 Pathania had telephoned 
to say that "he was closing down his headquarters at Dhirang Dzong, 
because of the Chinese threat, and was moving— though he could not state 
\ihat his destination would be".^ *^ Discovering that all ooranunication 
links with the forces defending the Se La-Bomdila Road silent, Palit was 
now in "no doubt that everybody was on the run. 4[th] Infantry Division 
had ceased to exist".^^" Informed of these developmaits, Thapar and Sen 
"looked stunned". With Idle Chinese seemingly advancing at will, Palit
ibid., p. 315. 
ibid., pp. 317-318. 
ibid., op.cit., p. 319. 
ibid., p. 321.
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advised preparing for the defence of Assam. But the top triumvirate of
India's military leadership could only hold
a number of discussions in opinions gyrated freely but
were seldom to the point. In the midst of the most acute 
military crisis the nation had faced in centuries, none seemed 
able to stretch his strategic horizon to take in the full 
significance of the situation.^ *®
At mid-aftemoon, with no effective orders yet issued, Sen scr^)ed the
bottom of India's military decision-making barrel, saying to Ihapar,
"Sir, there is no option left for us but to ask for a 
ceasefire!"
"What!" I [Palit] blurted out, "Surrender?"
"If it comes to that, 1 suppose, yes," he [Sen] relied.
"Never! What are you talking about.. .If the Chinese come
down into to the plains, that's the time to get our own back on
them— not to put out hands vç)!"
I looked at Thapar and thought I sensed sL^ ]port, but he said
nothing.” "
This conversation immediately was followed by news that Bomdila, 
defended by 48th Brigade, was under attack. Leaving Sen and Kaul to 
organise what was left of the 4th Infantry Division's defaioe of eastern 
NEFA, Thapar and Palit left for Delhi to brief the political leadership 
on the prospects of protecting Assam from a Chinese invasion.
The humiliation heaped on India's civil-military leadership seemed 
limitless. Alreac^, N^iru had had to ask for Western military aid and 
been forced to aoc^jt Menon's resignation from the government (see 
below). Now, on 19 November, a day after the coll^se of the Se La- 
Bomdila defences, he wrote to US President Kennedy requesting American 
aircraft and pilots provide edr cover for Indian cities." ”  With little 
news of any effective armed resistance, the s^iior military leadership 
under Thapar came close to recommending the evacuation of Assam, and the
ibid., p. 324.
""" ibid., p. 327.
Akbar, cp.cit., p. 560.
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Hcrae Ministry signalled its perscnnel in Tezpur and other northeastern 
cities to pr^ore for a scorched earth policy of defence/ ' ' Thsqpar then 
resigned cn grounds of ill-health to make way for (then GoC South 
Lieut.-Gaieral) Chaudhuri. (Nehru was dissuaded from his original 
intention of replacing Ihapar %d.th Kaul ty some forceful persuasion t y  
President Radhakrishnan)* In a national broadcast that evening, Nehru 
seemed to be pr^aring "our friends in Assam"^  ' ® for imminent invasion, 
giving rise to public panic. But Chaudhuri's first act as chief, his 20 
November order that his conmanders must stand and defend Assam,^  ' * 
became redundant the very next day vhai the Chinese added the final 
humiliation of declaring a unilateral ceasefire on all fronts and a 
withdrawal, to begin on 1 December, to positions behind the "line 
of actual control" which Nehru had refused to accept earlier. To reach 
this ignominious end had cost the Indian Amy 1,423 killed, 3,078 
wounded, 1,655 missing believed dead.^*’
II.B. Performance
India's political leadership was not keen to expose its decision­
making failures to public scrutiny. Ihe only official inquiry into the 
d^Dacle of the 1962 War, a wholly military affair instigated by 
Chaudhuri and compiled by GoC 11th Corps Major-General Henderson-Brooks 
and IMA Commandant Brigadier P.S. Hiagat, was severely restricted in its 
access to both officers and documents.Nonetheless, the "Elenderson-
See Hoffmann, op.cit., pp. 196-210; Maxwell, op.cit., pp. 408-414; 
and Palit, op.cit., p. 336-348.
' Edwardes, cp.cit., p. 308.
Maxwell, op.cit., p. 409.
" Chaudhuri, op.cit., pp. 174-175.
Longer, op.cit., p. 397.
* For instance, the enquiry did not ask for nor receive Palit's
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Brooks Report:" proved so disagreeable to the government that its 
findings remain secret to this day. Ihe only official reaction came on 2 
September 1963 when new Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan (sworn in on 21 
November) / ' * stating that the purpose of the inquiry had never been "in 
any way [to] undertake a witch-hunt into the capabilities of those who 
were concerned with or took part in these operations"/** gave 
Parliament only a most gaieral description of its findings. He did admit 
that the inquiry's report contained reccnmmdations including:
(i) The need for more realistic battle training, especially in 
mountain warfare.
(ii) The urgency of eliminating shortages of et^pœnt.
(iii) The need for curbing the tendency among senior officers to 
interfere in the tactical handling of troops at lower levels.
(iv) The requirement of preparing troops adequately before 
committing them to a theatre of operations.
(v) The requirement of better communications (signals and 
equipment).
(vi) The need for a better intelligence set-tp.* * *
Althou^ Chavan added that the r ^ r t  recommended political directives 
be more closely related to the army's size and equipment, he neglected 
to say that it had apparently traced the roots of the defeat to the 
"hitler direction of war".*** For the political leadership, the sooner 
the 1962 War was forgotten, the better.
II.B.l. KdCB
The KdOs are not reticent in noting the causes of defeat. Thorat 
holds Kaul "responsible for the chaos in N.E.F.À It was also he who.
"Sunmary of Events and Policies", the only contemporaneous record of 
events written by an officers at Army HQ. See Maxwell, cp.cit., pp. 437- 
438; Kaul, op.cit., pp. 454-455; and Palit, op.cit., pp. 376, 388-391. 
*** Longer, op.cit., p. 392.
*** Statement in Ldk Sakha, 29.9.63 as used in Maxwell, cp.cit., p. 437.
* * * Praval, op.cit., pp. 326-327. See also Hoffmann, op.cit., pp. 221- 
222.
* * * Maxwell, op.cit., p. 438.
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while he was oonmanding the forces in N.E.F.A., left the battlefield on
the plea of ill-health and flew to the safety of New Delhi leaving his
troops to perish in the Himalayas".^  ’ ’ When Kaul, adds Verna,
got sick, junped into a helicopter and rushed back to Delhi, to 
ocmnand cperaticns frcm his bedroom in York Road, the troops 
could not be blamed for losing confidence and heart. The famous 
4th Indian Division was routed, and some of the finest 
units.. .threw away their weepcns and ran for safety. What an 
ignominious blot on the name of the finest army in the %rorld!
And all because of lack of true leadership at the top, both 
civil and military. In any other democracy, those re^xnsible 
would have been put on trial. Our heroes were only removed from 
their posts and are still being eulogised. [îty indent. ]‘ ’ *
Admiral Katari also blames the d^jacle of defeat on the civil-military
leadership as a whole. The political leadership failed because
a lack of probity.. .Cne cannot play favourites and still espect 
to command universal loyalty or provide purposeful control.. .in 
war, it can be disastrous, as indeed it proved to be.
The leadership failure at the military level was more 
difficult to understand. Some at least of the seiior officers 
had proved themselves as good fi^iting leaders in the past. Hy 
only conclusion is that they were a demoralized lot, an 
extension to the individual level of the general demoralization 
that had been crewing into the arzy.
Also I believe that the functioning of the intelligence 
machinery was far frcm effective.
Whatever the reasons, it resulted in a grave loss to the 
country's prestige and a shattering of the reputation of our 
fine army. [!^  indents. ]“ *
Thorat, Verma and Katari eill had their differences with the Menon-Kaul
nexus and perhaps may be expected to be over-critical of the civil-
military leadership's performance during the 1962 WSar.^  ’ ‘ Miat of those
officers who had risen to top under this regime?
Thorat, cp.cit., pp. 199-200.
Verma, cp.cit., p. 127.
Katari, A Sailor Remembers, pp. 116-117.
In 1967, Thorat's Vital Points Plan effectively was admitted by 
Menon to have been 1±e tactically wise choice for the defence of NEFA 
when he stated that Chinese forces should have been allowed "cxme into 
Indian territory in depth before giving them a fight". This is exactly 
what Thorat's Vital Points Plan envisaged. This was not done, said 
Menon, because "this is a kind of thing which we were unable to persuade
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Of the three main military protagonists in the dd^acle at NEFA—
Thapar, Sen and Kaul— oily the last has put his thcuc^ its into writing.
Vtiile Thapar himself has remained silent, S@i is quoted as to why he, as
army commander, did net sack Kaul for incxmpetenoe:
It is all very well for you to say this.. .but do you know what 
his stature was then? He never talked to me; he would just pick 
up the phone and talk to the Prime Minister. He never even 
consulted the OCAS [Thapar]. I weuld have got no support from 
anyone. Krishna Menon and Bijjy Kaul were running the armed 
forces of the country.
Kaul blames all manner of factors, including the political leadership's
continued faith in non-violence (which stifled spending on the armed
forces), failure to provide "clear policy directions to the Array as to
what its responsibilities are concerning important areas", and
extraordinary concern with pudalic opinion vis-a-vis border incursions.
Particular civilians faulted include Nehru— for formulating the Forward
Policy and issuing inflammatory remarks— Menon and his civil servants—
for promoting the indigenous defence production of tomorrow at the
e3g)ense of importing we^xairy to meet the needs of today— and Finance
Minister Desai— for providing insufficient funds when Menon did ^ prove
military resource requests. Kaul also censures fellow officers Sen— for
a poor grasp of tactics— Pathania— for misleading him about the strength
of the Chinese attack on 17-18 November and for not putting up enough
resistance— Dalvi— for insufficient preparation of his unit's defences—
and assorted field commanders— for not having "di^layed greater
our public opinion to accept then.. .Public opinion %*as [so] built up by 
various parties sometimes under the influence of foreign propaganda that 
we were never able to look at things objectively." Apparently public 
opinion and not the political leadership had dictated the border defence 
policy. See N.a., "Black November", The Statesman supplement, November 
1967 as used in Dalvi, op.cit., pp. 66-67; and Maxwell, op.cit., p. 391.
Praval, cp.cit., p. 325.
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determination” in fi^rting the enemy. While all of Kaul's criticisms may
be argued to be correct, he himself repeatedly refuses to accept any
personal responsibility for the ddDacle— débité acknowledging the
degree to which the public and his fellow officers held him re^mnsible
for the defeat. He admits only to that "collective acoountability which
may be attached to all members of the General Staff for their troops'
lack of training, acclimatization, or shortage of resources".^’* But
then, adds Palit, Kaul "seemed to spend a large part of his life in
disguise, even from himself".^
Palit himself places responsibility for the defeat on the nature of
India's civil-military decision-making hierarchy. Because meetings were
ad hoc, policy decisions were made with little or no staff analysis.
Decisions based on false or misguided assunptions were then compounded
by the tendency, as the crisis on the northern borders developed, for
the "the decision-making cell in the government... [to grow] not larger
but smaller and, consequently, not more but less accountable.. .Few
authoritarian systems oould have spawned a more exclusive policy-making
apparatus.^ *® For all these faults, continues Palit,
the main responsibility for the disasters of 1962 lies squarely 
on the shoulders of the high oommand and their staffs, for their 
unawareness or disregard of operational and logistical 
constraints cn the Himalayan front, for tteir failure to inpress 
on the politicos the impossibility of the operational tasks 
demanded of them, and, above all, for their insensitivity to the 
plight of the officers and men in the battalions witlessly 
pushed ip into the hi^ mountains— insufficiently armed, clothed 
or provisioned— at the mercy of an eneny well-^ arepared for 
war.^ *^
" ' Kaul, op.cit., pp. 279-280, 320, 327-333, 336-340, 342-344, 348-349, 
368-369, 374-376, 379, 381, 387, 393, 406, 408, 414-417, 425-426.
Palit, op.cit., p. 77. 
ibid., pp. 124, 275-276. 
ibid., pp. 354-355.
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Palit oould hardly be more damning: "If the fitting had continued on 20 
November, I feel sure that there would have beai few left among the top 
ranks vAo could, or would, have effectively directed the army in war or 
led army corps in battle".^ **
II.B.2. Questionnaire Pe^nndents
As EMD, Palit was at the heart of India's senior military 
leadership— what was the view further down the ranks? In 1962, the armed 
forces' field grade officers who experiaiced first-hand the bloody 
battle results of poor civil-military leadership decisions were the 
questionnaire re^xndents. Vho and/or what did they perceive as having 
performed badly during the defeats in Ladakh and NEFA? See 'hahle 8.2.
TABLE 8.2
Which factors acquitted thanselves worst in the 1962 Sino-Indian War?
Peroent(No.) of Total Votef
Military Equipment and Training 26.97 (82)
Political leadership 23.69 (72)
Military leadership 20.07 (61)
Intelligence 18.75 (57)
Military Field Officers 5.92 (18)
Jawans 3.29 (10)
Other 0.99 (3)"
Total Votes Cast 99.96 (304)
* 85 respondents cast multiple votes; 11 respondents cast no votes.
® JOOs (1); Lethargy & Panic (1); Roads (1).
With over a quarter of the vote (26.97%), "Military Bquipmait and 
Training" was held by respondents as most responsible. For Brigadier 29, 
"officers and jawans in the field acquitted themselves the best th^ 
could but were handicapped by sitetandard equipment, lack of suitable
ibid., p. 352.
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training and hostile elements for which they were unpr^ared". Brigadier 
29 is the exception in that few other officers offer any further oommart 
on this topic; for most the sad state of the military's preparation for 
war with China appears self-evident.
Ihe respondents are more forthri i^t describing the shortcomings of 
their second-most culpable factor, India's "Political Leadership" 
(23.69%). For Brigadier 90, "Ndiru's rhetoric of 'throwing out the 
Chinese' was emotional and typical of an autocrat". Lieut.-General 10 
asks one to
ocnpare Churchill in 1940 to Ndiru in 1962. In 1940 the British 
Field Amy had been destroyed in Dunkirk and Great Britain had 
no allies. But Churchill was was moved to make his speech: "I've 
nothing but blood, a^ #eat and tears to offer. We'll fi^it on the 
beaches, we'll fight on the streets..." In 1962 Nehru had lost 
only 25-30,000 [sic] men. India still had an amy of 500,000 and 
allies in the US and UK. Yet he made a radio address which 
practically resigned Assam to the Chinese. He should have and 
could have fought back.^  * '
Despite such sentiments, most respondents naming a particular individual
as a poor performer point not to Ndiru, but to his defence minister. Air
Chief Marshal 12 e)q)lains how the "d^Dacle happened because of Krishna
Menon who told Nehru that he would take care of Pakistan and China and
watch the defence farces".^ ** "Ihe amy was prevented from any
pr^aaration for war in that particular area [NEFA] by Krishna Menon who
had inplicit faith in the peaceful intentions of the Chinese", adds
Major-General 34.
Although Major-General 36 argues that one "should not blame the 
military leadership or the officers and men...political decisions [are] 
taken and orders have to be obeyed", "Military Leadership" (20/07%)
From an interview with Lieut.-General 10; Patna, 29 September 1989. 
From an interview with Air Chief Marshal 12; Pune, 11 Oct(±er 1987.
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oomes in for almost as much blame as the "Political Leadership". For
Brigadier 40, the
military leadership at divisional and hi^^er levels acquitted 
itself very poorly. Both insofar as surrendering tactical 
direction to the political leadership and executing the military 
manoeuvres were concerned. Especially as far as the latter is 
concerned, there was to my mind, utter panic...causing 
incalculable damage to troc^ and equipment.
Lieut.-General 93 "was [Military Attaché] to OCAS [lhapar] at the
time and I just could not believe the behaviour of senior military
leaders at the time". Lieut.-General 16 is more ^ secific:
Worst were Kaul who failed to understand the militeucy problem 
and played into the hands of Krishna Menan, Lt Gen. L.P. Sen of 
Eastern Oocmand vtio did not siçport his field oocmanders, Gen. 
lhapar whose stand against the forward policy was not stirng 
and last but not least, Maj. Gen. A S. Pathania who let 
down the famous 4th Division by pulling out without fighting 
from his prqmred defences.^ **
For Brigadier 76, "military honour dictated that, rather than jeopardise
the safety of his trocys and the prestige of his country.. .General
Ihapar should have at the time threatened to resign.
Of all "Military Leadership" figures, it is Kaul who is most 
mentioned— and not always negatively. Kaul, argues Lieut.-Ceneral 95, 
was "a favourite of Menon and Nehru who tried to make up for his lack of 
combat experience... [by putting him] in at singularly inopportune time 
as commander 4th Corps. Any other officer would have not been able to 
handle that bad a situation any better".^ ** Brigadier 28, previously one 
of Kaul's PSOs "in a particular ^ jpointment v^xn he was Major General" 
agrees that "any conmander in NEFA would have then met the same fate due 
to our lack of preparedness there". Kaul was a "convenient scapegoat",
From the questionnaire and an interview with Lieut.-General 16; New 
Delhi, 3 September 1987.
From an interview with Lieut.-General 95; New Delhi, 13 S^jtember 
1989.
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adds Major-General 96; "in that situation, Napoleon, Rcranel and Zhukov 
rolled into one oculd not have done any better".
Yet most respondents who mention Kaul's performance in the Sino- 
Indian War disparage it. Fran the outset, argues Ifejor-General 34, Kaul 
was "a politician in the garb of a military officer who curried favour 
with the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister and fooled them into 
thinking that the military was well prepared to face the Chinese". This 
was fatal, adds Lieut.-General 16 (%Ao served with Kaul in NEFA), as he 
was "completely lacking in either strategic or tactical sense". Lieut.- 
General 10, a staff officer of Kaul's, "respected him for his drive and 
Qiergy but I did not have a high opinion of his strategic or tactical 
skill". Thus, recalls îfejor-General 20, "on his anointment as goieral 
officer cocroanding NEFA we all knew that as a mere service corps officer 
Kaul will meet his Waterloo. No one was surprised when he failed".
"Intelligence" (18.75%) comes just after "Military Leadership" as a 
factor responsible for India's 1962 reverses. For Major-General 98, 
Mullik "poisoned [the] iAole mind of Nduru [and was] the man behind the 
throne".^*’ However, like '^ Military Eguipooent and Training", this factor 
is little commented upon by the respondents. Cne exception is Major- 
General 20 who thinks Müllik, "who had the full confidsice of Nehru and 
could influence the national policy.. .was influenced by the CIA".
The respondents' most common response pattern is to nominate a 
combination of factors. Like Lieut.-General 4, most blame civil-military 
decision-makers equally: "failure of politicians to select sound 
military hi^ier ccanmanders. Failure of the good military commanders to
From an interview with Major-General 98; New Delhi, 15 S^jtember 
1989.
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win the oonfidenœ of the politicians". Brigadier 44 factors in
differences in commissions:
The KCIOs, who guided the destiny of the amy and vho, as 
captains and majors had been mediocres [sic], never succeeded in 
climbing above "below average" in terms of military performance 
as Gaierals. The war-time commissioned officers, who had the run 
of the regiments and instructiongLL schools, hadn't the 
background to succeed in their appointments, they just about 
"managed". The Indian soldier remained about the only one who 
had not lost his basic qualities but, unfortunately, the 
regimental leadership had not had the time to build itself up to 
the level recpiired to meet the challenge of 1962. It was a 
failure of military and political intelligence, senior army and, 
most of all, regimental leadership.
Lieut.-Gaieral 17 describes hew prewar civil-military decision-making
led to ignoring the potential threat posed by the Chinese:
The politicians and the military did not see China as a threat 
throng the 1950s. The military only became aware of impending 
trouble after 1958 the border incidents.. .the indications [were] 
fairly obvious. But nothing was done because of ineptitude on 
the part of the government and politicians.
Brigadier S.S. Kallik, the military attaché in Peking, went 
for himself to assess the border situation. He brought back 
reports that there indeed oould be serious trouble. But 
Ambassador [to China] B.K. Nehru didn't r^jeat this to Nehru 
because he didn't want to contradict Ndiru's own thinking on the 
subject.* * •
Whatever the order, most questionnaire respondents hold cill Indian 
participants— save officers and jawans in the field— in the 1962 war as 
guilty of contributing to the debacle.
III. Aftermath
III.A. Coup D'État?
Never did India's civilian government seem more vulnerable to a 
military ootp then in the iirmediate aftermath of defeat in the 1962 
Sino-Indian war.
' From an interview with Lieut.-<3eneral 17; London, 26 November 1987.
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China's lightning victory had been helped at every turn by the 
**hi^ ier authorities”; they had given the military a very hard 
task and then underequipped [sic] it, told it when and where to 
deploy, forced inoaiçetent officers vçxjn its troops, [and] 
postured politically with no regard as to the military 
consequenoes.. / * '
The first and second coup theories believe a government's failure to
meet the ohallaiges of modernization will pull or push armed forces'
officers into taking over. Althou^ such failings are usually described
in the context of socioeconomic and internal political developnait, the
first duty of any competent regime is to protect its territory and
citizenry from external aggression. Ihe third set of theorists, seeing
ootps as the result of officers' corporate grievances, are much more
specific predicting the effect on a civilian govemmait of defeat
in war. Ihonpson, for instance, includes as coup précipitants
instances of "psychological violence".. .when civilian 
legislatures have laid the blame for defeat in war at the 
doorstep of the army" as a ooup precipitant... [or] vhere 
officers feel that a regime's incompetence has made the nation—  
and thus its standard bearer, the military— a standing joke to 
the outside wcrld. ’^®
Thccpson also argues that "ootp-makers are ^ parently dissatisfied
with.. .gmeral military policy and/or the level and nature of support
for military operations.. .during or in the aiftermath of a defeat at
w a r . W e l c h  and smith agree: "Defeat in war, particularly if
accompanied by a belief that the government failed to give the armed
forces sufficient sipport, increases the likelihood of military
intervention" '
14 9
15 0 
1 5  1 
15 2
Kundu, "Civil-Military Relations in India", p. 15. 
Thompson, The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers. p. 16. 
ibid., p. 25.
Welch and smith. Military Role and Rule, p. 22.
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The question of continued civilian rule in the aftermath of defeat 
depends more on the attitudes of the armed forces' field officers—  
majors, colonels, and brigadiers— than on their siç)eriars/“ The latter 
are more likely to have been spared the trauma of the battlefield, be 
content with their positions and perks, and, at least while working at 
military headquarters, command less personal loyalty among the men of 
the fitting arms. In contrast, field officers are more likely to be at 
the sharp end of any failures in civil-military decision-making, be 
envious of their superiors' position and perks, and command the personal 
loyalty of their men. Perhaps most importantly, disgruntled field 
officers are more likely to see the military leskdership as part of the 
problem rather than the solution.
As field-grade officers in 1962, the questionnaire re^xxidents post­
ceasefire perspective on the Sino-Indian War would be crucial in 
determining whether civil sipremacy-of rule continued. Table 6.2 shows 
these officers blaming everything and everyone but themselves and their 
men for performing poorly during wartime. How did this affect their 
perorations of civilian rule? If blame centred on the political 
leadership, if the respondents felt distanced from their superiors, if 
they perceived public support for the armed forces and anger at the 
political leadership, a military coup in India was not unthinkable.
III.B. Attitudes Towards the Political Leadership
For the respondents' postwar percr*ion of the Nehru government, see 
Table 8.3. Due to the unusually hi^ percentage (36.46%) of officers
 ^ ' "Military intervention is more likely to be planned and executed by 
field grade officers than by commanding officers, noncommissioned 
officers, or the rank and file". See ibid., p. 21.
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giving **No Answer" in Table 8.3 and the desire to cxnçare Tables 8.3 and 
8.4 in Ibble 8.5, the first two contain a column of figures "Adjusted" 
for the subtraction of their respective "No Answer" respondents.
TABLE 8.3
In the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, what was 
the attitude of field officers towards the political leadership?*
unadjusted Adjusted
Percent(No.)
Negative 38.54 (37) 60.66 (37)
No Change 6.25 (6) 9.84 (6)
Positive 18.75 (18) 29.51 (18)
No Answer 36.46 (35) 00.00 (0)
Total 100.00 (96) 100.00 (61)
* In Questionnaire II, this question substituted "the military" for 
field officers". See ^ çendix B.
Despite their poor opinion of the political leadership in Table 8.2, 
fully a third (29.51%) of respondents in Table 8.3 recall a "Positive" 
post-ceasefire attitude towards their civilian leaders. Most, like 
Brigadiers 64 and 29, respectively, say this views sprang from seeing 
"increased civil-military understanding and cooperation" as "politicians 
started taking them [officers] more into confidence". Others saw civil- 
military relations baiefiting from increased military professionalism as 
officers now "realized how irportant it was from [a] professional point 
of view to ke^ the politician away from matters concerning military 
alcxie" (Brigadier 38), "learnt to be more deliberate in getting 
involved with war-like operations" (Brigadier 62), and "resolved never 
to caught napping again" (Brigadier 40). With the country's immediate 
postwar civil-military relationship more equal, officers could feel more 
confident in their political masters.
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Some of those few (9.84%) respondents who recall "No Charge" in 
their attitude also note officers' increased confidence. For Lieut.- 
General 95, it was business as usual, "except that seme oocmanders 
showed more moral courage in standing up to the political leaders in 
professioncd. matters". Otherwise, says Lieut.-General 49, the "military 
did not change attitudes, they were earlier and continued to be neutral 
in politics".
That a two-thirds majority (60.66%) of respondents recall a
"Negative" post-ceasefire view of the political leadership raises the
question of how neutral Indian armed forces' officers could remain.
Major-General 59 felt "disgust" and Air Chief MarshEd. 18 remembers "a
lack of confidence...[in] the political leadership against whom there
was resentment for a considerable amount of time". Nehru, adds Air Chief
Marshal 12, "was exposed... [he] totally panicked... [as shewn by] his
desperate appeal for world-wide help to help fight the invasion. This
upset many people...»"** Major-General 106 (interviewed only) disagrees,
saying that "anger was mainly directed at Kaul and Menon. Blaming of
Nehru reedly didn't begin until after his death".^  * * Brigadier 61
compiles a long list the culpable:
The military leadership certainly was very bitter about [the] 
political leadership and the soiior civil service over the 
issues: a) politicising the amy leadership— Kaul's exanple; 
[and] b) disregard of any intelligence of the Chinese and 
assessment of the Chinese intaitions by the amy and its field 
commanders at the hipest level, and only going by [IB Director] 
Mr B N Mullik's assessment...
As before, the defence minister takes much of the blame. Brigadier 73
recalls how
*^* From an interview with Air Chief Marshal 12: Pune, 11 October 1987.
** From an interview with Major-General 106; New Delhi, 12 S^Jtenber 
1987.
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We in the amy felt that Menon and IAS officers should be 
drowned in the dirty nallahs [ditches] of Delhi.. .All in all, if 
China would not have acted in 1962, Menon would have ruined the 
armed forces and the country. We must thank the Chinese for 
getting rid of Menon. [Ify italics. ]
Ihe respondents were happy to see Maion go. How long could Ndiru remain?
Despite the prewar machinations of the Menon-Kaul nexus, the Nehru
government never had been under serious threat by the military because
he and his party remained demonstrably pc^ jular. Did the humiliation of
defeat in war change the peoples' opinion of their political leaders?
More iiDportantly, if so, how did military officers' understand this
shift? See liable 8.4.
TABLE 8.4
In the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, vhat was 
the attitude of the public towards the political leadership?
unadjusted Adjusted
PeroaTt(No. )
Negative 81.16 ( 56) 96.55 (56)
No Change 1.45 (1) 1.72 (1)
Positive 1.45 (1) 1.72 (1)
No Answer 15.94 (11) 0.00 (0)
Total 100.00 ( 69) 99.99 (58)
With just two excitions, every (96.55%) re^xxident feels the Indian 
people had a "Negative" post-ceasefire attitude towards the civilian 
government.^ ** "Of course they blamed political leaders for short 
sifted policy [on the northern borders", argues Brigadier 30. Ihe 
"political leadership was in total disgrace", agrees MajorHSeneral 34.
Ihe two exceptions offer scant comfort to the government. While "No 
Change" respondent Lieut.-Colonel 80 says that the public continued to 
have an attitude of "Indifference" towards government leaders, 
"Positive" respondent Major-Gaieral 65 recalls that the "Political 
leadership did not suffer any disrepute, till the facts were known".
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The public, add Brigadier (Dr.) 55 and Major-General 32, respectively, 
felt "disgust" and "anger" with their civilian rulers.
TABŒ 8.5
In the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, what was the attitude 
of field officers/the piPlic towards the political leadership?
Field Officers Public
Percent(No.)
Negative 60.66 (37) 96.55 (58)
No Change 9.84 (6) 1.72 (1)
Positive 29.51 (18) 1.72 (1)
Total 100.01 (61) 99.99 (58)
Ihe respondaTts perceive the public as even more critical of the 
political leadership than they themselves. See Table 8.5 (extrapolated 
frcm Ihbles 8.3 and 8.4. Remember, the second set of ooip prediction 
theorists believe officers will act like any other political actor and 
push their way into powsr when they detect a weakness at the centre. 
Ooming on top, as it were, of their own "Negative" feelings tcrords 
India's civilian rulers, would the public's marked disapproval of the 
"Political Leadership" prompt officers to move against the government?
III.C. Attitudes Towards the Military (Leadership)
After 15 years of unintempted democratic rule, the political
leadership's unpopularity with both the public and the armed forces was
insufficient motive for a coup. Such a momentous step also depended on
military officers' understanding of their own popularity. Did they
believe themselves to enjoy public sipport, even after the humiliation
of defeat? Did their characterization of the military leadership's
performance as poor distance field officers from their superiors? Did
officers feel the political leadership blamed than for failure in war?
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TABLE 8.6
In the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, 
what was the public's attitude towards the military
Percent(No.)
Positive 51.04 (49)
Mixed 7.29 (7)
Negative 36.46 (35)
No Answer 5.21 (5)
Total 100.00 (96)
Ihe answer to the first of these questicns is shown in Table 8.6.
ttTsurprisingly, almost half the respcndaTts recall the public's attitude
towards the armed forces as **Nègative" (36.46%)— "cne of disbelief and
their inmediate reaction was a loss of faith in the army and most blamed
military officers, [and] military leadership for letting them down"
(Brigadier 61)— or "Mixed" (7.29%). For Brigadier 70, class was the key:
Ihe public of India should be divided into two broad segments—  
the multitude of ignorants who comprise the bulk and thus the 
much larger voteHaank, and the few vho [are] comprised of 
newspaper readers and are thus aware of what is happening. It is 
only a few of the latter vho also stop to analyse the news. Ihe 
latter sympathised with the dilemma of the services having to 
oontaid vnth the ignorant political leadership whose credibility 
had dwindled considerably.
Nonetheless, a slim majority (51.04%) of re^xndents believe the public
displayed a "Positive" attitude towards the military. Air Chief Marshal
1 "did not hear anyone blaming the defences", Major-General 36 recalls
"all the praise for the army and the way they fou^t against a
formidable Chinese force", and Brigadier 44 remembers people as
"unstintingly generous to the army and excused its failures". Ihe
public, argues Lieut.-General 10, understood the "military had been let
down by the political leadership".
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Might the Indian armed forces use this perceived public support to 
act as one against the govemment? Recall the fourth ocup prediction 
theory's belief that officers stage a oaap for personal/clientelist 
motives. In an Indian Array of huge numbers, nationally representative 
personnel and (in 1962) three commands/'^ it was 2dways unlikely that 
any small group of officers united by personal/clientelist ties would be 
Cc^eble of acting alone to end civil supremacy-of-rule. Only an entire 
class of officers, thinking and acting together, mi^rt be able to 
threaten the government. Did such a class now exist in the ranks of 
Indian Array officers field officers?
Ihe state of corporate unity in tdie post-ceasefire Indian armed 
forces is shown in Table 8.7. A tenth (11.46%) of respondents recall a 
"Positive" attitude towards the military leadership. Some, like 
Brigadier 90, say their saise of professional oorporateness stemmed from 
an understanding of "the degree of impotency imposed on service chiefs 
by the political leadership". Others, like Lieut.-Oolonel 14 and Air 
Marshal 78, respectively, felt "sympathy towards [the] military chiefs" 
because they "were seen as being made scapegoats of". Whatever Ihapar's 
failings, adds Lieut.-General 87, "the Chief is at too high a level for 
field officers to have any 'attitude' towards him". Moreover, "loyalty 
to the institution is stronger than towards any individual".
Par the three-quarters (75.00%) of "Negative" respondaits, however, 
the manifest failures of the military leadership overshadow any loyalty 
to professional corporateness. Brigadier 83's attitude towards his 
seniors was "one of revulsion because the military chiefs were more
Kavic, op.cit., p. 242.
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ccxiœmed with personal grardicseraait [sic] and ambitions rather than
serious training and soldiering**. Brigadier 31 recalls how
field officers were generally bitter and they considered that 
chiefs did not provide proper leadership, they failed to 
hi^ili^t problems faced by field oocmanders and at no time 
cautioned the government of the urpr^aredness of the forces 
from the point of view of logistics, training and equipment.
Brigadier 60 feels the **military chiefs should have resigned so that the
nation would have known earlier that all was not well**.
TABLE 8.7
In the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, what was the attitude of 
field officers towards the military leadership?**
Percent(No.)
Negative 75.00 (72)
No Change 9.38 (9)
Positive 11.46 (11)
No answer 4.17 (4)
Total 100.01 (96)
IVjo in particular offended the **Negative** respondents. Officers,
remembers Major-General 96,**had not taken kindly to the ^ pointment of
either Kaul or.. .Ihapar, [and] they were relieved at their replacement**.
Lieut.-General 16 also cites these two;
It was felt that the array had been given an assignment for which 
it did not have the resources, for which no preparation had 
been made. Secondly, the Chief of Amy Staff [Ihapar] should 
have takai a firm stand. Ihirdly it was felt that Kaul had 
swallowed the political line that China would not go to war and 
landed the army in a mess by adopting the forward policy.
Ihe average field officer, CŒTCludes Lieut.-General 88, **felt sorry for
his weak chief [Ihapar] and cursed B.H. Kaul**.
Field officers' post-ceasefire resentment with the military
leadership signalled danger for both the amy's corporate cohesiveness
and civil sipreraacy-of-rule. Relatively junior officers are more likely
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than their siçeriars to stage a ooup. The majority of respondents^  
pero^jticn that seiior officers contributed to the debacle oculd allow 
Indian field officers to unite, not as a small personal/clientelist 
group, but as an entire class against both the civil and military 
leadership— a coup to save both the army and the country. If senior 
officers, asks Lieut.-Goieral 95, "knew of China's probability of acting 
and their recocnendaticxis to pr^are for this were not heeded, vhy 
didn't they do the honourable thing and resign? Younger officers like 
nyself felt to hell with the tc^ field, let us do our own thing to 
rectify the situation"* italics.]^ ** Just what mi^it they do?
TABLE 8.8
In the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, 
what was the political leadership's attitude towards the military?
Percent(No.)
Positive 60.42 (58)
Negative 26.04 (25)
No Answer 13.54 (13)
Total 100.00 (96)
What other motivation did they need? Tbble 8.3 alreacfy revealed that 
a number of officers saw the government as blaming them for defeat. The 
quarter (26.04%) of respondents in T^ble 8.8 who think the political 
leadership held a "Negative" postwar attitude towards the armed forces 
oily reinforces this attitude. The government was "suspicious" (Lieut.- 
General 19), "sceptical" (Wing Conmander 26), and di^layed a "lack of 
confidence" (Brigadier 43) in the military. Politicians, adds Brigadier 
61, "k^ jt blaming the armed forces for this debacle". In 1962, mi^t 
this perception combine with military and public anger with the
' Rxm an interview with Lieut.-General 95; New Delhi, 13 S^jtember 
1989.
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government, public support of the armed forces, and field officers' 
disillusionmait with their seniors to create an ur^ irecedented challeige 
to civil sLÇfreroacy-of~rule in India?
No; that civil siçranacy-of-rule was not in danger is shown by the
three-fifths (60.42%) of "Positive" respondents who argue that defeat
provoked any number of beneficial changes for Indian civil-military
relatifs. To begin with, recadls Major-Goieral 96 and Air Chief
Marshall2, respectively, "the politicians generally felt guilty" about
their role in the debacle and had "an awareness that they themselves
were to blame". In defeat, argues Brigadier 30, the political leadership
finally "realized that [the] country's mi^it is not only democratic
socialism but also its military potential". This new understanding, adds
Lieut.-Gagerai 94, made for
a sea change in the political leadership's attitude towards the 
military. After this conflict much greater attention and respect 
is [sic] paid to the views of the military on professional 
matters. Allocation of sufficient funds for the modernisation of 
the Armed Faroes are [sic] now made available.
Lieut.-Gaieral 10 gives thanks that "the era of overbearing bureaucrats
matching arrogance with ignorance and of a non-professional intelligence
agaxy was over". Officers also got oocmanders they could respect.
Majcr-Gaieral 36 appreciated that "Chief of the Amy Staff [Th^ar] was
changed and Gen. Kaul went on retiremart", and Vice Admiral 2 hailed the
"spectacular and welcome ocmebadks" of Chaudhuri and Manekshaw. The
political leadership, concludes Major-Gaieral 34, "was in the doc^TOuse
and was in no position to apportion any part of blame for the dd^acle to
the army.. .Kaul followed Krishna Menon into oblivion and the tragic
memory was erased to some extent from peoples' minds".
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III.D. Post-Oeasefire Changes
Ihe "Positive" respondents of Ihble 8.8 touch on edl those factors 
which oombined to ensure ocntinued civil siçceaaacy-of-nile. The rift 
between field officers and military leaders began to heal when vilified 
stç)eriQrs resigned and were replaced by respected oocmanders. Within 
months of China's unilateral ceasefire, Ihapar, Kaul and Paüiania 
resigned from the army. Althou^ Palit recocmended to the new chief that 
Sen also be forced to retire, he continued in this post for seme time 
(until also resigning for unrelated matters). In contrast, Prasad 
appealed his dismissal by Sen to President Radhakrishnan and was 
reinstated as a division conmander in Western Occmand.^ '^ Ihe real 
iinprovement in the Indian Amy's morale and corporate cohesiveness came 
with the respective appointments of Mandoshaw as GoC 4th Oorps, and 
Chaudhuri as chief.
Ihat many officers had been unfit was ok^ous. In Table 8.2, very 
few respondents cite "Field Officers" and/or "Jawans" as having 
performed worst in 1962, perhaps because the 40% casually rate of those 
fighting in the north “* let many believe that the military had defended 
stoutly. Yet, as only 24,000 of the Indian Army's ^ proodmately 550,000
 ^® * In one of Nairn's last acts before his death, Ihapar was appointed 
India's Ambassador to Afghanistan. Chaudhuri apparently offered to 
"rehabilitate" Kaul in seme unspecified post in the civil-military 
hierarchy but was refused. In the 1965 Indo-Pak War, Prasad edlowed to 
fall into eneny hands some of his papers which were sharply critical of 
his superiors and the government, and was forced to leave the army. In 
1966, Dalvi was siç)erseded in prcmoticn to major-general and resigned. 
See Kaul, op.cit., pp. 421-422; Maxwell, op.cit., pp. 426-427; Palit, 
c^ .cit., p. 331, 339, 347, 366, 375-376; and Praval, op.cit., p. 323- 
325. 446-448.
Praval, op.cit., p. 321.
—356—
personnel took part in the war/ ' ^ few officers could know of their
ccrarades' mixed performanoe. On cne hand, ea^lains Venna,
the defended localities that we had established stood vç> to 
the Chinese assault, like the heroic fi^it put up by the 13th 
Kumacnis at Penzang La covering Chushul. They had lost more than 
120 men of the company, but killed over a thousand Chinese and 
held the position to the last man/‘ '
In other places, admits Brigadier 69, "the military ran away...so the
military blamed itself for defeat".^Civil SL^ aremacy of-rule %jas
helped both because this sense of responsibility tempered seme field
officers' negative attitudes towards the military and political
leadership, and because any lingering resentment was "by and large
confined to those troops and officers who fou^it in NEFA and ladaMi"
(Major-General 89)
Ihat defeat in war had becomie "real" helped both sides of “Oie civil-
military "divide" to improve themselves and to strengthen civil
sipremacy-of-rule. For Welch and Staith, "Ihe likelihood of military
intervention diminishes with the esnergenoe of a clear-cut, external
focus for national defence.^ ** China's arrival as a threat to national
security "brought us in touch with reality", says Air Marshal 78, by
making Indian officers focus their attrition on developing and deepening
their professional expertise and oorporateness. Ihe war also forced
Indian politicians to re^praise national defence as, adds Lieut.-
General 95, "the military's value as a deterrent was newly
16 1 
16 2 
16 3 
16 4 
16 5
See Kavic, op.cit., p, 242; and Praval, op.cit., p. 321.
Verma, op.cit., p. 120
From an interview witii Brigadier 69; London, 9 December 1989.
From an interview with Major-General 89; New Delhi, 18 August 1989. 
Welch and Smith, op.cit., p. 11.
-357-
discovered"/'' This new awareness of the military's importance also 
helped soothe officers' resentment with the civilian administration.
The political leadership's improved understanding of the armed 
forced as a vital ccnpcnoTt of national defaioe brought changes to the 
civil-military decision-making hierarchy as well. An improved rapport 
between civilian politicians and bureaucrats and military officers began 
when Chavan replaced Mencmi as defence minister. Joint Secretary 
(Defaice) Sarin was also transferred, and Defence Secretary PuUa Redc^ 
replaced by P.V.R. Rao, one of vihose first acts was to take personsü. 
charge of General Staff matters.^*’ To prévoit poor civil-military 
communications, the service chiefs were now given a greater voice in 
defence policy, and were henceforth allowed to attend the Defence 
Ocmmittee of the Cabinet whenever necessary. The administration also 
created an advisory NaticnEil Defence nr— ittrr (cocposed of the FM, the 
Emergency Oomittee of the Cabinet, the service chiefs, assorted retired 
officers— including Thorat— state chief ministers, and prominent 
citizens). '" Hopefully, Indian civil-military decision-making would 
never again be so blinkered.
If only the seniormost officers appreciated the decision-making 
modifications, every field officer— and the public— oould understand the 
other post-ceasefire changes in civil-military relations: money and 
size. Broadcasting over All-India Radio, the Minister for Planning 
stated: "We can safeguard peace only vhei we have the strength to make 
aggression a costly and profitless adventure.. .From now on, defence and
From an interview with Lieut.-General 95; New Delhi, 13 September 
1989.
Palit, op.cit., p. 366.
' See Longer, op.cit., pp. 382-383; Palit, op.cit., p. 358; and 
Thorat, c^ .cit., pp. 214-217.
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developnent raust be regarded as integral and related parts of the 
national economic plan"/^" In 1964-65, a five-year defence plan was for 
the first time fcrmulated and inplemaited,^’® while innediately the 
defence budget leapt from 17.0% to 32.4% of total central expenditure 
and military personnel increased by over half, from around 550,000 in 
1962-63 to over 850,000 in 1964-65.^ ^^  Ihe government, recalls Brigadier 
40, "showed a healthy understanding of the military's handicaps and went 
all out to ranedy them".
To all of the above anti-cotç) factors must be added the continued 
respect shown Nehru and the availability of Menon as a foil for post­
ceasefire resentment. Despite defeat in war, the IM was still seen as 
the father of the country and remained almost above reproach. In 
contrast, the CM was blamed by the public, military officers and civil 
servants for misreading Chinese intentions, misleading Nehru, and 
politicizing and neglecting the training and equipping of the armed 
forces. So great was the feeling against Menon that when Nehru fought to 
ke^ his long-time colleague and friand in office, he himself was 
threatened with removal by the Ocxigress Party.^  ’ ' When Menon went, anger 
with the political leadership dissipated, civil-military relations 
improved, and civil sipremacy-of-rule was safe.
As quoted in R.G.C. Thomas, "The Armed Services and the Indian 
Defence Budget", Asian Survey XX:3, 1980.
Y. Lakshmi, Trends in India's Defence Expenditure (New Delhi: ABC 
Publishing House, 1988), p. 69.
See Lakdnmi, op.cit., p. 144; Major-General K.S.Pendse, "India's 
Defence Budget: A Case for Better Planning", Indian Defence Review. July 
1989, pp. 158-173; and Praval, op.cit., p. 321.
See Bdwardes, op.cit., pp. 304-305; and Hoffmann, op.cit., pp. 200- 
206. Air Chief Marshal 1 recalls the danger: "Nehru did not want to let 
Menon go but Congress, [the] opposition, the people demanded it. Anger 
and resentmant focused on Menon. I cannot predict what would have 
happened if Menon had been kept on". From an interview with Air Chief 
Marshal 1; New Delhi, 9 September 1987.
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Or was it? See Itihle 8.9 in vAiich nine (9.37%) respondents say 
"Yes”, "Civilians" (five) and/or "Military Officers" (four) spoke of a 
coup. Pour of these officers point to "Civilians" as the sole source. 
Lieut.-General 66 recalls "only loose talk in public". Brigadier 45 
r^)orts discussion of a possible coi^ > by "the conncn nan in the street 
and often very subtly from the administrators and other Govt, 
eanployees", and Lieut.-General 49 remembers "talk amongst.. .the business 
coraiunity and some 'intellectuals'. But I found most were totally 
uninfooBed on the elements of military rule and were after 
stability/organisation only". Brigadier 46 also dismisses "civilians 
[who] used to irresponsibly mention so many times that amy should take 
over. I do not think it was ever meant seriously. And I doubt if ever 
army senior brass thou^t of taking over the country".
TAEI£ 8.9
In the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian War, did civilians/military 
officers feel the armed forces should move against the government?
Civilians Military Officers
Peroent(No. )
NO 91.67 (88) 92.71 (89)
Yes 5.21 (5) 4.17 (4)
No Answer 3.13 (3) 3.13 (3)
Total 100.01 (96) 100.01 (96)
Three respondents do r^xart talk of a coiç) among "Military Officers" 
oily. "Amongst young officers [the] feeling prevailed that something 
should be done to uphold dignity and status of armed forces", recalls 
Major-General 68. Such talk, adds Major-General 32 focused of "the need 
for military leadership to be insulated from political machinations..." 
Brigadier points out that these rumours had a finite shelf-life of "only
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to the time vAen the Prime Minister refused to remove his Defence 
Minister. Onoe that happened all dissidaioe against the government 
disappeared".
Finally, two respondents say both "Civilians" and "Military 
Officers" spoke out. Major-General 85 recalls how "a number of officers 
felt the military had been let down by the political leadership alone 
and mistakenly many felt that a government headed by the military would 
be the remedy. A number of civilians also held this idea" [ny italics]. 
Brigadier 70 adds that such action was discussed "very vaguely among the 
major to brigadier level and very infrequently at that".
That just nine of 96 re^X3ndents recall "Civilians" and/or "Military 
Officers" talking of moving against the government, despite defeat in 
war, indicates just how strong civil siçremacy-of-rule was embedded in 
India. Comparing Tbbles 8.9 and 6.4 shows respondents recall less talk 
of a military ooup in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian War than after 
President Ayub Khan's 1958 Revolution in Pakistan. Both the public and 
armed forces' officers appear to have felt that the prc^ e^r re^xxise to 
the gravity of defeat was not a revolution but reform. Thus, in Thhle 
8.9, huge majorities (91.67% "Civilians" plus 92.71% "Military 
Officers") of respondents can remember no sector of society as desirous 
of an armed forces' coup. Brigadier 9's answer— "No! No! No!"— indicates 
the stability of civil siçremacy-of-rule in India.
Conclusion
In shattering any number of myths— the FM always knew best, Hindi- 
Chini hMi, bhai", negotiation and not military miçbt oould settle all 
intemationed differences, national defence policy oould be decided by a
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tiny coterie of civil-military decision-makers operating ad hoc, China 
would never attack isolated forward outposts, the armed forces did not 
need additional resources, the Indian professional officer and his 
troops were the equal of any in the world— previously believed by the 
Ndiru administration, the 1962 Sino-Indian War tested civil-siçremacy- 
of-rule in India to the full. After China's unilateral and humiliating 
declaration of ceasefire, military field officers, that segment of any 
officer corps most likely to instigate a coup, held a negative opinion 
of the Forward Policy and felt their superiors had performed abysmally. 
They also perceived the public to be synpathetic towards the military 
and resentful of the political leadership. Yet, as seen in %ble 8.9, 
hardly any respondent can recall talk of moving against the govemmait.
Civil-supreroacy-of-rule remained intact mainly because field 
officers' grievances were directly addressed. Disgraced senior officers 
were r^laced. The govemmait embraced the the armed forces as an 
integral part of national defæoe, showering them with money and men. 
The civil-military hierarchy was modified to include the opinion of 
senior officers and their staff, and the whole nation focused their 
attention not on internal revolution but external vigilance. In time, 
the amy also admitted to some responsibility for not meeting the enemy 
with as much conviction as indicated by its previously outstanding 
combat record. In the eyes of field officers— and the public— the chief 
"villain of the piece". Defence Minister Menon was removed. With him, 
Nehru had been seen as part of the problem. Without him, the HI was free 
to, if not regain his prewar stature, then at least remain as the 
uncontested head of a civilian administration.
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Ihe 1962 Vfer may be argued to have benefited India. Ihe political 
leadership realized that the strength and numbers of the armed forces 
are an essential measurement of national defence, that professional 
merit and not personal connections should be the criteria for 
advancement, and that civil-military decision-making is best done in a 
formal structure and with proper staff support. For ex-Ambassador T.N. 
Kaul (no relation to the lieut.-general), the "Chinese invasion proved 
indeed to be a blessing in disguise. India woke iç> to the need to mend 
her defences, unite the people and harness her resources. India had lost 
a battle but not the war".^”  Victory in the 1965 Indo-Pak War would 
show the Indian Array "professional enou^ to reconstruct itself.
Ihat victory lay in the future. For now, it was enou^ that those 
weeks after the Kiola Post's frantic 8 September 1962 signal 
characterised by Palit as "a time out of reality",^were over.
1 7  ^T.N. Kaul, Reminiscences Discreet and Indiscreet, p. 172 
Cohen, "Ihe Military and Indian Democracy", p. 112. 
Palit, op.cit., p. 200.
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Civil-Military Relations in British and Independent India. 1918-1962
and Coup Predicticyi Hieorv
GOMCLDSICK
From 1918 to 1962, there was never any serious threat that Indian 
armed forces' officers would instigate a coup against the government. A 
brief review of the evidence provided in the thesis, using as a guide 
the four competing military intervention theories outlined in Chapter 
One, confirms this.
The first groip of military intervention theorists see third world 
officers as supremely qualified citizens, only reluctantly pulled into 
assuming power so as to resuscitate their country's attempts at 
modernization. This somewhat idealized cono^)t of officers is abstracted 
from the second of two methods of civilian control of the military as 
seen by Huntington. It is not subjective control vhich makes officers 
into a mirror of the ruling regime by maximizing their identification 
with governmental institutions, social classes and/or constitutional 
forms, but objective control %Aich fashions officers into the tool of 
govemmait by maximizing their professional characteristics of 
expertise, oorporateness and re )^onsibility.
Althouÿ) Huntington himself bases his understanding of military 
professionalism on an analysis of Western militarism, the commissioned 
Indian officer equally may have been the idealized citizoi envisaged by 
the first set of coup prediction theorists. Certainly, he and his 
comrades were subjected to both objective and subjective methods of 
control. Selected from the best of backgrounds, educated and trained to
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British standards of an officer and gentleanan, Indian officers' loyalty 
to the Raj came from their identification with the ruling elite and 
desire to perfect their professional expertise and corporate izzat7'~'^ y 
Responsibility was a trickier notion. With the rise of the independence 
movement, just who was the legitimate voice of the subcontinent?
Led by Finer, the second set of ooup prediction theorists hi^ilights 
this question of professional responsibility when arguing that 
oonmissioned officers are simply political actors, using their 
organizational skills and moncpoly of force to replace a regime made 
vulnerable by the pressures of modernization. Here, if professional 
responsibility is not internalized as an explicit principle, it may 
encourage coips by leading officers to understand their duty as loyalty 
to the nation rather than the legal government. Again, only independence 
would revecil the nature of oonmissioned Indian officers' understanding 
of their professional responsibility.
Except for some youthful involvement in nationalist activities, the 
struggle for s^araj barely toudied ocnmissioned Indian officers. Ihe 
non-violait nature of the independence movement, the indifference of 
public and nationalist leaders to military matters, officers' privileged 
backgrounds and physical separation; all contributed to their loyalty to 
the Raj throu^iout the interwar years. With the singular but ultimately 
ineffectual exception of the Indian national armies, this allegiance 
remained unquestioned even during the Quit India movement of WWII.
When independence arrived, Nehru's seemingly naive assunption that 
with political control would come civil siçremacy-of-rule proved true. 
Ihat this astonishingly smooth (conpared to newly independait nations 
throuÿiout the third world) transference of professional re^cnsibility
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took place despite the multiple challenges of Partition and the Transfer 
of Power was due to commissioned officers' demonstrated confidence in 
their own professional competence and in the skills of the new political 
and administrative elite, all of which continued to be practised largely 
according to British norms. India would not "flounder" on the path to 
modernization. Politicians continued to lead, bureaucrats to administer 
and the country to develop. Subjective control of the military also 
remained effective as, for the most part, officers, politicians and 
bureaucrats continued to be drawn fromi the same socioeconomic strata and 
believe in the same values of democracy, secularism, and development. 
This shared background and belief manifested itself in officers' 
indulgent attitude towards the government in the first decade of 
independence.
The third set of military intervention theorists, such as Thompson 
and Welch and Smith, understand coups as an officer carps' reaction to 
perceived interference in their corporate ^ here of influence. Yet, 
despite widespread dissatisfaction with their pay, share of national 
budget, downgrading in the warrant of precedence, and perception of 
political and bureaucratic indifference to their organizational worth, 
Indian officers remained in their barracks. Even the example of their 
former comrades in Pakistan taking over power failed to stir their ire. 
Althou^ Price's reference-grotp theory of military intervention may 
have ^ plied to Pakistani officers' involvement with the American armed 
forces, it had limited resOTance with Indian officers under a non- 
aligned movement and very conscious of their superior professionalism.
Decalo proposes a fourth theory of military intervention which sees 
officers' personal and/clientelist ambitions as motives behind coups
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became relevant during the rise of the Menon-Kaul nexus. Any number of 
personal— as well as corporate— grievances were generated as the 
expertise of senior officers was disputed, their corporate sphere of 
decision-making invaded, and the civil-ioilitary decision-making process 
ignored and/or manipulated for personal ambition.
Yet, even as officers began to be identified as being for or against 
Menon-Kaul, the possibility of a coip remained small. Opponents of 
Menon-Kaul had also circumvented formal civil-military decision-making 
procedures and their champiœ. General Uiimayya, had meekly withdrawn 
his resignation. Any officers thinking of offering themselves as popular 
alternatives to the Nehru government continued to be hampered by their 
non-participation in the nationalist movement and, especially. Congress' 
continued electoral strength.
Defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War challenged all these notions by 
c^ )enly exposing governmental ineptitude. The Indian Army's field 
officers blamed the political leadership's Forward Policy and its craven 
implementation by their military superiors, while perceiving the public 
as synpathetic towards them and resQitful of the administration. Yet, in 
this potentiedly ultimate test of civil supremacy-of-rule, hardly any 
officers can recall talk of moving against the government.
On the face of it, civil-sipremacy-of-rule remained intact because 
of quick and decisive decisiœs by the political leadership. Field 
officers' grievances were assuaged as disgraced senior officers were 
replaced, the civil-military hierarchy modified, and the armed forces 
invigorated with money and men.
Yet, underpinning the ease with which these changes could be 
implemented and incorporated was the ingrained professionalism and long
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tradition of occmissioned Indian officers. As stated in Chapter One by 
Ruth First, '*Ihe virginity of an army is like that of a woman.. .once 
assailed, it is never again intact”. Frcm ind^iendenoe to 1962, Indian 
officers were contait— and proud— to remain ^ insters.
Ihe sureness of civil supremacy-of-rule in India during that period
in which civilian regimes are most vulnerable— the transition to an
independent state and the first years of self-government— may suggest
lessons applicable to civil-military relations in other third world
countries. See IbbLe 0.1 in which the respondents rank those factors
they believe contributed to India never having experienced a military
coup. Pour of the 17 factors ranked may be seen as ocnsocn to many
develcping countries:
7th: Widely-held belief in democracy 
8th: Wisdom and stature of national leaders 
Joint 14th: Example of ineffectiveness of military rule in 
Pakistan and Bangladesh 
17th; Political unawareness of masses
Another five factors, inolvdirghht'se of the top are found in a
number of third world countries:
1st: Professionalism of armed forces 
3rd: Initial political stability, quality and/or 
democratic rule 
4th: Nationally represaitative military personnel 
Joint 11th: Institutionalization of diverse caitres of power 
Joint 11th: Logistics unfavourable: five regional any cccnands, 
troc^ dispersed nationally, etc.
The ^ parent commonality of these anti-coup factors is, however,
misleading. lake the crucial 1st-, 3rd- and 4th-place factors described
above. Other than India, whioh third world state can be argued to
enjoy/have enjoyed a professional officer corps, stable democratic rule
at independence and armed forces containing a representative mix of
persmnel? Many enjoy the first two, but most fail to have the third.
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Moreover, the remaining factors ranked by re^)ondents in Table 0.1 
are unique and/or virtually unique to India. IWo apply to India alone:
6th: Dcminant Hindu culture inherently against military 
rule
Joint 14th: Independence struggle's non-violent nature
Another three, s^licable iniividually to other developing countries,
are not found together elsewhere:
Joint 8th: Administrative efficiency 
Joint 8th: Political awareness of masses 
Joint 11th: 40-year old habit of democracy
Leaving out "16th: Other", the two remaining factors, both in the tcp
five, further illustrate the uniqueness of the Indian experience:
2nd: Diversity of peoples, cultures, languages
5th: Sheer size of India
These two factors have hitherto not been specifically highli^ited in the 
thesis (althou^ both are related to the 4th-place factor discussed in 
Chapter Five) since the unparalleled scale and complexity of India's 
social mix and size is obvious. Officers are well aware of the inraensity 
of the task of governing such a state as well, if not better, than any 
civilian regime.
Of course, the questionnaire re^xndents are by no means the only 
judges of vAiich factors have resulted in India never having esq^ erienced 
a military coup. Nonetheless, as the ultimate arbiters of any such 
action, their understanding of coup inhibitors must be respected. And 
their particular list in its entirety seems inapplicable to all other 
third world countries. Is it?
While the particular mix of coup-inhibiting factors on Table 0.1 may 
suggest that India has remained free from a military ccxp by chance, 
this is not so. Granted, the country is large, diverse, predominantly
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Hindu and had the "father of the country" Nehru and other admirable 
politicians live long into its initial years as an independent state. 
Yet the remaining factors are the result of deliberate choices by the 
civil-military leadership, either of the Raj or independent India or 
both. Of these, professionalism is undoubtedly the most iiportant, and 
the British ideal of an officer and gentleman welded by izzat to his 
regiment and by professional training to his barracks remains the model 
taught evQi today. Ihe British practices of recruiting officers— if not 
men— from all over the country and having regional army arjniHnds has 
cdso continued. Other factors— India's initial political stability, 
quality and tradition of democracy, its relative etdministrative 
efficiency, and institutionalization of diverse centres of power— were 
also the result of isported policies which Indians consciously embraced 
as their own. Iheir great improvement on the Raj pattern of governance 
vas in the enrolment of the masses in a unique non-violent independence 
movement which raised their political awareness and instilled in them 
the idea that votes counted. Ihese choices were all deliberately made, 
and all have contributed to India's 40-year old habit of democracy which 
its officers are so reticait to threaten.
Although this examination of Indian civil-military relations does 
not surest a general theory of the conditions which preclude a military 
OCHÇ), other third world cxxmtries wishing to ensure civil sipremacy-of- 
rule would be wise (in no particular order) to:
(a) Maximize their officer corps' professionalism
(b) Recruit military personnel frcm all societal groups
(c) Disperse ccxTcaïtrations of military force
(d) Raise the political awareness of their people
(e) Preach and practise democracy
(f ) Allow political power to flourish outside the capital
(g) Increase the efficiency of administrators
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Perh^» taking all of the above steps will ke^ the "man on horseback" 
from (re)appearing on the political scene.
What this examination does reveal is that, while the four competing 
coup prediction theories may be ^ plicable to different periods of 
Indian civil^ aiilitary relations, a coup is ultimately the result of 
officers' intentions. At Partition, ccranissioned Indian officers may 
have been altruistic citizens qualified to lead the modernization of 
their country. During the first decade of indspendence they may have 
wanted to behave as political actors. In the early 1960s they may have 
held a host of grievances against the government, and at any time they 
may have formed self-interested personal/clientelist associations.
lhat commissioned officers never attempted a ocup %^ as partly because 
other groips were more qualified and motivated to rule, because no such 
opportunity ever arose, because their grievances were never enough to 
force this momentous stqp, and/or because their numbers and diversity 
thwarted the primacy of any one internal group. Other factors— their 
remoteness to the people, a public belief in democracy, their 
antagonistic relationship with civil servants— also mitigated against 
the success of an attempted coup, much less a military regime.
Nonetheless, their virtual monopoly of weaponry and organizational 
size and efficimcy may still have led Indian officers to atteanpt to 
intervaie against the government. That they did not was thair decision; 
whether based on professional conditioning, respect for the political 
leadership, understanding of the govemmgit's budgetary priorities, 
pride in their difference from their farmer comrades in Pakistan, 
professional and psychological inability to challenge Nehru, and/or 
satisfaction with their corporate rewards.
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will cxxnnissioned Indian officers remain out of politics in the 
challenges to come? Although the outcomes of notable post-1962 ^isodes 
of potential and/or particular civil-military stress are known— the 
Nehru succession, Indira Ganc2ii's 1975-77 period of Etoergency Rule, the 
array mutinies which followed 1984's Operation Blue Star* — they need to 
be examined as a continuation of the work undertaken in this thesis. 
Current issues such as the increasing recruitment of commissioned 
officers from lower socioeconomic classes, the growing conraunalism in 
Indian society, and the increasing use of the armed forces in 
maintaining internal order also need to be investigated for their effect 
on the military's non-propensity to contemplate or attempt cotqps.
Yet, barring extreme and unforeseeable circumstances, commissioned 
Indian officers will never instigate a coup against the government.
Iheir professional training and historical traditions demand they remain 
in their barracks. Officers also realize that to move successfully 
against the government demands a representative mix of cxxp executors 
from the diverse ethnic, regional and religious groups in the armed 
forces, as well as the cooperation of all army commands— hardly likely. 
They further recognize that to govern effectively as a military regime 
would demand the collaboration of the civil service and the general 
acquiescence of the people— even more improbable. Officers also concede 
the unlikelihood of tackling the challenges of administering a state as 
large and diverse as India better than a civilian administration.
Finally, commissioned Indian officers take great pride in the contrasts 
between themselves and the officer corps of neighbouring Pakistan. They
 ^ For an examination of the post-Operation Blue Star mutinies, see A. 
Kundu, “Operation Blue Star and Sikh and Non-SiJdi Indian Military 
Officers", Vmfici Affairs (Vancouver) 67:1, faring 1994.
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have, and will never wish their self-peroeived high military 
professional ism and record of respect for democracy to be tarnished by 
entering the "dirty" world of politics.
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Civil-Military Relations in RriHgîh and Independent M i a. 1918-1962,
and Ccxip Prediction Theory
APPBXyiX A: QDESnOtiAIRE T
1. Personal details:
a) Birthdate?
b) Place of birth?
c) Place of içbringing?
d) Caste?
e) Mather tongue?
f) Are you proficient in any other languages? (Please list.)
g) Wiat was your father's occupation?
h) If retired from active military service, what is your present 
occupation?
i) Would you characterize your cwn economic situation as better, the 
same, or worse than that of your father's?
j) Does anyone in your immediate family own land? If so, how nuoh, 
vhere, and of what type is it?
k) Wat was the extent of your formal education? (Circle one.) Also, 
W^ere did you attend? (Please list after choices.)
Wiere
Secondary school completion 
Bachelor's degree 
Seme graduate work 
Master's degree 
Some post-graduate work 
Doctoral degree
1) Whioh, if ai^ , religion do you follow?
m) How often, if at all, do you observe your religion's formal rites? 
n) How often have you voted in national elections? (Circle one. )
Always Sometimes
Almost always Cnoe
Most times Never
o) Have you ever been actively involved in politics? If so, for which 
party?
p) Have you ever stood for political office ? If so, where, vhen and 
for which party?
q) Have any members of your family ever been actively involved in 
politics? If so for vAiich party? Have any members of your family ever 
stood for political office? If so, vhere, when and for which party?
2. Vhat was your reason for joining the military?
3. Whioh branch of the armed forces did you join and why?
The original Questionnaire I had blank spaces between the questions.
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4. What do you think was the gaierally perceived status of a career in 
the military when you joined?
5. What do you think was the gaierally perceived status of a career in 
the military when you last actively served? And today?
6. Career details: (Please list the details of your military career in 
the spaces provided.)
Yearfs) Postings______Promotions_____ Type of troop comanded
Action seen (if any):
Decorations awarded (if any):
Date of retirement (if applicable):
7. What do you remember as the attitude of Indian officers towards 
British officers and vice-versa in the Indian Army of pre-Independence?
8. What is your view of the practice of designating certain peoples as 
"marticil races"?
9. Did the British practice of heavily recruiting martial races help or 
hinder overall military efficiency and/or effectiveness?
10. What do you remember as the attitude of the common man towards the 
Indian Array before Ind^jendenoe? V#iy do you think he held this attitude?
11. What do you remember as the attitude of Indian officers towards the 
Ind^jaidence movement?
And towards the politicians who led the movemait?
12. Were you yourself, any family members, or any close friends 
personally active in the independence movement? If so, who and in what 
ways?
13. During World War II, what do you remember of Indian officers' 
attitudes towards those officers and soldiers who joined the Indian 
National Array (INA)?
Was this attitude at all affected by the post-war trial of suspected 
INA members at the Red Port? If so, how?
14. At the time, did you feel that the political leadership was prc^ )erly 
pr^jared for Independence? Why or why not?
15. At the time, did you feel that the civil service was prc^ )erly 
pr^aared for Independence? Why or why not?
16. At the time, did you feel that the armed forces were properly 
prepared for Ind^)eidence? Why or vhy not?
17. Did the break-up of the Indian Array into the two separate armies of 
Pakistan and India aiffect the professionalism of the new Indian 
military? If so, in what way(s)?
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18. In the ten year period frcm Ind^)endence to the appointment of 
Krishna Menon as defence Minister (1947-1957), how would you 
characterize the Central Goverraaent's attitude towards the military?
19. At the time, what were your feelings on Ayub Khan's military oaap 
d'état in Pakistan? Was this action necessary?
20. Were you aware of any talk or feelings at the time within the 
military which viewed Ayub Khan's action as one which the Indian 
military could or should follow? If so, from where were these views 
emanating and how strongly held were such beliefs?
21. What were your initial feelings on the ^:pointment of Menon to the 
Defence Portfolio? Did they change over time and, if so, why?
22. Did Menon politicize the military? If so, how?
23. What were your feelings on the amy career of B.M. Raul before the 
Autunn of 1962?
Did they change over time and, if so, how and why?
24. Were you at all personally affected the talk of political 
favouritism at the içjper levels of the military hierarchy during Menon s 
tenure as Defence Minister? If so, hew?
25. Wiat was your attitude towards the "forward policy" d^loyed on the 
Sino-Indian border before October 1962?
Did your opinion of this policy change after the events of October- 
November 1962?
26. Various ocmmentators have explained the reverses suffered against 
the Chinese in October-November, 1962, in terms of a failure in any 
number of areas; for example: the political leadership, intelligence, 
the military leadership, the field officers, the jawan, and the standard 
of equipment and/or suitable training. Vhat is your ex^anation? Were 
any of the above at fault and if so, how and why?
27. Whioh of the above groups acquitted themselves best during the 
period leading up to October, 1962? Which of the above groips acquitted 
themselves worst during this period? How and why?
28. Hew large a part do you think public opinion played in shaping the 
events leading up to the Chinese attack of October, 1962? was their 
influence, if any, to the benefit or detriment of India's defence?
29. What did you feel was the typical field officer's attitude towards 
the military chiefs in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian conflict?
And towards the political leadership?
30. Were you aware of any talk or feelings either %ri.thin the military or 
amongst the civilian population which spoke of moving against the 
government? If so, from where were such views emanating and how strongly 
held were they?
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31. What did you feel was the political leadership's attitude towards
the military in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian conflict?
32. What did you feel was the public's attitude towards the military in
the aftermath of the Sino-Indian conflict?
33. Since the events of 1962, has the border situation with china eased, 
remained the same, or worsaied? Due to what factors?
34. Was the military at all apprehensive about the possibility of mass 
public disorder after Jawaharlal Nauru's death? Did it feel that it 
mi^it be called in to ensure public order?
35. At the time, did you think the 1971 signing of the 20-year Treaty of 
Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between Indian and the Soviet Union 
would be beneficial to India's security?
Would be beneficieil to India's armed forces?
36. Have you feelings on the 20-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and 
Coc^ Deration changed since 1971. If so, in what way(s) and why?
37. Do you think that Indira Gandhi %as justified in declaring 
Bnergaicy? Why or why not?
38. Did you feel that the Indian military approved or disapproved of 
Braergency?
Was this a unanimous view amongst senior and junior officers, or 
were there differences of opinion within the armed forces? If you think 
the latter true, vhat were the different opinions and which quarters 
held them and why?
39. Hew long did you think the Emergency could have endured and v*y?
40. Did your own opinion on the Bnergency change during its duration? If 
so, how and why?
41. After losing the elections of 1977, scrae cccmentatars felt that 
Indira Gandhi mi^it call on the militaiy to forcibly keq) her in office. 
Did you feel that there were any members among the armed forces %ho 
would have obeyed such an order? If so, vAat kinds of people were they 
and how strong were their feelings on the matter?
42. What is the military's attitude towards internal policing actions? 
Are such duties they beneficial or detrimental to amy efficiency?
Have there been any instances of internal policing actions which you 
felt were particularly appropriate and/or necessary? Any actions \hich 
were inapprc^iate and/or unnecessary?
43. What is the military's attitude towards such paramilitary 
organizations as the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Central Reserve 
Police Force (CRPF)? Do they help or hinder the effectiveness of the 
military in defending the nation's borders?
Also, hew would you compare the level of professionalism found in 
the BSF and CRPF with that of the amy, navy and air force?
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42. Looking at the defence budgets of: a) the mid-1950s; b) the mid- 
1960s; c) the mid-1970s; and d) today.. .Do you think the absolute level 
of defence expenditure too high, about ri^t, or too low for:
Ocraoents
a) the mid-1950s?
by the mid-1960s?
c) the mid-1970s?
d) today?
Do you think the defence budget had been properly divided between 
the amy, navy and air force? If not, which service(s) benefited, which 
service suffered and vhy in:
Oomoents
a) the mid-1950s?
b) the mid-1960s?
c) the mid-1970s?
d) today?
Do you think that each of the three services have spent their 
respective allocations wisely? If not, how and in why were the funds 
misspelt in:
OoBiaents
a) the mid-1950s?
b) the mid-1960s?
c) the mid-1970s?
d) today?
45. India today faces the possibility of Pakistan acquiring nuclear 
weapons...
a) Do you think Pakistan is indeed intent cn acquiring a nuclear 
arsenal and, if so, will she succeed?
b) If Pakistan does acquire the nuclear bomb, will it be aimed at 
Indian and/or other foreign targets?
c) Should India develop her own nuclear weaponry: only if Pakistan 
gets the bomb first; before Pakistan does; or regardless of whether 
Pakistan does or does not acquire the bomb? Why?
d) If India does decide to develop nuclear we^cns, who will have 
pushed hardest for their developmait: the military; Central Government; 
the public; or foreign powers? Why?
e) If India decides Qot to develop nuclear weapons, who will have 
pushed hardest against their acquisition: the military; Central 
Government; the public; or foreign powers? For what reasons?
f) If the bomb comes to the subcontinent, do you think it will ever 
be used? If not, why not? If so, describe the scenario(s)?
46. India has lately been pursuing a policy of diversifying the 
countries from which it purchases arms. Is this policy beneficial or 
detrimental to the effectiveness of the Indian military? Why or why not?
47. The above policy has beai interpreted by some as the beginning of 
closer Indian identification with the West, specifically with the Unites 
States. Is it in India's security interest to be seen as moving closer 
to the U.S.?
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48. Since you first joined the military, have the backgrounds—  
geographical, social and économie— of incoming officers changed? If so, 
how?
Has this affected the quality of the officer corps? For better or 
worse?
49. Since you first joined the military, have the backgrounds—  
geographical, social and économie— of incoming soldiers changed? If so, 
how?
Has this affected the quality of the fighting man?
50. How would oopyare the level of professional ism among officers of the 
Indian Amy officer of 1946 with that of the period in which you last 
served?
And with the professionalism of the officers today?
51. How would you rate the professionalism of the Indian military of 
today with its contemporaries in:
a) China
b) Gt. Britain
c) USSR
d) USA
52. How would you rate the professionalism of the Indian military of 
today with its contemporaries in:
a) Pakistan
b) Bangladesh
c) Sri Lanka
53. How would you rate the effectiveness and efficiency of the Indian 
political class with its contenporaries in:
a) China
b) Gt. Britain
c) USSR
d) USA
54. How would you rate the effectiveness and efficiency of the Indian 
political class with its contemporaries in:
a) Pakistan
b) Bangladesh
c) Sri Lanka
55. Ihe unrest in the Punjab continues.
a) How large a part did Central Government play in creating the 
circumstances v^ iere army action became a real possibility? (Circle one.)
NONE AT ALL— Central Government was sinply responding to events 
outside its control.
A UTILE— Central Government was somewhat negligent in its 
attention to the problems in Punjab.
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À FAIR BIT— Coîtral Government's mismanagement of events helped 
fuel the crisis.
A LOT— Central Government's bad decisions were to a great extent 
directly responsible for the deterioration of law and order.
b) was array action in Amritsar absolutely necessary? Wiy or why
not?
c) Do you think the array will eventually be called in to r^laoe 
the CRP and/or local police in establishing order? Wiy or %*y not?
Would such an action adversely affect the morale of the arm/?
Why or why not?
d) Do you think any of the current trouble in Punjab can be blamed 
on foreign support? If so, who is ultimately behind such agitation and 
why?
56. Accords granting greater powers of self-government to the states of 
Punjab and Mizoram have recently been signed. With respect to each case, 
has the Central Govemmait gone too far in acceding to the states' 
wishes? Or were these accords— when signed— necessary moves in trying to 
bring peace to these regions?
55. Punjab, Mizoram and most recently the agitation for a separate 
"Gurkhaland". Some ocraoentators see such developments as but the first 
steps towards the fragmentation of India. Are they correct— is India 
moving towards that day when the military will be the only boc^ capable 
of holding the nation together and will have to act forcefully to do so? 
Why or \f*iy not?
56. It has often been said that the armed forces of India are too 
diverse in their make-t^ and too spread out in their barracks to ever be 
enable of the ti^it coordination needed to stage a coup d'état. Do you 
agree? Why or why not?
57. What do you think are the reasons for India remaining virtually the 
only nation in the "developing world" never to have experienced a 
military take-over of government?
Hew long do you think Indian will enjoy this state of affairs?
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Civil-Mlitary Relations in British and Independent India, 1918-1962,
and Ooup Prediction Theory
AETBdX B: ÇPESITŒWMEE IT
1. Personal details:
a) Birthdate?
b) Place of birth?
c) Place of içbringing?
d) Caste?
e) Mother tongue?
f) Are you proficient in any other languages? (Please list.)
g) Which, if any, religion do you follow?
h) How often, if at all, do you observe your religion's forml rites?
i) What was your father's oociçation?
j) If retired from active military service, %Aat is your present 
occupation?
k) Would you characterize your aan economic situation as better, the 
same, or worse than that of your father's?
1) Does anyone in your immediate family own land? If so, how much, 
vhere, and of what type is it?
m) What was the extent of your formal education? (Circle one.) Also, 
where did you attend? (Please list after choices.)
Where
Secondary school oonpletion 
Bachelor's degree 
Some graduate work 
Master's degree 
Some post-graduate work 
Doctoral degree
n) How often have you voted in nationcd elections? (Circle one. )
Always Sometimes
Almost always Cnee
Most times Never
o) Have you ever beoi involved in politics and/or stood for political 
office ? If so, for vhioh party and/or where and when ? (If you or your 
family was active in the Ind^)endence movement please see question # 12) 
p) Have any members of your family been actively involved in politics 
and/or stood for political office?If so for which party and/or when and 
vhere? (If you or your family was active in the Ind^)@Tdenoe movement 
please see question # 12)
2. What was your reason(s) for joining the military? Did your choice 
meet with your family's eçjproval or disapproval?
3. Which branch of the armed forces did you join and why?
The original QuesticxTnaire II had blank spaces between the questions.
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4. Career details; (Please list the details of your military career in 
the q)aoes provided.)
Yearfs) Postings______ Promotions______ Type of troop commanded
Aotion seen (if any):
Decorations awarded (if any) :
Date of retireroent (if applicable):
5. a) What do you think was the generally perceived status of a career 
in the military when you joined?
b) What do you think was the generally perceived status of a career 
in the military when you last actively served?
c) What do you think is the generally perceived status of a career in 
the military today?
d) In the future, do you think the status of a military career will 
inprove or
decline? For what reasons?
6. What is your view of the practice of designating certain peoples as 
"martial races"?
7. Did the British practice of heavily recruiting martial races help or 
hinder overall military efficiency and/or effectiveness?
8. Vhat do you ranember as the attitude of Indian officers towards 
British officers and vice-versa in the Indian Amy of pre-Ind^)endenoe?
9. What do you remember as the attitude of the occncn man towards the 
Indian Army before Independence?
Why do you think he held this attitude?
10. What do you remember as the attitude of Indian officers towards the 
Independence movement?
And towards the politicians who led the movement?
11. 9Aat do you remember as the attitude of the Independence movement 
politicians tcnÆirds the Indian Army?
12. Were you yourself, any family members, or close frieids personally 
active in the Independence movement? If so, who, and in what ways?
13. During World War II, what do you remember of Indian officers' 
attitudes towards those officers and soldiers who joined the Indian 
National Army (INA)?
Was this attitude at all affected by the post-war trial of suspected 
INA members at the Red Port? If so, how?
14. At the time, did you feel that the political leadership was properly 
prqpared for Independence? Why or why not?
15. At the time, did you feel that the civil service was properly 
preared for Inde^ndence? Why or why not?
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16. At the time, did you feel that the armed forces were properly 
prepeired for Ind^)endenoe? Why or viiy not?
17. Did the break-tç) of the Indian Amy into the two separate armies of 
Pakistan and India affect you personally? If so, in what way(s)?
18. In the first ten years of Ind^iendaioe (1947-1957), how would you 
characterize the political leadership's attitude towards the military?
19. During this same ten year period, how would you characterize the 
senior civil service's attitude towards the military?
20. At the time, what were your feelings cn Ayub Mian's coup d'état in 
Pakistan? Was this action necessary and/or desirable?
21. At the time, were you aware of any talk or feelings either within 
the military or amongst the civilian population which viewed Ayub Khan's 
action as one which the Indian military should follow?
If so, from where were these views emanating and how strongly held 
were such beliefs?
22. What were your initieil feelings cn the appointment of Krishna Menon 
as Defence Minister?
23. Did Menon politicize the military?
If so, was it a deliberate action?
If so, for what purpose(s) was it undertaken?
24. What were your feelings cn the array career of B.M. Kaul before the 
Autumn of 1962?
Did th^ change over time and, if so, hew and wty?
25. Were you at aill personally affected by the talk of political 
favouritism at the içjper levels of the military hierarchy during Menon s 
tenure as Defaioe Minister? If so, in what way(s) and why?
26. What was your opinion on the "forward policy" deployed on the Sino- 
Indian border before October 1962?
Did your opinion of this policy change after the events of October- 
November 1962?
27. How large a part do you think public opinion played in shewing the 
evaTts leading up to the Chinese attckok in October 1962?
Was their influæce, if any, to the benefit or detrimæt of India's 
security?
28. Various ooraoaentators have explained the Indian reverses suffered 
against the Chinese in October-November 1962, in terras of a failure in 
any number of areas; for example: Political leadership. Intelligence, 
Military leadership. Field officers, The jawan, Ihe standard of 
equipment and/or suitable training.
What is your explanation? Were any or all of the above at fault? 
Which of the above groups acquitted themselves best before and during
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Oc±ober-November 1962? Which of the above grcitçs acquitted themselves 
worst during this period? How and why?
29. What did you feel was the typical field officer's attitude towards 
the military chiefs in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian conflict?
30. What did you feel was the public's attitude towards the military in 
the aftermath of the Sino-Indian conflict?
And the public's attitude towards the political leadership?
31. What did you feel was the political leadership's attitude towards 
the military in the aftermath of the Sino-Indian conflict?
And the military's attitude towards the political leadership?
32. At the time, were you aware of any talk car feelings either within 
the military or amongst the civilian population which spcke of moving 
against the govemmaat?
If so, from where were such views emanating and how strongly held 
were they?
33. "After Ifâiru, vdio?" was a much discassed question in the early 
1960's...Was the military at all apprdiensive about the possibility of 
mass public disorder after Jawaharlal H^mi's death? Did it feel that it 
mi^it be called in to ensure public order?
34. Did you think that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was justified in 
declaring Bnergency?
Why car v*y  not?
35. Did you feel that the Indian military approved or disapproved of 
Bnergency?
Was this a unanimous view amongst senior and junicar officers, car 
were there differences of opinicxi within the armed fcaroes?
If you think the latter true, what were the different opinions and 
which quarters held them and why?
36. When it was first declared, how long did you think the Bnergency 
would endure?
a) How long do you think it could have endured and why?
37. Did your opinican cn the Bnergency change during its duration? If so, 
hew and why?
38. Why do you think Indira Gandhi called elections?
a) Did you feel that, win or lose, Indira Gandhi would abide by the 
result of the election?
39. After losing the elections of 1977, seme cccmentatars thought that 
either Indira Gandhi would call on the military to forcibly ke^ her in 
offiœ, or that some military officers would act to ke^ her in office. 
Were any military officers who would have obeyed such an order from the 
P.M.? Or were there were any officers who would cxauncil her to remain in 
office?
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40. What is the military's attitude towards internal policing actions? 
Are they beneficial or detrimental to army efficiency?
a) Have there been any instances of internal policing actions which 
you felt were particularly appreciate and/or necessary?
b) Have there beai any actions which were inappropriate and/or 
unnecessary?
41. What is the military's attitude tov^rds such paramilitary 
organizations as the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Oaitred. Reserve 
Police Force (CRPF)— do they help or hinder the effectiveness of the 
military in defending the nation's borders?
a) Hew would you compare the level of professionalism found in the 
BSF and CRPF with that of the amy, navy and air force?
42. looking at the defaioe budget.. .Do you think the absolute level of 
defence e^ qjenditure too hi^, about right, or too low for:
Oonments
a) the mid-1950s?
b) the mid-1960s?
c) the mid-1970s?
d) today?
43. mdia today faces the possibility of Pakistan acquiring nuclear 
we j^ons...
a) Do you think Pakistan is indeed intent on acquiring a nuclear 
arsenal and, if so, will she succeed?
b) Should India develop her own nuclear weaponry: only if Pakistan 
gets the bomb first; before Pakistan does; or regardless of whether 
Pakistan does or does not acquire the bomb? Why?
c) If India does decide to develop nuclear we^ xsns, who will have 
pushed hardest for their development: the military; Central Government; 
the public; or foreign powers? Why?
d) If India decides not to develop nuclear weapons, who will have 
pushed hardest against their acquisition: the military; Central 
Government; the public; or foreign powers? For what reasons?
44. Since the first years of Independence, India has officially been 
pursuing a foreign polioy of nonalignment.. .Has this policy increased or 
decreased India's security in:
Comments
a) the mid-1950s?
b) the mid-1960s?
c) the mid-1970s?
d) today?
45. At the time, did you think the 1971 signing of the 20-year Treaty of 
Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between India and the Soviet Union 
would be beneficial or detrimental to India's security?
And would be beneficial or detrimaital to India's armed forces?
a) Have your feelings on the above treaty changed since 1971? If so, 
how and why?
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46. India has lately been pursuing a policy of diversifying the 
countries frcm viiich it purchases arms, turning more often to Western 
suppliers...
a) Is this policy beneficial or detrimental to India's security ? 
Why or why not ?
b) Is this policy beneficial or detrimentcd to the effectiveness of 
the Indian military? Why or why not?
47. Since you first joined the military, have the backgrounds—  
geogr^ iiiccil, social and économie— of incoming officers changed? If so, 
how?
Has this affected the quality of the officer corps? For better or 
worse?
48. How would compare the level of professionalism of the Indian Amy 
officer of 1946 with that of the period in vAioh you last served?
And with the professionalism of the officers today?
49. Since you first joined the military, have the backgrounds—  
geographical, social and economic— of incoming jawans changed? If so, 
how?
Has this affected the quality of the fi^iting man?
50. How would you rate the professional 1 sm of the Indian armed forces 
with their ccntarporaries in:
India's is... Far Hi(#ier/Hiçher/B%uAl/IoweF/mA Irwer 
Oonments
a) China / / / /
b) Gt.Britain / / / /
c) USSR / / / /
d) USA / / / /
e) Pakistan / / / /
f) Bangladesh / / / /
g) Sri Lanka / / / /
51. How would you rate the effectiveness of the Indian politicsd class 
with its ccntarporaries in:
India's is... Far Hiaher/Hicher/ngual/Tjower/Much Lower 
Coranents
a) China
b) Gt.Britain
c) USSR
d) USA
e) Pakistan
f) Bai^ladesh
g) Sri Lanka
52. How would you rate the efficiency of the Indian senior civil service 
with its contenporaries in:
India's is... Far Hicher/Hicher/Fgual/rrwRr/Much Lower 
Oonments
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/ / / /
/ / / /
/ / / /
/ / / /
/ / / /
/ / / /
/ / / /
a) China / / / /
b) Gt.Britain / / / /
c) USSR / / / /
d) USA / / / /
e) Pakistan / / / /
f ) Bangladesh / / / /
g) Sri Lanka / / / /
53. The unrest in the Punjab continues...
a) Hew large a part did Central Government pl^ in creating the 
circumstances vAere amy action became a real possibility? (Circle one.)
NCNE AT ALL— Central Government was sinply resending to events 
outside its control.
A Lrni£— Central Government was somewhat negligent in its 
attention to the problems in Punjab.
A FAIR BIT— Central Government's mismanagement of events helped 
fuel the crisis.
A LOT— Caitral Govemmait's bad decisions were to a great extent 
directly responsible for the deterioration of law and order.
b) Was amy action in Amritsar absolutely necessary? Why or ^ Ay
not?
c) Do you think the amy will eventually be called in to r^laoe 
the CRP and/or loccd police in establishing order? Vty or why not?
Would suoh an action adversely affect the morale of the amy? 
Why or why not?
d) Did the isolated outbreaks of troop mutinies which followed 
Operation Blue Star affect ethnic relations within the military? If so, 
has the change promoted better efforts at understanding different groups 
or increased prejudice?
e) Can any of the current trouble in Punjab can be blamed on 
foreign support? If so, who is ultimately behind such agitation and why?
54. Punjab, Mizoram and most recently the acptation for a separate 
"Gurkhaland”...Some cocmentators see such developments as the first 
steps towards the fragmentation of India. Are they correct— is India 
moving towards a day whai the military will be the only body enable of 
holding the nation together and will have to act forcefully to do so?
Why or vhy not?
55. India remains virtually the only nation in the "developing world” 
never to have eoperienoed a military take-over of government...
a) Which of the following reascns do you think have contributed to 
this enviable state of affairs? (Please rank in order of significance, 
with ”1” being the most irportant. If you feel that any item is 
relatively insignificant, cross it out. Feel free to add your own 
choices under "OTHER”.)
 A. Administrative efficiency
 B. Diversity of pecples, cultures, languages
 C. Dominant Hindu culture inherently against military rule
 D. Example of ineffectiveness of military rule in Pakistan and
Bangladesh
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 E. 40-year old habit of democracy
 F. Ind^)endence struggle's non-violent nature
 G. Initial political stability, quality and/or democratic form
 H. Institutionalization of diverse centres of power
 I. Logistics unfavourable— five regional anny corananders, troops
spread out over country, etc.
 J. Nationally representative military personnel
 K. Political awareness of masses
 L. Political unawareness of masses
 M. Professionalism of armed forces
 N. Sheer size of India
 O. Widely-4ield belief in democracy
 P. Wisdom and stature of national leaders
 Q . OIHER
b) Do you foresee any circumstances that might change this state of 
affairs?
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Civil-Military Relations in British and Independent India. 1918-1962
and CC3UP Prediction Hheorv
APPENDIX C: MTT.TTARY CFTTCHl rKTATTg
a) Answered a questionnaire and interviewed.
b) Answered a questionnaire only.
c) Interviewed only.
d) Grand Total.
Army Officers Naval Officers
a) Answered a questionnaire and interviewed.
Air Force Officers
00 General
08 Lieut.-General 
04 Major-General 
03 Brigadier
01 Colonel
01 Lieut.-Colonel
01 Admiral 
01 Vice Admiral 
00 Rear Admiral 
00 Oonmodore 
00 Captain 
00 Commander
03 Air Chief Marshal 
02 Air Marshal 
00 Air Vice Marshal 
00 Air Commodore 
00 Groiç) Captain 
00 Wing Commander
17 Any 02 Navy 05 Air Force
24 Total
b) Answered a questionnaire only.
00 General
12 Lieut.-General
13 Major-General 
35 Brigadier
01 Colonel
03 Lieut.-Colonel
00 Admiral 
02 Vice Admiral 
00 Rear Admiral 
00 Commodore 
00 Captain 
00 Commander
00 Air Chief Marshal 
02 Air Marshal 
00 Air Vice Marshal
00 Air Commodore 
02 Group C^tain
01 Wing Commander
01 Anonyncus (Amy)
65 Amy 02 Navy 05 Air Force
72 Total
c) Interviewed only.
00 General
04 Lieut.-General 
03 Major-General
01 Brigadier
00 Colonel
01 Lieut.-Colonel
01 Admiral 
01 Vice Admiral
00 Rear Admiral
01 Commodore 
00 Captain 
00 Commander
00 Air Chief Marshal 
00 Air Marshal 
00 Air Vice Marshal 
00 Air Commodore 
00 Groqp Captain 
00 Wing Coaomander
09 Amy 03 Navy 00 Air
12 Total
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d) Gtand Total.
00 General 
24 Lient.-General 
20 Major-Goieral 
39 Brigadier 
02 Oolcxiel 
05 Lient. -Colonel
00 Major 
00 Gs Æ^ain 
00 Lieutenant
00 2nd-Lientenant
01 Anonymous (Army)
02 Admiral 
04 Vice Admiral
00 Rear Admiral
01 Ocumodore 
00 Captain 
00 commander
00 Lient.-Commander 
00 Lieutenant 
00 Sub-Lieutenant 
00 Midshipaan
03 Air Chief Marshal
04 Air Marshcil
00 Air Vice Marshal
00 Air Ocmmodore 
02 Group Captain
01 Wing Commander
00 Squadron Leader 
00 Fli^it Lieutenant 
00 Flying Officer 
00 Pilot Officer
91 Anny
108 Total Officers
07 Navy 10 Air Faroe
A further note on the questiaonaire/iixterview sanple:
In total, 96 senior retired Indian armed forces' officers replied to 412 
questionnaires p o s te d from the UK. This 23.30% response rate is 
statistically significant, especially given the officers' random 
selection (described in the Introduction text and footnote #17) and 
their having received the questionnaire "cold" (i.e., with no prior 
solicitations from nyself). This response rate is also significant 
because p ro fe s s io n a l officers are unusually reluctant to discuss 
sensitive civil-military topics. Nonetheless, the written replies of the 
questionnai re respondents were both frank and expansive.
Of the 36 officers interviewed face-to-face, 24 previously had 
answered a questionnaire vhile 12 had not. The first group were selected 
because their questionnaire responses were usually interesting and/or 
eloquent. The second set were chosen after being recotimended by the 
first. All interviewees were forthright and voluble in their answers.
There arises a question of bias in that, given the sensitive nature 
of Tty research, officers willing to answer a questionnaire and/or submit 
to interview may form a non-representative "liberal" wing of the Indian 
military. Although this argument may have some basis, I renain confident 
that the above sanple accurately represents their peers: retired 
officers are both more able and likely to speak candidly of their 
attitudes to civil-military issues than are serving officers; a nunber 
of interviewees were selected because their questionnai re replies 
notably differed from those of their comrades; in Chapter Six the 
respondents ' religious mix was shown to reflect the variety found in the 
military as a vhole; and all opinions were checked against other sources 
where possible. Finally, whether having attended Sandhurst, Woolwich, 
Cranwell or the IMA, the officers of the Indian Amy, Navy and Air Force 
who served during 1918-1962 were trained to display the professional 
attributes of the British ideal of "officers and gentlemen". Chief among 
these was just the respectful, non-political, "liberal" attitude towards 
civil supremacy-of-rule consistently displayed by the sanple of 
questionnaire respondents and/or interviewees.
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and Coup Prediction Theory
A*
APFQOIX D: MILITARY OEFICSi INIBR/IEW DEEMT-S
Rank Number Place Date
a) Xntervieued as a foUow^qp to answering a qoestLcmaire.
Air Chief Marshal 1 New Delhi 09 September 1987
Vice A±niral 2 Bombay 07 October 1987
Air Marshal 3 Ifeia Delhi 04 September 1987
Lieut.-General 4 Pune 12 October 1987
Air Marshal 5 New Delhi 17 August 1989
Lieut.-General 10 Patna 29 September 1989
Air Chief Ifarshal 12 Pune 11 October 1987
Lieut.-General 16 New Delhi 03 September 1987
Lieut.-Gaieral 17 London 27 November 1988
Air Chief Marshal 18 New Delhi 03 September 1987
Lieut.-General 19 New Delhi 10 September 1987
Brigadier 22 New Delhi Summer 1986, 1987
Lieut.-General 23 New Delhi 06 September 1987
Colonel 24 New Delhi 12 September 1987
Lieut.-Colonel 25 Richmond Sumner 1987
Brigadier (Jbstioe) 47 New Delhi 20 August 1989
Admiral 58 Gurgoan 28 August 1989
Brigadier 69 Pune 09 December 1989
Major-General 74 New Delhi 21 August 1989
Major-General 75 New Delhi 14 August 1989
Major-General 85 New Delhi 16 August 1989
Major-General 89 New Delhi 18 August 1989
Lieut.-General 94 New Delhi 15 August 1989
Liait.-General 95 New Delhi 13 September 1989
24 Total
b) Interviewed only.
Ifejor-General 97 Noida 15 September 1989
Brigadier 98 New Delhi 15 Sept 1987, 21 Aug 1989
Commodore 99 Bombay 06 October 1987
Lieut.-General 100 New Delhi 09 September 1989
Lieut.-General 101 New Delhi 18 August 1989
Lieut.-Colonel 102 New Delhi 15 September 1987
Vice Admiral 103 New Delhi 18 September 1987
Major-General 104 London 24 June 1988
Ifejor-General 105 New Delhi 11 September 1987
Admiral 106 New Delhi 17 September 1987
Lieut.-General 107 New Delhi 20 Sq*ember 1987
Lieut.-General 108 Meerut 14 September 1989
12 Total
36 Grand Total Interviewees
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Civil-Military Relations in British and Independent India. 1918-1962
and Cnup Prpdictign Theory
AFFBDIX E: CIVILIAN IN1ÏKVIEW rKPATT^ q
Title Number Place Date
Defence Journalist Mr. Cl New Delhi 13 Sœtenber 1989
International affairs expesrt Mr. 02 New Delhi 21 August 1989
Professor C3 New Delhi 11 September 1989
Ex-Principal Defaioe Secretary C4 New Delhi 04 September 1989
Ex-Defence Secretary Mr. C5 New Delhi 14 August 1989
Ex-officer Dr. C6 Pune 12 October 1987
Ex-Governor Mr. C7 N ^  Delhi 13 August 1989
Indian defence expert Mr. C8 Cambridge 15 May 1988
08 Total Civilian Interviewees
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Civil-Mlitarv Relations in British and Independent Trriia^  1918-1962,
and Ooup Prediction Theory
AE¥QC)1X F: TABLE 0.1 nPFMTfi
Which of the following factors have oontrituted to India 
never having eaqierienoed a military cotç)?
Ranked by the questionnaire respondents in order of irportanoe.
(A) Administrative efficiency.
(B) Diversity of peoples, cultures, languages.
(C) Dominant Hindu culture inherently against military rule.
(D) Ebcanple of ineffectiveness of military rule in Pakistan and
Bangladesh.
(E) 40-year old habit of democracy.
(F) Indepoidenoe struggle's non-violait nature,
(G) Initial political stability, quality and/or democratic rule.
(H) Institutionalization of diverse centres of power.
(I) Logistics unfavourable: five regional amy cccraands, troops
dispersed nationally, etc.
(J) Nationally r^resentative military personnel.
(K) Political awareness of masses.
(L) Political unawareness of masses.
(M) Professionalism of armed forces.
(N) Sheer size of India.
(O) Widely-held belief in democracy.
(P) Wisdom and stature of national leaders.
(Q) Other.
Respondents 
28-96 only
Factors with rankings
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
0
0
0
3
4
13 
0
14 
12
9
0
11
9
13
0
0
0
10
(B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N) (0) (P) (Q)
3 4 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 10 6 1 9 8 7 12 11 2 0 14 4 13 15 0
3 0 7 9 1 5 0 12 6 0 0 2 10 8 11 0
1 10 12 7 11 13 9 4 5 14 17 2 3 8 16 6‘
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
10 4 6 8 9 7 11 15 3 12 0 1 2 5 13 0
2 15 9 7 14 13 11 8 3 4 0 1 5 6 10 0
10 5 7 11 12 2 3 8 6 15 16 4 13 14 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0
7 1 14 10 12 5 6 9 4 2 0 3 13 8 15 0
6 0 7 0 0 10 1 4 5 0 0 8 3 11 12 2“
5 9 14 2 15 4 11 6 8 12 0 1 7 3 10 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 2 0 0 4 3 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
5 3 0 8 9 4 
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7 0 0 0 6 1 2 11 0 0
46 11 7 13 2 1 12 3 8 10 14 6 16 15 5 4 9 IT
47 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
48 0 2 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0
49 0 9 0 8 7 13 5 10 0 2 11 0 3 0 4 12 1,6“
50 0 2 4 0 0 0 5 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
51 6 2 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 3 0 0 0
52 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0
53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 3 0 0 0
54 9 1 11 0 2 15 14 13 3 4 12 8 5 6 7 10 0
55 11 5 0 10 9 0 1 0 7 3 5 0 2 12 4 0 13*
56 9 1 0 8 0 0 0 3 3 5 0 0 5 7 0 0 2*
57 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
58 10 3 15 12 13 9 1 5 14 8 7 0 4 2 11 6 0
59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
60 6 8 0 11 5 0 4 10 13 2 12 14 1 9 3 7 0
61 2 8 0 6 13 11 1 7 14 5 4 0 3 12 9 10 0
62 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
63 7 5 0 0 8 3 4 0 0 9 2 0 11 12 6 1 lOP
64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
65 0 1 2 0 0 0 8 9 5 4 0 6 3 0 0 7 0
66 0 1 0 7 6 0 10 11 2 3 8 0 4 5 9 12 0
67 0 1 5 0 0 0 2 0 6 4 0 0 3 7 0 0 0
68 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 2 3 0 0
69 0 3 0 4 8 0 5 9 2 6 0 0 1 7 0 0 0
70 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
71 0 1 0 2 4 0 0 8 0 6 7 0 0 5 3 0 0
72 5 4 7 9 0 0 1 0 8 2 0 0 6 3 0 0 0
73 15 1 5 8 11 10 9 6 7 4 12 3 13 2 14 16 1®
74 10 0 4 8 6 0 5 9 0 7 2 0 3 11 0 1 0
75 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
76 5 0 0 0 3 0 1 6 0 0 4 0 0 0 2 0 0
77 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 9 5 3 0 0 1 5 7 7 0
78 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
79 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0
80 0 4 0 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0
81 0 2 10 0 0 0 8 9 3 4 0 6 5 1 7 0 0
82 0 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
83 5 6 0 10 9 8 7 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 4 0
84 12 2 0 0 10 9 4 8 7 1 12 0 3 6 5 11 0
85 7 5 0 9 6 0 8 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 0 3 r
86 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
87 1 7 4 0 0 0 3 5 9 8 0 0 10 6 0 2 0
88 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 6 7 0 4 0 0 0 0
89 15 5 2 16 8 6 12 9 7 1 11 14 4 10 3 12 ir
90 11 7 0 6 10 5 9 12 0 4 0 3 1 2 0 8 0
91 4 3 10 0 6 5 7 0 13 2 11 0 1 8 9 12 0
92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
93 5 9 0 0 1 0 2 10 12 11 6 0 3 8 4 7 0
94 0 3 1 8 7 0 5 0 0 6 0 0 7 2 9 4 0
95 0 7 3 0 0 0 2 0 6 4 0 0 1 0 5 0 0
96 0 6 4 10 0 7 3 9 0 2 11 0 1 8 0 0 0
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N) (O) (P) (Q)
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Mtnber of 1st- to 5th-plaoe rankings
(A) (B) 
First's:
(C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N) (0) (P) (Q)
3 17 
Second's:
4 1 5 3 7 2 0 5 3 0 18 4 4 6 4
1 7 
Third's:
2 2 2 0 5 1 2 7 4 0 10 10 1 1 2
1 7 
Fourth's:
3 0 1 1 7 3 3 6 0 2 10 7 5 2 0
2 4 
Fifth's:
7 2 1 1 6 0 3 9 3 1 7 1 4 2 0
4 6 3 2 2 2 7 4 3 4 1 0 3 5 3 0 0
Total 11 38 18 7 10 7 31 10 10 30 11 3 46 27 16 11 6
Final rankings
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N) (O) (P) (Q) 
8 2 6 14 11 14 3 11 11 4 8 17 1 5 7 8 16
"Absence of unified ocnmand of the three services".
® "Non-emergence of a charismatic leader amongst the armed forces".
<= "Lack of prc^ Der communications".
® 1) "Aàoinistrative inheritance of the anry from British Army culture 
and even earlier". 6) "Wisdom of the best army leaders in the past and 
present".
* "Repeated utterance of Mahatma Gandhi and evai by all leaders cn 
'Panchayat Raj'".
' "No military leader of enoo^ stature, universally loved and 
respected, universally known, whom all, or a majority, would follow".
® "Recèle of India consider it [an apolitical amy] a challenge".
® "Loyalty to service rather than the nation as instilled by Britain".
 ^ "British tradition of the military subordinating itself to the 
government in power".
 ^ "Preoccupation of [the] military leadership in rebuilding the forces 
while carrying cut a perpetual confrontation with neighbouring countries 
Pakistan and China".
NGOE: Wei^ïting the rankings (e.g. 1st = 9pts., 2nd = 6pts., 3rd =
4pts., 4th = 2pts., and 5th = Ipt.) only affects the minor positions.
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N) (O) (P) (Q)
PTS; 45 237 74 27 65 10 140 40 33 133 58 10 276 131 73 72 48
RANK: 12 2 6 15 9 16 3 13 14 4 10 16 1 5 7 8 11
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